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ABSTRACT 
 
 This dissertation is a history of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  Passed by Congress in 1971, it set the national suffrage age at 
eighteen for all state and federal elections.  It remains the last federal amendment 
to broaden voting rights and the most quickly ratified amendment to the 
Constitution.  Those few scholars who have written about the 18-vote law uniformly 
explain that it emerged as recompense for patriotic duty; i.e. if teenagers were old 
enough to fight for America in Vietnam, they were also old enough to vote in U.S. 
elections.  This dissertation agrees that young Americans certainly deserved 
enfranchisement.  It argues, however, that youth earned suffrage not as a reward 
for their public service but in recognition of their personal aptitude and political 
gumption.  Beginning during World War II, federal lawmakers offered legislation to 
set eighteen as the national age of enfranchisement.  In the 1960s, public support 
for the 18-vote swelled as young people challenged authoritarian institutions and 
orthodox values.  Creative legislative maneuvering by a small group of dedicated 
congressmen managed to extend suffrage to 18-year-olds through an amendment to 
the Voting Rights Act of 1970.  They steered the rider through a skeptical Congress 
by persuading their colleagues that adolescents were capable of mature deliberation 
and beneficial civic involvement.  In an era when generational revolution appeared 
iii 
 
a real possibility, many legislators believed formally melding youths into the 
electoral fold would be a tenable way to sustain sociopolitical order.  However, other 
lawmakers thought establishing youth suffrage via statute violated the 
Constitution.  In 1970, the Supreme Court ruled in Oregon v. Mitchell that 
Congress could only regulate voting ages in federal elections and not for state or 
local polls.   Congress reversed the Court’s decision by passing the Twenty-Sixth 
Amendment.  After nearly thirty years of gestation, the 18-vote measure sailed 
through the Article V ratification process in record time – a mere 100 days – to 
become law in July 1971.  Passage of the amendment induced state governments to 
lower the basic age of legal majority to eighteen for most ventures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DEDICATION 
 
 
 
To my parents, Dennis and LaDonna, for their love, my life,  
and a red stick 
 
To my children, Madeleine and Jack, for their love and patience  
while Daddy was in the basement 
 
To my wife, Susan, for her love, encouragement, inspiration,  
and red pen 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 
 No man is an island, and I could not have completed this dissertation without 
the aid and succor of many people.  Thanking them for their generous aid and 
support is one of the happy pleasures of completing this dissertation.  The History 
Department of the University of Mississippi charitably provided a travel grant in 
fall 1997 that launched the research.  My employer, East Central College in Union, 
Missouri, kindly granted a semester sabbatical so I could advance my work.  
Thanks to the staffs of the J.D. Williams Library at the University of Mississippi, 
the Mercantile Library at the University of Missouri-St. Louis, the Ellis Library at 
the University of Missouri-Columbia, the John M. Olin and Law Libraries at 
Washington University, the Bentley Historical Library at the University of 
Michigan, the Hargrett Rare Book and Manuscript Collection and Richard B. 
Russell Library for Political Research and Studies at the University of Georgia, the 
University Archives and Records Center at the University of Louisville, the Birch 
Bayh Senatorial Collection at the Indiana University, the Gerald R. Ford 
Presidential Library at the University of Michigan, and the Harry S Truman 
Presidential Library in Independence, Missouri for their assistance.  I extend 
special thanks to Dr. Robert Florian of Salem International University in Salem, 
West Virginia.  He was a most gracious host to the Jennings Randolph Papers.  I 
vi 
 
am immensely grateful for the generous access he allowed.  
I extend sincere thanks to Dr. Charles Eagles.  He initiated my research 
interest in the Twenty-Sixth Amendment by suggesting that an amateurish 
research essay held the potential to become a dissertation topic.  His patient 
prodding and firm, but kind, words over the years motivated me to liberate myself 
from the desert of A.B.D. status.  Most especially, I thank him for encouraging me 
to become and teaching me how to be a historian.  The lessons he imparted inside of 
class and in personal conversations have shaped my approach to this profession.  I 
try, as they say, to “pay forward” those lessons each day to my own students.  If I 
have one-tenth the impact on them that Dr. Eagles had me, I will consider my 
career a success. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................... ii 
 
DEDICATION ............................................................................................................... iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................ v 
 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 
 
THE TYRANNY OF THE (LEGAL) MAJORITY:  ADOLESCENCE, 
     ADULTOCRACY, AND VOTING AGES ............................................................... 14 
 
WAR, YOUTH, AND SUFFRAGE, 1940-1945 ........................................................... 43 
 
CITIZEN OR OUTLIER: TEENAGERS AND SUFFRAGE, 1945-1960 ................. 152 
 
LIBERALS, YOUTH, AND THE 18-VOTE, 1960-1971 ........................................... 265 
 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................... 375 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................... 393 
 
VITA ........................................................................................................................... 428 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Section 1.  The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age 
or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State 
on account of age. 
 
Section 2.  The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation. 
        Twenty-Sixth Amendment1 
 
 
 
On 1 July 1971, the headline of the New York Times, America’s paper of 
record, blared in bold, thick print the thrilling end to a remarkable legal fracas:  the 
Supreme Court declared the Times could resume publishing the top-secret Pentagon 
Papers.  The Court’s ruling halted the first ever attempt by the federal government 
to restrain the publication of a newspaper in American history.  The Times 
justifiably trumpeted the decision and the paper’s role in defending a free press.  
The other front-page news fit to print that day received more modest coverage.  
Below the fold, tucked between stories about political bribery in New Orleans and 
military pay raises, the Times conveyed the approval of a twenty-sixth amendment  
to the United States Constitution.2  The Times had not, of course, overlooked the 
                                                          
1 The words of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment can be readily found in any source that 
contains the text of the United States Constitution.  The amendment appears officially in 85 Stat. 
825. 
2 R.W. Apple, Jr., “The States Ratify Full Vote at 18,” New York Times, 1 July 1971, p. 1.  
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amendment, but it appeared overshadowed by the sensational splash of the 
Pentagon Papers ruling.  The Times’s plain reporting of what would typically be 
historic news – the most quickly ratified of all the federal amendments – made 
passage of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment appear underwhelming.  The ordinary 
coverage of its ratification accurately encapsulated the public’s relative indifference 
to its enactment yet ignored the remarkable circumstances that led to its 
establishment of eighteen as America’s uniform voting age.3 
The debate over reducing the national voting age from 21 to 18 began quietly 
during the Civil War.  It ebbed thereafter until it captured the public’s attention 
during World War II. Between 1942 and 1970, congressmen filed hundreds of bills 
calling for a lowered voting age; in 1969 alone, over 60 resolutions were introduced.  
Only one, in 1954, resulted in any action, and it failed to pass the Senate.  Despite 
public support from presidents Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, Lyndon 
Johnson, and Richard Nixon, efforts to establish a federal suffrage age remained 
stalled.  A handful of states, however, moved to lower their official voting ages, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
The article contains an error made in the process of trying to complete the story by deadline.  Apple 
reported that Ohio became the last state necessary to ratify the Twenty-Sixth Amendment when its 
legislature approved the proposal on 30 June 1971. Ratification of the amendment was actually 
completed when North Carolina’s legislature voted its approval early on 1 July, just before 
Oklahoma endorsed it.  The Administrator of the General Services Administration (the person duly 
charged with officially validating alterations to the United States Constitution and U.S. legal code) 
confirmed the authoritative ratification timeline on 5 July 1971 upon President Richard Nixon’s 
certification of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment.  See 36 Fed. Reg. 12725 and The Constitution of the 
United States of America:  Analysis and Interpretation, Rev. ed,   (Washington, D.C.:  Government 
Printing Office, 1973), p. 44. 
 
3  U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Ratification of Amendments to 
the U.S. Constitution, by David C. Huckabee, CRS Report 97-922 GOV, (30 September 1997), p. 4.  
Huckabee determines that, excluding the 27th, the average number of days for ratifying 
constitutional amendments is 617.   
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including Georgia, Kentucky, Alaska, and Hawaii.4  
Not until the late 1960s did Congress address youth suffrage seriously.  In 
1970, Congress approved an extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that 
included a provision providing 18-year-olds franchise privileges in federal, state, 
and local elections.5  The Supreme Court ruled at the end of 1970 that Congress did 
not have the power to extend suffrage via statute or to stipulate minimum voting 
ages in state or local elections.6  The decision meant that 18-to-20-year-olds would 
be allowed to vote for president and vice president in the upcoming 1972 election 
but not for state or local officials. The Court’s verdict posed a dreadful quandary for 
the states:  how to create and finance a dual ballot system for federal and all other 
elections.7   
Faced with potential election-day confusion and the extra expenses of 
complicated voting mechanics, the states appealed to Congress for legislative relief.  
Congress responded in March 1971 by approving a constitutional amendment 
prohibiting the denial of voting rights to all American citizens age eighteen and 
older.8  State legislatures rushed to sanction the proposal; by July, the necessary 
                                                          
4 Georgia and Kentucky set the voting age at 18; Alaska, 19; and Hawaii, 20. 
 
5 Title 3, 84 Stat. 318, 42 U.S.C. § 1973bb. 
 
6 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). 
 
7 See U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Constitutional 
Amendments, Lowering the Voting Age to 18:  A Fifty-State Survey of the Costs and Other Problems 
of Dual-Age Voting, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., (Washington, D.C.:  Government Printing Office, 1971). 
 
8 S.J. Res. 7, 92nd Cong., 1st sess. (1971). On 10 March 1971, the Senate passed an 18-vote 
joint resolution, which the House of Representative approved on 23 March – the day the Twenty-
Sixth Amendment was sent to the states for ratification.  
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three-fourths of states (or 38) needed to ratify an amendment proposed by Congress 
had done so.  On 5 July 1971, President Nixon signed the Twenty-Sixth Amendment 
into law after Ronald L. Kunzig, head of the General Services Administration, 
declared it ratified.9    
The Twenty-Sixth Amendment remains the last federal amendment to 
broaden voting rights, but it has attracted slight academic interest.  Only one full 
monograph has chronicled its history.10  Most descriptions of the Twenty-Sixth 
Amendment occur as token asides in larger volumes of history or political science.11  
Several commonly-used monographs covering the history of the 1960s either ignore 
it altogether or mention it in passing;12 one mistakenly labeled it the “Thirty-Sixth 
                                                          
9 New York Times, 6 July 1971, p. 1.  No story accompanied the photo.  On 7 July 1971, the 
Administrator of General Services published the certifying statement that the amendment had 
become valid.  See F.R. Doc. 71-9691 and 36 F.R. 12725.  
 
10 Wendell W. Cultice, Youth’s Battle for the Ballot: A History of Voting Age in America (New 
York:  Greenwood Press, 1992).  The book’s title is somewhat misleading because it is more of a 
descriptive, blow-by-blow narrative detailing federal and state 18-vote proposals than an analysis of 
voting age in America.   
 
11 For example, see Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard 
University Press 1991), 91; George Anastaplo, The Amendments to the Constitution:  A Commentary 
(Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 221-223; Richard B. Bernstein with Jerome 
Agel, Amending America:  If We Love the Constitution So Much, We Do We Keep Trying to Change 
It? (New York:  Times Books, 1993), 138-139; Alan P. Grimes, Democracy and the Amendments to 
the Constitution (Lexington, MA:  Lexington Books, 1978), 141-147; Alexander Keyssar, The Right to 
Vote:  The Contested History of Democracy in the United States, (New York:  Basic Books, 2000), 
277-281; David E. Kyvig, Explicit and Authentic Acts:  Amending the U.S. Constitution, 1776-1995 
(Lawrence, KS:  University Press of Kansas, 1996), 363-368; Judith Shklar, American Citizenship:  
The Quest for Inclusion (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1991), 17-19; and Clement E. 
Vose, Constitutional Change:  Amendment Politics and Supreme Court Litigation since 1900 
(Lexington, MA:  Lexington Books, 1972), 357-359. 
 
12 For instance, see Terry H. Anderson, The Movement and the Sixties:  Protest in America 
from Greensboro to Wounded Knee (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1995); William Chafe, The 
Unfinished Journey:  America Since World War II, 7th edition, (New York:  Oxford University Press, 
2010);  David Farber, The Age of Great Dreams:  America in the 1960s (New York:  Hill and Wang, 
1994); Todd Gitlin, The Sixties:  Years of Hope, Days of Rage (New York:  Bantam, 1993); and James 
T. Patterson, Grand Expectations:  The United States, 1945-1974 (New York:  Oxford University 
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Amendment.”13  There are some clear reasons why the amendment has been a 
neglected research subject.  It is not considered a major moment in American 
history (like the ratification of the Constitution), a legislative turning point (like the 
Social Security Act of 1935), an essential amendment (like the Fourteenth) or a 
critical civic law (like the Voting Rights Act of 1965).     Establishing a national 
voting age never became a cause célèbre like women’s suffrage, nor did youth 
suffrage ever reach the level of “movement” akin to other civil rights ventures.  
Until the late 1960s, the 18-vote issue garnered little sustained interest, and, 
mirroring the public’s apparent indifference, politicians viewed the matter as of 
marginal legislative importance.  Lowering the voting age also became 
overshadowed by other contemporary concerns involving young people, such as the 
Cold War, Vietnam, the civil rights movement, juvenile delinquency, and the 
counterculture.  Understandably, scholars have given more consideration to 
subjects deemed more consequential or dramatic.    
The lack of a rich historiography has engendered a uniform explanation of 
why the Twenty-Sixth Amendment was ratified.  The consensus asserts, as 
Alexander Keyssar summarizes, that “were it not for the war in Vietnam, the voting 
age still might be twenty-one.”14 Youth suffrage advocates reckoned that if young 
men were old enough to be drafted to fight and die in Vietnam, then they should be 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Press, 1996). 
 
13  Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin, America Divided:  The Civil War of the 1960s (New 
York:  Oxford University Press, 2000), 281. 
 
14 Keyssar, The Right to Vote, 318.  
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old enough to choose the public officials responsible for making war policy.  
Proponents of the 18-vote often cited the selfless sacrifice of young citizen-soldiers to 
justify a claim for enfranchisement.  Other supporters emphasized the obvious 
unfairness of demanding compulsory military service from disfranchised youths.  
Historians rarely concur when analyzing events, but the “old enough to fight, old 
enough to vote” thesis remains the ubiquitous interpretation of the Twenty-Sixth 
Amendment.15 
The portrayal of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment as the reflexive legislative 
spawn of uncomplicated circumstances oversimplifies why Congress established and 
the public accepted youth suffrage. Moreover, its slender historiography neglects 
the thirty-year gap between its initial offering during World War II and eventual 
ratification in 1971.  The focus of this dissertation is to explain that delay.  It argues 
that establishing eighteen as the national voting age was deferred until adults 
acknowledged adolescents as autonomous, rational decision-makers capable of 
giving electoral consent.  Youth earned voting rights not as a reward for their public 
                                                          
15 For example, see Cultice, Youth’s Battle for the Ballot; Keyssar, The Right to Vote, pp. 
277-281;  Solomon Montoya, “The Formulation and Ratification of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment”  
(Ph.D. Dissertation, New York University, 1973); Samia J. Amamoo, “The Legal Struggles to Gain 
Americans the Right to Vote,” Social Education, vol. 64, no. 3 (April 2000), 172-179; and Wynell 
Schamel, “The 26th Amendment and Youth Voting Rights,” Social Education, vol. 60, no. 6 (October 
1996), 374-377.  Non-academic sources also support the consensus; for instance, see Elaine Scarry, 
“Separate But Equal for Gays, Too:  Emancipation, Women’s Suffrage, 18-Year-Old Vote Were All 
Linked to the Right to Serve in the Military,” Los Angeles Times, 16 February 1993, 5B, and “The 
26th Amendment,” The History Channel, accessed 10 July 2011, http://www.history.com/topics/the-
26th-amendment. Official government sources concur with the “old enough” thesis; see as examples 
“The 26th Amendment,” History, Art, & Archives, U.S. House of Representatives, accessed 10 July 
2011, http://history.house.gov/HistoricalHighlight/Detail/37022; and “Presidential Proclamation:  
40th Anniversary of the 26th Amendment,” White House, accessed 10 July 2011, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/07/01/presidential-proclamation-40th-anniversary-
26th-amendment. 
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service but in recognition of their personal aptitude and political gumption. 
Lowering the age of suffrage required two prerequisites before it could become 
federal law:  1) a change in the social perception of adolescence, and 2) the 
restoration of political reformism.  Both factors coalesced in the late 1960s to 
encourage young people to demand enfranchisement and to justify constitutionally 
expanding the domain of suffrage to include adolescents. 
In the long, tough slog to secure youth suffrage, adolescents overcame 
significant sociopolitical barriers that had tangential connection to the war in 
Vietnam.  Youth once inhabited a nebulous niche in American society that 
circumscribed their political relevance.  Like other societies, the United States 
partially stratified its population by age.  Age stratification steered people into roles 
and ranks that carried different degrees of prestige, prerogative, and power. For 
American adolescents, chronological age became the benchmark of their social age, 
or the time within the human life cycle a society deems a person capable of 
performing expected tasks.16   For example, 18-year-olds can vote and 17-year-olds 
cannot simply because their birth date (and not any demonstrated proof of interest, 
aptitude, or knowledge) legally allows them to register.  Different ages of legal 
majority, however, let 16-year-olds sign binding contracts and determine courses of 
medical treatment without the consent of parents or guardians.  Teen-aged persons 
lacked electoral privileges because age-conscious norms shaped adult views of what 
                                                          
16 Gunhild O. Hagestad and Bernice Neugarten, “Age and the Life Course,” in Robert H. 
Binstock and Ethel Shanas, eds., Handbook of Aging and the Social Sciences, 2nd ed., (New York:  
Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1985), 46-61. 
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citizenship roles were “appropriate” for youth.  Until the late 1960s, adult doubt 
about the intellectual and emotional capacity of young people to act responsibly 
squelched actions to lower voting ages. 
The social conception of adolescence framed adult perceptions about teenage 
abilities.  Scholars of adolescent history find that western cultures have 
traditionally maintained a view of adolescence as an innately turbulent time of the 
human lifespan.  American educator G. Stanley Hall theorized in 1904 that “storm 
and stress” defines adolescence, meaning it is characterized by mood swings (the 
storm) and conflict (the stress).17   His thesis lent scientific credence to social 
generalizations that cast adolescents as insolent, irresponsible, and immature 
creatures.  Hall’s work gave new authority to old prejudices that restricted youth 
actions until grown-ups deemed adolescents capable of self-determination, the 
common hallmark of adulthood.  Young people did things to expose the speciousness 
of the stereotypes characterizing adolescence, such as conducting political advocacy, 
making tough battlefield decisions, and analyzing their own behaviors in light of 
societal norms.  Nevertheless, the insidious convictions of “storm-stress” thwarted 
efforts to extend voting rights to American youth.  
Adolescents also confronted a sociopolitical tradition of unequal electoral 
inclusion.  The establishment of legal ages of electoral majority served as the 
fundamental, but usually unmentioned, baseline for all suffrage qualifications.  
                                                          
17 G. Stanley Hall, Adolescence:  Its Psychology and Its Relations to Physiology, 
Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion, and Education, 2 vols., (New York:  D. Appleton and 
Company, 1904). 
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Western democratic states, starting with ancient Athens, adopted restrictive laws 
that reduced the voting citizenry to persons perceived as naturally most capable:  
those people who, first, had reached majority age and who, additionally, also 
possessed real estate, an XY chromosome, white skin, wealth, and/or citizenship.  
Rooting the franchise in age evidenced a social belief that voting was a political 
license extended only to mature individuals who theoretically possessed the 
cognitive and emotional qualities supposedly requisite for casting ballots 
responsibly.  Thus, suffrage was conceived more as a privilege of adulthood than a 
right of humanity or citizenry.  While majority ages for voting sometimes 
fluctuated, age 21 served as the traditional western standard, and it became the 
most universal of all suffrage requirements. Historian Marchette Chute contends 
that, in America, the conditions “free, white, and twenty-one” became so pervasive 
that they “passed into the language as a litany.”18  No matter how qualified 
otherwise, potential voters had to be, as the laws required, of “full age” before 
becoming a bona fide elector.   
To gain the prize of suffrage, young people had to focus on the process of 
earning it.  Establishing a minimum national voting age at eighteen could not 
become an actionable legislative possibility until 1) young people became conscious 
of themselves as a political constituency, and 2) adults became convinced that young 
people possessed the ability to deliver a rational and meaningful vote.  The former 
required a galvanizing of shared opinions, feelings, and beliefs, which the dramatic 
                                                          
18 Marchette Chute, The First Liberty:  A History of the Right to Vote in America, 1619-1850 
(New York:  Dutton, 1969), 313.  
10 
 
events of the 1960s made possible.  The latter demanded young people prove 
themselves to be adults, which the transformative experiences of the 1960s made 
poignant.  Lowering the voting age could not be achieved until adolescents 
demonstrated a capacity to proffer consent sensibly. 
The active campaign to establish 18 as the national voting age began during 
World War II.   Youth agitation for a lowered franchise age prodded state and 
federal politicians to consider the prospect.  Though only Georgia acted on youth 
suffrage during the war, teens got adults to ponder whether adolescents should 
vote.  During the 1950s, adults became increasingly convinced that young people 
could vote.  Postwar teenagers gradually showed themselves to be independent 
young adults capable of expressing maturity and responsibility.  Businessmen, for 
instance, took notice of the personally sophisticated and publicly influential 
economic choices made by teenage consumers.  Mass media circulated seminal 
academic theories casting adolescents as more talented, skillful, and clever than 
previously perceived.  Insightful adults looked past the stereotypes of “storm-stress” 
to glimpse the sometimes brilliant social and cultural critiques made by young 
people in graffiti, poetry, and song. Many adults realized that the erudite views of 
youth suggested a talent for critical thought.  However, fears of teen recklessness, 
fueled by Cold War-enhanced hysteria about “juvenile delinquency” and “beatniks,” 
continued to impede the enfranchisement of adolescents. 
During the 1960s, a small but persistent cadre of advocates prodded 
lawmakers to accept a lowered voting age.  Rather than march in the streets like 
11 
 
young militants, they lobbied in the halls of legislatures on behalf of their cause. 
They devised a considered, well-crafted argument that youth suffrage would make 
America’s political milieu less unhinged by offering young people a direct stake in 
the system. Critics of the 18-vote argued that the meretriciousness of adolescents, 
personified by bomb-throwing radicals and dope-smoking hippies, showed youth 
lacked the maturity to participate responsibly in politics or society; hence, lowering 
the voting age would damage America’s democracy.   In an era when traditional 
authority looked ready to crumble and generational revolution appeared a real 
possibility, formally melding youths into the electoral fold proved to be a tenable 
way to smooth generational tension and sustain sociopolitical order.   
Creative political maneuvering played an important role in establishing the 
18-vote. A small group of dedicated federal legislators, particularly Senators Birch 
Bayh, Edward Kennedy, and Mike Mansfield, steered youth suffrage through a 
skeptical Congress.  They persuaded a majority of their colleagues that young 
people were capable of mature deliberation and beneficial civic involvement.  They 
also pointed to polls indicating a public groundswell supporting youth suffrage.  
Their task was abetted by a congressional era defined by institutional and 
legislative reformism.  During the 1960s, liberal Democrats pushed procedural 
changes that harnessed obstructionism.  Modifying how Congress worked led to the 
approval of historic legislation that provided social welfare, protected civil rights, 
and broadened suffrage, including constitutional amendments that allowed citizens 
in Washington, D.C. to vote in presidential elections, abolished poll taxes, and 
12 
 
granted youth suffrage.    
A liberal Supreme Court determined to expand civil liberties helped, too, by 
affirming the principle of “one man, one vote.” In four decisive cases, the Court 
expanded federal oversight of suffrage by mandating that all citizens, regardless of 
where they reside in a state, receive equal representation.19  In Oregon v. Mitchell 
(1970), however, it authored a curiously narrow decision allowing states to 
determine the time and manner of conducting elections. That ruling confused who 
possessed the authority to regulate voting ages in state and federal elections.  
Congress reversed the Court’s holding by passing the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, 
which the states adopted in short order.  After nearly thirty years of gestation, the 
18-vote measure sailed through Congress and the Article V ratification process in 
record time – a mere 100 days – to become law in July 1971. 
Though not as monumental as other federal amendments, the Twenty-Sixth 
should not be trivialized or dismissed.  It marked the political coming-of-age for 
American youth by granting 18-to-21-year-olds the right to vote and by 
guaranteeing them the privilege of self-determination.  Ratification of the Twenty-
Sixth Amendment was not simply a reaction to the turmoil engendered by Vietnam; 
it acknowledged a new understanding of youth status within a society becoming less 
deferential and more inclusive.   Dropping the voting age did the very thing 
centuries of tradition had delayed:  it gave instant civic responsibility to 
inexperienced adolescents.  The Twenty-Sixth Amendment should be understood as 
                                                          
19 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963), Wesberry v. 
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
13 
 
the byproduct of social change and political labor rather than as recompense for 
patriotic service.  Like the other suffrage amendments, changing the electoral 
status quo through setting a uniform voting age required hard work and tough 
advocacy by committed activists and their congressional champions.  Their 
resiliency resulted in a fundamental alteration of constitutional law: forever 
banning age-based electoral discrimination against persons aged eighteen to 
twenty.   The Twenty-Sixth Amendment was the reward youth had earned for 
proving the capacity to proffer consent as maturely as adults.  How young people 
eventually overcame political resistance and social prejudices to change the 
Constitution is a fascinating tale that stretches back to the establishment of voting 
as a mechanism for group decision-making. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE TYRANNY OF THE (LEGAL) MAJORITY: 
ADOLESCENCE, ADULTOCRACY, AND VOTING AGES 
 
 
For although there may be exceptions to the order of nature, the male is by nature 
fitter for command than the female, just as the elder and full-grown is superior to 
the younger and more immature. 
 
                                                             Aristotle20 
 
 
In 1930, Bernard R. Riley, an 18-year-old from Miami, filed suit in Florida 
court to obtain suffrage, seeking to take advantage of an apparent loophole in state 
law.  Section 3962 of Florida’s Revised General Statutes of 1920 declared that 
married male minors “are hereby authorized to assume the management of their 
estate, to contract and be contracted with, to sue and be sued, and to do and 
perform any and all acts, matters, and things that he could do if he were twenty-one 
years of age.”21  The recently-wedded Riley argued the statute implicitly conferred 
suffrage rights by granting him “any and all” civil prerogatives afforded majority-
aged men. The Florida Supreme Court unanimously disagreed, ruling statutes could 
not alter the age qualification of voters fixed in the state constitution.  The Court 
deftly sidestepped the “any and all” clause by determining Florida’s legislature 
                                                          
20 Aristotle, The Politics, 1.1259b. 
 
21 Quoted in Riley v. Holmer, 100 Fla. 938, 939 (1930). 
 
15 
 
intended the statute to remove the disability to contract and be contracted with and 
not to permit married minors to vote in state elections.  Justice C.J. Terrell 
concluded, “Under our law, both males and females are minors till they reach the 
age of twenty-one years.  This was the common-law rule.”22  That Riley remained 
disfranchised, though allowed other privileges of legal adulthood, also followed an 
ostensibly common-sense tradition:  adolescents should not vote in any case 
whatsoever. 
Becoming a certified elector, as Riley’s suit implied, had served as the 
capstone to full-fledged adulthood.  Determinations of majority age became the 
foundation for adultocracy, or the sociopolitical system that vested decision-making 
authority in adults.  It forged age-related constructs of power that transcended race, 
class, and sex and cut across every type of social, economic, and political structure.  
Adultocracy bolstered western systems of age hegemony by adding legal, 
governmental, and electoral layers to communal frameworks that stratified persons 
old to young.  A universal and unchallenged understanding of adolescence as a 
period of “storm and stress” abetted adultocracy by framing adolescents as a 
separate and subordinate social species ill-equipped for grown-up tasks.   
Since adults believed youth a group naturally inferior, as Arisotle had 
proposed, governments denied suffrage to teen-aged persons, like Bernard Riley, 
until judged by adult authorities as 1) sufficiently experienced to vote responsibly 
and 2) developmentally capable of voting rationally.  Age qualifications to vote and 
                                                          
22  Ibid, 939-940. 
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hold office spawned a tyranny of the majority consciously designed by the architects 
of democracy:  minors governed without consent by those persons of legal majority 
age.  As a result, adolescents, like other social minorities, existed as political 
subjects to the will of the majority with few civil privileges and scant influence upon 
official decision-making processes. 
 
Every society has developed some mechanism of voting for resolving 
individual differences concerning collective action.  The custom of voting, however, 
did not mean that every individual played an equal role in decision making.  Every 
polity permitted only those individuals considered physically, mentally, and 
emotionally fit the license to make binding decisions for whole societies; usually, 
those persons were men; invariably, those persons were adults.  Control over group 
decision-making processes rooted adultocracy.  The term adultocracy describes a 
sociopolitical system ruled by people who have reached legal adulthood but who are 
not considered elderly.23    Its definition follows the logic of 18th-century British 
                                                          
23 As a political arrangement, adultocracy should not be confused with gerontocracy. 
Gerontocracy is a form of rule defined by two central qualities: 1) a small cadre of elders control 
political power and 2) those elderly leaders are significantly older than the majority of the adult 
population.  Humans rarely employed gerontocracy as a governing system because, as Phyllis 
Dolhnow attests, few people lived past age fifty in most societies throughout history.  Phyllis 
Dolhinow, “The Primates:  Age, Behavior, and Evolution,” in Age and Anthropological Theory,  David 
I. Kertzer and Jennie Keith, eds., (Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University Press, 1984), 65-81.  Ancient 
Sparta hosted one of the few successful gerontocracies in world history.  It was ruled by a council of 
elders (the gerousia) comprised of two kings and twenty-eight men over 60 years old.  They were 
nominated from the most prestigious families, elected by acclamation in the Spartan assembly, and 
served life terms.  The gerousia held veto power over decisions made by the assembly.  The 
consensus appears to be that the gerousia, and not the Spartan assembly, was the sovereign body of 
state; thus, Sparta could be understood as a political gerontocracy.  See Aristotle, The Politics 
1272a4-12; Paul Cartledge, Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta (London:  Duckworth, 1987), 124-129; 
and G.E.M. De Ste. Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War (London:  Duckworth, 1972), 124-
138.   
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statesman Edmund Burke who declared that only persons “of adult age, not 
declining in life, of tolerable leisure for discussions, and of some means of 
information” should be granted civic authority.24    
In every sociopolitical system, adultocracy granted adults special dominion 
over young people.  To the progenitors of bands, tribes, and states, adultocracy 
appeared the most organic means for effecting communal order:  from the 
distinctive abilities of fully mature creatures to provide for and protect their young 
and the innate authority of parents to rule their children emerged the social right of 
adults, especially men, to govern. 25   No matter the political family (one, few, 
many), the governmental genus (monarchy, oligarchy, democracy), or the 
lawmaking species (despotism, plutocracy, republicanism) the universal aspect to 
each system was that adults, particularly men, ruled.   
Three cross-cultural generalities can be observed in the history of 
adultocracy.  First, those persons considered adults ruled no matter the size of the 
population, the particular political form employed, or the complexity of the 
governing system.   Second, adolescents had more influence in smaller, informal, 
and decentralized political arrangements (like bands and tribes) than larger, 
formal, and centralized political structures (such as states).    Third, voting ages 
                                                          
24 Frank O'Gorman, Edmund Burke:  His Political Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1973), 133. 
 
25 According to political sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset, the legitimacy of any political 
system can only be achieved when its denizens can “engender and maintain the belief that the 
existing political institutions are the most appropriate for the society.”  Seymour Martin Lipset, 
Political Man:  The Social Basis of Politics, 2nd ed., (Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1981), 64.  
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evolved from culturally amorphous references to fixed legal requirements as age 
stratification gradually formalized and political schemes became evermore 
systemized.  Societies that lacked an ability to fix precise birth dates, featured short 
life expectancies, and practiced egalitarianism created sociopolitical climates in 
which the classification “youth” was not completely prohibitive in relation to status 
as compared to cultures that developed systems to document age, fostered longish 
life spans, and adhered to constitutionalism.  Adultocracy did not, of course, 
completely exclude youth from civic life.  Parents and authorities expected 
juveniles, at minimum, to marry, soldier, work, pay taxes, participate in worship, 
and obey the law.  But underage youth generally lacked their own sovereign voice, 
representation, or agency, while the interests of adults were given direct expression. 
26 And adolescents, though citizens, could not share equally in the prerogatives of 
the commonweal because of the preponderance of power afforded adults.  
Adultocracy slotted adolescents into a peculiar niche that circumscribed their 
political relevance:  they were neither truly children totally adult nor fully citizen.   
Adultocracy determined who could participate in decision-making 
enterprises.  When to declare a person an adult became a riddle partially solved by 
the social construction of age.  Like other social categories, such as race, class, 
gender, sexuality, and ethnicity, age provides primary shape to the contours of 
group organization and the conditions of individual life.  Age also conditions social 
                                                          
26 See Ruth R. Faden, Tom L. Beauchamp, and Nancy M.P. King, A History and Theory of 
Informed Consent (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1986) and Robert Mnookin, Child, Family, 
and State (Boston:  Little, Brown, 1978).  
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assumptions about individual capacities and frames cultural standards for 
evaluating appropriate behavior and conduct.27   Sociologist Cheryl Laz points out, 
for example, that various societies routinely employ the commands “grow up” and 
“act your age” to correct non-conformity to normative expectations associated with a 
particular chronological age.28  The admonitions “not old enough” and “too old” 
exemplify the use of age norms to impede persons from pursuing non-age-
appropriate courses of action.  Historically, all societies have deemed children 
innately inferior to adults in strength and sense, and most of them have judged 
adolescents as more mistake-prone, restless, and unruly relative to adults.   Such 
culturally-accepted age prejudices justified cordoning off young persons into age-
segregated institutions (like schools and juvenile halls) and temporally parceling 
civil, communal, and individual liberties along chronologically-restrictive timelines.    
The universal predisposition to esteem chronology rather than ability when 
assigning citizen roles rooted age stratification within the world’s governance 
                                                          
27 See Ralph Linton, “Age and Sex Categories,” American Sociological Review, vol. 7, no. 5 
(October 1942):  589-603; Talcott Parsons, “Age and Sex in the Social Structure of the United States,” 
American Sociological Review, vol. 7, no. 5 (October 1942):  604-616; and Matilda W. Riley, “On the 
Significance of Age in Sociology,” American Sociological Review, vol. 52, no. 1 (February 1987):  1-14.  
Curiously, the study of age as a social construct has lagged. For many years, age was a “neglected 
aspect” of academic study.  See Ralph Linton, “A Neglected Aspect of Social Organization,” American 
Journal of Sociology, vol. 45, no. 6 (May 1940):  870-886. Some forty years later, Matilda White Riley, 
a leading practitioner of age studies, admitted “age and aging constitute an empirical domain about 
which little is known.”  See Matilda White Riley, “Foreword,” in Age and Anthropological Theory, 
David I. Kertzer and Jennie Keith, eds., (Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University Press, 1984), 10.  The 
scholastic literature examining age remains scant compared to the volumes devoted to race, class, 
gender, sexuality, and ethnicity.  The most significant work on age has been conducted by 
anthropologists and sociologists.  Historians, even of a social bent, seem disinterested in chronicling 
age as a factor of decisions and actions in the past.  The few pieces that do examine age, particularly 
the history of adolescence, were written in the 1960s and 1970s as a means of ascertaining and 
explaining contemporary youth issues.  More investigation into the history of age would be 
academically beneficial, since age hierarchies remain as pervasive as other social constructs.   
 
28 Cheryl Laz, “Act Your Age,” Sociological Forum, vol. 13, no. 1 (March 1998):  85-113. 
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systems.  Age stratification steered people into sociopolitical ranks that carried 
different degrees of prestige, prerogative, and power.  For adolescents, age signified 
qualification to assume certain personal, civil, and legal prerogatives.  Age of 
majority laws allotted duties and privileges to citizens based on arbitrarily-chosen 
years of chronological time.   As much as any other social category, age defined the 
boundaries of citizenship.  Majority-age laws framed civic inclusion by temporally 
apportioning a person’s ability to marry, drive, get a job, sign a contract, fight in the 
military, own property, vote, and seek political office.   Lawmakers and jurists in 
Athens and Rome crafted the western template for allocating majority ages:  first 
bestow transactional prerogatives; next impart civil protections; then confer 
political rights.29   The tenets that govern majority ages in England and America 
derived chiefly from tort law (which controlled civil liability), common law (which 
offered statutory rules regarding individual emancipation), and legislation (which 
provided a chronological sequence for doling out civic prerogatives).   
Majority-age schemes exemplified a key aspect of age stratification in 
western societies:  adults do not usurp decisions from minors; rather, they attempt 
to manage consent for minors.    The logic of majority age laws emphasized that 
                                                          
29 Both Athens and Rome recognized the two key transactional rights (to enter contracts and 
to draft wills), three civil rights (to declare emancipation from fathers, elder brothers, or guardians, 
to secure inheritances, and to own property), one public right (to participate in communal worship), 
two legal protection (to initiate legal proceedings and to represent themselves in courts), and one 
political privilege (to attend meetings of the popular governing assemblies).  See W. Warde Fowler, 
The City-State of the Greeks and Romans:  A Survey Introductory to the Study of Ancient History, 
5th ed., (London:  Macmillan and Company, 1907), 209-210; Léon Homo, Roman Political 
Institutions from City to State (New York:  Alfred A. Knopf, 1929), 74-75; Robert Garland, The Greek 
Way of Life (Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University Press, 1990), 180-183; Lesley Adkins and Roy A. Adkins, 
Handbook to Life in Ancient Rome (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1994), 46-51; and Beryl 
Rawson, Children and Childhood in Roman Italy (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2005), 73-74, 
136, and 142. 
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undeveloped persons had special vulnerabilities that rendered them in need of 
sustained adult protection until they had matured, even to the point of excluding 
them against their will from certain public or private activities.30  Common sense 
dictated and common law insisted that children needed special legal protection 
because of their physical, emotional, and mental immaturity.   William Blackstone, 
the foremost legal expert of 18th-century England, forcefully asserted that extending 
minority status allowed parents and civil authorities to best protect children “from 
the snares of artful and designing persons; and, next, of settling them properly in 
life.”31  The sociopolitical biases favoring “mature” persons posited that aging 
provided the experience and wisdom required to perform vital civic tasks 
proficiently.32   Western peoples defined “maturity” as the capacity to think 
intelligently, cope steadfastly, and relate rationally.   Legal definitions of maturity 
emphasized the achievement of sui generis (i.e. personal control over decisions and 
actions free of compulsion) as the crucial factor separating children and adults.  
Western law allowed for some juveniles, in extraordinary circumstances, to make 
                                                          
30 Western states, starting with Athens, constructed a system of statutory and procedural 
safeguards designed to assure the “best interests” of children.    The “best interests” doctrine 
asserted that governments had an inherent power (parens patriae) to protect minors because the law 
deemed them unable to act of their own accord. See Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert J. 
Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (New York:  Free Press, 1973), and Julia Halloran 
McLaughlin, “The Fundamental Truth about Best Interests,” St. Louis University Law Journal, vol. 
54, no. 1 (October 2009):  113-165. 
 
31 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol. 1, Of the Study, Nature, 
and Extent of the Laws of England (New York:  Oceana Publications, 1967; reprint of the 1st 
American edition, 1771), 441. 
 
32 Gunhild O. Hagestad and Bernice Neugarten, “Age and the Life Course,” in Robert H. 
Binstock and Ethel Shanas, eds., Handbook of Aging and the Social Sciences, 2nd ed., (New York:  
Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1985), 46-61. 
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autonomous decisions sans parents or guardians over some legal matters (usually 
financial and medical).33   To avoid case-by-case competency judgments, however, 
western codes considered all youth as persons with limited but increasing capacities 
for consent.  Pinpointing legal ages when sui generis occurred was problematic.  The 
choosing of the precise chronological years for marriage, employment, conscription, 
contract, and suffrage ultimately relied on adult discernments of youth 
competencies rooted in age chauvinism.  As Bernard Riley discovered in 1930, 
adult-developed majority ages curbed full self-determination for adolescents 
regardless of life achievement or personal ability.   
The social conception of adolescence framed adult perceptions of teenage 
immaturity.  Historians of childhood debate whether the conception of adolescence 
was the result of “invention” or “discovery.”34   But they agree that the main 
constant in cultural metaphors describing adolescence was its depiction as an 
inherently turbulent time of the human lifespan.  For example, Romans blamed an 
innate “mental wickedness” for causing adolescents, especially males, to behave 
mischievously and act impulsively.35  Early modern Englishmen characterized 
                                                          
33 During the 1970s, for example, American jurists established the “mature minor” doctrine 
that permits children deemed capable by a court to give consent sui generis to medical treatment.  
See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981). 
 
34 Some scholars support the thesis of Philippe Ariés, who argues that western peoples 
conjured adolescence as a component of social life during the Renaissance; before then, it “was 
confused with childhood.”  Other academics agree with the development model of Erik Erikson.  He 
maintains scientific research uncovered adolescence as a universal “life stage” in human maturation 
that transcended social boundaries and historical eras.  See Philippe Ariés, Centuries of Childhood:  
A Social History of Family Life, trans. by Robert Baldick, (New York:  Knopf, 1962), 25, and Erik 
Erikson, Identity, Youth, and Crisis (New York:  W.W. Norton, 1968). 
 
35 Beryl Rawson, Children and Childhood in Roman Italy (New York:  Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 75.  See also Emiel Eyben, Restless Youth in Ancient Rome  (New York: Routledge, 
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adolescence as a “wild and wanton” “stage of lawlessness” plagued by “vice, lust, 
and vain pleasures of the flesh.”36  Contemporary Europeans and Americans have 
continued constructing negative images of “incorrigible,” “juvenile,” and 
“delinquent” youth around the age norms associated with mature, well-adjusted 
adults.37   
In 1904, an American educator, G. Stanley Hall, seminally defined 
adolescence as a life stage characterized by a “storm” of emotional mood swings and 
the “stress” of physiological and psychological conflicts.38   His thesis lent scientific 
credence to social generalizations that cast adolescents as unstable, irresponsible, 
and disobedient creatures.  To save young people from degeneracy during the 
maturation process, Hall advocated lengthening and institutionalizing adolescent 
preparation for adulthood.39  He asserted that a temporally-extended, state-crafted 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1993). 
 
36 Ilana Krausman Ben-Amos, Adolescence and Youth in Early Modern England (New 
Haven, CT:  Yale University Press, 1994), 18; Barbara A. Hanawalt, Growing Up in Medieval 
England:  The Experience of Childhood in History (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1993), 197; 
C. John Sommerville, The Discovery of Childhood in Puritan England (Athens:  University of 
Georgia Press, 1992), 34; and Steven R. Smith, "Religion and the Conception of Youth in 
Seventeenth-Century England,” History of Childhood Quarterly 2, no. 4 (Spring 1975):  513.  Paul 
Griffiths contends that youth had a creative influence on pre-civil war English society despite 
demonization by adults.  Paul Griffiths, Youth and Authority:  Formative Experiences in England, 
1560-1640 (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1996). 
 
37 See Pamela Cox and Heather Shore, eds., Becoming Delinquent: British and European 
Youth, 1650-1950 (Hampshire, England:  Ashgate-Dartmouth, 2002) and Anne Meis Knupfer, 
Reform and Resistance:  Gender, Delinquency, and America’s First Juvenile Court (New York:  
Routledge, 2001). 
 
38 G. Stanley Hall, Adolescence:  Its Psychology and Its Relations to Physiology, 
Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion, and Education, 2 vols., (New York:  D. Appleton and 
Company, 1904).  
 
39 Hall’s biographer, Dorothy Ross, contends that his recommendation to extend the 
preparation for adulthood, and not the coining of “storm-stress,” proved his most innovative 
contribution to the social conception of adolescence. Dorothy Ross, G. Stanley Hall:  The Psychologist 
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adolescence would allow adult authorities to better control youth development and 
to better shepherd adolescent assimilation into modern adult culture.   
Hall’s counsel to extend adolescence under firm adult oversight mirrored 
traditional remedies for handling adolescent tempestuousness.  Beginning with 
Athens and Rome, western people reckoned that anxiety-ridden and rebellious 
juveniles needed extended time to acclimate to the different expectations and 
increased responsibilities of age and citizenry.  In drafting majority-age schemes, 
western jurists reckoned all humans had a facility to assent (or provide silent 
acquiescence) but only certain persons possessed the capacity to consent (i.e. furnish 
active agreement or dissent).  Legislative decisions regarding who would be granted 
suffrage boiled down to which social groups could be trusted to proffer consent 
independently and sensibly. 40  Admittance policies based on birth and residence 
initially pared who could vote.  Subsequent debilitations based on wealth, gender, 
race, religion, literacy, and age whittled enfranchisement further, and competence-
based restrictions narrowed it to a small cadre:  adults, particularly men.  No 
matter how qualified otherwise, potential voters had to be, as the laws required, of 
“full age” before becoming a bona fide elector.  Thus, western states conceived 
suffrage more as a privilege of adulthood than a right of humanity or citizenry.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
as Prophet (Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press, 1972). 
 
40 Legally, people who seek the power of consent have to demonstrate: 1) the facility to 
comprehend understandably and disclose accurately the information necessary to make a decision 
that could be judged as reasonable by informed persons; 2) the freedom to make decisions absent 
pressure, duress, fraud, deceit, intimidation, coercion, constraint, enticement, and/or undue 
interference; and 3) the fitness to do or decide upon something suitably.  See Paul S. Appelbaum, 
Charles W. Lidz, and Alan Meisel, Informed Consent:  Legal Theory and Clinical Practice (New 
York:  Oxford University Press, 1987). 
25 
 
The civic reason for age-delaying political participation was plain:  to protect 
the best interests of the state from the disorders of rowdy and bumptious young 
males.  They were not allowed full enfranchisement – to participate in assembly and 
hold political office – until adulthood because supposedly wild and wanton nature of 
adolescents compelled adults to marginalize them, albeit briefly, to maintain civic 
order.  The disability of age made young males in western states subjects of adult 
rule since adult lawmakers had absolute control over official decision-making 
bodies.  As adult men saw their civic responsibilities swell with the centralization 
and expansion of their states, the governmental participation allowed young males 
decreased.  Adults thought adolescents too impulsive and irresponsible to conduct 
the august work of the state assiduously or sensibly.   A Roman jurist, Ulpian, 
claimed the exclusion of adolescents necessary because “everyone agrees that 
judgment, at this age above all, is delicate and weak, exposed to numerous 
deceptions and vulnerable to the treachery of many.”41  States held youth back from 
full immersion into political life until their skills had sharpened and their 
egocentrism had dulled, irrespective of ability or aspiration.   
When to apportion the power of electoral consent to adolescents became a 
socio-legal conundrum.  Lawmakers recognized the task of codifying precise suffrage 
ages as fundamentally arbitrary but wholly necessary since consent required 
developed faculties to understand, reason, and judge.  Western states grafted 
franchise ages onto the scaffolding of majority-age laws.  Athenian and Roman law 
                                                          
41 Bruce W. Frier and Thomas A.J. McGinn, A Casebook on Roman Family Law (New York:  
Oxford University Press, 2004), 438. 
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codes used the word “adult” to describe the ages when males could begin the process 
of attaining full citizenship:  18 in Athens and 17 in Rome.42   But neither Athens 
nor Rome promulgated an official suffrage age. Becoming a citizen did not confer a 
civil right to vote since Athenians and Romans did not elect candidates to civic 
offices or decide upon public proposals in plebiscites.  Instead, citizenship bestowed 
a political privilege – to attend meetings of the popular governing assemblies – and 
voting remained bound to deciding legislative or judicial questions and confirming 
magistrates.43  In addition, the age of citizenship did not grant a claim to seek 
political office.  Athens and Rome set minimum ages to hold bureaucratic and 
administrative positions between the late 20s and early 40s; the more important the 
responsibility, the higher the prerequisite age.44  
                                                          
42 One of the frustrations involved with antiquities research is the imprecision regarding age.  
Few studies examine ancient voting, and they say little about age requirements. Most works claim a 
potential voter had to be an “adult” without clarifying a minimum voting age.  Aristotle’s work, as 
detailed as it is, does not specify exactly at what age males earned full voting status within the 
Athenian assembly.  E.S. Staveley, the author of the only single-volume study of Greek and Roman 
voting, even admits “. . . it is not ever certain who constituted the electoral body” in Athenian or 
Roman congresses. E.S. Staveley, Greek and Roman Voting and Elections (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1972), 101.  Hence, my conclusions regarding age conception within the Greco-
Roman franchise are conditional considering the limited nature of the available evidence and a lack 
of first-hand knowledge of the Latin or Greek languages.  
 
43 Fowler, The City-State of the Greeks and Romans. 
 
44 In Athens, Cleisthenes’s reforms of 508/7 B.C.E. set age thirty as the threshold for 
membership in the Boule  (council of 500) and dikasteria (the law courts).  In Rome, no legally-
prescribed age threshold barred young males from seeking magistracies for most of the Republican 
era.   The governmental sprawl of empire required Rome to institute official minimum ages for 
holding offices.  The Lex Villia Annalis (“age law”) of 180 B.C.E. set age 28 for the Quaestorship, 40 
for the Praetorship, and 43 for the Consulship.44   Sulla (82-81 B.C.E.) increased the age to become 
an quaestor to 30, while Augustus (27 B.C.E.-14 A.D.) lowered it to 25 so that the age of majority for 
holding office matched the age of discretion set in private law by the Lex Plaetoria of 200 B.C.E.  See 
Staveley, Greek and Roman Voting and Elections, 121-179; Homo, Roman Political Institutions from 
City to State, 49-84, 124-125, 207, and 345; Rawson, Children and Childhood in Roman Italy, note 
10, 138; Barry Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1962), 5-
6; Alexander Yakobson, Elections and Electioneering in Rome:  A Study in the Political System of the 
Late Republic (Stuttgart:  Franz Steiner, 1999), 8-9; Florence Dupont, Daily Life in Ancient Rome, 
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Similar to Athenians and Romans, Englishmen considered the power to 
consent an essential element of political citizenship.  After King John signed the 
Magna Carta in 1215, enfranchisement evolved from scant to significant 
importance.45  Internecine brawls over governmental authority prompted British 
citizens to view voting as a civic task to be performed only by those persons who had 
a noticeably personal stake in the outcomes of public decision-making.  British 
lawmakers granted shares of political involvement to males based on perceptions of 
ability and achievement measured by amounts of land owned and years of age lived.  
England’s representative bodies, the Witan (the great king’s councils first organized 
in the 10th century) and Parliament (which first met legally in 1236), retained the 
same basic criteria for participation: only “wise men,” or experienced men who held 
important socioeconomic positions, would be summoned to attend.46  In 1430, 
members of Parliament (M.P.s) established the vital qualification for 
enfranchisement.  To be an elector or M.P., a man had to be a freeholder (i.e. a 
landowner holding permanent and absolute tenure of property with the freedom to 
dispose of it at will) possessing real estate assessed at least 40 shillings of value for 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
trans. Christopher Woodall, (Oxford:  Blackwell, 1992), 7; and W. Jeffrey Tatum, “Roman 
Democracy?” in A Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought, Ryan K. Balot, ed. (Oxford:  
Wiley-Blackwell, 2009),  217.  
 
45 James C. Holt, ed., Magna Carta and the Idea of Liberty (New York:  John Wiley and Sons, 
1972). 
 
46 See John Maddicott, “Parliament of England to 1307:  Origins and Beginnings to 1215,” in 
A Short History of Parliament, Clyve Jones, ed., (Rochester, NY:  Boydell & Brewer, 2009), 3-9 and 
Levi Roach, Kingship and Consent in Anglo-Saxon England, 871-978 (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), 27-44. 
 
28 
 
the annual land tax.47   Thereafter, English political theory claimed property 
ownership reflected the permanent stake in society that ensured the independent 
judgment required of a virtuous voter.  The 40-shilling freehold remained the basic 
franchise standard until abolished by the Reform Act of 1832.  
The repeated use of the word “men” in English political documents presumed 
the attainment of adulthood as a condition of enfranchisement.  For example, the 
Magna Carta guaranteed critical civil rights to all free men of “full age” without 
stating what chronological year marked civic majority.  Confusion over the political 
definition of “adult” grew in the early modern era as the practice of electing M.P.s 
gradually replaced the tradition of selecting “wise men” to serve.  Throughout the 
17th century, competitive partisan politics gradually replaced the casual, patron-
driven poll of yore.48   Questions regarding franchise credentials increasingly arose 
when people were asked to vote for, rather than assent to, parliamentary 
candidates.  When youths got involved, especially 40-shilling freeholders, the issue 
                                                          
47 8 Henry VI. c. 7 (1430).  Read the citation as “the 8th year of King Henry VI’s reign, 
statute issue no. 7.”  See also William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 1:172-173.  
Two years later, another statute mandated that a freeholder must live within his declared county of 
election. 10 Henry VI. c. 2 (1432).  At the time of the 40-shilling proclamation, Henry was only eight 
years old.   See Ralph Griffiths, The Reign of Henry VI:  The Exercise of Royal Authority, 1422-1461 
(Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1981).   The 40-shilling requirement limited suffrage to 
less than 20% of England’s adult male population.  But historian Derek Hirst finds that many local 
officials creatively quantified 40 shillings to help men gain franchise; e.g. they might include 
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16th and 17th centuries stimulated by the turn from feudalism to capitalism made the 40-shilling 
requirement “virtually meaningless” because increased land values multiplied the number of 
potential voters.  See Derek Hirst, The Representation of the People?:  Voters and Voting in England 
under the Early Stuarts (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1975). 
 
48 See Mark A. Kishlansky, Parliamentary Selection:  Social and Political Choice in Early 
Modern England (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986); and John A. Phillips, Electoral 
Behavior in Unreformed England:  Plumpers, Splitters, and Straights (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1982). 
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of qualifications became more problematic.  Sculpting the temporal bounds of youth 
suffrage could determine the outcome of elections, particularly since scholars 
believe that 17th-century England hosted a young population.49  
In the years after the Restoration and through the Glorious Revolution, local 
uncertainty over franchise parameters, including age restrictions, incited 
arguments regarding voter eligibility. British laws provided cities, boroughs, 
counties, and shires the prerogative to determine the standards for voter eligibility.   
Those units developed a mish-mash of idiosyncratic franchise criteria that yielded 
an inconsistent and confusing muddle of voting conditions that allowed adolescents 
political inroads.50    Some community traditions, for example, permitted 
enfranchisement to those males who knew how to identify a counterfeit penny, 
count money, measure cloth, or conduct business properly.51   During the 1680s and 
1690s, public concern over age eligibility escalated as the number of young males 
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Samuel E. Thorne, (Cambridge, MA:  The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1968), 2:250.  
Bracton claimed that bodily appearance “as where he is bearded, great in stature or the like” 
presumed “sufficient proof of age.”  If visual appearance left a question of age, the petitioner’s age 
could be “proved” by either an examination of “twelve lawful men,” testimony of fact by kinsmen, or 
by an affirmative oath swearing “that he has reached at least his twenty-first year or more.”  Bracton 
concludes, “When the justices have judged him of full age, he will be taken of full age, as against all; 
there must be no further argument against their judgment.”  Ibid, 4:320.  The writings of a 12-
century jurist, Ranulf de Glanville, influenced Bracton.  Glanville clarified, “If there is any doubt 
whether heirs are of full age or minors, then it is clear that the lords [of the manor] shall have both 
heir and inheritance in wardship until full age is reasonably proved by the oath of lawful men of the 
neighbourhood.”  Ranulf de Glanville, The Treatise on the Law and Customs of the Realm of 
England, trans. and ed. G.D.G. Hall, (London:  Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1965), 83. 
30 
 
participating in politics and standing for election swelled.  In more than a few cases, 
teen-aged males won seats in Parliament.52    Many adults complained that minors 
should not be allowed to legislate on matters to which they were not themselves 
liable.  Other Englishmen feared corrupt operators and scheming fathers would 
cajole the young political neophytes into making imprudent, maybe even dangerous, 
decisions that served partisan interests more than the public good.53   William 
Blackstone chastised the immature politicos for their "imbecility of judgment.”54      
Concerns about irrationality and rambunctiousness within the electorate 
spurred Parliament to eradicate the potential for youth disruptions to political 
order. In 1696, it passed an omnibus bill to reform elections. Part VII of the act 
barred all males below twenty-one years of age from voting for members of 
Parliament or serving in Parliament.55  Blackstone admitted the choice of twenty-
one to be the suffrage age was “merely arbitrary.”56  But he declared Parliament’s 
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action entirely necessary “to prevent the mischiefs that might arise, by placing 
extensive [governmental] authority in hands that are either incapable, or else 
improper, to manage it.”57   To shield the state from the potentiality of damage 
inflicted by unruly adolescents, M.P.s closed the local loopholes that had allowed 
adolescents electoral participation by declaring a national voting age.  
The popular explanation why 21 became the year of electoral majority says it 
emerged from a tradition of concluding the training for knighthood at that age.  
However, knighthood was an age-fuzzy apprenticeship. The general age range for 
reaching full knighthood stretched between the mid-teens and mid-twenties, 
depending upon when his riding and martial skills were perfected and tried in 
battle.58    Parliament’s promulgation of 21 as the national electoral age squared 
more with the scheme of majority-age laws than the vocational education of 
knighthood.  The establishment of a fixed suffrage age corresponded with other 
state efforts, begun in the 12th century, to assimilate young males into adulthood 
and incorporate them into the citizen body within an age-graded legal structure. 
M.P.s did not conjure an age at random to proclaim the attainment of suffrage; they 
consciously borrowed a pre-existing age from two property rights gained only upon 
reaching twenty-one:  to inherit (important in a culture that practiced 
primogeniture) and to dispossess (which implied a right to action:  to obtain, keep, 
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use, or discard property based on individual discretion).59   By welding 
enfranchisement to the age of inheritance and the dispossession of property, 
Parliament upheld the tradition of land-based, stakeholder political rights.  
Therefore, the setting of twenty-one as the nationwide age to vote and hold office 
was not as subjective as commonly believed. 
Parliament’s establishment of an official voting age triggered a significant 
change in the nature of suffrage.  Because of the reform bill, age replaced property 
as the primary basis for election.  After 1696, arguments about the enfranchisement 
credentials for teen-aged, 40-shilling freeholders ceased:  no matter how much 
property an adolescent held, he could not vote or hold office until reaching age 21.   
For adolescent lads, however, the 1696 decree closed paths for electoral opportunity 
and political agency that custom had once abided.   The precision of 21 took from 
local officials the authority to interpret the electoral meaning of “adult,” but, 
concurrently, the law provided them the means to thwart claims to suffrage by 
underage constituents.  Hence, the 21-vote law accomplished what Parliament 
intended:  to harden the traditional practices and beliefs supporting adultocracy. 
In America, the colonies replicated the English pattern of gradual youth 
marginalization through suffrage codification.  According to historian Cortland F. 
Bishop, the initial colonial franchise laws were “neither numerous nor well 
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defined.”60   Most colonies simply enfranchised “freemen” or “freeholders” with little 
definitiveness in regard to precise qualifications. 61  For young males, the 
imprecision of electoral codes and the fluidity of colonization opened avenues to 
political involvement.  Well-known, well-connected, or well-born adolescents 
sometimes cast ballots, competed for local offices, and won elections.62  In the very 
earliest years of settlement, when elections were occasional and irregular, colonial 
governments allowed males as young as 16 and 17 to vote.  America’s first 
representative assembly, Virginia’s House of Burgesses, initially allowed 17-year-
olds who paid poll taxes to become legislators.  Virginia and Plymouth each taxed 
16-year-olds in the early 1620s to pay for the salaries of public officials and fund the 
maintenance of government.  Historian Marchette Chute posits that “since this tax 
was imposed on all males over sixteen it seems probable that all of them were 
voters.”63     
Colonial adolescents did not inhabit a world as socioeconomically caste as 
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that in Europe, and westward expansion provided them wide opportunities to strike 
out on their own and claim independence.  Scholars Oscar and Mary F. Handlin 
maintain that many young males parlayed their abilities into official or informal 
roles of communal influence.64  A colonial atmosphere favoring aptitude allowed 
ambitious and talented youths to leverage their endowments individually to voice 
opinions and to express consent periodically in group situations, such as militia 
elections.65  In addition, informal politicking customs (including a reliance on 
personal testimony and communal knowledge to determine franchise ages) allowed 
ambitious adolescents assorted entry points into the multi-layered colonial political 
structure.  The young population of America provided some pull for youth; for 
instance, Robert E. Brown’s study of colonial Massachusetts found that “more than 
60 per cent of the people were minors” and “25 per cent of the polls (males over 
sixteen) were under twenty-one.”66   
Demographic heft, however, did not garner for youth power equal to that of 
adults.   Political participation by young colonists appears inconsistent and did not, 
like in England, ever seriously threaten to disorder colonial governance.   Assertive 
adolescents may have nudged and pushed, but, clearly, adults held the command to 
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decide political courses of action.  Historian Holly Brewer finds that a moderate 
number of Virginia adolescents served in the House of Burgesses.  Though each of 
them “fit the picture of teenage males elected to Parliament during the seventeenth 
century:  significant wealth, high status, powerful patron, previous membership of 
father, often early inheritance,” Brewer finds few of the young assemblymen had 
any real legislative clout.67    
When lawmakers sensed that youths might threaten the adultocratic status 
quo, colonial assemblies responded by codifying enfranchisement ages.  The 1629 
charter for Massachusetts Bay, for instance, empowered “the Freemen of the 
Company” to elect governing officials “from tyme to tyme” without specifying a 
suffrage age.68  In 1631, the General Court legislated that “no man shall be 
admitted to the freedom of this body politic” who was not a full church member, but, 
again, it did not set an age floor for “man.”69   The 1641 Massachusetts Body of 
Liberties provided that 21-year-old freemen could give “votes, verdicts, and sentence 
in civil courts” but did not specifically provide for their inclusion at the colonial 
assembly.70  In 1646, a group of prosperous merchants who attended worship but 
were not members of a church petitioned for suffrage rights.  The merchants argued 
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they deserved a vote because they had served in Indian wars, paid taxes, and led 
godly lives.  The General Court denied their petition, but Marchette Chute notes it 
“had a particular attraction to the young” who sympathized with the claim to an 
earned electoral stake.71  The grumblings of un-franchised adolescents caused the 
General Court in 1647 to proclaim twenty-four as the voting age.72  Twenty-four 
remained the age standard in Massachusetts until 1692, when William and Mary 
issued the colony a new charter that lowered it to 21.73 
Like Massachusetts, the other colonies eventually moved from de facto to de 
jure electoral ages of majority.74   In the process, each colony entrenched the power 
of adults by codifying specific chronological years for voting and office-holding.  
Parliament’s 1696 act declaring twenty-one as the national age of enfranchisement 
seems to have instigated colonial actions.  Prior to 1696, just three colonies had self-
declared twenty-one as the official voting age:  Connecticut (1656), Pennsylvania 
(1682), and New Hampshire (1682), and only Pennsylvania had proclaimed it as 
part of a founding charter or frame of government.  After 1696, each colony codified 
21 as the franchise age.  Four colonies had twenty-one imposed upon them as part 
of William & Mary’s re-chartering process:  Massachusetts (1692), Carolina (1696), 
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Virginia (1699), and New York (1699).  The other colonies adopted twenty-one on 
their own: North and South Carolina (1715), Rhode Island (1723), Delaware (1734), 
and Georgia (1754).  Maryland and New Jersey never promulgated an age of 
electoral majority prior to America’s break from England, but historian Albert 
Edward McKinley asserts that “there is no doubt” that twenty-one “was enforced in 
those colonies.”75   
Like in England, adolescent males in America increasingly found themselves 
politically marginalized as adult lawmakers formalized electoral qualifications.  
That process continued when the colonies transitioned to states upon America’s 
independence.   The military, social, and intellectual upheavals of the Revolution 
inspired young people, especially those males aiding the Patriot cause, to stake 
practical and ideological claims to suffrage.   States received a smattering of 
proposals to extend franchise privileges to minors serving in the armed forces.  Only 
Pennsylvania allowed adolescent soldiers to vote in general elections, but just once 
(in spring 1776) before reverting back to the 21-vote tradition upon the writing of a 
new state constitution in fall 1776.76   And every state required delegates to 
constitutional conventions to be at least twenty-one.  
The Revolution caused Americans rethink traditional limits on political 
participation, but it did not prompt a radical redefinition of suffrage.  Some scholars 
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regard the Revolution as fomenting a republican ideology that energized 
disfranchised social groups to pursue the benefits of citizenship.   They argue that 
the egalitarian, contractual, and consent-based philosophy that animated America’s 
patriots became a dominant force behind the clamor for including more people into 
the political nation.77  During the 1770s and 1780s, the transition of the American 
population from subjects to citizens required that persons contributing to the well-
being of the country should have some say in government.  In some states, that 
sentiment provided the moral justification to enfranchise women and free blacks.78  
Driven by the relationship between taxation and representation, other states 
reduced property qualifications or separated voting requirements from owning 
property to paying taxes, which allowed poor men in those places a voice in political 
decision-making.79 
For minors, the transformative power of the Revolution and republicanism 
was far weaker:  adults remained unshakably in control as Americans seized rule 
from the British and formed the federal republic.   Suffrage rights for youth were 
not on the Patriot political agenda, and no prominent American of the founding era 
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publicly challenged the legal or traditional supremacy of adultocracy.  America’s 
founders fully supported republican forms of government, but they could not justify 
allowing minors to vote or hold office.  To validate the turn from monarchical 
authority, Americans employed an age-based paradigm:  since adults possessed the 
capacity to reason, born from the wisdom gained from experience, a government 
based on the consent of the governed was justified.  To maintain the viability of the 
claim, America’s Founding Fathers perpetuated the British tradition of defining 
electoral consent as an entitlement of age rather than ability.  They accomplished 
that by writing constitutions that specified when enfranchisement would be granted 
to constituents and ignoring how consent could be assessed among the citizenry.   
American lawmakers justified the denial of youth enfranchisement and the repeal 
of suffrage extended to women and free blacks by raising the specter of an unwise 
and unrestrained democratic multitude threatening civil order.   As educator 
Thomas Cooper exclaimed, “Republicanism is good, but the ‘rights of boys and girls’ 
are the offspring of Democracy gone mad.” 80 
The traditional skepticism about the mental and emotional fitness of young 
people served as the main rationale for barring youth suffrage.  The customary view 
of adolescence as a time of tumult compelled adults to not enfranchise adolescents, 
despite youth contributions to securing nationhood and the egalitarian spirit of 
republican ideology.  In a 1776 letter to a fellow member of the Massachusetts 
assembly, John Adams asked rhetorically, “Why set the standard at age twenty-
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one?  What reason should there be for excluding a man of twenty years eleven 
months and twenty-seven days old, from a vote when you admit one who is twenty-
one?”  Adams answered himself, “The reason is, you must fix upon some period in 
life, when the understanding and will of men in general, is fit to be trusted by the 
public.”81  To Adams and his adult contemporaries, turning twenty-one served, in 
lieu of a common rite of passage, as an arbitrary but necessary marker of civic 
maturity signifying social recognition of full adulthood, enfranchisement, and 
citizenship.  Despite the turn in home rule established by Adams and other 
founders, American voting age laws replicated the adultocratic boundaries of 
authority defined by British custom.  Every state constitution from 1776 through 
1943 declared twenty-one as the electoral age of majority.    
 
The basic thesis for age-delaying enfranchisement emphasized that adults would 
not grant adolescents suffrage until they gained the cognitive capacities necessary 
for balancing the grown-up demands of public and private life.   The laws of Athens, 
Rome, England, and America each incorporated Aristotle’s view that the 
development of self-determination constituted the hallmark of maturity by 
constructing an age-graduated process for apportioning decision-making sanction.  
By the time the Florida Supreme Court heard Bernard Riley’s case in 1930, he had 
attained the traditional social attributes normally associated with adulthood:  a 
married, self-sufficient, taxpaying householder.  In a vital political aspect – his age 
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– he remained a child.  Riley’s case evidenced that the typical evaluation of 
adolescent requests for prerogatives, whether arbitrated by judges, legislators, or 
parents, focused narrowly on the chronological age of the petitioner rather than the 
content of character or the context of condition.  For adolescents, the command to 
act one’s age became a doubled-edged sword requiring them to balance comporting 
to adult-defined behavioral standards while harnessing their natural impulses for 
individual autonomy.  Riley’s plea did not ask to overturn statutory orthodoxy; it 
simply asked for a share of electoral self-governance equitable to his own personal 
sovereignty.  The aged judges of the Florida Supreme Court refused to consider 
Riley’s life circumstances and instead focused on the legal precedent of denying all 
minors, self-sufficient or not, the adult privilege of suffrage.   
As Riley learned, adolescents suffered the disabilities of age-based 
chauvinism because of a social consensus stereotyping them as reckless, insolent, 
and unruly no matter how independent or self-reliant.   The term “adolescence” 
became code for a pernicious form of prejudice that anchored denials of opportunity 
to a chronological bigotry that cut across racial, sexual, and economic 
disfranchisements.  Juveniles could engage in civic life, but they were not entrusted 
with civil authority.   Conceptions of adolescents as congenitally inferior creatures 
informed the contrivance of adultocracy to harness their dynamism.  Adults feared 
that the innate defiance of adolescents would morph into fanaticism and, possibly, 
anarchy if not checked.  Adultocracy granted grown-ups absolute power and special 
privileges because they appeared, as Aristotle averred, naturally possessed with the 
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equanimity to govern sensibly and the experience to rule wisely.   
The adult consensus that only persons of majority age possessed the cache of 
wisdom and experience to vote and hold office smacked of autocracy. Many 
adolescents had similar, if not better, cognitive abilities than adults but were un-
franchised because of age-based chauvinism.  Adults considered young people 
incompetent for having the developmental imperfections that, as Aristotle observed, 
were “natural” to adolescence.   Teen-aged persons, especially those emancipated 
like Bernard Riley, became politically anomalous:  they possessed the requisite 
personal skills to live independently but were denied the electoral license to shape 
the political life of the nation they inhabited.   The great risk of democracy is that 
the state trusts individual judgement to make the electoral and governmental 
decisions necessary for its preservation.  Because adults simply did not trust 
supposedly stressed-out and rebellious adolescents to carry out democratic tasks 
maturely, they consciously constructed a tyranny of the legal majority that favored 
age over ability.  American adolescents vowed that if given a genuine opportunity 
by adult authorities to prove their mettle, they would secure their right to vote.  
That chance came during World War II.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
WAR, YOUTH, AND SUFFRAGE, 1940-1945 
 
 
 
This is no easy war.  It means the continuation of democracy or the end of it, so it is 
a pretty serious war for us.  We have sent hundreds of thousands of soldiers abroad, 
and while they are fighting for democracy abroad it is just as important for us to 
preserve democracy at home.  And the most important part of that is the right to 
vote. 
 
                                           John J. Bennett, New York State Attorney General82  
 
 
D-Day, 6 June 1944, began badly for Allied invasion forces.  German 
defenders along the ridgelines of the coasts of Normandy, France, poured mortar 
shells and machine-gun fire into enemy platoons stuck on the beach.  Allied 
strategists planned to spread the assault over five beaches, each given special code 
names.  The Germans put up the toughest resistance on Omaha beach, where Allied 
invaders suffered an 80% casualty rate, the highest of the five attack points.83  The 
recollections of the surviving paratroopers, foot soldiers, and marines starkly 
describe the harrowing experiences of the day’s combat.  Bernard Friedenberg, a 
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medic assigned to the 16th Infantry Regiment’s Medical Detachment, remembered 
vividly a young soldier at Omama with a gaping chest wound.  Friedenberg quickly 
diagnosed that only constant pressure on the wound could stave off the GI’s death.  
As his hands worked to control the bleeding, he heard the desperate cries of 
“Medic!” from other troops who needed his immediate attention.  Friedenberg now 
faced an awful quandary.  Should he stay with the patient, who was most likely to 
die regardless, or leave him to save other lives?  At that moment, Friedenberg 
understood the grave consequences of his battlefield assessments.  “Who should live 
and who should die,” he wrote, “is not a decision a twenty one year old boy should 
have to make.  It is a decision only God should make but where was God?”84  
Friedenberg shot the GI full of morphine to ease his pain and moved on to treat 
another injured soldier. 
Wartime America asked young men like Sergeant Friedenberg to make such 
tough, life-changing choices.  American youths threw themselves into the work of 
war.  On front lines and factory floors, they labored with conviction and devotion. 
Yet the government that willingly sent 18-, 19-, and 20-year-olds into battle 
willfully refused to enfranchise them.  Advocates of youth suffrage exposed the 
hypocrisy of employing adolescents to defend democracy while denying them 
electoral rights.   They pushed the issue into the national political arena by framing 
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it as one of reward.  Youths deserved enfranchisement because of their meritorious 
service.  State and federal lawmakers put forward bills to reduce legal suffrage ages 
from twenty-one to nineteen or eighteen.  Except for Georgia, wartime governments 
rejected those proposals.   
Two interconnected factors influenced wartime debates regarding voting 
ages:  legal structures parceling opportunities to proffer consent by age and social 
conceptions defining adolescents as immature and recalcitrant. The recent (ca. 
1900) social subscription to a liminal (i.e. prolonged) adolescence fused onto the pre-
existing structure of gradated majority ages.  Together, beliefs in liminality and the 
piecemealing of full legal standing had bolstered the abiding consensus that teenage 
persons needed some time to develop the temperament and judgment necessary to 
execute the grown-up tasks of civic life. An advocate for establishing eighteen as the 
national voting age identified the conundrum of youth:  “These young people, who 
certainly could be trusted to exercise the citizen’s prerogative to vote, are still 
chained to our elders’ concept of ‘legal age.’”85  Supporters of the 18-vote argued that 
the circumstances of war had upset those convictions by plunging adolescents into 
adult situations.  In an April 1943 poll, George Gallup’s American Institute of 
Public Opinion revealed that many Americans sympathized with the plight of the 
unfranchised underage soldier.  A Gallup interviewer summarized, “The majority 
feel that since the Army can use the judgment of this age group to good advantage, 
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there seems no good reason why the same judgment would not work in politics.”86  
Opponents conceded that the stellar war service of youth appeared to make them 
deserving of suffrage.  But to enfranchise all 18-, 19-, and 20-year-olds because of 
the patriotic actions of a few gallant youth obfuscated the longstanding recognition 
of teenage persons as “immature and unstable as they stand in the swirl of 
adolescence.”87    
Several obstacles blocked revising voting ages during World War II.  Some 
lawmakers thought adolescents should be enfranchised as recompense for duties 
performed, but many, including President Franklin Roosevelt, did not reckon youth 
suffrage a political priority in the midst of war.  Most members of Congress, 
particularly conservatives, believed federal legislation to set a national voting age in 
American elections violated the states’ constitutional right to determine the 
qualifications of electors.  Many policymakers heartily acknowledged the vital 
contributions of young people to the war effort, but, like their adult constituents, 
they did not readily accept adolescents as capable voters.  Though government 
officials relied on young combatants to make mature decisions on the battlefield, 
they distrusted adolescent citizens to choose sensibly at the ballot box.  Nor did 
young people appear all that interested in obtaining suffrage.  When asked, most 
individual teenagers agreed with the reasoning that a person old enough to fight for 
democracy was old enough to be afforded the full franchise of democratic 
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citizenship.  Yet, adolescents did not collectively mobilize or campaign on behalf of 
their own enfranchisement.   As a result, neither superb war service nor stirring 
democratic appeals yielded voting rights for American youth.   
 
Fighting World War II fostered a high degree of social unity among 
Americans.  The clarity of the battle between democratic good v. totalitarian evil 
inspired them to toil tirelessly and enthusiastically for victory.  Like other social 
groups, America’s youth rallied to help win the war.  Enthused by the spirit of 
collective purpose, teen-aged Americans joined the “Arsenal of Democracy” that 
churned out enough tanks, planes, ships, and armaments to overwhelm the Axis.  
Thousands of other adolescents, particularly males, enlisted in the armed forces.  
The labors and sacrifices of young people, similar to other social groups, helped to 
vanquish fascism and established democratic societies in Europe and Asia.   
Young Americans accepted the national consensus that World War II was 
being fought to defend the right of all persons to have self-determination and to live 
in security.  Even left-wing youth groups that had criticized the war as a needless 
conflict to enrich western capitalists ardently supported the fight against fascism 
after Pearl Harbor.  One leader of the Youth Communist League declared, “Our 
objective was and is:  every YCL member a Production Commando.”88   The self-
evident need for youth to serve and the clarity of the cause that America fought for 
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inspired adolescents to accept the grown-up obligations of warfare.  As one lad 
declared,  
I, as an individual, will do my utmost to help in national  
defense, and will do all in my power to protect my country  
from any country who tries to destroy democracy.  I will be  
ready at any time to be called upon for national defense, if  
it is for the army or in my community or in a factory.  I will  
do all I can to express to other people my thoughts on what  
a free country means to me.  In other words, I love to be an  
American, and I want to stay that way.89 
 
Factors such as race, gender, class, ethnicity, and religion differentiated the 
war experiences of youth.   But, in the context of war service, all adolescents 
yearned to be, or be seen as, adults; i.e. persons capable of determining their own 
fates or courses of action without compulsion.  Adolescents saw World War II as an 
opportunity to overcome age-based prejudice through their achievements.  Historian 
James Marten posits that warfare has usually allowed young people to escape 
“prewar restraints on their behavior and limits on their imaginations.”90   Youth in 
wartime America hoped to accelerate their advancement into adulthood by 
showcasing their skills and aptitudes.  They believed adults would accept them as 
first-class citizens by exhibiting their willingness to sacrifice, soldier, and sweat for 
the Allied cause.  Many young people, like Bernard Friedenberg, disproved the 
stereotypes of youth irresponsibility through their splendid service.  Many 
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adolescents even chose to withdraw from school, knowing full well the long-term 
ramifications of an incomplete education, to secure the esteem of “mister,” “Mrs.,” or 
“sergeant” rather than remain classified as a “kid” or a “teenager.”91   
Adult authorities publicly and repeatedly deemed young citizens a necessary 
part of the fight. A pre-war report authored by the National Youth Administration 
predicted:  “That the nation needs the loyalty and cooperation of its youth, now and 
in the days to come, is not to be questioned.”92  President Roosevelt, in a speech 
before the International Students Association, declared that the Allied cause was 
“the cause of youth itself . . . youth must fight the battles and bear the 
responsibilities of the peace to follow.”93   Adults encouraged Washington officials to 
mobilize youth manpower.  A March 1942 poll conducted by George Gallup’s 
American Institute of Public Opinions revealed that 82% of respondents agreed that 
“all men and women over 18 who are not already in military service” should be 
“required to register with the government for some kind of civilian defense or war 
work.”94  And adults lavishly praised youth for superlative service.  In a 1944 
editorial, the Chicago Tribune lauded those “tens of thousands of boys whose 
ordinary prospect in peace times would have been limited by the theory of juvenile 
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delinquency, the teen-age tradition, who are now out with the army, navy, and coast 
guard, in combat or in training for combat, doing a man’s job and probably with 
more than the ordinary adult’s vigor, resiliency, and instinctive courage.”95    
Such declarations clarify adult appreciation of youth, but scholars disagree 
over the intentions of adults to draw young people into the war effort.  Robert 
William Kirk contends that adults encouraged them to participate for material (to 
collect needed war supplies) and personal (to develop character) reasons.96  William 
M. Tuttle, Jr. holds that the involvement of youth had mainly a political motive (to 
embrace democratic values).97  Whatever their aim, many adults believed that 
united war service might rekindle a sense of intergenerational comity that had been 
lost during the Great Depression.  An Army recruitment poster targeted toward 
youth emphasized, “This fight is for your country.  You must make sure it’s your 
victory too!”98 
Adults, however, kept youth from full immersion into the war because of the 
age prejudice inherent to the storm-stress model of adolescence.  The cultural 
understanding of adolescence as a naturally turbulent period framed teenagers as a 
discrete social group mentally and emotionally ill-equipped to handle the mature 
tasks of grown-up life.  Historian Anthony M. Platt shows how G. Stanley Hall’s 
                                                          
95 “New Youth on the Horizon,” editorial, Chicago Tribune, 8 January 1944, 12. 
 
96 Robert William Kirk, Earning Their Stripes:  The Mobilization of American Children in the 
Second World War (New York:  Peter Lang, 1994).  
 
97 William M. Tuttle, Jr. “Daddy’s Gone to War”:  The Second World War in the Lives of 
America’s Children (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1993).   
 
98 Atlanta Constitution, 9 October 1942, 2.  Italics in original source. 
51 
 
identification of adolescence as a “problem” spurred state intrusion into the private 
sphere to “save” youths from their inherent deviancy.99  Over the first four decades 
of the 20th century, adults utilized Hall’s prescription for a prolonged adolescence to 
intensify public control over young people.  Authorities designed juvenile courts, 
compulsory education laws, and prohibitions on child labor to protect the best 
interests of minors and assist their transition to adult status but, in the process, 
they institutionalized chronological segregation.   Sociologist David Bakan contends 
that such enactments imparted a modern calibration of ages that divided 
adolescence and adulthood at the high-school years, particularly eighteen – the 
customary year of graduation.100   
To avoid carping about the science of adolescent development, government 
administrators utilized the age gradations of secondary school as the rubric for the 
dividing and sub-dividing of civic assignments.  For instance, the War Labor Board 
allowed children as young as fourteen to obtain work permits, but only if they had 
completed the eighth grade, passed a physical examination, and received 
permission from their parents.101  Influenced by the custom of a prolonged 
adolescence but tempted by the weighty burdens of war to mobilize all youth, 
civilian and military authorities disagreed over when they would allow young 
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people to serve autonomously (i.e. without the need for parental consent) as workers 
and soldiers.  After some debate, federal officials chose sixteen as the minimum age 
of employment and eighteen as the age floor for conscription.  
Those decisions sparked a generational quarrel over the service role of youth.   
Underage adolescents saw themselves as associate partners in the campaign, 
players who possessed talents and abilities exceptionally suited for modern warfare.  
Teenagers understood clearly how their efforts, irrespective of their youthful age 
and inexperience, directly connected to the defense of freedom at home and around 
the globe.  And they insisted upon having their fair share of the work load.  A 
Census Bureau survey in April 1944 showed that 20% of males aged fourteen and 
fifteen and more than 25% aged sixteen and seventeen were gainfully employed.  
Fewer teenage girls worked, in aggregate, than boys, but the report revealed that 
33% of females aged sixteen to eighteen had jobs.  Moreover, 35% of all adolescents 
(primarily boys) between ages sixteen and eighteen had left school altogether and 
gone to work.102   A wartime study of young males found, however, that well over 
half of them desired “adult” service activities and deemed their current position 
(usually part-time manual labor) was not “big enough” to assist the war effort 
meaningfully.103   
Federal war planners viewed juveniles as adjunct assistants to adult labor, 
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helpers who would act as subordinates and make secondary contributions to war 
activities.  Public authorities sought to look out for the best interests of young 
people, and the war effort itself, by striving to protect unsure and unqualified 
youths from harmful or overwhelming situations.  The system for acclimating teen-
aged people to war service apportioned tasks along a stepped structure of 
chronology-based eligibility standards, resembling closely the graduated allocation 
of responsibilities forged by age of majority laws.  War administrators limited 
adolescents to roles that adults thought young people could handle relative to the 
magnitude of the task.  Adult perceptions of youth capability rather than 
demonstrations of aptitude or interest initiated the drawing of age lines.  As 
historian Joseph Kett asserts, “Adolescence was essentially a conception of behavior 
imposed on youth, rather than an empirical assessment of the way in which young 
people actually behaved.”104   
Following the cues of Paul V. McNutt, chairman of the War Manpower 
Commission, civilian authorities outlined a program for youth service founded on 
educational age gradations.105   Adults enlisted junior-high school children as 
“salvagers.”  They mainly recycled consumer goods and collected donations of, 
among other things, scrap metal, fats, and money, activities usually chosen and 
organized by school administrators.106  Besides meeting national material needs, 
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adults also encouraged participation in scrap collection, historian Robert William 
Kirk claims, for psychological reasons, such as “improving character through 
practicing diligence, enhancing patriotism, developing a sense of purpose in children 
in order to reach a common goal, preventing their delinquency, and lessening 
children’s fears and insecurity.”107  The war work of junior-high youth functioned 
more as volunteerism, purposefully expending time and energy directed at 
benefitting society.  They grew frustrated that their young age excluded them from 
assisting the war effort in an independent manner; a psychologist reported that 
they deeply resented “being treated like babies when there is so much vital work to 
be done.”108  Young adolescents believed themselves to be contributing to the war 
effort but became impatient to experience the sense of personal triumph and feeling 
of patriotic amity associated with autonomous, rather than adjunctive, war service.   
Authorities regarded high-school teens as homefront “reservists” available 
for, but not yet fully capable of, war duty.  Their war work more resembled 
employment, or the deliberate use of labor to perform the jobs of war.109   As youths 
grew older, the age shelters that had protected them from full immersion into the 
war gradually fell. And adults insisted high-schoolers put aside the high jinks of 
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teendom to take on the serious duties of citizenship.  In a story about female war 
service, reporter Yolande Gwin noted that “Betty Co-ed of 1943 is not the dating, 
dancing, and frivolous young student as were her predecessors. . . . Her daily 
schedule is taken in the tempo of war rather than peace and her spare time is taken 
in doing her part for her country rather than for herself.”110   The main task of high-
school age youth was to gain the education and training fundamental to their 
imminent war duties.  While in the process of getting ready to work or fight, they 
participated in homefront preparedness.  Adults usually coordinated the important 
rear-guard activities, such as taking part in civil defense, war bond sales, Red Cross 
first aid, and messenger service.  In less vital ventures, like forming “anti-rumor” 
squads, planting backyard gardens, and assisting rationing boards, teenagers were 
given slight supervisory agency.  When working together, the roles of males and 
females often, but not always, differed.  Boys generally carried out managerial 
errands or manual labor, while girls performed clerical work or served as support 
staff.111   
The expectation of adults that secondary-school students would make 
significant, but supervised, contributions to the war effort did more to reinforce civil 
paternalism than develop youth autonomy.  The notion that adolescents would 
benefit from adult-imposed structure, order, and discipline formed the ideological 
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core of age relations during the war. Gladys Huntington Bevans, a nationally-
syndicated home-affairs columnist, counseled her parent-readers to tamp the 
precocious, though patriotic, desires of their high-school aged children to rush into 
war service.  Rather than prematurely endure the pressures of handling orders by 
officers or bosses, teenagers, she advised,  
should have during this part of their adolescence the  
guidance and championship of their parents and the  
developing influence of home.  Under the most favorable  
circumstances this fast maturing period that is often  
accompanied by bewilderment asto conduct and ideals.   
Teen age boys and girls often find it difficult to adjust to  
the world.  They are not ready at 13 or 15 for the experiences  
and shocks of war.  Rather do they need those years at  
home to build up their bodies and their characters to better 
fit them to fight for their country.112 
    
Like Bevans, most every adult believed that anxiety-ridden juveniles needed 
and desired guidance in finding self-definition.113  Authorities could, therefore, 
simultaneously exploit adolescents for their adult-like capabilities and treat them 
like dependent children.   Historian Joseph Kett contends that one of the 
continuities in youth history is adolescent wavering between states of dependence 
and semi-independence, especially during times of national strife.  He writes, 
“Young people at times experienced a halfway blend of freedom and restraint, with 
elements of freedom becoming more pronounced over time.  But at other points they 
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were exposed to temporally alternating opportunities for independence and adult 
responsibility on one side and demands for submission on the other.”114  Traditional 
dogma about the storms and stresses of adolescence mandated that adults check 
teen impulses for the good of society and the war effort.  Restricting youth to a 
narrow range of adult-approved activities, however, mitigated the hopes of 
adolescents to leverage their war ventures to break the customary confines of 
chronology.   
Many young people, of course, found the adult-imposed, age-based structure 
of mobilization conspicuously neglectful of ambition and ability.  They viewed the 
system as poignantly un-democratic as they strove for the chance to work and fight 
against fascism on par with other citizens.  Youths also perceived a fundamental 
hypocrisy in the conflicting messages authorities conveyed.  Adults insisted that 
teenagers act maturely while helping the cause, but they treated adolescents as if 
they were incapable of mature behavior or deeds.  Scholar Richard M. Ugland finds 
that juveniles grew more dismayed than delinquent over their inability to assist the 
war effort fully.  He quotes from a 1942 report issued by the Progressive Education 
Association that concluded, “’Youth have suffered more from the frustration of not 
being invited to share in solving real problems than from being overtaxed in 
working at them.’”115  Over the course of the war, Ugland concludes, adolescents 
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became more and more perplexed by their marginalization.  As a girl from 
Indianapolis wrote, “’We know we’ve got to do something; we know we’ve got to go 
out there and help. . .or we’ll go crazy but what can we do?’”116   
Adolescent Americans who worked and fought for democracy considered 
themselves worthy of political privileges.  Traditional adult concerns about teen 
credulity, though, motivated a stunting of political involvement among adolescents.  
The chaos of the Great Depression pushed millions of young Americans, particularly 
college students, to join political advocacy groups.  The American Youth Congress 
emerged as the unofficial spokesman for the young.  It was an umbrella 
organization of diverse student and youth groups, including the Boy Scouts and 
Young Communist League, that supported liberal positions, such as the creation of 
federal scholarships for education, abolition of child labor, and elimination of 
warfare.117  In 1937, the AYC became the first student group to advocate publicly 
for reducing voting ages to eighteen.118  Though the AYC and other youth 
organizations condemned communism and fascism, adults thought malleable young 
minds might succumb to charismatic Pied Pipers of radicalism, foreign-born and 
homegrown.119  In October 1940, Mrs. William Hastings, first vice president of the 
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National Congress of Parents and Teachers, asserted, “Corruption of our youth by 
subversive propaganda is a violation of our American liberties regardless of high-
sounding names of hypocritical ‘front’ organizations.  Certainly we have a right to 
inquire about the character of our children’s education; to see that they are taught 
the true principles of Americanism and nothing else.”120   The Educational Policies 
Commission of the National Education Association issued a report in November 
1940 summarizing the results of a nationwide investigation into high-school 
programs for civic preparation.  The Commission concluded that, on the whole, 
secondary school graduates were “’loyal to the ideals of democracy’” and “’well-
informed on many political and economic questions.’”  It labeled the time gap 
between graduation and the attainment of suffrage a “’distinct problem’” and 
recommended lowering voting ages to eighteen to maintain the civic consciousness 
of young adults.121  
Members of the NCPT and NEA and other public officials did not fear young 
people publically goose-stepping or subverting the republic.  They did have a 
concern for the political thoughts and talents of youth on the eve of World War II as 
part of their general worry about the global state of democracy.  In the context of a 
war proclaimed as a democratic crusade, adult concern for political socialization 
made ideological and practical sense.  Public officials strove to cultivate among 
young people a sense of personal ownership in America’s democratic system.   Gene 
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Tunney, former heavyweight boxing champion of the 1920s, organized the Young 
Voters’ Exchange to coordinate local and state efforts that worked to get young 
people active in civic life.  Tunney avowed, “They are the reservoir, the new blood of 
democracy.  If we can get them excited about the privileges and duties of 
citizenship, our democracy lives.  If not, it sickens and dies.”122  Tunney and other 
public leaders urged adolescents to self-engage by studying the governmental 
system, investigating contemporary issues, and forming political beliefs. Seventeen 
magazine, a periodical aimed at teen-age girls, editorialized: “The only people who 
are too young to . . . have political opinions are the truly infantile who can’t read, 
and the perpetually young who don’t read.”123  In a war to defend democracy, elders 
placed great pressure on young Americans to uphold the tenets of the republic by 
performing their civic duties – even if voteless.  
The first congressional conversations regarding youth suffrage emerged as a 
result of disagreement about the age of conscription.  The push for draft legislation 
came from the Military Training Camps Association, a small but vocal group that 
had been a part of the pre-war “preparedness” movement.  In May 1940, it started a 
lobbying campaign for compulsory military service.   The issue of conscription 
became extremely controversial.  Opponents included the education establishment, 
major religious groups, organized labor, the pacifist movement, and Republican 
isolationists.  Some of them argued an antebellum draft was unconstitutional 
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because in 1918 the Supreme Court upheld the legality of involuntary induction but 
only in times of war.124  Other draft foes charged financiers and arms 
manufacturers were pressing for conscription to maximize profits under the guise of 
defending democratic principles, rekindling fears that the so-called “merchants of 
death” would again trick America into entering a European war.  Most congressmen 
backed the use of volunteers, particularly unmarried and childless young men, 
before resorting to conscription.125   
The Nazi sweep across Europe, and, in particular, France’s surrender to 
Germany in June 1940 tilted congressional opinion toward acceptance of a 
peacetime draft.  On 21 June 1940, one day before France fell, Senator Edward 
Burke (D-NE) and Representative James Wadsworth, Jr. (R-NY) each filed 
legislation proposing to make able-bodied males ages 18 to 65 available for 
enlistment.126 Lawmakers agreed that men in the lower age brackets (18 to 30-35) 
should be drafted first. They wrangled mostly over the age floor of conscription.  
Some congressmen agreed with 18, the accepted age for full combat participation 
during World War I.  Other legislators wanted it raised to 21 to match the 
traditional age of majority and the original conscription age set in the Selective 
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Service Act of 1917.127    
The American public generally supported the return of conscription.  A Life 
magazine poll taken in July 1940 revealed that 71% favored “the immediate 
adoption of compulsory military training for all young men.”128  A month later, 
George Gallup found that 67% of males between sixteen and twenty-one and 61% of 
young men 21-to-24 supported the principle of a peacetime draft.129  Isolationists in 
Congress acknowledged that the poll results mirrored a shift in public opinion from 
favoring complete neutrality to supporting limited aid to the Allies.  They 
strenuously objected to the Burke-Wadsworth bill, however, arguing peacetime 
enlistment would precipitate actual American intervention in the war.130  
Isolationist groups picketed Capitol Hill and crowded the galleries in the House and 
Senate seeking to derail Burke-Wadsworth.131  The draft issue also sparked protests 
by left-wing student organizations, such as the American Youth Congress, 
American Youth Committee, Youth Committee Against War, Young People’s 
Socialist League, and American Student Union, that had advocated pacifism or 
isolationism since the 1930s.132  As Congress debated conscription ages during the 
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first week of September 1940, Washington, D.C. police dispersed over 1,500 young 
people demonstrating against coerced induction.  Some opposed conscription 
altogether; others supported the Burke-Wadsworth bill but assailed plans to limit 
the call-up to males in their 20s.133  No adversaries to the draft law mentioned the 
incongruity between the conscription and disfranchisement of young men since 
America was not yet at war.   
In early September, a joint House-Senate committee set ages 21 to 65 as the 
range for registration and 21 to 35 as the ages eligible for induction to military 
duty. The committee did not conjure original age spans; rather, it borrowed from 
age classifications used by American armies during the Civil War and World War 
I.134  On 14 September, the House and Senate approved the committee bill, known 
officially as the Selective Training and Service Act.  President Roosevelt signed it 
into law two days later.135   The act required every male from 21 to 35, regardless of 
race or nationality, to enroll in the Selective Service system.   Registered men could 
volunteer before being called, and volunteers could choose their branch of military 
service.  In October 1940, the first peacetime draft in America’s history commenced.  
The government selected men through a lottery system administered by local draft 
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boards.  Conscientious objectors were offered a choice between noncombatant 
military duty or alternative service.  Draftees were required to serve one 12-month 
enlistment, and were limited to duty only in the Western Hemisphere or U.S. 
territories.136  These restrictions on service reflected the nation’s lingering 
isolationism, suspicions of militarism, and reluctance to fight except for defensive 
reasons. 
As the international pressures to enter the war increased in 1941, federal 
officials pondered reducing the minimum age for draft eligibility.  In April 1941, as 
Axis armies conquered southern and eastern Europe, the War Department 
announced a tentative proposal to lower the conscription age to 18 and begin a 
compulsory military training program for youths as young as 17 and up to age 21.  
“At present,” the Chicago Tribune reported, “the army has enough older men and 
the need is for younger men who are more physically fit for army life.”137   President 
Roosevelt and the head of Selective Service, Lewis B. Hershey, declared the plan 
“necessary” to prepare a backlog of young men for future combat.138  A May 14 poll 
indicated a slight majority (51%) agreed with lowering the draft floor to eighteen, 
but, as Gallup reminded, 71% had approved it in August 1940.139   Representative 
Charles I. Faddis (D-PA), spokesperson for the House Military Affairs Committee, 
asserted that no member backed the Army’s plans.  Faddis indicated that the 
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committee agreed with his belief “that the average 18-year-old boy ‘has not reached 
the proper physical development to be able to make as desirable a soldier as he 
could.’”140 A woman from San Francisco writing to the Washington Post identified 
youth disfranchisement as “the strongest argument” against reducing the 
conscription age, lamenting that the “boys of 18” had no say in the issue since they 
lacked “a voice in Government.”  “If ‘taxation without representation’ was deemed 
unbearable to our forefathers, what can one say of ‘taxing’ one’s physical being 
without representation?” she asked, “Is a man free who is compelled to risk his 
neck, yet is denied the right to vote?”141  In August, Congress dropped the top draft 
age from 35 to 28 and increased the term of service for conscripts from twelve to 
thirty months.  But it did not stray from the 21-draft though the Army insisted it 
needed younger, more physically fit troops.142  
The national defense emergency caused by Japan’s bombing of Pearl Harbor 
changed the public calculus regarding adolescent military service.  Of the 1.6 
million men enlisted as of December 1941, about half had been drafted under the 
Selective Training and Service Act, and most came from the 21 to 28 age class.143  
Immediately after the attack, FDR, Hershey, and Henry Stimson, the Secretary of 
War, pressed Congress to reset the minimum registration age to either 18 or 19 to 
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create a large pool of potential combatants.144  “We may need a lot of men,” Hershey 
affirmed, “And we have to find out where we can get them.”145  Some lawmakers 
publicly worried the nation could not adequately equip or train a military inflated 
by teenage conscripts, while others privately cringed at the notion of compulsory 
service for under-age “children.”146  Columnist Walter Lippmann reported that part 
of the objection among congressmen to the induction of 18-or-19-year-olds sprung 
from a “feeling that those who are too young to vote and enjoy the full privileges of a 
citizen should not be called upon to pay the full price of citizenship.”147  
On 19 December 1941, Congress amended the Selective Training and Service 
Act to require all males between 18 and 64 to register for the draft and to make men 
from 20 to 44 eligible for active duty.  The revision also removed the prohibition on 
duty outside the Western Hemisphere and increased the term of service to the 
duration of the war plus six months.148  From 41 million liable registrants, the War 
Department projected it could raise a fighting force of 7 million if combat 
circumstances required.   Though 18- and 19-year-olds were not subject to 
compulsory military service, they could be mobilized along with older men for work 
in war industries.149   The editors of the Chicago Tribune, a conservative, anti-New 
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Deal daily, cheered Congress’s action.  “There is no better material for the army 
than the youth of 18 or 19,” they stressed,  
He has a man’s strength and much more than a man’s re-  
cuperative powers.  He can enjoy hardships which would 
reduce a more mature brother to sullen anger.  He is at an 
age when obedience comes easily and the capacity to learn 
and to adapt to changed circumstances is greater than it 
will be a few years hence.  What the young man of 19 may 
lack in caution can be corrected with training and, in any 
event, will be more than balanced by his greater audacity 
in times of danger.150 
 
As manpower needs escalated, the pressure to lower the age for active duty 
intensified.  Military leaders initially projected that an armed force of three million 
men would suffice; by February 1942, they expected to need seven million.151  After 
the first official registration drive following Pearl Harbor, Selective Service officials 
predicted that 18- and 19-year olds (which the War Department estimated to 
number nearly 3 million)152  would become eligible for active duty in future 
drafts.153  In April 1942, the Army tried to induce pre-draft-age youths to volunteer 
by offering them their choice of service branch, which was a departure from regular 
enlistment procedure.  Parental consent, however, was still required before the 
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armed forces would accept an underage recruit.154   In late May, President Roosevelt 
ordered 18-and 19-year-old males to complete the Selective Service inventory of the 
nation’s available manpower, which several observers claimed was a precursor for 
asking Congress to revisit the draft-age floor.155  With American families sending 
loved ones off to battle, public opinion regarding lowered draft limit changed; a June 
1942 Gallup survey revealed that 52% of persons opposed an 18-19 draft.156  The 
parents and grandparents of underage teens candidly voiced their disapproval.  A 
grandmother, for instance, impugned “the fathers of our democracy” as craven for 
contemplating any proposal to “send the children out to fight for them.”157  “If it is 
true that men always have to call on children to help fight their wars,” a person 
from Washington, D.C. maintained, “then it is high time the voting age be lowered 
and children have all the privileges of men.”158   
Despite the naval victory at the Battle of Midway and ground advances in 
North Africa during the summer of 1942, Secretary of War Stimson stated drafting 
18- and 19-year-old youths “would be necessary eventually.”159  House Military 
Affairs Committee Chairman Andrew May (D-KY) disagreed.  He relayed to parents 
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that “private advices”160 assured him that the Allies should bring the war to an end 
“probably in 1942 and unquestionably in 1943”; thus, there would be no need to 
induct their young sons.161  The exhaustion of unmarried men from the draft rolls, 
not battlefield triumph, stirred the War Department to request another review of 
the minimum conscription age.  In August 1942, Selective Service chief Lewis 
Hershey warned married men faced mobilization by Christmas because the 
numbers of unwedded draft-age males were rapidly dwindling.162  An unnamed 
congressman predicted that the exhaustion of single men from the enlistment rolls 
meant the armed forces would renew their request for drafting 18- and 19-year-olds.  
“’And if our generals and admirals tell us this is essential to insure victory,’” he 
forecast, “I believe Congress will amend the Selective Service Act.”163   
When the Democrat-controlled 77th Congress returned from summer break in 
September 1942, governmental sentiment leaned toward calling up adolescents 
before married men with children.164  A high-ranking Selective Service official told 
the Wall Street Journal that conscripting the under-aged would impel Congress to 
take on the herculean task of redesigning the system of draft classifications: from 
statuses determined primarily by deferments based on marital status, child 
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dependency, and employment necessity to those based solely on physical fitness 
tests.165  Nevertheless, Republicans and Democrats re-litigated the draft age floor.  
On 2 September, Senator Chan Gurney (R-SD) introduced an amendment to the 
Selective Training and Service Act that would lower the minimum conscription age 
from twenty to eighteen, which was followed on 7 September by a nearly-identical 
18-draft bill filed in the House of Representatives by James Wadsworth (R-NY).166  
Government officials estimated that including 18- and 19-year-olds would add 
somewhere between 2.5 and 3.25 million males to the Selective Service rolls, with 
about 1.5 million physically capable of military service.167  House Military Affairs 
Committee Chairman May reiterated his personal opposition to conscripting youths 
under twenty “’unless I am convinced that the nation actually needs them.” He 
added that forthcoming hearings on the Wadsworth proposal would “’give the Army 
an opportunity to show the need.”168 
Democrats offered two main objections to the Republican proposals.  They 
said  inducting inexperienced youth would put military units at risk and mobilizing 
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college-aged teens would endanger America’s productive capacity.169  Republicans 
countered that permitting them to be drafted had an advantage over volunteerism:  
the provision of adequate preparation by professional military personnel.  They 
reasoned that, in theory, a more mature 18-year-old conscript would be better 
equipped physically to train for combat than an underdeveloped 17-year-old 
volunteer.170  As Wadsworth claimed when he submitted his 18-draft amendment, 
“History teaches us that these young men will make most effective soldiers when 
given thoro[ugh] training and the army will be the better for their being in it.”171  
The GOP also warned that unless Congress changed the Selective Service Act to 
allow the induction of 18- and 19-year-olds, enormous economic and domestic 
dislocations would incur because of need to draft married fathers.172  Newsweek 
reported that the chatter about drafting family men “was pumped along partly to 
build a fire under Congress to legislate for conscription of 18- and 19-year-olds.”173  
Senator Albert J. Engel, Sr. (R-MI) privately expressed to his son that the use of 
this tactic by his party was “undoubtedly to crystallize public sentiment which has 
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been against the drafting of boys under 20 years of age.”174   
House and Senate leaders appeared reluctant to address the 18-draft bills as 
thousands of parents loudly protested.175 As the editors of the Washington Post 
observed, “The implication right along has been, of course, that since the proposed 
measure is bound to be politically unpopular and since elections are in the offing, it 
might be better to withhold consideration for the time being.”176   As Congress 
dickered, other federal officials pressed the 18-draft issue.  The War Department 
began by announcing two plans to expand its youth manpower.  In mid-September, 
it called to duty all draft-age college members of its enlisted reserve, whom had 
been allowed educational deferment.177  Less than a month later, it escalated the 
recruitment of under-20 volunteers by offering them their choice of service in all 
Army branches and the opportunity of qualifying for commissions.178  Then, during 
the first two weeks of October, President Roosevelt took to the airwaves to urge 
national support for the 18-draft “so that an Army with the spirit and hardihood of 
youth may shorten the war with annihilating new offensives”179  Before the radio 
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chats, FDR had thought it unnecessary to lower the age of conscription before the 
end of 1942.180  Convinced by federal manpower executives that enlisting 18- and 
19-year-olds would not disrupt agricultural or industrial production and persuaded 
by military brass that more troops were necessary to fight, what one general called, 
“’this young man’s war,” Roosevelt reversed his stance – which GOP leaders charged 
was nothing more than a political ploy to placate upset constituents before the 
upcoming November mid-term elections.181   In response to the president’s call, 
committees in the House and Senate took up the Gurney and Wadsworth measures 
after weeks of delay. 
Cued by the Commander in Chief, Secretary of War Stimson and Army Chief 
of Staff George Marshall argued the case for the military necessity of resetting the 
age floor of conscription.  Stimson claimed only the 18-draft would allow the armed 
forces to reach its manpower goal of nine million (7.5 million Army + 1.5. million 
Navy).  He also provided data that indicated the Army was “too old”:  the average 
age of a division had climbed exactly two years (26 to 28) from March to August 
1942.182   Marshall testified the swift, highly mobile, and mechanized warfare being 
fought in Europe, Asia, and Africa “requires youth” because of their comparative 
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advantages in physical fitness to older men.183  He also claimed, anecdotally, that 
platoons performed poorly because they were staffed with “too many overage men” 
who lacked the “vigor and enthusiasm” of young troops.184  Indeed, both Stimson 
and Marshall emphasized that adolescent males possessed superior fighting ability 
relative to adult men.  As Stimson declared, 
Members of the 18 and 19 age groups are peculiarly well  
adapted to military training.  This is a military axiom.  Their  
response to leadership, their recovery from fatigue, their  
enthusiasm, or ‘flair for soldiering,’ are exceptional as compared  
with older and younger age groups.  The simple fact is, they  
are better soldiers and never before in its history has the  
American nation more urgently needed exceptional soldiers.185 
 
 
 Other War Department staff echoed Stimson’s beliefs.  His adjutant, Major 
General James A. Ulio, averred, “In many instances, [18- and 19-year-old males] 
have proved to possess not only physical stamina superior to that of older comrades 
but more dash and fighting spirit – which when equally trained and equipped 
soldiers meet – is the deciding factor in battle.”186  Influential Americans outside of 
government concurred.  “[B]oys of eighteen are ideal material for pilots, 
bombardiers, radiomen, navigators, jeep and tank drivers,” syndicated columnist 
Robert Quillen stressed, “They learn fast; they are daring; they are resilient, and, 
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above all, they have a split-second reaction that is lost in a few years.”187  Eighteen-
year-olds also appeared to have other advantages.  As William D. Hassett, Harry 
Truman’s personal secretary, explained to an Oklahoma congressman that they 
“generally have fewer reasons for deferment than older men since they are rarely 
fathers, normally have not developed skills making them essential to war industry, 
and usually are in better physical condition.”188   
The draft-age debate exposed familial splits and professional disagreements 
splits regarding youth capabilities.  Protective parents and grandparents 
emphasized that the inborn juvenility 18- and 19-year-old boys should warrant 
further seasoning at home before shipping them abroad.  They seemed to agree with 
an adult who wrote Survey Graphic magazine that teenagers should have “a chance 
to gain experience and independence before going, fresh from school, into war.  
Everyone should have at least the right to grow up!”189   While generals and 
admirals advocated drafting teenagers, educators and doctors argued that most 
youths of 18 or 19 were not psychologically or physically developed enough to stand 
the shocks of modern battle.  Dr. Thomas V. Moore of Catholic University 
recommended to the House Military Affairs Committee that “some effort should be 
made to test their emotional maturity, and all those who are emotionally immature 
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should be rejected” if Congress decided to lower the draft age.190 Other physicians 
recommended underage lads receive a combination of physical and combat training 
up to age 20 or 21 before deployment overseas.191  Many adolescent boys, however, 
declared themselves immediately fit for duty.  A telephone poll of 17, 18, and 19-
year-old males conducted by George Gallup showed an overwhelming majority 
(81%) in favor of a reduced conscription age. Many of the youths surveyed said they 
backed the proposal to bypass parental objections to joining the military; as one 
respondent admitted, “’I approve lowering the draft age but my parents don’t.’”192   
Thousands of young men below age twenty flocked to recruiting offices in 
anticipation of a new draft floor.  Reports from towns and cities across America 
showed a stunning spike of teen volunteers, many of whom abandoned their 
schooling to enlist.193 
Pressed by Roosevelt, Stimson, and Marshall and pushed by the wave of 
underage enlistments, Congress worked quickly to lower the conscription age.  On 
Thursday, 15 October 1942, after only two days of hearings and less than eighty 
hours after the president’s request, the House Military Affairs Committee 
unanimously approved James Wadsworth’s proposal to reset the draft age at 
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eighteen.194  The next day, the House Rules Committee (the institutional panel that 
determines the guidelines that define the length of debate and the nature and 
extent of amendment for every major bill shall debated on the House floor) 
hurriedly cleared the measure for consideration by the full House under a partial 
“gag” rule.  It limited deliberation to four hours and restricted changes to the 
measure only to amendments seeking to revise the conscription age limits. Also on 
Friday the 16th, the Senate Military Affairs Committee unanimously endorsed Chan 
Gurney’s 18-draft measure, which was to be delivered to the Senate the following 
Monday.195  The committee’s report, clearly impressed by the testimony of Stimson 
and Marshall, affirmed,  
Not only the success of our armed forces depends upon the  
employment of our 18 and 19 year old men as soldiers but 
that our very national existence is dependent upon their use. 
Members of these age groups are particularly fitted for military 
training and combat.  Their response to leadership, their 
quick recovery from fatigue, their aggressiveness, their enthu- 
siasm, and their ‘flair for soldering’ far exceed such qualities 
in other age groups.  The simple fact is that they make better 
soldiers than persons of other age groups and that America 
cannot win unless full use is made of their military capabilities. 
Our armed forces must have the qualities that belong to youth.196 
 
Congressional action on the 18-draft decelerated once the bills reached the 
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House and Senate floors for deliberation.  On 17 October, in an unusual Saturday 
session, the House overwhelmingly approved, 345-16, Wadsworth’s measure.197  
Before final acclamation, the House was roiled by intense debate over an 
amendment filed by Ed Gossett (D-TX) to set the age of conscription at nineteen.  
Before Gossett’s motion, Hamilton Fish (R-NY) assailed the “gag” rule limiting floor 
action, declaring it forestalled consideration of his plan to require that all teenage 
troops receive a year’s worth of training before entering combat.  Piggybacking on 
Fish’s complaint, Jerry Voorhis (D-CA) supported Gossett’s pitch as a safeguard to 
prevent drafting immature 18-year-olds.  Harold Cooley (D-NC) angrily attacked 
the Wadsworth bill, shouting:  “’It doesn’t take a lot of courage, but it take[s] a lot of 
gall to take 18-year-old boys and make cannon fodder out of them because you know 
that’s what will be done. . . .Has Congress decided to let Boy Scouts fight this 
war?’”198  Military Affairs Committee chair Andrew May calmed the chamber by 
offering his personal regrets that teenage boys had to fight at all, with or without 
preparatory training, but he beseeched his colleagues “’to be brave.  Let’s get this 
job over with and let’s get the job of licking Hitler and Tojo over with.’”199 
Anticipating ratification of Wadsworth’s bill by the Senate, King George VI of Great 
Britain signed a proclamation making English males 18 years of age liable for 
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military service.200   
The chief threat to speedy passage of the 18-draft in the Senate was an anti-
vice amendment filed by Joshua Lee (D-OK).   In advance of the debate regarding 
the House-approved conscription bill, civic organizations and parents (particularly 
mothers) bombarded senators with letters and telegrams demanding they provide 
teenage enlistees “special safeguards” for their education, military training, and 
recreation.201  Anxious adults had seemingly shifted their concerns about 
conscripting 18- and 19-year-olds from worries about their physical and emotional 
capacities to soldier to distress about maintaining their moral turpitude within the 
rowdy, macho culture of the camp environment.  Lee responded to the communiqué 
barrage by proposing to ban prostitution and liquor sales in and around military 
posts.  On 19 October 1942, the Senate Military Affairs Committee rebuffed Lee’s 
tender, 7-1.202  After Lee vowed to bring his amendment to the Senate floor, military 
officials moved to undermine it.  Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox said Lee’s plan 
would wreck troop morale.203  Secretary of War Henry Stimson claimed he had no 
objection to the anti-prostitution article but dreaded the prohibition section would 
encourage bootlegging.204  Many senators concurred; as Millard Tydings (D-MD) 
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emphasized, “’I think liquor is one of the greatest curses that ever afflicted the 
human race. . .but heaven knows I do not want to go back to the Capone era all over 
again.”205   Other senators blasted Lee for attempting to inject a moral “diversion” 
into a debate on military affairs.  Some lawmakers insisted that adolescent 
conscripts were “old enough” to make independent choices about their private lives.  
Senator Robert LaFollette, Jr. (R-WI) asked, “’Why should we assume that these 
men who are fighting to preserve our country don’t know enough to be careful in 
their personal habits?  Why should be discriminate against them?’”206  On 22 
October, the Senate killed Lee’s prohibition rider 45-29.207   
Two days later, the Senate voted to accept the House-approved 18-draft bill 
but added an amendment, offered by Lee O’Daniel (D-TX), requiring a 12-month 
training period for all soldiers under age twenty before deployment into combat.208  
Senators heatedly clashed over the necessity of mandatory training, and, 
collaterally, the military’s stated need for adolescent conscripts.  Prewar 
isolationists, particularly Robert Taft (R-OH), George Norris (I-NE), and Hiram 
Johnson (D-CA), strongly supported the bipartisan drive for the 1-year training 
program.  Johnson insisted it was necessary because “’these are our children.  These 
children have a right to their little span of life, their little fling at happiness, just as 
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we have had ours. . . .Give youth some other opportunity than to die.’”209  President 
Roosevelt tried to intervene by sending a letter to the Senate, read aloud by Chan 
Gurney, imploring it to accept the view of Stimson and other military leaders that 
the 12-month preparation course would needlessly shackle war planning and troop 
deployment.210   The Senate tacked the training provision to the 18-draft bill 
anyway.  Its decision meant a joint congressional conference had to settle the 
differences between the Senate and House versions of the legislation.  The 
conference would not meet for another two weeks, however, because of a work break 
to allow congressmen an opportunity to campaign before the 3 November 1942 mid-
term elections. 
Being the first national election held after Pearl Harbor, the 1942 mid-terms 
allowed voters their first chance to express their opinion of federal war 
management.  The plebiscite revealed much displeasure with the paucity of military 
success and the surfeit of bureaucratic regulations.   The people appeared restless 
that battlefield progress against the Axis had proved elusive after the U.S. victory 
at the Battle of Midway the previous June.  And at the time of the election, the 
Marines were stalemated at Guadalcanal.  Americans seemed particularly 
perturbed with the government agencies that ran the war economy and especially 
annoyed by the rationing of consumer goods, wage and price controls, tax increases, 
limits on commerce and trade, and rising inflation. Republicans benefitted from the 
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public disenchantment with Washington, winning 44 seats in the House and 9 in 
the Senate.  Though the Democrats still maintained a 222-209 House majority (with 
four independents) and a 57-38 majority in the Senate (also with four 
independents), the election results indicated that voters wanted the GOP to temper 
the statist tendencies of Congress and the White House.211 
Some Democrats said congressional actions to lower the conscription age from 
twenty to eighteen cost them important votes, principally among the parents and 
grandparents of draft-eligible boys.  About a month after his party’s pummeling, 
Kent Keller, a staunch New Dealer from Illinois, wrote to Vice President Henry 
Wallace that familial concern over the issue created “’a swelling chorus’” among 
mothers that their “’very babes (for all children remain babies to all mothers) were 
being sent out by Roosevelt to be killed in HIS war.  And they voted that 
conviction.’”212   The stunning results of the mid-term may have caused Keller and 
other incredulous Democrats to overstate the electoral impact of the mother-voters.  
Yet, two of the foremost liberal incumbents to lose their seats – Joshua Lee and 
George Norris – were prominently embroiled in the draft-age kerfuffle just before 
election-time.   
Following the mid-terms, lawmakers rushed to solve the 18-draft dilemma 
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before the 77th Congress concluded, as scheduled, in mid-December.  In the morning 
of Wednesday, 10 November 1942, the joint legislative committee stripped the 1-
year, mandatory training amendment from the conscription-age proposal; that 
afternoon, the House adopted the committee measure with a “mighty roar” viva 
voce.213  The Senate ratified the bill the following day also via voice vote.214   On 13 
November 1942, President Roosevelt signed the 18-draft into law.215  The Teenage 
Draft Act was the last major legislation passed by the 77th Congress.  
In adopting a clean (i.e. no pre-combat training provision) draft bill, Congress 
acquiesced to military necessity.  Lawmakers listened to the pleas of President 
Roosevelt, Secretary Stimson, and General Marshall for young troops to be made 
immediately available and believed their assurances that teenage conscripts would 
be adequately prepped for battle.  With the Army entering the fight against the 
Germans at North Africa, the Navy struggling to sweep the Axis out of the Pacific 
and Atlantic Oceans, and the Marines stymied at Guadalcanal, congressmen 
understood that allowing the armed forces instant access to the approximately 
100,000 youths who turned eighteen each month was essential to victory.216  
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Representative Dewey Short (R-MO) summarized the thoughts of many of his 
congressional colleagues in explaining the main objections to the compulsory 
training amendment.  “’It is a terrible thing to draft youths 18 and 19 years of age 
and send them forth into battle to die,” he exclaimed, “But we are engaged in a 
devastating war and we’re not going to defeat the Nazis and Japs with 45 year old 
potbellies. . . .Let us do nothing to hamstring our military efforts.  Who, in the name 
of God, is going to tell us what is “adequate training” unless we leave it to the 
military leaders themselves?’”217  The urgent need for combatants, as so well-
articulated by the armed forces chiefs, also swung public opinion.  A Gallup poll 
released after the mid-term elections showed 67% (men 73%, women 60%) 
supported the drafting of 18- and 19-year-old young men, a clear change from the 
slight majority who opposed it back in June.  In addition, a “special survey” of 
under-20 youths showed 81% approved lowering the conscription age to eighteen.218   
As the joint congressional conference met, college-aged youths sent letters and 
declarations petitioning lawmakers to drop the training requirement from the 18-
draft bill.  Typical of the messages was a note from Dartmouth College’s 
undergraduate governing council:  “’We think that the Senate amendment would 
only hamstring our generals at a time when speedy action is necessary for our 
successes and for the success and relief of our Allies.’”219 
                                                          
217 Chicago Tribune, 11 November 1942, 14. 
 
218 Washington Post, 7 November 1942, 3.   
 
219 Ibid, 8 November 1942, 6. 
 
 
85 
 
After the change of the draft age, American combat units in the final two 
years of the war were mainly staffed by men in their early 20s who had been 
conscripted as older teens in 1943 or 1944.  Establishment of the 18-draft affected 
the age demography of the U.S. armed forces.  The average age of an American 
soldier was 26, sailor 23, and Marine 22.220  In September 1943, Congress briefly 
discussed and quickly rejected drafting 17-year-olds (for lacking “maturity”) as part 
of a bill to exempt fathers from conscription.221  Beginning in December 1943, 
fathers were called to duty, with those in the 18 to 21 age group inducted first.222  
Sending teenage sons into combat distressed parents like no other issue of the war.  
A small contingent of mothers wrote the St. Louis Globe-Democrat to complain that 
“boys of 18 and 19 are too young to go to war, too youthful to be sent in to settle a 
gory mess.”   “If they’re not old enough to vote,” the mothers concluded, “they’re not 
old enough to take the place of the oldsters in the fighting ranks.”223   
Public consternation about fixing a national conscription age initiated the 
first significant congressional discussion about setting a national age of 
enfranchisement.  Going into World War II, every state limited voting rights to 
persons age 21 and over.  Youth suffrage proponents hoped to declare eighteen as 
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the minimum federal voting age.  The U.S. Constitution did not declare a majority 
age of enfranchisement or specifically prohibit persons under age 21 from voting.  
The only statement in the Constitution referencing age in relation to suffrage 
occurred in the Fourteenth Amendment.  It forbade states from abridging or 
denying “to any of the male inhabitants . . . being twenty-one years of age” the right 
to vote in federal elections “except for participation in rebellion, or other crime.”224  
The intent of the wartime legislation was to establish a uniform national voting age 
since none existed and not to reduce an existing age by two or three years.   
On 17 October 1942, the same day the House voted to reduce the draft age to 
eighteen, Representative Victor Wickersham (D-OK) offered the first youth suffrage 
amendment.  He proposed to set eighteen as the voting age for federal elections.225  
The 36-year-old Wickersham had spent most of his political career as the court clerk 
of Greer County, Oklahoma, before being elected to Congress in spring 1941 to fill a 
vacancy caused by the death of Sam C. Massingale.226  Wickersham was known for 
his dedication to constituent service and his affability (e.g. he always answered his 
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telephone by saying “Hello, this is Victor Wickersham, your best friend”).227  He also 
had a reputation for helping young people, as a 17-year-old from Frederick, OK, 
remarked upon requesting information from Wickersham about a career in 
journalism:  “I have heard a great deal of your interest in the young people of our 
district.”228  Wickersham routinely courted potential young voters by writing 
congratulatory letters to junior- high, senior-high, and college graduates.229   He did 
not make any public statement in Congress or to the press about his 18-vote 
proposal.  Whether Wickersham was motivated by his “continued interest in the 
youth of our nation” or moved by the House vote to reduce the draft age to eighteen 
remains unclear.230 
Two days after Wickersham filed his resolution, the Senate began debate on 
the House-approved legislation to subject 18- and 19-year-old males to conscription.  
In the midst of the deliberations, Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI), 58-year-old 
dean of the GOP’s isolationist wing, offered an amendment that would set the 
national voting age at eighteen for both federal and state elections.  Prompted by 
his opposition to the pending conscription bill, Vandenberg stated upon filing his 
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motion:  “If young men are to be drafted at 18 years of age to fight for their 
Government, they ought to be entitled to vote at 18 years of age for the kind of 
government for which they are best satisfied to fight.”231  Whereas Wickersham 
made his amendment applicable only to national elections, Vandenberg’s resolution 
extended voting rights to citizens over eighteen in all elections, federal and state: 
Section 1.  The right of the citizens of the United States, who are 18 years of 
age or older, to vote shall not be denied to abridged by the United States or 
by any State on account of age.  The Congress shall have power to enforce 
this article by appropriate legislation. 
 
Section 2.  This article shall be inoperative unless it shall be ratified as an 
amendment to the Constitution by the legislature of three-fourths of the 
several states within seven years from the date of its submission to the 
States by the Congress.232 
 
Raymond Willis (R-IN) hailed Vandenburg’s motion and urged “’the states 
individually to reduce the voting age to fighting age.’”233 
Vandenberg’s 18-vote resolution appeared to counter to his reputation as a 
crotchety curmudgeon.  In April 1940, Dorothy Thompson wrote in her syndicated 
column “On the Record” that “Senator Vandenberg simply does not speak the 
language of anybody under the age of 40 in this country. . . .Even when he says 
something very nice, he says it in words that are used up, which have unfortunate 
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associations which harken back to a time that no one wants to see restored.”234  
Despite his seeming antiquarianism, Vandenberg’s domestic politics reflected a 
layer of sympathy for young people buried underneath his crusty conservatism.  The 
economic panic of 1893 wrecked his father’s leather-goods business, which, 
according to biographer Lawrence S. Kaplan, forced “the nine-year-old Arthur to 
spend much of his youth living by his wits.”235  The tough socioeconomic 
circumstances of his upbringing led him as a journalist and editor of the Grand 
Rapids (MI) Herald to demand safe working conditions for children and to champion 
legislation that barred the use of child labor.  As a U.S. Senator, Vandenberg 
continued his advocacy to protect young workers.  In 1937, 1939, and 1941, he filed 
constitutional amendments that empowered Congress “to limit and prohibit the 
labor for hire of persons under 16 years of age.”236  Vandenberg’s private papers do 
not provide any hint as to why he submitted his 18-vote resolution, but, in the 
context of his opposition to lowering the draft age, it appropriately fit his penchant 
to shield youth from exploitation while simultaneously seeking to expand their 
opportunities as individuals.237 
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Vandenberg’s act inspired other congressmen to pursue the establishment of 
a national voting age.  In the two weeks after his 18-vote motion, representatives 
Jennings Randolph (D-WV) and Jed Johnson (D-OK) submitted House legislation 
that copied Vandenberg’s measure verbatim.238  Several people congratulated 
Vandenberg for illuminating the injustice of youth votelessness in light of the 
teenage conscription bill and encouraged him to square other suffrage inequities, 
such as the disfranchisement of Washington, D.C. denizens.239   The Wall Street 
Journal, a conservative newspaper that had routinely supported Vandenberg’s 
isolationist and anti-New Deal tack, chided him for filing a mawkish “gesture.”  
“There is no connection in reason between military duty and the political franchise,” 
the Journal’s editors opined, “It does not follow that the youth of 18 has attained the 
maturity of judgment which intelligent voting requires.  To say that if a man is good 
enough to fight he is good enough to vote is only sentimentalism.”240  The 77th 
Congress ended on 16 December 1942 without taking action on any of the 18-vote 
proposals. Establishing a national voting age did not garner much attention since it 
was broached late in the legislative session and because, as reporter W.H. Lawrence 
of the New York Times noted, it was a “collateral issue” to the draft age 
imbroglio.241 
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The 18-vote also became collaterally attached to congressional debate 
regarding anti-poll tax legislation.  During the 1890s, southern state governments 
adopted the poll tax (an assessment fee levied as a prerequisite to vote) as part of a 
cache of disfranchising measures to exclude African-Americans and poor whites 
from electoral politics.242  In 1937, the Supreme Court upheld the legality of poll 
taxes and ruled the authority for levying them rested wholly with the states.  It also 
noted that the Constitution allowed for the eradication of poll taxes as applied to 
federal elections.243  After the ruling, congressional efforts to eliminate poll taxes 
intensified.  Southern Democrats, with assistance from a handful of Republicans, 
successfully rebuffed legislation in 1939, 1940, and 1941.244  On 13 October 1942, 
four days before Wickersham proposed his 18-vote measure, a House motion filed 
posthumously for anti-poll tax champion Lee Geyer (D-CA) easily passed a 252-84 
roll-call vote.  Southern Democrats bitterly objected that it would stir up racial 
strife by enfranchising blacks and deprive states control over their elections as 
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guaranteed in the Constitution.245  The bill, as Geyer had formulated it in 1940, 
cleverly framed abolishing poll taxes as the prevention of “pernicious political 
activities” that might disable overseas soldiers from casting ballots in forthcoming 
federal elections.  Geyer had borrowed the phrase “pernicious political activities” 
from the Hatch Act of 1939.  Named for Senator Carl Hatch (D-NM) the law 
restricted employees of the executive branch (except the president, vice president, 
and certain high-level officials) from engaging in partisan political activities, such 
as using public funds for electoral purposes.246  Geyer originally filed his bill as an 
amendment to the Hatch Act, reasoning that southern politicos manipulated 
elections by paying the poll taxes of some citizens.  His 1940 measure banned the 
levying of poll taxes as a prerequisite for voting for the President, Vice President, 
Senator, or Representative in Congress; it did not seek to outlaw poll taxes for other 
elections.247   After his death in October 1941, collegial sentiment for Geyer within 
Congress and the emotion of fighting a “good” war on behalf of democracy carried 
other anti-poll tax proposals.248  As Representative Thaddeus Wasielewski (D-WI) 
underscored, “’Thousands of people disfranchised by the poll tax are serving in the 
armed forces of the United States.  Is it fair to deny them the right to express their 
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will as to the people who will represent them?  We cannot fight for freedom and 
then deny its existence, to any degree whatsoever, to any group, any place, in 
America.’”249  
Since soldiers were technically employees of the executive branch (as 
members of the War Department), Geyer had believed the Hatch Act might provide 
an indirect path to poll tax elimination via the policing of federal solider-vote 
laws.250  Congress faced a tangled mess of state voter qualifications that challenged 
enfranchising military personnel.  Kentucky, Louisiana, and New Mexico, for 
example, had no provisions for absentee voting whatsoever.  New Hampshire 
allowed absentee voting only in presidential elections. Massachusetts and North 
Dakota mailed absentee ballots to all persons outside the state serving in the armed 
forces.  Seven states (Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Nevada, and 
South Dakota) mailed ballots to state citizens in the armed forces and called for 
their collection at training camps or points of station.  Fourteen states (Connecticut, 
Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, 
North Carolina, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina) allowed state 
citizens who were in military to absentee vote by mail but did not send them a 
ballot until requested.  And twenty-one states (Alabama, Arizona, California, 
Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Michigan, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode 
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Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, 
and Wyoming) extended absentee voting privileges to soldiers and civilians but had 
no specifications for delivering or collecting ballots.251   
In July 1942, Representative Robert Ramsay (D-WV) and Senator Theodore 
Green (D-RI) introduced companion absentee soldier vote bills.  Green, chairman of 
the Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections, maintained that the acts did not 
alter state voting requirements regarding residence, poll-tax payments, or age.  The 
measures sought to permit any member of the armed forces stationed within the 
continental United States to vote by postcard in the November 1942 mid-term 
elections if eligible to meet their home state’s qualifications for voting.252  On 23 
July 1942, the House passed Ramsay’s resolution after nearly seven tumultuous 
hours of delaying tactics coordinated by John Rankin (D-MS), who, Gordon Canfield 
(D-NJ) angrily snapped, had orchestrated a “’sorry day in the history of the 
republic.  We filibuster all day, and over what?  Over giving the service men their 
vote, and we are dancing minutes with the question of giving the right of franchise 
to those who are preparing to give their lives for what they call a free America.’”253  
Over the next two months, the Senate and House approved amendments to 
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Ramsay’s measure that allowed absentee voting in primary and general elections 
for federal offices, permitted mail ballots for military personnel at home and abroad, 
and waived poll tax obligations if servicemen met residency, minimum voting age, 
and/or property requirements.254  
The addition of the poll-tax rider to Ramsey’s amendment became, according 
to New York Times Capitol Hill reporter C.P. Trussell, “the most volatile measure 
dropped into the hoppers since Pearl Harbor.”255  It would apply only to soldiers 
hailing from the eight remaining poll-tax states:  Arkansas, Alabama, Georgia, 
Mississippi, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.   The congressional 
battle over the poll-tax waiver pitched Southern Democrats and a small group of 
hardcore anti-statist Republicans against northern and western congressmen, 
Democrat and Republican, “from districts having an important colored vote.”256  
Senator Walter George (D-GA), who led Senate resistance, clarified that the poll tax 
allies were not “’opposed to soldier voting’” since many congressmen, including 
himself, had sons and other males relatives in service.  However, the poll-tax rider 
to the soldier vote bill set an ominous precedent:  “I]f Congress can now say who 
shall vote for membership in the House and Senate in wartime, it will not be long 
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before the Congress is exercising the same power in peacetime.’”257  Some 
Republicans, including party leaders Arthur Vandenberg and Senator Robert Taft 
(R-OH), agreed with George and criticized federal countermanding of state laws; 
other GOP members believed Ramsey’s proposal would create an army of new 
Democrat voters.258  Southern Democrats denounced the poll tax exemption as a 
liberal-northern threat to the right of states to determine election qualifications, 
which, of course, was the fount of one-party, one-race rule in the South.  
Representative John Rankin thundered that the poll-tax rider was “’part of a long-
range Communistic program to change our form of Government and our way of life, 
and to take control of our elections out of the hands of the white Americans in the 
various States and turn them over to certain irresponsible elements that are 
constantly trying to destroy private enterprise and to stir up race trouble – 
especially in the Southern States.’”259 Supporters of the legislation retorted that 
eliminating poll taxes for all the soldiers, white or black, who willingly sacrificed to 
defend the freedoms of their fellow citizens simply served the cause of democratic 
justice.   As Representative William Pheiffer (R-NY) declared, “’if a man is good 
enough to fight for his country he is good enough to exercise his right of franchise 
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without paying tribute.’”260   On 16 September 1942, less than two months before 
the November elections, President Roosevelt signed the Soldier Vote Bill despite 
some hesitation regarding the mechanics of processing the mail-in ballots.261   
After executive approval of the soldier vote measure, the legislative push for 
a discrete anti-poll tax resolution embroiled Congress.  Poll tax foes realized the 
Soldier Vote Bill had induced Congress to declare for the first time that it had the 
power to quash all forms of poll taxes, not just those that touched military 
personnel.  To many people, a war that required special individual sacrifices to 
preserve democracy made poll taxes an anachronistic affront. “American citizens 
should not be required to pay for the privilege of extending democratic rights,” the 
Washington Post editorialized, “The poll tax should go the way of the former 
property qualification for voting.”262  One week after President Roosevelt authorized 
the Soldier Vote Bill, anti-poll tax advocates in the House managed to pull off a 
discharge petition, a rare parliamentary procedure.263  They gathered the necessary 
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218 signatures to discharge (i.e. relieve) the House Judiciary Committee of its 
jurisdiction over Lee Geyer’s bill (which had been stuck in committee over twenty 
months since it was originally filed in January 1941), thereby turning the measure 
to the House Rules Committee.264   Under the parliamentary rule governing the 
discharge petition, the earliest date for House consideration of Geyer’s motion 
would be 12 October.  On that day, the House passed a resolution that took it out of 
the southern-dominated Rules Committee directly to the legislative floor.265  The 
next afternoon, 13 October, the House overwhelmingly approved the Geyer Bill, 
thus sending it to the Senate for consideration.266   
Prospects for passage of the anti-poll tax legislation initially looked slim.  Ten 
days prior to receiving the Geyer motion, a Senate Judiciary subcommittee had 
roundly rejected a statute offered by Senator Claude Pepper (D-FL) to void poll tax 
prerequisites for voting in federal elections as a “’clear violation’” of the 
Constitution.267  Within the full Judiciary Committee, Chairman Frederick Van 
Nuys (D-IN) engineered an alliance of northern and western Democrats and 
moderate Republicans to approve the Geyer Bill handily (13-5) but with an 
amendment that banned poll taxes in both the primaries and elections for national 
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offices.268  Southern Democrats again fumed that the proposal was an 
unconstitutional infringements of states’ rights.  “’This bill means federal control of 
elections,” Senator Tom Connally (D-TX) bristled, and, in language recalling the 
supposed era of “Negro Rule” during Reconstruction, he charged,  “’However 
obnoxious may be poll tax requirements, they are not as bad as federal bayonets at 
the voting booths.’”269 
 Helped by a two-week recess to campaign for the November mid-terms, 
southern Democrats schemed to stall the Senate’s legislative clock until the end of 
the 77th Congress (slated to adjourn on 16 December 1942).  As congressional rules 
stated, all unaddressed or unresolved bills had to be re-introduced at the start of 
the next Congress once a legislative session ended.270  On 13 November, Theodore 
Bilbo (D-MS) launched the first full-blown Senate filibuster since one in 1938 
orchestrated by southern Democrats to kill an anti-lynching bill.271  He was a 
master of the race-baiting politics of the Jim Crow era and a staunch defender of 
states’ rights, particularly in regard to determining voter qualifications.272   Bilbo 
claimed he was prepared to talk until Christmas, but the strategy plotted by his 
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legislative confederates planned to bury Geyer’s revised bill in an avalanche of 
parliamentary maneuvers, quorum calls, points of order, and amendments.   
One of the amendments, filed by Bilbo on the seventh day of his filibuster (21 
November), proposed to establish eighteen as the national minimum voting age.  
His 18-vote rider to the Geyer Bill surely sounded democratic when it said, “No 
person otherwise qualified to vote in any primary or other election for any such 
[federal] officer shall be denied the right to vote in such election because of his age, 
if such person is 18 years of age or older.”273  Bilbo’s motives, however, were clearly 
polemic.  He utilized the 18-vote measure as a hedge against the possibility that 
further efforts to pass the anti-poll tax bill might be made.274   In case the Senate 
revived the bill, Bilbo hoped to slay it by pressing consideration of his resolution to 
lower the minimum voting age via continuation of the filibuster.  Bilbo, like other 
southern congressmen, believed a national anti-poll tax bill was the first step 
toward federal control of state elections.  According to historian Ronald L. 
Heinemann, southern objections to such legislation “were heightened by wartime 
pressures that threatened to upset not only political equilibrium but traditional 
race relations as well.”275 Bilbo’s resolve to maintain white supremacy by quashing 
a simple expansion of electoral privilege drove his legislative charlatanism.  On 23 
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November 1942, two days after filing his 18-vote measure, a Senate vote for cloture 
on Bilbo’s filibuster failed, thereby killing the Geyer anti-poll tax bill and closing 
any further discussion in the 77th Congress of a uniform suffrage age.276  
The first session of the 78th Congress (6 January to 21 December 1943) 
opened with a rush of youth suffrage bills.  Senators Arthur Vandenberg and Harley 
Kilgore (D-WV) and Representatives Hamilton Fish (R-NY), Jennings Randolph, 
Thomas J. Lane (D-MA), and Grant Furlong (D-PA) each filed joint resolutions 
proposing constitutional amendments to extend voting rights in all elections to 
citizens at least 18 years of age.277 Each of these proposals copied the wording of 
Vandenberg’s October 1942 measure. Congressman Wickersham re-filed his 
previous amendment allowing persons over age 18 to vote only in federal 
elections.278    Representative J. Buell Snyder (D-PA), chairman of the House 
Military Appropriations Subcommittee, submitted an amendment establishing 
nineteen as the national voting age for all elections.279   
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Congressional motions to lower the voting age gained influential support.  
The American Civil Liberties Union, and the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine 
Workers Union of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, and the National 
Education Association each publicly supported the 18-vote.280  Joy Elmer Morgan, 
an NEA executive, declared, “The enfranchisement of 18-year-olds would be a 
logical climax to the amazing growth of the American high school . . . is in keeping 
with the work to extend and enrich education for citizenship and to encourage 
increased emphasis on the study of current affairs.”281 Eleanor Roosevelt was the 
first federal official connected to the executive branch to back resetting voting ages.   
In late January 1943, Eleanor Roosevelt asserted in “My Day,” her nationally-
syndicated column, “If young men of 18 and 19 are old enough to be trained to fight 
their country’s battles and to proceed from training to battlefields, I think we must 
face the fact that they are also old enough to know why we fight this war.  If that is 
so, then they are old enough to take part in the political life of their country and to 
be full citizens with voting powers.”282  On a trip to Columbia, Missouri, a few weeks 
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after the column appeared, she reiterated:  “I have no objection to lowering the 
voting age to 18 years if students are properly trained in citizenship.  We expect so 
much of 18-year-olds in war it is only fair that we should expect the same of them in 
peace.”283  The public comments of the First Lady were significant because, as the 
New York Times emphasized, her “daily newspaper column often gives hints of 
policies under discussion in Administration circles.”284  
The seeming interest of the White House and the flurry of federal bill filings 
triggered state action to reduce voting ages.  The U.S. Constitution gave to the 
states primary authority for establishing eligibility requirements for suffrage.  
Despite a wide variety of voter prerequisites, only two qualifications were 
prescribed by all the states:  residence and minimum voting age.   Since the Civil 
War, only New York had seriously considered reducing the age of 
enfranchisement.285  In 1943, thirty-one state legislatures, stirred by the “old 
enough to fight, old enough to vote” argument, weighed measures to recalibrate 
legal voting ages.  State lawmakers sympathetically but unenthusiastically 
considered the youth suffrage proposals.  Twenty-seven statehouses either chose not 
to act on or did not report bills out of committee.  In Arkansas, New York, and 
Wisconsin, one house of the legislature approved a youth suffrage proposal while 
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the other house declined.  Only Georgia successfully lowered its voting age, from 21 
to 18, during the war.286 
 State rejection of extending voting rights to young people mirrored public 
opinion.  Gallup polls conducted in January and April 1943 showed that a majority 
of those persons asked opposed changing laws to permit 18-, 19-, and 20-year-olds 
suffrage.  The January and April polls, however, revealed that the idea of lowering 
voting ages was gradually gaining favor:287 
 
Date of Poll Yes No Undecided 
June 1939 17% 79% 4% 
January 1943 39% 52% 9% 
April 1943 42% 52% 6% 
 
In June 1939, Gallup’s group first asked Americans about the prospect of youth 
suffrage in response to its promotion by Judge Ben B. Lindsey.  Americans knew 
Lindsey as the originator of America’s juvenile court system, an international 
authority on juvenile delinquency, and outspoken advocate for children’s rights.288  
In spring 1939, Lindsey had given several public speeches and, according to 
nationally-syndicated columnists Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen, had been 
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granted a private audience with President Franklin Roosevelt in support of the 18-
vote.  Pearson and Allen reported that Lindsey emphasized two points in his talk 
with FDR:  1) modern youth were capable of voting because they matured more 
quickly, in terms of educational and experiential development, than prior 
generations, and 2) young men who faced the possibility of conscription because of 
world political events deserved an electoral say in deciding whether the United 
States should go to war.   Lindsey told Pearson, “’With longevity increasing, we are 
becoming a nation in which old people have a controlling voice in the affairs of the 
nation.’”  Because America “’always has been a young nation,’” Lindsey concluded, 
“’we must keep it that way” by enfranchising America’s three million 18-, 19-, and 
20-year-olds.289   
 The overwhelming majority of poll respondents in 1939 disagreed with 
Lindsey.   Gallup’s results showed some demographic variation:  Democrats and the 
working class favored the 18-vote more than Republicans and the wealthy.  The 
reason for the party and class split, Gallup speculated, related to a general belief 
that young people and the poor strongly supported the President Roosevelt and the 
New Deal.290  Nevertheless, nearly everyone queried opposed Lindsey’s idea for 
generally the same reason.  People disputed his claim that better contemporary 
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schooling had prepared youth to vote as knowledgeably as adults.   Gallup 
conveyed, “By far the most frequent comment is that most young people under 21 
are too unfamiliar with political matters to make competent voters.  Many of them 
remark that ‘even at 21 you don’t know very much about what’s going on.’” That 
sentiment held across age lines:291  
 Persons Aged Yes No  
           21 to 29 17% 83%  
          30 to 49 17% 83% 
 50 and over 18% 82% 
 
 
Neither Nazi aggression in Europe nor other international episodes portending war 
affected the poll results.  Gallup made no mention of the looming war or potential 
conscription as factors influencing what people thought about reducing voting ages.    
 By April 1943, however, America’s participation in World War II and the use 
of youth in combat convinced 25% more respondents that adolescents should vote 
than the June 1939 survey.  Though a slight majority still supported the 21-vote 
tradition, the induction of 18-year-olds into the armed forces caused many citizens 
to reconsider whether it should persist.  The January 1943 Gallup poll revealed a 
consistent rise in favorable opinion for youth suffrage over different age spans:292 
 
Persons Aged Yes No Undecided 
21 to 29 41% 53% 6% 
30 to 49 38% 52% 10% 
50 and over 37% 52% 11% 
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 Two population groups acutely affected by the impact of war – teenagers and 
the parents of young troops – nudged the 18-vote issue into the national spotlight by 
highlighting the intelligence of contemporary youth and the injustice of service 
without suffrage.  A high-school student from Hancock, Maryland, asked, “if a 
young man at [eighteen] is old enough to fight for a thing, and know what he is 
fighting for, isn’t he old enough to help protect and play an active role on behalf of 
that for which he is giving his life?”293  Another adolescent challenged the supposed 
“’fact that the men below 21 were ill-advised in political matters.’”  “’This might 
have been true in 1789,’” the youth asserted, “’but the educational systems of this 
country have advanced to the point where a young man has a knowledge of political 
affairs at the age of 18.  I have recently turned 19 myself and have participated in 
many debates with elders who have respected and valued my opinions on a parity 
with one who has passed the present legal age.’”294  The father of a soldier from New 
York City questioned why adolescents “who certainly could be trusted to exercise 
the citizen’s prerogative to vote, are still chained to our elders’ concept of ‘legal age.’  
I have a son who will be 21 in a few days, but as he is serving in our Army overseas, 
this won’t mean a thing to him from this angle of consideration.  It seems to me that 
if these young people of 18 and over are old enough to fight they should be 
considered old enough to vote; otherwise we oldsters do them a great disservice.”295   
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 The slim public majority who backed the 21- vote remained skeptical about 
enfranchising adolescents.  They acknowledged that young men had benefitted from 
improvements in American education, shouldered much of the fighting burden, and 
made tough decisions in harrowing circumstances.  And they often congratulated 
underage troops for their impressive military service.  Nevertheless, most adults 
believed that, as a group, adolescents lacked the knowledge of current events, 
interest in political matters, and maturity of cognitive judgment to vote wisely.  As 
a Baltimore clerk summarized to a Gallup pollster, “They just haven’t got enough 
sound political judgment at that age.”296  Other adults doubted the claim that the 
battlefield prowess of young combatants proved teenagers possessed the sagacity to 
cast ballots.  “How anybody can relate the capacity to tote a gun to experience in 
affairs of government is more than I can see,” a man wrote the New York Times, “I 
had, naturally, expected to see a lot of harebrained things emerge from the welter of 
war, but I never expected to see [the youth suffrage] proposal taken seriously; yet 
we see it actually taken up by a few otherwise sensible men.”297 
 The “otherwise sensible men” gibe referred to those state and federal 
lawmakers who endorsed Georgia’s approval of the 18-vote.  During the first week 
of August 1943, Georgia voters had overwhelmingly accepted, by over a 2 to 1 
margin, a constitutional amendment lowering the legal suffrage age from 21 to 18, 
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thereby becoming the first state to grant voting privileges to teenagers.298    Youth 
suffrage had been a chief plank of Ellis Arnall’s gubernatorial campaign.  Arnall, a 
35-year-old former state attorney general, had won the governorship in 1942 from 
demagogue Eugene Talmadge by pledging to cleanse the Peach State of cronyism 
and corruption.  In particular, Arnall promised to eradicate political tampering with 
Georgia’s higher education system.  In the spring and summer of 1941, Talmadge 
engineered the firings of Marvin Pittman (president of Georgia State Teachers 
College), Walter Cocking (dean of the University of Georgia’s School of Education), 
and ten professors from other Georgia universities for allegedly promoting 
communism, religious non-conformity, and/or race-mixing in their professional 
capacities.  Several members of the Georgia Board of Regents (the state’s 
educational oversight committee) balked at Talmadge’s demand for lack of 
reasonable evidence and refused to sack the accused.  Talmadge then moved to 
“pack” the Board of Regents by forcing the resignations of the disagreeable 
members and replacing them with stooges who coveted being his hatchet men.  In 
July 1941, the Talmadge-tilted Board discharged the accused educators.  In 
December, the Southern Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools suspended 
the University of Georgia and nine other public colleges from its list of accredited 
institutions for violations of academic freedom and political interference into the 
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operations of the state’s colleges.299  Over the next several months, the American 
Medical Association, Association of American Law Schools, Association of American 
Universities, American Association of Teachers Colleges, and American Association 
of College Schools of Business all sanctioned or suspended Georgia colleges in some 
fashion for Talmadge’s meddling.300 
 Talmadge staked his re-election campaign on stirring the economic and 
psychological anxieties of the “wool-hat boys,” i.e. rural white Georgians.301   
Historian Thomas G. Dyer asserts Talmadge built his political career on a message 
tailored to country folk that combined “a strong populist appeal with anti-urbanism, 
anti-intellectualism, and racism.”302  The dislocations and uncertainties engendered 
by the Great Depression and World War II heightened provincial paranoia about 
the South’s scant leftists, labor organizers, and race liberals.  The penchant to place 
blame on every variety of social, political, or economic radical for causing the 
Depression or war or threatening white supremacy spurred Talmadge and other 
southern demagogues to search college campuses for ideological deviants.  
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“Although he had graduated from the [University of Georgia’s] law school,” Dyer 
writes, “Talmadge had little fondness for higher education and seemed to delight in 
making educators uncomfortable.”303   
 In the past, Talmadge’s purges of educational “furriners” who seemed to 
challenge his views or the South’s orthodoxy garnered him much electoral 
support.304  The discharge of Pittman and Cocking and the resulting loss of 
accreditation backfired.  Devereaux McClatchey, member of Atlanta’s Board of 
Education, called the affair “a disgusting triumph of ignorance, prejudice, and 
savagery over the forces of enlightenment and civilization.”305  A Georgia “farm boy” 
averred, “I am a high school graduate and plan to enter college in September.  This, 
if for no other reason, would make me a bitter non-supporter of Talmadge if I were 
of voting age.  I dislike his dictatorial methods of ruling the University System as 
well as the state as a whole.”306  The education controversy alienated many white 
Georgians, rural and urban, and it provided the cohesion to hold together an anti-
Talmadge political alliance that coalesced around Ellis Arnall.   According to one 
biographer, Arnall’s “youth and inexperience neatly fit the prototype of a crusader 
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against an entrenched machine.”307  Labeled the “boy wonder of Georgia politics,” 
Arnall pledged to sweep away the “high-handed, low-browed” practices of the 
Talmadge gang.308  During the gubernatorial race, Talmadge taunted Arnall as a 
liberal zealot bent on racial coeducation.  Arnall swiftly thwarted the charge.  “’If a 
nigger ever tried to get into a white school in my part of the state,” he vowed, “’the 
sun would never set on his head.’”309  With his segregationist bona fides affirmed, 
Arnall tore into Talmadge’s  malfeasance.  The damage inflicted by Talmadge to 
Georgia higher education gave Arnall an issue to keep him on the defensive 
throughout the campaign no matter how many times Talmadge tried race-baiting.  
In a 1971 interview, Arnall declared:  “I ran against Talmadge because he had 
interfered in the University System of Georgia about saying what the teachers could 
teach and what they couldn’t. . . .[I]t was academic freedom, dictatorship, accredited 
schools.  He thought, Talmadge thought, the ignorant people, who didn’t have a 
college education, would be for him.  But they were the most strongest for me 
because they wanted their children to have that advantage.”310 
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  The education issue also rallied Georgia students to Arnall’s side, and they 
were responsible for much of the fervor that the campaign generated.  The loss of 
accreditation meant graduates from state universities possessed diplomas worthless 
outside of Georgia; i.e. they were barred from postgraduate work and professional 
practice in other states. “To these young people,” the Atlanta Constitution 
emphasized, “the threat of Talmadge’s dictatorship in Georgia is quite as real as the 
threats of Hitler and Mussolini and Tojo.”311  Outraged by Talmadge’s “Hitlerism,” a 
group of Georgia co-eds from across the state formed the Student Political League in 
April 1942.312  According to its leaders, the SPL organized “to destroy Talmadge-ism 
in Georgia” and “to restore the accredited rating to the University System.”313  
Willis Johnson, University of Georgia SPL organizer, declared that its members 
simply could not stomach “the public lynching of Georgia educators by a mere nod of 
the Governor’s head.”314   The SPL claimed no “affiliation to any candidate for public 
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office,” but its members eagerly worked to elect Ellis Arnall governor.315  “Arnall for 
Governor” clubs formed on university campuses, and student newspapers endorsed 
his candidacy without hesitation.  A poll of University of Georgia students revealed 
that 92% supported Arnall over Talmadge.316   “We know what Ellis Arnall stands 
for,” one student declared, “integrity in public office. . . .We like his youth, vitality, 
and his sincere desire to change things long in need of changing.”317  Many students 
saw a ripe opportunity to topple Talmadge’s machine via a youth-led political 
operation.   The student editors of Georgia Tech’s weekly, The Technique, urged,  
 Students of Georgia, to arms. . . .Let us conscript the  
 power of the ballot box to reinstate academic freedom  
 in Georgia, to dethrone injustice, despotism, and ignorance.   
 Let each student who is of age be certain to register and  
 cast his unchallengable vote against tyranny.  And let each  
 student wield all the influence he can possibly command  
 for this same purpose.  May this September see the end of  
 demagoguery and despotism in Georgia.318 
  
 Arnall’s staff worked closely with the SPL to take an active part in the 
campaign.  During the summer vacation of 1942, several thousand SPL members 
fanned out across the state to urge parents, friends, and fellow Georgians to vote for 
Arnall.  They mailed literature, wrote influential letters, canvassed neighborhoods, 
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arranged parades, carried placards, burned Talmadge in effigy, spoke at rallies, and 
implored Georgia troops stationed out of the state to obtain absentee ballots on 
Arnall’s behalf.319   The SPL also enlisted the aid of high-schoolers.  Jean Martin, 
17-year-old president of the Ben Hill County SPL, stressed, “We are too young to 
vote.  We don’t earn any money to give to a campaign fund.  Still we want very 
much to help.  We high school students may be wrong.  But we aren’t dumb enough 
to think Talmadge will stop with the university if he gets away with his grab there.  
We want to help stop him now before he grabs for the high schools with the support 
of a Talmadgized university system.”320     Some adults became irritated by the 
exuberance of the student campaigners.  A man from Colbert, Georgia complained,  
 They really believe that they must organize a crusade  
 and save the state. . . .Most of them are sophomores and  
 freshmen and very few of them are 21 years of age, and  
 very few can vote.  Why should a minor who cannot vote  
 tell us, the voters, how we should vote?  The daddies of these  
 boys should call them home; they are too smart for their  
 breeches; they know too much for their ages.  They fail to  
 realize that their minds are as yet immature and they cannot  
 pass sound judgment on anything.”321    
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Although most of the students were, indeed, under twenty-one and could not vote, 
Arnall believed their activism, rather than their ballots, would get him elected 
governor.322  After he won the office in September 1942, Arnall said in a speech 
broadcast over national radio that young Georgians should receive “full credit” for 
his victory over Talmadge.323 
 As governor, Arnall worked to reestablish the accreditation of Georgia’s 
colleges as part of a progressive reform package to restore political integrity and 
citizen-focused government to the state.324   One element of the program sought to 
enfranchise young people.   In November 1942, Arnall first announced his proposal 
to lower Georgia’s voting age to eighteen at a national conference of state attorneys 
general held in St. Louis.   He claimed his primary motive in seeking youth suffrage 
was patriotic: “if men of 18 are old enough to fight for their country, they should 
have a right to vote.”325  Arnall also hinted that he wanted to enfranchise Georgia 
youth as a reward for helping him fulfill a personal ambition.326  He acknowledged 
in his 1946 autobiography the quid pro quo elements behind his 18-vote call,  
 I knew that I owed much to the audacious and vigorous  
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 campaign of Young Georgia.  I knew that they represented  
 an element in public life that deserved, somehow, to be recognized.   
 But it was not until the campaign and the party convention  
 were over that their real place in the political system occurred  
 to me.  A young man, a student at Georgia Tech, who had worked  
 hard in the campaign and shown exceptional interest in spite  
 of his nineteen years and his disqualification as a voter, came 
 to my office to tell me goodbye.  He was being inducted into the 
  service and expected to be stationed soon in New Mexico.  ‘Well,  
 I guess I am old enough to help with the Japs, even if I can’t vote.’  
 he said as he was leaving.  My young friend was old enough to  
 fight, but he was not old enough to vote.  It set me to thinking  
 and to examining the precedents.327  
 
 
Ralph McGill, influential columnist of the Atlanta Constitution, enthusiastically 
backed Arnall’s proposal.  He agreed with Arnall that young people old enough to 
fight for democracy should be allowed to participate in its construction.  McGill also 
emphasized the political potential of youth:  “They would bring a lot of intelligence 
and enthusiasm to politics.  That was demonstrated in our recent primary.  They 
would provide a healthy leavening of the political mixture.”328  McGill’s editors 
exhorted state lawmakers to accept youth suffrage legislation.  They opined that 
America “needs the clear-eyed, fearless, and idealistic thinking of her young 
people.”  Furthermore, Georgia would benefit from the “powerful effect” the votes of 
youth would exert “in lessening the stranglehold of ‘machine politics’ in many areas 
where it now controls the ballots for the benefit of a privileged few.”329   
 Arnall’s vote-at-18 pitch became the “liveliest issue” of Georgia’s 1943  
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legislative session.330 In late January, the Southern Association of Colleges and 
Secondary Schools reaccredited the state’s universities after Arnall personally 
assured the group that his reform package would block future governors from 
tampering with higher education.331   Arnall’s feat earned him much political capitol 
with state lawmakers.  As his reorganization plan for Georgia’s government breezed 
through the General Assembly, Arnall predicted, “Give me the backing of the boys 
and girls and we will save the state.”332   On 9 February 1943, a joint oversight 
committee unanimously approved a bill that lowered the voting age from 21 to 18.333   
The next day, in a “ribald” gathering, the Georgia Senate overwhelmingly consented 
to the 18-vote measure, 39-8.334  Disapproving senators expressed concerns that 
changing state electoral law could allow black youth to vote and might politicize 
high-school and college classrooms.  Supporters of the 18-vote bill placed it within 
the context of Arnall’s reformism.  Senator Alpha Fowler (D-Douglasville) 
maintained including young people as electors would “improve our government.”335  
Many senators who voted in the affirmative expressed privately they opposed the 
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measure but felt state voters should have a chance to ratify or reject it through 
popular referendum.336  Arnall praised the Senate for acting “purely in the interest 
of good government” and pledged to stump in every county of Georgia on behalf of 
youth suffrage.337 
 The debate in the House was “riotous” and reaching the necessary 2/3 
majority for passage of the 18-vote amendment proved difficult.338  Led by J. Robert 
Elliott, former floor leader during the Talmadge regime, opponents attacked the 
proposal as a plot concocted by the Communist Party and the Roosevelt 
administration to “throw open the ballot box to everybody – 18, 19, or 20 – 
regardless of their color or whether they had paid their poll tax.”  Representative 
M.G. Hicks thundered that passing the bill would make Georgia a “hotbed for every 
subversive influence under the heavens.”  Mrs. John B. Guerry, one of two female 
lawmakers, charged the measure “would give the right to vote to those not best 
fitted to vote, those the armed services are rejecting.”339  Advocates of the 18-vote 
countered it was a necessary part of Arnall’s effort to de-Talmadgize state 
government.  Representative Ben W. Fortson contended, “Youth could bring a 
wholesome effect of open-mindedness and lack of cynicism to the ballot.”340  Other 
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legislators played the old enough to fight-vote card.  Spence Grayson, one of the 
bill’s main proponents, professed, “I would feel ashamed of myself if I stood here in 
civilian clothes and voted to deny the right of the ballot to beardless youths who are 
driving tanks and manning machineguns on the battlefields.”341   Some lawmakers, 
like House Speaker Roy Harris, indicted pro-Talmadge forces for “pure cussedness 
and selfishness” in their vengeful efforts to stymie youth suffrage.  On 2 March 
1943, the House accepted the proposition 126-60 (19 not present) – twelve votes shy 
of the 2/3 majority legally required to pass constitutional amendments.  During that 
night and into the next day, Arnall, Harris, and House floor leader Adie Durden 
pressed the absentee representatives for their support and cajoled those legislators 
wavering on the bill.   The buttonholing and arm-twisting succeeded.  On 3 March, 
the House voted 149-43 to submit the youth suffrage measure for referendum. 
 The 18-vote proposal was one of 28 amendments presented to Georgia voters 
for approval during the August referendum.   Governor Arnall, House Speaker 
Harris, and Senate President Frank Gross organized the Georgia Committee for 
Good Government to push electoral acceptance.  Arnall campaigned around the 
state, emphasizing how each amendment on the slate would reform, streamline, 
and/or modernize state and local government.  Supporters of the youth suffrage 
portion highlighted its national significance. Arnall said he was “especially proud” 
Georgia had influenced other states to ponder their electoral-age laws.342  And he 
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asserted throughout the run-up to the referendum, “Eighteen is not too young to 
learn at first hand the business of self-government, which is the American tradition 
of all government; nor is 18 too young to assume some of responsibilities that are a 
part of the right of citizenship in our State and our Nation.”343  The Atlanta Journal 
editorialized that voter approval of teenage voting would indicate to the nation a 
new “open-mindedness” in Georgia:  “Willingness to consider new ideas on their 
merits and to thresh them out in a forum of free discussion is a mark of intellectual 
courage and political growth. . . .This is democracy, thinking democracy in place of 
static prejudice.”344   If passed, Georgia Tech’s student newspaper predicted, the 18-
vote might “mark the beginning of voting franchise for 18-to-21-year-old youths all 
over the country.  From Georgia the idea would, no doubt, spread rapidly from state 
to state, especially with public opinion supporting all men in the service, be they 18 
or 35.  Thus the question should be debated on the basis of nationwide benefit – not 
thinking of Georgia alone.”345 
 Georgians pondered both the national and statewide consequences of 
allowing 18-year-olds to vote.  Arguments for and against the amendment were 
framed by the countrywide “old enough to fight, old enough to vote” debate but were 
also fixed within the context of Georgia politics, particularly the question of whether 
Arnall’s reformism could erase the taint of Talmadgism.  The bulk of the pre-
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referendum chatter considered whether teenagers collectively possessed sufficient 
preparation for effective electoral participation.  Advocates of the amendment 
cleverly posed the “old enough” thesis as both a deserved reward for services 
rendered and an earned privilege for aptitudes demonstrated.  As a man from 
Winder, Georgia, reasoned,  
 To fight and defend their country is a responsibility which  
 has been thrust upon 18-year-old youths.  Suffice it to say  
 that they are living up to expectations; they are ‘making good.’   
Then, again, 18-year-old youth, as a class, are making use of  
their opportunities to inform themselves, and as a consequence,  
they’ll be well fitted to help take care of the interests of the  
state and the nation.  It goes without saying, that if youths  
are granted the right of suffrage, they’ll not only be voters of  
thought, but voters of action as well.346   
 
Other supporters praised young Georgians for their “educational maturity,” “mature 
judgment,” and “clear-minded, progressive, and well-informed” viewpoints – 
attributes that youth had demonstrated “in helping clean our state of some of the 
most outstanding rottenness from which we had so severely suffered.”347  Governor 
Arnall contended,  
 At the age of 18, most young men and young women are self- 
 supporting, self-reliant, and able to judge reasonably well for 
 themselves.  They are old enough to serve their country on 
 battlefields, in airplanes, and on the seas.  They are old enough 
 to work as riveters or cartridge-loaders or typists.  They are 
 also old enough to assume the responsibilities of their citizen- 
 ship and to learn the lessons of public life by participation in 
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 public affairs.348 
 
 
Many 18-vote sponsors agreed with Arnall that the advance of democracy in 
Georgia and America required youth enfranchisement.  “The best way to teach 
democracy is to practice it,” WSB-Atlanta radio commentator John Paschall 
asserted, “When our boys and girls return from their posts of duty in many parts of 
the world, they will have some understanding of the kind of world in which they 
wish to live. . . .We trust them in a Flying Fortress, surely we may in wisdom, 
justice, and moderation, trust them in the ballot booth.”349 
 Opponents of the amendment retorted that the physical abilities that made 
young men good soldiers did not necessarily imply that young people possessed the 
cognitive qualities that defined good voters.  A woman from Atlanta insisted, “Mere 
fighting does not empower a boy with judgment as how to handle state affairs, not 
to mention national.”350  Another Atlanta inhabitant pointed to the War 
Department’s supposed preference for “reckless and daring” teenage draftees willing 
to “rush into a fight without considering the consequences or counting the costs” as 
evidence that adolescents could not be trusted to cast ballots sensibly.351  Many 18-
vote foes conceded that contemporary youths were better educated than previous 
generations, but they contested the notion that educational advances automatically 
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yielded a more prudent teenage elector. “The test of a good voter,” a man from 
Hapeville, Georgia, declared, “is experience and intelligence, not merely some 
schooling.”352  The political naïveté of well-read but callow teens, some argued, 
exposed them as corruptible prey for devious politicians; a Rome, Georgia, resident 
reminded his fellow citizens, “Mussolini and Hitler established their dictatorships 
through youth movements.”353  Anti-18-vote Georgians dismissed claims of “the 
youngsters of this day and generation being wiser and maturing earlier” than their 
forefathers; “This is pure nonsense,” an Atlantan held, “nature is just like it has 
always been.”354  Amendment adversaries unwittingly employed a key contention of 
G. Stanley Hall to buttress their position.  The quickened pace of modern life had 
magnified, rather than diminished, the puerile disposition of teenagers; hence, a 
prolonged adolescence unencumbered by grown-up obligations would allow 
immature juveniles the time to develop their private, public, and political personas 
freely and fully.  “Let us not burden, unsolicited, our boys and girls with the cares 
and responsibilities of voting, during their last three years of adolescence,” a man 
from Decatur, Georgia, implored, “Spare them, during this interim between bloom-
time and maturity, from the cares of state.”355   
 Georgia adults chose to incorporate 18-, 19-, and 20-year-olds into the 
electoral body politic.  By a count of 42,284 to 19,682, voters ratified the youth 
                                                          
352 “Against Teen-Age Amendment,” letter to editor, Ibid, 11 June 1943, 18. 
 
353 “Eighteen Too Young,” letter to editor, Atlanta Journal, 1 March 1943, 10. 
 
354 “Against Suffrage Amendment,” letter to editor, Ibid, 27 July 1943, 10. 
 
355 “The Voting Age,” letter to editor, Ibid, 28 July 1943, 10. 
125 
 
suffrage measure.  It carried 128 of Georgia’s 159 counties, including Eugene 
Talmadge’s home county of Telfair.356  Arnall was “jubilant” that all twenty-eight 
reform amendments had passed referendum but claimed to be, “Especially delighted 
that Georgia leads the nation in lowering the voting age to 18.”357  “I’m glad Georgia 
is first in something at last,” Arnall rejoiced, “I’m tired of us always being at the tail 
end.”358  The Atlanta Constitution editorialized that “this state started something 
that is going to bring nation-wide repercussions.”359  Americans widely commended 
Georgia’s accomplishment. A man in New York City praised it as evidence of a new 
“enlightened progressivism” in the South.360  The Christian Science Monitor 
congratulated the “Cracker State” for being “First in peaches, first in watermelons, 
first to give the vote to 18-year-olds.”361  National publications predicted Georgia’s 
action might spur state and federal legislation to standardize eighteen as the 
national electoral age.362  Some periodicals hailed Arnall as a rising political star.  
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In smashing “the statutes on which Talmadge had built his dictatorship,” journalist 
Rufus Jarman extolled, Georgia not only “regained her self-respect” but America 
reaped a “good politician” dedicated to public service rather than personal graft.363  
Arnall said that he would press for an 18-vote plank in the 1944 Democratic 
platform and urged young people across the nation to “look to me for leadership” in 
gaining suffrage rights.364   
Georgia’s approval of youth suffrage re-launched national discussions of the 
voting age issue.  Soon after the August referendum, other states moved to re-
consider previously shelved youth suffrage bills, and ten states requested formal 
copies of the 18-vote amendment from Georgia officials.365  Georgia’s ratification 
also appeared to alter national opinion regarding youth suffrage.   A September 
1943 Gallup poll showed a majority of Americans (52%) approved teenage voting for 
the first time.366  A second September survey indicated that 18-vote measures might 
pass easily in six of the ten states with the largest number of votes cast in the 1940 
presidential election (New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, California, Michigan, and 
New Jersey) if their statehouses brought the youth suffrage issue to voters as a 
referendum.367   Gallup attributed the change in public sentiment to the 
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“considerable” national attention Georgia’s referendum garnered and the “effect of 
the war” on communal attitudes, particularly the “cry that if a man is old enough to 
fight at 18 he is old enough to vote.”368 
Federal congressmen also seemed to be newly energized about establishing a 
uniform voting age.  After a bout of youth suffrage filings early in 1943, federal 
action in the 78th Congress waned due to the exigencies of war, particularly the run-
up to the Allied counterattack in North Africa and invasion of Italy.  Congress had 
also spent much time in the spring approving the Current Tax Payment Act, which 
established the modern “pay-as-you-go” system of withholding taxes from individual 
paychecks.369  Days after Georgia’s August referendum, Senator Frederick Van 
Nuys (D-IN), chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, said that Arthur 
Vandenberg’s resolution would be allowed a public hearing after Congress returned 
from vacation in September.370  The Associated Press reported, “The issue of 
making 18, 19, and 20-year-olds eligible to vote seemed headed for noncontroversial 
treatment by Congress.”  It noted that Vandenberg’s amendment “thus far has 
drawn no public criticism from members of either party.”371  By the end of August, 
the 18-vote measure had attracted so much support that the radio debate program 
American Forum of the Air had to scrub its 14 September broadcast regarding the 
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voting-age issue because of a “lack of congressional opposition.”372  The Senate, 
though, held no hearings on Vandenberg’s measure; it focused instead on anti-poll 
tax and soldier-vote bills that had passed the House before Congress’s summer 
break.  
In October 1943, the House Committee on the Judiciary sent an 18-bill to 
Emanuel Celler’s subcommittee on constitutional amendments for review.  On 20 
October, it held a public hearing to discuss Jennings Randolph’s measure, House 
Joint Resolution 39.  Only two people testified: Randolph and Ellis Arnall.  Both 
men cleverly posed the “old enough” thesis to justify youth suffrage as both 
recompense for patriotic service and recognition of adolescent ability.   Randolph 
argued the “intrepid” war service of young people on the battlefield and homefront 
not only made youth deserving of voting rights but demonstrated that the 
traditional stereotypes maligning adolescents as irresponsible, irrational, and 
immature to be “meritless.”373   According to Randolph, Georgia’s August 
referendum and the two September Gallup polls indicated growing public support 
for reducing enfranchisement ages.  Because of the opposition by state legislatures, 
however, he believed that a federal amendment would be necessary to set a national 
voting age.  Randolph predicted that an 18-vote amendment would eventually be 
established, like that for the Nineteenth Amendment, after a successful 
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“educational campaign” convinced adults that “youngsters” were qualified to vote.374  
Randolph concluded, “I am very firmly convinced, and I would not have sponsored 
this amendment were I not of the considered opinion. . .that today we have a great 
youth population within this age bracket which is entirely capable and eager for 
participation in our Government as voters.”375   
Governor Arnall concurred with Randolph’s assessment of youth capabilities.  
He declared, “No one can convince me that a young man or young woman of 18 
today does not have a power of understanding that transcends that of a 21-year-old 
man or woman of a generation ago.”376  Arnall, too, played the “old enough” card as 
his main claim for championing the 18-vote.  He burnished his case with a “true 
story” about an injured, underage ex-sailor who won a statewide essay contest on 
why Georgia should lower its voting age by writing:  “I was at Pearl Harbor.  I 
participated in the Battle of the Coral Sea.  I was wounded 22 times fighting for my 
country.  I am not yet 21.  Do you not think I have won the right to vote?”377   
Dubious committeemen, particularly Emanuel Celler, questioned the “old 
enough” hypothesis.  After Randolph stated that the lowering of the draft age 
convinced him that teenage combatants deserved to vote, Celler inquired, “Let us 
suppose – God forbid – that the exigencies of would turn against us and . . .we 
would have to reduce the draft age to 16, as is the case in Germany today.  Would 
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you say the voting age should likewise be reduced to 16?”  Randolph responded, “No, 
Mr. Chairman.  I would not advocate the lowering of the voting age to 16.  I feel 
there is a point below which we should not go.”378  Estes Kefauver (D-TN) got 
Governor Arnall to admit that Georgia precisely chose eighteen as its suffrage age 
because of its correlation to high-school graduation rather than its connection to 
military service.  Immediately afterwards, Cellar challenged, “Is it fair to offer that 
as an argument, that if a boy is old enough to fight he is old enough to vote?”  Arnall 
retorted,  
I do not desire, first of all, for the eminent chairman of this 
subcommittee to allow my argument to be drawn into one line 
only.  You will recall I have submitted a number of reasons, 
such as participation in government being fine training in 
citizenship, and the ardor and candor of youth will bring to 
the ballot box, and other reasons.  But another reason is that 
if a young man risks his life for his government, he is entitled 
to vote.379  
 
  
The southern members of the panel peppered Randolph and Arnall with 
queries about the possible constitutional harm of a federal voting-age amendment to 
the rights of the states to determine elector qualifications.  Hatton Sumners, (D-
TX), chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, alleged that H.J. Res. 39 
“proposes an abridgment of the powers of the States. . .to take from their 
governmental discretion, does it not?”  Randolph said the amending process, as 
specified in the Constitution, respected local prerogatives by mandating ratifying 
                                                          
378 Ibid, 3. 
 
379 Ibid, 11. 
 
131 
 
action by at least three-fourths of the states.380    Governor Arnall deftly parried the 
legal queries posed by Sumners, Kefauver, and Sam Russell (D-TX).  He agreed 
with the congressmen that H.J. Res. 39 impinged states “to some extent” but 
concurred with Randolph that the Constitution’s Article V procedure provided 
“adequate safeguards” for state discretion to determine voter requirements.381  He 
riposted, “we have talked too much about states’ rights and not enough about state 
responsibilities.”382  Arnall did not indicate whether his state had a responsibility to 
extend its new 18-vote law to black Georgians.  He defined a “good citizens” as 
someone who combined “moral fitness and intellectual ability” with “an interest in 
his Government” and “the ability to understand that issue upon which he may 
vote.”383  Some black Georgians fulfilled Arnall’s definition of a “good citizen” but, 
obviously, were denied democratic participation for reasons irrespective of 
capability or age but wholly lashed to the Peach State’s right to set the legal 
prerequisites for voting. 
The pointed questions about federal intrusion upon a traditional state 
prerogative clearly indicated that most members of the subcommittee, especially the 
southern Democrats, opposed federal legislation to create a national voting age.  
Nor did the hearing on H.J. Res. 39 attract much attention.  Fifty years afterwards, 
Randolph recalled that only eleven people attended it, including the subcommittee 
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members and no major newspaper or periodical covered it.384  The House Judiciary 
Committee took no further action on Randolph’s amendment.  No lawmaker filed an 
18- or 19-vote proposal during the second session of the 78th Congress (10 January 
to 19 December 1944).  And public calls for lowering suffrage ages quieted in 1944 
and 1945 as the battle against the Axis barreled toward crescendo.  For all intents 
and purposes, national consideration of youth suffrage during the war ceased with 
the closing of the October 1943 subcommittee hearing.   
House inaction on youth suffrage fit Congress’s propensity to short shrift 
social issues.  Between 1939 and 1945, two core concerns dominated congressional 
deliberations:  American participation in World War II and the continuation of New 
Deal socioeconomic programs.  Like in the 1930s, Democrats maintained control of 
Congress throughout the war years.  Influential leaders inside Congress, 
particularly Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn (D-TX), Senate majority leader 
Alben Barkley (D-KY), and House minority leader Joseph Martin (R-MA), gradually 
relinquished governmental control over foreign and military policies to the 
Roosevelt administration.  Though Congress delegated sweeping powers to 
executive and administrative agencies to meet the emergency, it did not become an 
anachronism or rubber stamp according to political scientist Roland Young.  He 
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argues Congress remained influential as it exerted vigorous oversight of 
bureaucratic operations and strict management over domestic legislation.  Young 
highlights the vital role Congress played in mobilizing the resources needed to fight.  
Through the meticulous conscription of men and the generous appropriation of 
money, Congress raised the armies, materials, and funds that the White House 
requested to conduct the war.385   
Mobilization measures frequently provoked controversy because they became 
entangled in the ongoing political struggle over the New Deal.  Historian Richard N. 
Chapman suggests that the persistence of party politics was Congress’s most 
notable contribution to the war, for the suspension of politics would have meant the 
adjournment of democracy.386  Debates within and between Congress and the 
Roosevelt administration over domestic policy, inflamed the ideological and regional 
factionalism endemic to prewar arguments about the New Deal.  Political historians 
and scientists agree that Roosevelt’s recovery and relief programs initially received 
ubiquitous legislative support and important congressional cooperation.387  During 
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his second term, internecine battles between New Deal Democrats and a bipartisan 
coalition of rightist congressmen both narrowed the reformist proposals of the 
administration and allowed Congress to reestablish its independence and authority 
in relation to the presidency.388   The informal “conservative coalition” of anti-
administration Democrats (predominantly rural and largely southern) and anti-
New Deal Republicans (mostly rural and midwestern) materialized around a shared 
fidelity to anti-statism.  Historian James T. Patterson emphasizes that the coalition 
never formally united as a caucus, but, after 1937, it successfully frustrated FDR’s 
attempts to broaden the New Deal, pack the Supreme Court with liberal judges, and 
consolidate federal authority within the executive branch.   Patterson finds that the 
first obligation of many coalition members was to their state or district (especially 
in garnering pork barrel funds to develop local economies) and not necessarily to 
advance a conservative agenda.389   The need for federal aid in the South and rural 
areas, the discrediting of isolationism, and the necessity of centralized planning in 
the run-up to war stunted the coalition’s quest to thwart the New Deal. 
During the war’s early years, FDR’s conservative opponents endeavored to 
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check his growing power, slash his programs, and bruise him at the polls.  The 
grand strategizing required to win the war necessitated political deference to the 
White House. Conservatives criticized Roosevelt for adopting a presidency-centered 
governing tack that disdained intergovernmental consultation, empowered 
executive agencies, and asserted unprecedented executive powers.  To smooth 
relations, Roosevelt appointed many rightward-leaning businessmen to the 
planning agencies in charge of wartime production and named a Republican, Henry 
Stimson, to be Secretary of War.  But the GOP did not offer FDR or his majority 
party a formal pledge to cooperate or an explicit promise of support, unlike within 
Britain’s parliament, and it often attacked the administration’s economic regulation 
and social welfare policies.390  Southern Democrats generally backed the president 
on war matters and rural development but contested his social justice initiatives 
and continuation of the reformist and redistributive elements of the New Deal.391     
Republicans, led by Senator Robert Taft (R-OH), and dissident Democrats, led by 
Senators Harry F. Byrd (D-VA) and Walter George (D-GA) and Representatives 
Edward Cox (D-GA) and Howard A. Smith (D-VA), argued certain New Deal 
agencies, particularly the ones that put people to work, should cease because 
continuation would cripple national defense by siphoning essential human and 
financial resources from the war effort. American voters listened attentively to their 
complaints about an over-intrusive bureaucracy as civilians experienced the hassles 
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of getting a proper draft classification or a new coupon book for gasoline.  The 
results of the 1942 elections emboldened Republicans (who were confident of a 
strong conservative upsurge in the nation) to reach out to southern Democrats (who 
had become leery that Roosevelt and other northern liberals within the party might 
submit to black demands for desegregation) to forge a powerful voting bloc within 
Congress.   
Although Democrats retained numerical control of both the House and 
Senate, the conservative coalition managed between 1942 and 1944 to carry out 
retroactive revenge on the New Deal.  Two of the first three programs liquidated, 
the Civilian Conservation Corps (defunded in June 1942) and the National Youth 
Administration (eliminated in July 1943), had been particularly helpful to 
adolescents and fond to FDR.  Conservatives contended the employ of youth 
manpower by the armed forces and defense industries made the CCC and NYA 
nonessential expenditures.  Historians John A. Salmond and Richard A. Reiman 
find little, if any money was saved by their elimination.  They point out 
congressional conservatives made it perfectly clear that the true targets were the 
agencies themselves as much as the funds.  Salmond and Reiman conclude that the 
war budget provided conservatives a political rationale, not a financial reason, to 
gut the CCC, NYA, and any other New Deal programs they loathed.392 
Politics also provided conservatives a reason to rebuff the patriotic appeal of 
                                                          
392 John A. Salmond, The Civilian Conservation Corps, 1933-1942:  A New Deal Case Study 
(Durham, NC:  Duke University Press, 1967) and Richard A. Reiman, The New Deal and American 
Youth:  Ideas and Ideals in a Depression Decade (Athens, GA:  The University of Georgia Press, 
1992). 
137 
 
the “old enough to fight, old enough to vote” rationale supporting youth suffrage. 
Southern Democrats, as exemplified in the 1943 House subcommittee hearing, 
obstructed all congressional attempts to expand voting opportunities as infringing 
upon states’ rights.  While spouting paeans to the valor of those citizen-warriors 
defending democracy, they actively opposed legislation to abolish poll taxes, set a 
national suffrage age, and establish uniform regulations to accommodate soldier 
voting as unconstitutional federalization of electoral qualifications.  Of course, 
racism factored into their obstinacy; southern Democrats fought against any plan 
that might enfranchise blacks either as combatants or civilians, especially those 
engineered by their northern-liberal partymates.   Republicans worried that 
enfranchising 18-, 19-, and 20-year-olds would hand the Democrats long-term 
electoral hegemony.   Many GOP devotees agreed with Arthur Vandenberg, their 
senatorial stalwart, that youngsters at war should gain electoral recompense.  Most 
Republicans, however, knew what opinion polls had revealed since the 1930s and 
throughout the war years.  American youth consistently sided with the Democratic 
Party and considerably favored liberal approaches to government.393  The 
Washington (D.C.) Times-Herald, an unfailingly conservative newspaper, 
summarized GOP views when it lambasted youth suffrage as another New Deal 
“scheme” masqueraded as a “reform” that would sully the electorate with a “large 
number of less experienced and less wise voters” but would solidify the Democratic 
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base “not only into our 1944 election, but also into our political system for all future 
elections.”394  Predisposed to a philosophy of limited government and states’ rights 
and concerned with a coagulating northern-urban-liberal consensus within national 
politics, the conservative coalition flexed its muscle against any federally-backed 
extension of voting rights – even to brave adolescent servicemen. 
Youth suffrage also suffered from a lack of executive interest.  Whereas 
Eleanor Roosevelt backed it, her husband never stated publicly whether he did.  In 
his speeches and fireside chats, Franklin Roosevelt mobilized support for issues 
related to young Americans (such as lowering the draft age and permitting soldiers 
to vote) by overtly articulating the necessity of each measure.  He also championed 
the use of teenage manpower to aid the civilian and military war efforts.  But FDR 
remained mute on the subject of adolescent enfranchisement even though young 
people expressed overwhelming approval for him and the Democrats.  The strains 
and stresses of the war made it difficult for Roosevelt to maintain his New Deal 
coalition, but he and his advisors neglected to enfranchise eager youth.  Many 
scholars have marveled at the cunning of FDR and his political gurus on Capitol 
Hill to compel lawmakers to adopt administration policies.  They conducted much of 
that work confidentially, mainly via private chats and telephone conversations, 
because Roosevelt, unlike modern presidents, held no regularly scheduled meetings 
with legislative leaders or employed a permanent congressional liaison office.395 
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Given their wont for the clandestine, FDR and his operatives may have tried quietly 
lobbying behind the scenes on behalf of the 18-vote.  But the image of Roosevelt as a 
political maestro, bending docile and hostile lawmakers to his legislative will, does 
not hold for the cause of youth suffrage. 
The disinclination of Roosevelt for youth suffrage could also be attributed to a 
belief that time spent on securing 18-vote legislation was a distraction to directing 
the war effort.  Preoccupied by the war, the president expended most of his energy 
on the formation of military strategy, diplomacy, and foreign policy.  He gave some 
attention to domestic affairs, prioritizing economic and financial interests over 
social welfare/justice matters.   Historian John Morton Blum contends that FDR 
consciously subordinated national issues to the Allied pursuit of victory. 
“Disinclined therefore to engage in causes he considered peripheral, divisive, and 
probably futile,” Blum states, “he ordinarily gave only rhetorical attention to 
questions of social or economic justice, including those that the progressive minority 
within his own party were eager to advance.”396  Scholar Nancy Beck Young finds 
federal lawmakers were not so quick to deemphasize domestic affairs since they 
were electorally beholden to their constituents. But like the president, Young 
concludes, most congressmen did not think conflicts over social matters important 
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enough “to waste their political capital on, especially when struggles about the 
economy were intense and, from their perspective, more relevant to the war 
effort.”397 
The indifference the president and most legislators showed toward the issue 
of suffrage ages indicates they thought it not meaningful enough to consider in the 
context of fighting a global war.  Compared to the soldier vote and anti-poll tax bills, 
the resolutions to set a federal age of enfranchisement were nonpartisan and 
noncontroversial.  Yet there did not appear, unlike the other suffrage measures, to 
be a pressing need to modify constitutional law to expand civil liberties for youth.  
Gallop polls and other public opinion barometers revealed that many Americans 
sympathized with the view that youth war service merited a revisiting of voting age 
statutes.  They concurred with the sentiment that denying young people suffrage 
was probably unfair and maybe unjust.  “It would be a strange democracy,” Frank 
C. Walker, Roosevelt’s Postmaster General and Chairman of the Democratic 
National Committee, asserted, “that singled out for disfranchisement the citizens 
who are giving the greatest service for democracy.”398  Yet there was no mobilization 
of popular will (except in Georgia) to reset voting ages because the vast majority of 
Americans and lawmakers did not see teenagers as a distinctively aggrieved class of 
citizens.  Most people maintained that the denial of adolescent suffrage, no matter 
how seemingly undemocratic, simply was not morally or politically urgent enough to 
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warrant purifying legislative action.   As a high-school senior from Cincinnati 
maintained on the radio program “America’s Town Meeting on the Air”:  
Every time in history that there has been a movement to extend  
the franchise, it has been with the purpose of including some  
new group heretofore entirely unrepresented.  The Negro’s fight  
to vote meant that a whole new element, a new race, in fact, with  
its own ideas and its own wishes was at last given the opportunity  
to express itself.  But to assert that the 18-year-olds represent  
some special group which does not find expression in American  
Government is to create a false illusion.399 
 
 
 The idea that youth should vote confronted a suspicion whether youth could 
vote.  Many citizens sympathized with view that adolescents deserved to vote 
because of their commendable war service.   Many more people doubted that 
teenagers possessed the sense to vote judiciously.  Youth suffrage advocates labored 
to establish the central point that adolescents, whether engaged in combat or not, 
could be entrusted with ballots.  “We have a sense of responsibility; we are 
intelligent; we are mature,” proclaimed a young man from Chicago on a national 
radio broadcast.400   Acculturated to view adolescents as anxiety-ridden and 
irresponsible, most adults and the majority of public authorities were skeptical that 
youths could perform electoral duties responsibly if enfranchised.  Even Eleanor 
Roosevelt admitted, “I realize that at 18 a great many young people are not mature 
enough to take part in government.”401   
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 Many Americans held great faith in the capabilities of young people, like 
Sergeant Bernard Friedenberg, to make the tough combat decisions necessary for 
victory.  However, most adults distinguished between responding to battlefield 
conditions and analyzing political choices.  Emanuel Celler (D-NY), for instance, 
maintained,  
How could the average youth of 18 evaluate properly  
intricate questions of economics and government, the  
politics and strife involved in a national campaign?  It  
might be contended that a lad of 21 or over would labor  
under similar disadvantages.  Probably so, but in a lesser  
degree.  The three years between 18 and 21 – three formative, 
impressionistic, highly absorptive years – make a great difference.402   
 
The adults like Cellar who opposed lowering voting ages simply distrusted that 
adolescents possessed enough age-forged wisdom to give electoral consent wisely. As 
a man from New Jersey expressed in a letter to the Washington Post:  “Even if 
service in the armed forces by a boy of 18 increased his ability to act intelligently as 
a voter, which is very doubtful, that is no reason for altering our Constitution to 
permit all boys and girls of 18 to vote for all time to come.  They have not had 
sufficient experience to form sound judgment on national and local affairs.”403  
Teenagers, too, disputed whether draft-age youths could vote responsibly.  A high-
school senior from Ocala, Florida, asserted during a national radio debate:  “Surely, 
the 18-to-20-year-olds constitute one of the greatest fighting groups in the world.  
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But because a man is a good fighter, that doesn’t make him a good voter.  
Recklessness, impetuosity, and dare-deviltry, the very best qualities which make 
him a great fighter, none of which depend upon reasoning, would tend to make him 
a poor voter.”404   
 Youth suffrage sponsors fervently challenged the doubts about the capacity of 
adolescents to cast ballots maturely.   Many 18-vote allies argued that advances in 
child development and education (particularly in social studies and citizenship 
training) made contemporary teenagers equally or better qualified to vote than 
their parents.  George D. Stoddard, president of the University of the State of New 
York and New York State Commission of Education, claimed modern high schools 
amply prepared 18-year-olds to meet their democratic responsibilities:  “Their 
intelligence, energy, and sense of participation adequately counterbalance the 
wisdom and life experience of voting citizens in the latter decades.”405  A high-school 
senior from Ithaca, New York, added, “the very qualities of youth that make them 
good soldiers – alertness of mind and body, quick thinking, and, above all, good 
judgment – are the very qualities that would make them good voters. The other 
recognized assets of good voters – intelligence, responsibility, and education – are 
the qualities of youth as well as adults.”406  Some supporters questioned how 
responsibly enfranchised adults tendered their votes.   For example, William E. 
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Mosher, Dean of the Graduate School of Public Affairs at Syracuse University, 
criticized the “widespread ignorance and indifference of our fellow adult citizens” 
regarding the principles and practices of “effective democratic citizenship.”407  Other 
18-vote exponents wondered if any objective data existed to substantiate adult 
claims to age-inherent electoral maturity.  A man from New York City asked:  “Who 
is prepared to prove, by any set of standardized scientific tests, that the attainment 
of legal maturity entails the acquisition of political wisdom?  If there is no such test, 
the present age of 21 should quite as rationally be raised as retained immovable.  
Contrawise, if there is no scientific proof that it should be immovable there is no 
inherent argument against lowering it.”408  
 Many advocates for lowering voting ages alleged the maturity concern was a 
canard that clouded the real issue:  the unfairness of denying suffrage to a citizen 
class who proved responsible enough to serve the war effort willingly and 
admirably.  Several backers pointed out that, although adolescents might be legally 
minors, their war effort made them de facto adults.  A Brooklyn resident writing to 
Congress through the New York Times declared, “You have taken the 18-year-olds 
out of the realm of childhood and made them men.  Why must you impose 
restrictions on these men?”409  Other supporters asserted that the laudable war 
service of teenage soldiers and workers entitled them to political enfranchisement; 
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as an elementary school principal from Norfolk, Virginia, argued:  “Certainly 
today’s 18-year-olds have every claim to the right of the vote.  They are fighting that 
their country might live.  In the Nation’s factories and fields they participate in the 
productive life of their country.  Simple justice demands that they be permitted to 
take part in determining what kind of life it shall be.”410  The democratic rhetoric 
that informed adult appeals to youth service, however, yielded to the public 
reservations about the electoral faculties of adolescents. 
 Many citizens also had doubts about the depth of youth support for their own 
enfranchisement.  An August 1943 survey conducted by the Institute of Student 
Opinion of 86,000 high school students from all forty-eight states found 53% against 
lowering the voting age.411  Other polls indicated vacillation among young 
respondents when asked if their age peers had enough knowledge and acumen to 
vote intelligently.412  Teenagers debated the issue in spirited forums hosted by high 
schools and radio stations.413   Few of the discussions pondered the constitutional or 
federalist theories regarding the authority of Congress to declare a national 
franchise age.  Most often, adolescent panelists contemplated whether the 
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mitigating qualities of youth, among them juvenile behavior and the struggle to 
understand consequences, should disqualify teenagers as electors.414  “Such honesty 
is refreshing,” the editors of the New York Times remarked, “whether well-founded 
or not.  Some people now old enough to have the franchise would do well to consider 
whether they, making up their minds rather casually at the polls on issues before 
them, have regarded the ballot with the same awe and respect as these boys and 
girls who decided they were not yet worthy of the voting privilege.”415  Adults 
listening to the deliberations or reading youth comments questioning the readiness 
of adolescents to vote wondered if young people wanted enfranchisement or if it was 
being forced upon them by self-interested politicians.  Alonzo F. Myers, professor of 
education at New York University, charged the 18-vote hullabaloo sprung from the 
“emotionalism” of war and the crass “political opportunism” of lawmakers groveling 
for votes.416   
 Some young people did independently advocate for suffrage.  Prompted by the 
draft age discussions in September 1942, Harold R. Moskovit, 36-year-old president 
of the Affiliated Young Democrats of New York, organized “Votes for Youth,” a non-
partisan drive that sought enfranchisement for all persons between 18 and 20. 417  
Moskovit envisioned flooding statehouses and Congress with teams of high-school- 
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and college-age activists pressing for passage of “right to fight, right to vote” 
legislation.  Votes for Youth never became the national lobbying operation that 
Moskovit anticipated.  It remained from its inception a petite publicity organ that 
periodically drew attention to youth suffrage through mass mailings, press releases, 
and personal visits (usually by Moskovit) to lawmakers, student governments, or 
newspaper editors.418  Unlike women suffragists, sponsors of lowered voting ages 
separately pleaded the case, which atomized the endeavor into small, disjointed 
petition cells.  Because advocates never joined in league, there was no coherent 
attempt to mobilize young people on behalf of their own enfranchisement en masse.  
Supporters of the 18-vote appeared to bank on a hope that legislative authorities 
would recognize the millions of teens performing vital war services with a reward of 
collective voting rights.  The lesson from Georgia was unlearned:  with no 
centralized group to organize public advocacy, the case for youth suffrage fell flat. 
 
Since the final bomb of World War II, scholars have traced the wartime 
contributions of various American social groups.  Historians generally agree with 
Richard Polenberg’s assessment that the war “radically altered the character of 
American society and challenged its most durable values.”419  For youth, the war 
created new opportunities and posed old challenges. National mobilization offered 
young people great prospects, but they were also burdened with greater 
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responsibilities.  Adolescents did not experience the war passively.  They insisted on 
getting involved as actors in their own right and not as appendages to adult 
ventures, even despite the skepticism of public authorities regarding their abilities.  
Adolescents expressed hope, similar to other social groups, that exceptional war 
service might improve their sociopolitical status.  Teen-aged Americans eagerly 
strove to prove capable of fulfilling the economic, military, and civic responsibilities 
of war to overcome the prejudice of age-based chauvinism.  The war experience 
showed that young people possessed a great adaptive quality to face most any 
situation and an acute capacity to analyze complex issues in sometimes harrowing 
circumstances.  The armed forces trusted millions of young troops, like Sergeant 
Bernard Friedenberg, to make the hard battlefield calls necessary to win the war.  
Some of the decisions they made affected limb; others determined life.  Youths who 
had shouldered the burdens of service at the front, on the farm, and in the factory 
considered themselves entitled to the privileges and prerogatives of adulthood – 
including the opportunity to make electoral decisions. 
Because adolescents had seemingly earned the right to vote, prospects for 
youth suffrage initially looked bullish.  Many teenagers served commendably, and 
most adults agreed their contributions greatly aided the war effort.  Several 
members of Congress supported extending the franchise to adolescents.  Opinion 
polls showed the public appeared to concur with the notion that young people 
deserved voting rights.  Many adults agreed with the argument that it was grossly 
inequitable to ask youth to work and fight for democracy and then deny them a full 
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electoral share.  Adolescents argued enfranchisement was vital to effectuate 
democratic citizenship, that not to vote would undermine the reason they had been 
taught in school the Allies had to vanquish fascism:  to preserve self-determination.  
Indeed, the promises of democracy animated the 18-vote cause more than the 
expected rewards of war service; as one advocate asserted:   “Democracy can grant 
one incomparable reward – the right to be governed by the consent of the governed 
– represented by the full franchise that goes with citizenship. . . .If our younger 
youth are big and brave enough to fight for us, they are good enough to say who 
shall represent them and what direction our government shall take under the 
Constitution.”420  
 But federal lawmakers did not extend suffrage to youth.  Other, more 
pressing and important war issues impeded the effort to lower the voting age.  The 
nascent conservative coalition of congressional Republicans and Southern 
Democrats held firm that any changes to suffrage qualifications, including age, 
must originate in the states.  Neither President Roosevelt nor members of Congress 
appeared willing to devote the time and energy to shepherd a youth suffrage bill 
through the legislative process while supervising the war effort.  In addition, there 
was a fundamental incongruity between their nationalistic rhetoric and legislative 
deeds.  White House and Capitol Hill officials sincerely praised America’s citizen-
soldiers fighting the battles of democracy and paid dutiful homage to the republican 
principles motivating the drive to exterminate fascism.  But their commitment to 
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democratization extended only to already-enfranchised adults.   Supporters of the 
anti-poll tax and soldier vote legislation believed that if adult servicemen were good 
enough to fight for the nation, they were good enough to be accorded the full 
exercise of their existent franchise.  Washington lawmakers did not afford 18-, 19-, 
or 20-year-old troops the same accommodation despite being legally old enough to 
defend American democracy.  Without expressing any sense of irony related to the 
votelessness of adolescent combatants or civilians, the editors of the Chicago 
Tribune charged:   
 The exercise of the franchise within the hundreds of encamp- 
 ments in this country should serve to emphasize to the men 
 in service the difference between their free republican gov- 
 ernment and the methods of the enemy countries.  It is regret- 
 table, however, that the exclusion from the voting of certain 
 of the men who are willing to give their lives for their country 
 will also emphasize the fact that we are setting out to evan- 
 gelize the world without first having practiced all that we 
 preach.421  
 
Young Americans who worked and fought for democracy considered 
themselves worthy of electoral privileges.  Adults, however, declined to accept 
adolescents as political stakeholders because they doubted the capacity of teenagers 
to proffer consent sensibly.   The political assimilation of youth, similar to their 
immersion into war work, was directly proportional to the degree adults allowed 
them meaningful involvement.  Whereas adults entrusted trained, but untested, 
teenagers to make purposeful choices on the job and in combat, they doubted 
educated, but inexperienced, 18-to-20-year-olds would make sensible electoral 
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decisions in the voting booth or at the ballot box.  Americans might have believed 
the denial of youth suffrage unfair considering adolescent war service, but neither 
lawmakers nor their adult constituents reckoned the 21-vote an unjust violation of 
rights that required legislative resolution.  Public authorities may have valued the 
service of adolescents, but they did not deem teenagers vote-worthy.   
Working without the force of unified leadership or the strength of national 
organization and within a society unwaveringly focused on the war effort, 18-vote 
sponsors could not convince enough legislators to overturn the convention of delayed 
electoral adulthood.  Patriotic petitions, righteous appeals, and superlative service 
simply were not enough; the case for re-conceptualizing the bounds of adolescence 
had to be made before recalibrating voting ages could occur.  Adolescents 
shouldered the heavy responsibilities of mobilization along with adults, but the 
confines of traditional age boundaries and the curbs of the “storm-stress” stereotype 
cramped the liberating possibilities of combat and defense work. By not allowing 
adolescents to join the war on their own timelines, adults took from youth the sense 
of collective unity and individual self-worth accorded other social groups who 
enlisted for duty on their own terms.  Establishing a uniform national voting age 
was not accomplished during World War II.  But youth suffrage found a champion, 
Ellis Arnall, and he would carry the cause into the postwar era. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
CITIZEN OR OUTLIER: 
TEENAGERS AND SUFFRAGE, 1945-1960 
 
 
 
Democracy can be cruel to misfits.  The reason it’s cruel is you’re told you can be 
anything, and there’s enough evidence around you of people getting ahead that you 
believe it’s true.  So when you don’t, it’s crushing.  The more democratic a society, 
the more humiliating the failure. 
 
                             Charles Peters, founder of The Washington Monthly422  
 
 
 
 On 14 September 1952, nearly 100,000 New Yorkers flocked to the Mall in 
Central Park for America’s first “Citizenship Day.”  Its origins lay in 1939 with the 
delivery of an unsolicited song called “I Am an American” to Arthur Pine, the head 
of a public relations firm in New York City.  Pine arranged for the tune to be played 
on the national radio networks of ABC, Mutual, and NBC, and its popularity 
inspired the New York Journal-American to organize “I Am an American Day” at 
the World’s Fair held in the city.  The promotion proved so successful that, in 1940, 
Congress designated the third Sunday in May as national “I Am an American 
Day.”423   The main purpose of the celebration was to salute “all who, by coming of 
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age or naturalization, have attained the status of citizenship.”424  Some people 
reckoned it a pseudo rite of passage, in a nation devoid of one, for it gave special 
recognition to persons who attained full citizen status by becoming eligible 
electors.425   In February 1952, Congress renamed it ‘”Citizenship Day” and moved 
it to the third week of September to also commemorate the signing of the U.S. 
Constitution.426   
The people who filled the Central Park Mall for the first “Citizenship Day” 
gala heard grand patriotic oratory by prominent political dignitaries.   The Cold 
War and the combat in Korea shaped the content of the day’s discourse.  Each 
speaker reminded the audience that only determined vigilance against communist 
expansion would safeguard world peace and domestic felicity.  James A. Farley, 
former Postmaster General, glowingly venerated the liberties inherent to 
“Americanism” by contrasting them to the constraints imposed by Marxism.  He 
declared, “We are not told how to vote and we can belong to any political party we 
choose.  We are not forced to join any political party.  We have a free hand and a 
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free mind.”427   To New York City Mayor Vincent Impellitteri, the perils of 
containing communism globally and thwarting subversion locally required national 
mobilization akin to World War II.  He implored the crowd to alert “our neighbors 
and our neighbors’ children, that we need their help to make the great decisions of 
our times.”428 
 The civic unity aroused by “Citizenship Day” contrasted the civil exclusion 
experienced by America’s social minorities, including young people.  Republicanism 
postulated that the sustainability of self-rule depended upon states enfranchising 
only those persons deemed capable of rational judgment.  Determining who 
possessed the requisite level of mental and emotional fitness engendered tense 
debates.  The employ of arbitrary markers of qualification, such as wealth, race, 
gender, and age, identified which people democratic states considered competent 
citizens and inept outliers.  During the post-World War II era, the liberating 
promises of democracy inspired disfranchised persons to demand the enforcement of 
their citizenship rights.  African-Americans, Hispanic-Americans, and other groups 
held faith in the Constitution’s avowal of popular political rights and embraced the 
rhetoric honoring the sacredness of suffrage.  As citizen-stakeholders, they insisted 
their consent be conferred as a check and influence upon governmental decision-
making.  With all deliberate speed, America’s republican system gradually granted 
them electoral equality.   
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Young people also desired enfranchisement, and they, too, encountered deep-
rooted social prejudices that blocked their paths to full political citizenship.  The 
popular sentiment formed during World War II that adolescents should be granted 
suffrage because of patriotic service faded quickly at war’s end.  Postwar debates 
over lowering voting ages examined whether young people could proffer consent 
sensibly and responsibly.   The social hysterias of the era amplified the usual adult 
qualms about youth capacities.  After the war, adolescents achieved unprecedented 
social attention thanks to the “baby boom.”   During the 1950s, a discrete “youth 
culture” materialized that set adolescents apart from adult culture.  The formation 
of youth culture crystallized “teenagers” as distinct social personae with their own 
lifestyles, outlooks, goods, fads, music, and slang.  The rising youth demographic 
tide begat for teenagers an economic and cultural clout heretofore unknown in 
American history.  Though businessmen cashed in handsomely on the consumer 
demands of adolescents, parents and politicians became ever-more alarmed by the 
collective want of youth to flout the norms, values, and behaviors of the larger adult 
culture.  Addled by Cold War paranoia, adults detected in the normal squalls and 
anxieties of adolescence a potential national security hazard.  The naïve credulity 
allegedly inherent to youth supposedly made them acutely susceptible to communist 
charms.  Civic concerns that the immaturity of “teenagers” and the criminality of 
“juvenile delinquents” might subvert the nation not only heightened traditional 
worries about adolescent rebelliousness but also muffled contemporary calls to 
enfranchise youth.   To many adults, teenagers lacked the levelheaded faculties 
156 
 
necessary for electoral cogency.   
Young people also confronted political obstacles impeding electoral selfhood.  
Postwar Americans broadly accepted that governments would protect individual 
rights, provide basic welfare, and commit to international involvement.  Presidents 
Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower and members of Congress steered America 
on a modest political course by striving to uphold those precepts while not 
expanding the prerogatives of government too much.  While Truman remained non-
committal to lowering franchise ages, Eisenhower publically endorsed establishing 
eighteen as the national suffrage age.  In May 1954, the Senate took the first 
congressional floor vote on a youth suffrage bill.  Southern Democrats rallied fellow 
partymates to reject it as an infringement upon the states’ right to set voter 
qualifications.  In the context of federalist traditions and contemporary politics, the 
18-vote resolution appeared to many lawmakers as just too constitutionally 
ambitious – even to those legislators who, every Citizenship Day, extolled 
enfranchisement as the essential democratic right.  The Senate’s decision to uphold 
the 21-vote meant teenagers remained sociopolitical misfits:  creative enough to 
wield cultural influence but not capable enough to be granted electoral power. 
 
 The victory over the Axis powers fostered a dismantling of colonial empires 
after World War II that allowed for the emergence of many modern democratic 
states.  Political scientist Samuel P. Huntington contends the historical pattern of 
global democratization can be broken into a series of three waves and reverse 
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waves.  The first wave began in the 1820s and lasted until the mid-1920s; however, 
some backsliding occurred as fascist, communist, or military dictatorships 
overthrew some of the fledgling democracies.  The second wave of democratization 
started during World War II and was finished by the mid-1960s; many of the 
democracies during this brief span succumbed to autocracy.  In the mid-1970s, the 
third wave of democratization commenced and continued through the 1990s with 
the end of the Cold War.  With the fall of communism, democracy became the most 
common form of world government.  The missionary zeal with which American Cold 
Warriors preached the transformative virtues of democracy had much to do with its 
global adoption.  Huntington maintains the second-wave democracies emerged 
mainly as a result of purposeful American efforts, supported by local partners, to 
squash fascism and thwart communism through the implementation of federalism 
(separation of powers), constitutionalism (rule of law), republicanism (popular 
sovereignty) and capitalism (free markets).  Though American action sometimes 
relied more on coercion than persuasion, thirty-six formerly autocratic nations, by 
his calculations, became functioning democracies by the mid-1960s.429  As a result, 
Huntington concludes, democracy developed from a largely northern European to a 
worldwide phenomenon over the course of the twentieth century. 
 The second-wave democracies established suffrage as a global right of 
citizenship.   In the past, disfranchised peoples insisted upon electoral equalization 
to channel legitimate claims against the tyranny of imperialists or despots.  In the 
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postwar era, as sociologist Reinhard Bendix emphasizes, the claims for political 
empowerment became part of larger strategies for national unification, the control 
of dissidence, and the securitization of human rights.430  In December 1948, the 
United States voted with forty-eight other countries to adopt the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.431  The United Nations drafted the Declaration to 
articulate the inalienable personal and political liberties implied by the terms 
“human rights” and “fundamental freedoms” that appeared in the U.N. charter.  
The Declaration pronounced moral standards and legal entitlements designed to 
protect the freedom, dignity, and quality of life for peoples and nations around the 
world.  Article 21, Clause 3 of the Declaration proposed:  “The will of the people 
shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in 
periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and 
shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.”432  The concept 
of “universal and equal suffrage” nourished the global trend toward democratization 
by insisting that the right to vote be granted to all qualified citizens.  Member 
nations, of course, retained the legal power to determine voter requirements.  
Signatories of the Declaration understood that arbitrary disbarments due to gender, 
race, class, ethnicity, religion, or sexual orientation should be eliminated.  Serious 
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struggles over suffrage and electoral procedures engulfed many countries, but, little 
by little, the principle of “one man, one vote” developed into the world standard of 
enfranchisement.   
 Though the Declaration never clarified if age represented an illegitimate 
deprivation of full citizenship, lowering voting ages became part of the global 
democratization process.  Before its first national election in 1949, for example, 
Israel dropped its voting-age threshold from 21 to 18.433  Brazil and Costa Rica set 
eighteen as the national franchise age to standardize the administration of suffrage 
laws.434  In Asia, establishing electoral ages grew out of American actions to 
reconstruct governmental systems shattered by World War II.  Japan’s postwar 
constitution amended previous election laws by authorizing women’s suffrage and 
lowering the franchise age from 25 to 20.435  The U.S. military government in South 
Korea approved an election law that established the minimum voting age at twenty-
three.436   
In Europe, a desire to avoid a future war enlivened actions to lower franchise 
ages.  Political activists asserted that broadening the voting base would serve as a 
brake to prevent governments from plunging into the diplomatic calamities that led 
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to warfare in 1939.  Their logic stressed that the more democratic the nation, the 
more accountable its leaders would be to the citizenry, which would, in theory, 
lessen the future prospects of war.  Other people argued that since the Allies armies 
had fought to preserve democracy, national electorates should expand to include 
previously un-franchised age groups who helped win the war.  Within five years of 
its end, Finland, France, the Netherlands, and Denmark each reduced their 
constitutional voting ages, but none reached below age twenty.437    
Europe’s communist countries were among the first on the continent to 
promulgate eighteen as the official franchise age – long before the United States did 
so.   The 1936 constitution of the Soviet Union established eighteen as its minimum 
voting age.  After World War II, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia each followed Russia’s example by 
reducing the age of enfranchisement to eighteen.438  Of course, suffrage inside the 
communist bloc meant nil politically without observance of popular sovereignty.   
Soviet leaders, however, intended the age drop of enfranchisement to enlarge 
membership in the Communist Party rather than to increase electoral participation.  
The practical gain in solidifying regional control in Eastern Europe via expanded 
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party constituencies also yielded a political profit beyond the Iron Curtain.  For 
those young Western Europeans who had become disillusioned by the democratic-
capitalist model, Soviet policies that purposefully included youth in party politics 
stoked interest in communism.   Within some of Europe’s democracies, particularly 
Greece, Italy, and France, communists made political inroads by rallying support 
among adolescents through promises to enfranchise them.439  A Frenchman 
complaining to the New York Times about the growing electoral strength of 
Western European communists lamented that they “have actually stolen and 
muffled the thunder which should be our own truth.”440 
Leftist political groups in the United States were early postwar champions of 
lower voting ages.  In January 1946, the American Labor Party set a 17-point 
legislative program that included a provision for reducing suffrage ages to 
eighteen.441  Left-wing youth organizations became vocal in support of revising the 
age of enfranchisement.  In February 1946, the New York state branch of American 
Youth for Democracy organized a protest at the capitol in Albany on behalf of youth 
suffrage.  Nearly 500 young people, “many of them in uniform and still more with 
GI buttons in their lapels,” demanded, among other things, voting rights for all 
persons over age eighteen.442  The youth bureau of the diminutive Liberal Party 
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called on lawmakers to revise voting ages, reckoning that “the contribution of the 
18-to-21-year-olds to our country during the last war needs no emphasis.”443  In 
1948, the National Youth Organization formed as an auxiliary to Henry Wallace’s 
Progressive Party.  The NYO sought “full assurance of civil liberties for Negro 
youth, the right to vote at 18 . . . and freedom from war for all youth.”444   Arthur 
Gilbert, chairman of the National Jewish Youth Organization, asserted politically 
open-minded adolescents had gravitated toward Wallace and the Progressives 
because the Republicans and Democrats “’destroy the full creative development of 
youth.’”   The Progressive Party’s 1948 platform indeed included a plank setting 
eighteen as the national age of enfranchisement.445  In the context of the Cold War, 
left-wing support of lowered suffrage ages colored the proposition with a radical 
tinge that made many lawmakers around the nation wary of communist 
encroachment.  But, during the immediate years after World War II, when most 
Americans were focused on economic issues, leftist advocacy carried on the 18-vote 
cause when few citizens cared. 
Former Georgia governor Ellis Arnall busily worked to keep the issue of 
franchise ages on the nation’s political radar.  Into the 1960s, Arnall encouraged 
federal and state legislators to follow Georgia’s lead in expanding franchise 
opportunities for youth.  Arnall penned essays for periodicals, spoke in public 
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forums, appeared on radio and TV programs, and testified at governmental 
hearings to promote the revision of voting-age qualifications.  He ardently disagreed 
with the oft-expressed view that 18-year-olds were too immature, too gullible, 
and/or too inexperienced to be entrusted with ballots.  Arnall consistently 
maintained his “faith in the young men and women of America” to be sensible and 
dutiful voters if ever enfranchised.446  His advocacy of the 18-vote garnered 
attention to youth suffrage; however, it did little to affect lawmaking during the 
postwar years.  He had acquired sizeable public capital as governor, but after being 
termed-out of office in 1946, he saw his influence decline as he transitioned into the 
private sector.  Regionally, Arnall fell out of favor by supporting voting rights for 
African-Americans.  Nationally, he lost popularity by campaigning for Henry 
Wallace.447  Nevertheless, he remained a valuable spokesman for youth 
enfranchisement. Though Arnall did not directly inspire legislators or governments 
to adopt lower voting ages, his persistent promotion of the 18-vote kept the issue 
afloat. 
Arnall avidly promoted youth suffrage as a curative to voter apathy.  He 
consistently asserted that “the idealism and candor of youth” could reenergize 
American politics similar to how adolescents had shaken up European elections.448  
Fervent political competition and democratization, including the lowering of 
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franchise ages, fostered massively high voter turnout rates across Europe.  A 
December 1948 mayoral race in West Berlin, for example, saw 85% of eligible 
electors cast ballots; whereas, only 51% of enfranchised Americans voted the 
previous month in the presidential plebiscite.449  The 51% score marked a 5% 
decline from the 1944 election and a 7% drop compared to the 1940 contest – and 
represented the lowest turnout rate by percentage since 1920.450  In several states 
that had voting-age populations equal to or less than West Berlin’s 1.5 million 
persons, constituent turnout could only be described as anemic:  South Carolina 
(13.6%), Alabama (13.7%), Mississippi (15.5%), and Arkansas (22%).451  “We are the 
freest people on earth, the most prosperous and the happiest,” U.S. Senator 
Wayland Brooks (R-IL) avowed, “yet we show an amazing indifference to politics.”452 
Political observers struggled to make sense of the “franchise delinquency.”453   
The Washington Post lamented that no analysis of the voting data could avoid the 
“painful conviction that a vast number of Americans do not take our democratic 
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system very seriously.”454  A college student from Providence, Rhode Island, who 
had longed to “fulfill my obligation as an American citizen” by casting his first 
presidential ballot, blamed public apathy on a disillusioning campaign that “seemed 
to degenerate into a ‘lesser-of-the-four-evils’ affair” that left voters with no “positive 
choice to make” among Harry Truman, Thomas Dewey, Strom Thurmond, and 
Henry Wallace.455  The Chicago Tribune, which notoriously headlined the wrong 
winner of the election – “DEWEY DEFEATS TRUMAN” – dismissed the shabby 
polling numbers as “a plain indication that the campaign was a dud to everyone.”456  
The 1950 mid-term elections appeared equally uninspiring;  only 41% of eligible 
voters took part in the balloting.457  
In contrast, European voter turnout soared. Italy averaged 90% participation 
in its 1948 and 1951 national elections.458  Sweden’s 1950 elections garnered a 78% 
showing by registered voters.459  And the 1951 plebiscite that propelled Winston 
Churchill to a second term as British Prime Minister generated an 83% turnout 
rate.460  European election returns so impressed President Truman that he scolded 
his fellow citizens for their “laziness and indifference.”  “Americans are mighty 
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proud of their democratic system of government, but when it comes to voting,” 
Truman admonished, “many other countries put us to shame.”461  Chastisement of 
“vote slackers” by Truman and other authorities, however, did little to spur 
participation.462   
Civic leaders fretted over the public’s cool detachment from the electoral 
process.  They pondered one of the great paradoxes of contemporary American 
politics: the United States was the first nation to endow its citizens with the powers 
of self-government, but modern Americans, as reflected by voter turnout rates, did 
not seem to cherish the privilege of self-determination.  Considering the serious 
international struggle America was waging against communism, many authorities 
believed the problem of democratic ennui posed as serious a threat to domestic 
tranquility as internal subversion.  As Minnesota governor Luther W. Youngdahl 
exhorted, “In these crucial days when democracy is endangered by an ideology that 
holds the right of free elections in contempt, it is tragic to find the great percentages 
of qualified American voters who fail to exercise their franchise at the polls.  This 
apathy, indifference, and neglect can undermine our heritage of ‘government by the 
people’ unless we take steps to overcome it.”463  Political scientists labored to deduce 
why qualified, enfranchised Americans chose not to exercise their suffrage rights.  
Their studies sketched three types of non-voters:  the lazy who did not get around to 
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voting; the skeptical who viewed voting as futile; and the discouraged who were 
prevented from voting by legal or practical difficulties.  The scholars also found that 
postwar economic prosperity had engendered a uniquely American version of 
electoral apathy rooted more in contentment than hopelessness.464   
University professors, newspaper editors, business executives, labor 
chieftains, and government officials conferred frequently to share ideas about how 
to inspire citizens to care and incite constituents to vote.  Some pundits backed 
coercive schemes, such as compulsory voting laws, that would punish qualified 
electors who evaded their democratic duty.465   Other observers blamed widespread 
ignorance of political affairs for the failures to exercise suffrage privileges.    The 
Detroit News questioned whether the bulk of American voters possessed the 
“elementary political knowledge as would indicate a minimum interest much less an 
intelligent absorption in political processes.”466  The New York Times encouraged “a 
greater effort, in the schools and elsewhere, to make the individual realize the 
importance of voting.”467  A public school teacher who claimed vast experience in 
political recruitment acknowledged, however, that “no amount of education or 
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pressure-appeals will bring all of the [electors] to the polls.”468   
A consensus developed that poor voter turnout emerged not only from 
popular indifference but also from faults in the electoral system.  Advocates for 
political reform identified America’s byzantine electoral laws as the chief obstacle 
holding back voter participation.  John C. Cornelius, president of the American 
Heritage Foundation (a conservative think tank based in Washington, D.C.), argued 
revising voting regulations, particularly at the state level, was necessary because 
many “were established in the last century and no longer meet current needs.”469  
The authors of the U.S. Constitution allowed the states great discretion, in the 
absence of a specific federal law or amendment, to establish the qualifications for 
suffrage, the requirements for office-holding, and the schemes for casting ballots 
within their jurisdictions.  Allowing states to determine the terms of 
enfranchisement, however, created an eclectic variance in eligibility standards 
qualifying how, when, where, and which electors could vote.   
Eager to expand the bounds of democracy, postwar reformers challenged the 
three systemic obstacles they believed most impeded voter turnout.  First, they 
disputed the legality of those codes that purposely disfranchised certain peoples, 
like Native Americans.470   They also contested the validity of those obligations, 
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such as paying poll taxes and passing literacy tests, designed to whittle 
“undesirable” groups from the electorate.  In addition, they questioned the 
rationality of rigorous registration and residential prerequisites that, in light of the 
mobility of the modern American populace, disqualified and discouraged loads of 
potential voters.471  U.S. Senator Francis Case (R-SD) lauded the reformism for 
easing the hardships of those persons living “’behind the iron curtain of legal 
technicalities that keep them from governing themselves.’”472  
Supporters of youth suffrage sought to wrap lowering voting ages into the 
electoral reform cause.  Father Edward Dowling, a fervent anti-communist Jesuit 
priest from St. Louis, implored Americans to practice what their nation preached to 
the world by getting behind democratization projects that would enhance popular 
sovereignty, particularly the elimination of “’outdated procedures’” such as the 
Electoral College and the 21-vote.473 India Edwards, director of the Women’s 
Division of the Democratic National Committee, advocated a “Voting Bill of Rights” 
that proposed, in part, that “no American shall be denied an effective vote because 
of race, color, or national origin, unreasonable literacy tests or excessive educational 
requirement, dishonest registration procedures or elections, taxpaying or property 
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holding requirements, unrealistic age requirements, or residence in the District of 
Columbia.”474   To Dowling, Edwards, and other allies of adolescent 
enfranchisement, the traditional 21-vote standard struck them as “unrealistic” 
because it appeared incompatible with the contemporary endeavors to widen the 
electorate and incongruous with the advanced education that modern youth 
received.  “For American life in the 20th century to deny the franchise till age 21,” 
University of Illinois president George D. Stoddard declared, “is to hold back 
persons who are capable of assuming social and political responsibilities.”475   
Youth suffrage received strong support from professional educators.  They 
asserted ever-increasing high school graduation rates signified that 18-year-olds 
were well-equipped to handle the obligations of enfranchisement.476  Historian 
Andrew Hartman contends that the impetus of the Cold War spurred government 
officials to mobilize teachers and students in the geopolitical contest for global 
hegemony.  He notes that educational programs evolved over the course of the 
postwar period. From the end of World War II to the early 1950s, most schools still 
employed John Dewey’s progressive education theories as the main pedagogical 
model.   Most every district abandoned progressive education after critics scored its 
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student-centered approach as the cause of poor academic results.  Between the early 
and late-50s, educators emphasized “life adjustment” classes that offered pupils 
lessons in the practical know-how for becoming happy and productive citizens.   
After the launch of the Soviet satellite Sputnik, federal officials insisted school 
administrators craft a more technological curriculum to produce mathematically 
and scientifically smart Cold Warriors.  As a result, Hartman concludes, the 
traditional belief that the primary purpose of American schools was to educate 
young people for responsible conduct as adults got subsumed into the political cause 
of developing the intellectual manpower needed to combat communism.477   
To cultivate the qualities of mind and heart required to sustain Americanism, 
educators created “civics” courses that intended to train students in “democratic 
citizenship.” Similar to the “life adjustment” pedagogy, civics classes strove to 
provide young people enough political knowledge so, as adults, they could 
adequately perform their citizen duties.  In 1955, sociologist Herbert Hyman 
observed that the American process of introducing youth to their nation’s politics 
relied more on indoctrination than education.  He coined the term “political 
socialization” to describe how communities fostered ideological conformity through 
the perpetuation of an ethos that stressed the importance of institutions and 
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political authority while disparaging imagination and personal license.478  Civics 
curricula lay emphasis on imparting the norms, values, and behaviors of American-
style democracy through a mixture of hagiography (studying the epic deeds of the 
great men of America’s political history), catechism (teaching the basic democratic 
principles as a set of incontrovertible verities, especially as compared to 
communism), and patriotism (coaching a dogmatic defense of America’s way of life 
against communist denigration or incursion).479  Public officials found ways to 
funnel young student-citizens into civics classes.  Some states, like Maryland, 
advised school districts to include Civics as a part of the core curriculum.480  Other 
states, such as Missouri, steered pupils towards Civics, History, and Government 
courses by mandating the completion of competency examinations over the U.S. and 
state constitutions within such classes as a requirement for graduation from public 
high schools.481   
Schools enhanced the citizenship training by sponsoring extracurricular 
activities that reinforced the importance of civic engagement within a constitutional 
democracy.  For instance, teachers reminded children of the communal duty to aid 
misfortunate persons by coordinating campaigns on behalf of the March of Dimes or 
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UNICEF.  Administrators arranged teams of students to take part in the mundane, 
but important, workings of democracy, such as assisting voter registration drives, 
phoning people to remind them of an upcoming election, offering babysitting 
services for mothers, and helping voters at polling places.482  Mock elections, usually 
held in conjunction with presidential or gubernatorial campaigns, informed teens 
about the candidates and issues and allowed teachers to tutor them in voting.483   
Some school districts, particularly those in the Northeast, partnered with 
Citizenship Education Project sponsored by the Teachers College of Columbia 
University.   The CEP worked with public schools to embolden citizenship by 
teaching adolescents about democratic ideals through hands-on civic activities, such 
as public service work and political volunteerism.   A group of teenagers in Pearl 
River, New York, who had gone through the CEP program, for example, organized a 
successful campaign that convinced voters to pass a bond issue for building new 
schools.  Another set of CEP-trained students in South Orange, New Jersey, so 
impressed local officials with their proposal to construct a youth recreational center 
that they were allowed to help plan the project.484 
While principals and faculty exposed youths to the democratic process, they 
stifled expressions of student opinions within the schoolhouse.  In the heightened 
tensions engendered by the Cold War, the excited, often poorly framed, political 
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utterances of adolescents that had been formerly considered different or weird were 
sometimes construed as radical or subversive.   Some students organized their own 
events outside of school to articulate their views.   Young people hosted community 
forums to discuss local problems or national concerns.485  Youth groups staged 
model legislatures to practice the intricate mechanics of speech-making, politicking, 
and lawmaking.486   President Truman encouraged a group of YMCA “boy 
governors” visiting the White House to continue rehearsing “the responsibilities 
that are necessary to carry on a government . . . In a few years the responsibility is 
going to be in your hands.’”487  Not every attempt to stimulate enduring interest in 
electoral affairs worked, of course; some adolescents remained indifferent to politics 
and civic duties into adulthood and old age.  For the majority of teenagers, however, 
partaking in the classes, forums, and elections, even if pretend, inculcated a spirit of 
civic guardianship necessary for the perpetuation of republicanism.  “Participation 
of youth in the democratic life,” a 1953 National Education Association resolution 
trumpeted, “prepares students for responsible citizenship.”488   
Many people maintained that well-schooled adolescents should be allowed to 
demonstrate their citizenship training in the voting booth.  Truman’s first attorney 
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general, Tom C. Clark, submitted, “I have a boy 18 and I think the right to vote 
would add to his consciousness of civic responsibility, as it would to all boys and 
girls in that age group.”489  Youth suffrage advocates argued the interest of high 
school graduates in politics dampened waiting three or four years for 
enfranchisement, which, in their view, fostered perpetual electoral disengagement.  
At a historical moment “when grownups are staying away from the polls in such an 
alarming manner,” Washington Post columnist Malvina Lindsay observed, 
capturing the “youthful enthusiasm” of teenagers could stoke “a widespread, steady 
buildup” of long-term electoral involvement.490  An Arlington, Virginia, attorney 
asserted that if 18-year-olds were enfranchised “the younger blood would help stir 
more interest in national politics.”491 Adolescents, when solicited by adults, 
confirmed an ardor for civic involvement.   A University of Illinois student believed 
a lower suffrage age would bring into the electorate “a great many more voters who 
are interested in civic problems.”492  A Manhattan teen affirmed that citizenship 
training had fostered an “enthusiasm” among teenagers for community affairs that 
“more than makes up for their lack of maturity.”   A Brooklyn youth insisted that 
“age is not the only criterion for maturity . . . many adults in the[ir] thirties are 
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irresponsible when they vote.”493   “If the 18-year-olds could vote,” a Newark, New 
Jersey, high-schooler predicted, “younger people would urge more of the adults to 
get out and vote.  We would also show them exactly how important it is to vote.”494   
Ellis Arnall pointed to the positive electoral contributions of Georgia youth as 
proof that the benefits of reducing suffrage ages would ripple through any political 
system.  He declared that adding adolescents to Georgia’s voting pool had a 
“tremendous” impact on state elections and government because “young people take 
a more active interest in politics . . . and want to become active at once.”495  As an 
example of the youth effect, Arnall credited the establishment of the 18-vote in 1943 
as the catalyst for eliminating Georgia’s poll tax in 1945.496   Because the Peach 
State decreased its franchise age, Arnall concluded in his book, The Shore Dimly 
Seen, “Georgia today has the broadest electoral base, not only of any Southern State 
but of any State in the Union. . . .This experiment in broadening the base of 
democratic participation in government will be helpful to every State of our 
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Union.”497   
In the decade after World War II, no state answered Arnall’s call to 
enfranchise adolescents.  Delegates to New Jersey’s 1947 constitutional convention, 
for example, defeated a resolution to establish eighteen as the state’s voting age.498  
Between 1946 and 1954, bills to reduce suffrage ages were offered in 21 of the 48 
states.499   Only the 1952 proposals in Oklahoma and South Dakota made it through 
their respective statehouses to citizen referendum, and adult voters rebuffed 
each.500  Rejection of the propositions could be partly blamed on the voting-age issue 
getting caught in the wake of more pressing state concerns.  For instance, 
Oklahoma voters also denied authorizing a 125 million-dollar bonus to World War 
II and Korean War veterans and a special sales tax to fund welfare programs as 
well as nixing the 18-vote measure.501    
The ineffectual state action reflected federal indifference to youth suffrage.  
Only seven times from 1946 to 1952 did congressmen put forward resolutions to 
establish a national voting age:  two in the Senate (both on the same day in 1947) 
and five in the House (four filed by New York Democrat Arthur G. Klein).  None of 
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the bills were reported out of committee.502  Most Washington officials considered 
enfranchising adolescents of slight importance compared to managing the domestic 
economy, maintaining internal political stability, sustaining military preparedness, 
and containing communism.  Congressional action also got hindered by concerns 
that declaring a federal age of enfranchisement might create sticky legal messes; 
e.g. many states tied jury service to voter eligibility.  Several lawmakers fretted 
that a promulgating a national voting age, either by statute or amendment, might 
necessitate a change to the Fourteenth Amendment since it fixed representation in 
Congress on the basis of male citizens at least twenty-one years old.503   
Harry Truman remained unenthusiastic about the prospect of lowering the 
voting age.  Like previous presidents, Truman promoted opportunities to expand 
the franchise.  He urged Americans to vote in greater numbers, supported federal 
protection of suffrage rights, convinced the Defense Department to streamline 
absentee voting for soldiers, and called for the residents of Washington, D.C. to be 
enfranchised.504  Yet he never made a formal statement in support of youth suffrage 
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nor did anything substantive to rally the public or push the 18-vote in Congress.  
The nearest Truman came to endorsing adolescent enfranchisement occurred at an 
informal question-and-answer session with Chicago high school students in April 
1946.  Truman told the group that he “didn’t see why any intelligent boy or girl of 
18 should not have the right to vote if they prepared themselves since they proved 
in time of war that they can shoulder citizenship’s highest duty.” 505  He refused, 
however, to commit to sponsoring 18-vote legislation.  “As far as I can discover,” 
Truman’s administrative assistant, Charles S. Murphy, wrote to a White House 
staff member inquiring about how to answer requests for the President’s views on 
reducing voting ages, “neither the President nor the Administration have taken a 
position on this issue beyond saying that it is a matter for state decision.”506  
Truman’s cool response to youth suffrage mirrored the national mood. A June 
1946 Washington Post survey of Maryland, Virginia, and District of Columbia 
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residents found 52% of respondents opposed lowering voting ages from 21 to 18.507  
A February 1947 poll conducted by George Gallup showed 60% against the 18-vote.  
Gallup concluded the results revealed “a marked shift in public opinion since 1943, 
when sentiment favoring youth suffrage was at its height.”508  Whereas lawmakers 
pondered the political and legal problems reduced voting ages might cause, many of 
their constituents wondered if adolescents had enough educational preparation to 
warrant enfranchisement.  Some people agreed with a Nebraska school 
superintendent who avowed, “’With the social studies and school discussions what 
they are today, many an 18-year-old is better qualified to vote than are his 
parents.’”509  University of Illinois president George D. Stoddard added, “There is no 
magic power in 20 or 19 or 18, but the last figure represents a young person farther 
along, thanks to science, education, and democratic procedures, than the 21 year old 
of the preceding century.”510  Other adults, like a man from Silver Spring, 
Maryland, contested the logic that contemporary teenagers could vote more 
intelligently because they were “better educated” than past generations.  
“Government,” he argued, was “more complicated also, and a year or two of high 
school social studies is meager prerequisite for suffrage.”511  The editors of the 
Chicago Tribune also disputed the notion “that thanks to science, education, etc., 
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the 18 year old today is more advanced than the 21 year old of the last century.” 
They concluded, “Modern education has its points, but the early acceptance of adult 
responsibilities by young people can hardly be counted among them.”512      
Young people, too, appeared conflicted about whether they had acquired 
enough education to be responsible electors.  A Chicago youth who graduated with 
honors from a public high school admitted that “he knows too little about present 
social and political problems to take advantage of a lower voting age if it were 
established.”513  Another honors student from Washington, D.C. countered that “a 
fellow in high school usually knows more about what’s going on in Government than 
a lot of adults.  A lot of things are discussed in civics and history classes, you 
know.”514  Adolescents also seemed to lack full confidence in the intelligence 
quotients of the teen masses.  A Newark, New Jersey, girl opposed lowering voting 
ages because most teenagers, in her estimation, lacked “the seriousness required to 
choose good candidates for government offices.  Eighteen-year-olds are too easily 
swayed to be able to make individual decisions.”515  Another young female from New 
York City claimed “the ability to cast an intelligent ballot was primarily an 
individual matter,” but she conceded that “a two-and-a-half-year high school history 
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course was not sufficient foundation for political intelligence.”516  Doubts about the 
aptitudes of potential teenage electors were confirmed by reports that during the 
first year of the Korean War “more than 500,000 men were turned down for military 
service because they failed the educational examinations.”517 
The general concerns about teen brainpower affected national conversations 
about youth suffrage during the Korean War.  In June 1950, the Cold War erupted 
into a shooting war when forces from communist North Korea invaded South Korea.  
Under the assumption that the Soviet Union or China had instigated the attack, 
President Harry Truman obtained United Nations sponsorship of a collective effort 
to defend South Korea.  Sixteen nations, including many North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization allies, sent troops to Korea, but the United States deployed most of 
the combatants, furnished most of the weapons, and planned most of the military 
strategy.   The first U.S. soldiers rushed to Korea, however, were underprepared 
and suffered major defeats during the initial three months of the war.  Shortly after 
a joint US-UN force successfully counterattacked and drove the North Korean army 
back to the border at the thirty-eighth parallel, the war fell into a stalemate. 
Americans grew increasingly frustrated with the impasse.  Some people believed 
inept leadership caused the deadlock; others blamed the pampering and cosseting 
young soldiers had experienced as children.  As Lieutenant Colonel John Michaelis, 
commander of the Army’s 27th Infantry Division, grumbled, “These kids of mine . . . 
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spent a lot of time listening to lectures on the differences between communism and 
Americanism and not enough time crawling on their bellies on maneuvers with live 
ammunition singing over them.  They’d been nursed and coddled, told to drive 
safely, to buy War Bonds, to give to the Red Cross, to avoid V[eneral] D[isease], to 
write home to mother – when someone ought to have been telling them how to clean 
a machine gun when it jams.”518   
The concerns of Michaelis and other officers about the battlefield 
consequences of mollycoddling postwar boys revived the issue of universal military 
training (UMT).   After the cessation of World War II hostilities, the federal 
government stopped drafting men – like it had done at the end of World War I.  The 
growing specter of communist expansion moved President Truman to advocate 
universal military training as a means of national preparedness in lieu of 
continuous conscription.519  In every legislative session between 1945 and 1948, 
Truman asked Congress to create a system subjecting all males who graduated high 
school or turned eighteen to one year of training either in the regular army or 
National Guard.  Upon completion of the training, the men would serve six years in 
the reserves.  Many Americans opposed Truman’s plan as advocating peacetime 
conscription.  Some congressmen thought UMT needless within a national defense 
strategy based upon atomic power.  Other lawmakers deemed Truman’s suggestion 
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too inflammatory in a time devoid of active warfare.  Congress even let the Selective 
Service Act of 1940 expire, as legislated, in March 1947.  Congressional inaction 
spurred Pentagon officials to discuss the possibilities of forming a national program 
based in high schools to improve the physical fitness and martial skills of young 
males.520   
The communist uprisings in Greece and Turkey that inspired the Truman 
Doctrine and the diplomatic crisis in Germany that instigated the famous airlifting 
of supplies to West Berlin roused Congress to reinstate the Selective Service 
system.  In June 1948, Congress adopted another Selective Service Act.  The 
measure temporarily reestablished local draft boards and authorized conscription as 
needed to meet military force requirements.521  Federal officials intended the 
renewal of Selective Service to provide the United States with a ready supply of 
manpower should the nation ever need to supplement active and reserve duty 
personnel.  The 1948 legislation continued the basic scheme of universal 
registration, selective conscription, and draft classification administered by local 
boards as devised in the 1940 statute.  However, the 1948 measure changed the 
mandatory enrollment ages from eighteen to forty-five, as previously designated, to 
nineteen through twenty-five.  It also allowed 161,000 18-year-olds to volunteer for 
twelve months of service in any of the armed forces branches.522  But it did not 
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create a system for universal military training despite pleas by Truman and the 
Pentagon.  The first draft under the auspices of the 1948 act was conducted in June 
1950 with the outbreak of the Korean War.    
The combat struggles in Korea re-stoked Pentagon interest in universal 
training.  In August 1950, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson and Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Omar Bradley warned the Senate Armed Forces Committee 
that America faced a manpower crisis if Congress failed to approve UMT.  They 
speculated that the invasion of South Korea might be the precursor to a larger 
communist attack fomented by the Soviet Union in Europe or somewhere else.  
Johnson and Bradley argued UMT would be a great deterrent to Soviet plans.523   
Johnson’s replacement, George C. Marshall, testified in January 1951 on behalf of 
UMT.  With the outcome of the Korean War still in doubt, Marshall emphasized the 
importance of trained reserves as a vital piece to America’s national security.524   
In June 1951, Congress amended the 1948 Selective Service Act (which had 
technically expired in June 1950 and had been kept active via continuing 
resolution) and re-titled it the Universal Military Training and Service Act.  Despite 
its title, the bill authorized a selective, not universal, draft of eligible males that 
would last four years (or until 1955).  Conscripts would serve 24-month tours of 
duty, with the first four months dedicated solely to basic training, and instituted an 
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eight-year obligation for combined active duty and membership in the reserves.525  
Congress inserted a “blueprint” for UMT into the act, expecting a detailed plan to be 
drafted at some point.526  In March 1952, it rejected a proposed training scheme as 
unnecessary.  By that time, truce talks were about to commence; hence, the theory 
that Korea would be the antecedent to all-out communist assault elsewhere 
appeared increasingly unlikely.527  Interest in UMT gradually waned.  Historian 
Russell F. Weigley notes that in the midst of the Korean conflict the army shifted 
away from the massive troop structures employed during World War II toward a 
sleek and nimble force prepared for limited engagements.  Plus, a growing reliance 
on air power and nuclear weapons made the need for a mass of trained reservists to 
repel large-scale attacks unnecessary.528  The scheme for offering every youth 
training in martial basics was never devised, but continued worries about “soft” 
youth stirred federal investments into physical education classes and the 
establishment of the President’s Council on Youth Fitness in 1956.529 
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The deliberations over universal military training sparked a hot debate about 
draft ages.  The Selective Service Act of 1948 established nineteen as the minimum 
conscription age.  As U.S. troops struggled during the initial months of the Korean 
War, Selective Service Director Lewis B. Hershey hinted that Congress should 
consider returning the draft age to eighteen as it had been during World War II.  
Hershey conceded that his suggestion to reinstitute the 18-draft would nudge 
Congress into a “’dangerous field,’” but he insisted that tapping that “’very rich 
source of manpower’” was necessary to build the 3-million-man army President 
Truman wanted.530   During the same January 1951 testimony in which he 
supported UMT, Secretary of Defense Marshall formally asked Congress to lower 
the age of conscription to eighteen because, as he declared, “We are confronted with 
a world situation of such gravity and such unpredictability that we must be 
prepared for effective action.”531   Through the spring, the House and Senate 
reviewed Marshall’s request.  Militarily, it made sense; the service branches, 
particularly the Army, needed the additional manpower (estimated to be a little 
more than one million 18-year-olds) to prevent communist takeover of the Korean 
peninsula.532   Politically, Marshall’s appeal proved explosive.   
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Almost from the moment Marshall posed his idea to draft 18-year-olds, irate 
citizens bombarded federal officials with heated objections.  A White House 
summary of 300 letters sent to President Truman dated 5 January to 21 January 
1951, for instance, showed only seventeen in favor.533  A high school student from 
Dearborn, Michigan, impatiently asked him why teenagers must “be drafted at all? 
Are there not enough other men in the whole wide world to choose from without 
robbing the cradle?  Men who have the right to vote are the ones that should be 
fighting for their country and not these mere boys who have just graduated and are 
entering the world as a new generation.”534  Pacifists and peace groups complained 
a return to the 18-draft, in combination with the installation of America’s national 
security state, would cast a permanent militaristic pall over the nation and foist an 
“undemocratic program” of martial indoctrination on young people.535  Educators 
claimed it would wreak havoc on the educational life of the nation by stripping 
colleges of potential students and reorienting high school curricula away from 
scholastic instruction towards military-influenced vocational preparation.536  
Parents, particularly mothers, argued eighteen was too tender an age to send green, 
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undeveloped boys into violent combat overseas before they could embark upon 
adulthood. “Should they be forced to give up their future plans,” a housewife 
demanded of Representative Charles W. Vursell (R-IL), “when they are not 
considered old enough nor intellectual enough to give their vote as to who the 
leaders of our Government will be until they are 21 years old?”537  Lawmakers 
considered manpower sources other than the 18-draft (such as re-calling World War 
II veterans who had served less than ninety days in uniform, reexamining males 
classified as 4-F, and enlisting married men under thirty who had no children) to 
balance the desires to meet Pentagon needs and muffle public complaints.538   In the 
end, Congress compromised:  it set age 18½ as the conscription age under the 
Universal Military Training and Service Act.539  
The dispute over the draft age prompted another round of public 
conversations regarding suffrage ages.  Like the World War II dialogues, the “old 
enough to fight, old enough to vote” aphorism controlled the discourse. The majority 
of Americans who linked soldiering and voting maintained the extension of suffrage 
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to draft-eligible teenagers was a matter of simple fairness.  As Illinois state senator 
Everett Peters summarized:  “Any person of an age to be called to the country’s 
service has a right to vote for or against the persons governing him.”540  The nature 
of the ballot-bullet debate, however, differed in the Korean War era.  During World 
War II, Americans mainly discussed whether youths should (ought to) vote at all.   
As reflected in public opinion polls, most citizens outside of Congress believed that 
young people deserved to vote because of stellar war service.   During the Korean 
War, people mainly disputed whether teenagers could (had the ability to) vote 
sensibly.  The squabbles over youth qualifications considered if adolescents, in light 
of the battlefield difficulties in Korea, had the intellectual and emotional capacities 
to cast levelheaded ballots.  Those deliberations became clouded by comparisons 
between youth generations.  Whereas adolescents during World War II were 
remembered as tough, dedicated, and serious, Korea War-era teenagers were 
perceived as soft, apathetic, and juvenile.  Parents and politicians alike divided over 
the question whether contemporary young people possessed the sober judgment 
expected of electors.  In September 1951, George Gallup sensed the public 
uncertainty when he reported that “popular sentiment at present is about evenly 
divided” regarding youth suffrage:  47% for, 49% against, and 4% undecided.541 
To buttress the overarching claim that young persons responsible enough to 
undertake warfare should be enfranchised, 18-vote advocates emphasized the 
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mental and physical development of the teenage troops fighting in Korea.   “The 
only possible excuse for not giving [youth] the voting privilege is one of maturity,” a 
man from Ponca City, Oklahoma, charged, “and in a world in which fighting for self-
preservation has become a dominant requirement, who can say that the inducted 
youngster does not possess essential qualifications for representing that 
maturity?’542   Some supporters stressed that contemporary warfare required high-
level decision-making by young soldiers.   “Modern warfare is mechanical and 
technical,” a mother from Paterson, New Jersey, wrote to Representative Victor 
Wickersham (D-OK), “Today’s soldier must be a responsible individual, a mature 
person.”543  Others highlighted the advanced motor skills required of young 
combatants.  Senator Blair Moody (D-MI) testified before a Senate subcommittee 
that “our jet planes are moving so fast these days that a pilot is considered old when 
he gets in his middle twenties because of the need for swift reflexes. . . .If they are 
old enough to fight, if they have sufficient maturity to be entrusted with jet 
airplanes and assigned to foxholes to defend our liberties, then they are old enough 
to vote.544  Several people suggested marrying the voting age and the draft age.  
Though enfranchising 18½-year-olds would create a logistical headache for local 
voting registrars, a woman from Washington, D.C. extolled its psycho-emotional 
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benefits.  “Anyone who has been closely associated with boys just out of high school 
at 18,” she wrote, “knows that six months, just then, is an amazingly worthwhile 
‘simmering down’ period.”545  A few groups, such as the Junior Statesmen of 
America, called for an extension of voting rights to all members of the armed forces 
regardless of age.546   The Chicago Tribune seconded the plea to enfranchise all U.S. 
troops by acknowledging that battlefield prowess had exposed an acumen not 
normally ascribed to adolescents.  “The peacetime 18-year-old frequently is too 
immature to use the ballot intelligently,” it editorialized, “This is not true of the 18-
year-old who is defending his country.  Anyone old enough to fight is old enough to 
share in government.”547   
 Critics of the “old enough to fight, old enough to vote” position chipped away 
at the contention that capable soldiering implied competent voting.  Most 
adversaries rejected the parallel between performing military duties ably and 
casting a ballot intelligently.   The editors of the Wall Street Journal dismissed the 
correlation as a “beautifully sentimental non sequitur.”  They opined: 
 It is impossible, of course, to determine an age at which 
 every person becomes mentally qualified to choose executors 
 of government. . . .We have settled on 21 years as the qualifying 
 age in the belief that then most persons can do some thinking 
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 and are less likely to be deceived by specious claims to states- 
 manship than at any earlier age.  No one imagines that that 
 theory holds true universally.  But it is the long considered 
 judgment of our people and as such it cannot be upset by 
 attempting to draw a false analogy between voting and 
 military service.548  
 
 
Many 18-vote opponents refused to accept the syllogism that voting requires mature 
abilities, some young soldiers have demonstrated high-level skill-sets under duress, 
therefore, all teenagers between 18-and-20-years-old were qualified to vote.  Some 
people asserted that the corporeal ability to fight bore no relation to the cerebral 
fitness to elect.  As a man from Magnolia, Arkansas, insisted:  “The catalytic action 
of physical maturity and duty and responsibility to defend the country physically 
does not bring about . . . the political maturity to vote.”549  Still others disagreed 
with the claim that battlefield decision-making evidenced the capacity for 
individual judgment required at the ballot box.  “[T]he very qualifications which 
make an 18-year-old a fine soldier – aggressiveness, daring, unquestioning 
obedience to command,” the Morgantown (WV) Dominion-News editorialized, “may 
well unfit him to cast an intelligent vote.”550  Members of the General Federation of 
Women’s Clubs roundly refused to endorse lowering suffrage ages because they 
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believed soldiers “were given orders and not expected to think for themselves.”551  A 
handful of citizens, like a man from Delta, Utah, recommended raising the draft age 
rather than reducing the franchise age because, in his opinion, “youths of 18 are not 
mature enough for either task.”552   
 Adult uncertainty about adolescent maturity impeded the progress of youth 
enfranchisement during the Korean War era.  Many Americans concurred with the 
sentiment of a “sincere 20-year-old” from Florida who declared young soldiers had 
earned suffrage rights for all youth for having carried “the responsibilities of our 
country on our shoulders.”553  Just as many people, including adolescents, doubted 
whether enough teenagers had enough sense to justify enfranchising them.   For 
example, several members of the 1956 senior class at Newark (NJ) Central High 
School (who entered as freshman during the time of the UMT and draft age 
debates) disagreed over the question whether military service validated teenage 
suffrage. One student thought that “any person who is physically fit to fight for his 
country has also to be mentally fit.  If he is mentally fit to safeguard the welfare of 
his country, why is he not mentally fit to vote?”  While another classmate insisted 
that “just because a boy is physically old enough to fight, it does not mean that he is 
mentally old enough to vote.”554  The public’s inability to reach a clear consensus 
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regarding the psycho-emotional acumen of adolescents checked the patriotic 
sentiment to grant youth the right to vote and stalled legislative action to 
enfranchise adolescents.   
While the citizenry partook in a lively discussion about draft ages and voting 
ages, Congress generally ignored the teen enfranchisement issue as it oversaw the 
war effort in Korea.  Only three lawmakers, Senator Blair Moody (D-MI) and 
Representatives Arthur Klein (D-NY) and Clyde Doyle (D-CA), offered 18-vote 
resolutions in the time between the first arrival of U.S. forces in Korea in July 1950 
and the election of Dwight Eisenhower in November 1952.  The House of 
Representatives neglected to consider Klein’s or Doyle’s proposals.555  Moody’s bill, 
however, garnered a hearing – the first by the Senate on any youth suffrage 
measure.  In June 1951, Michigan governor G. Mennen “Soapy” Williams appointed 
Moody to serve out the unexpired term of Arthur Vandenberg who died of cancer 
the previous April.556  Williams apparently named Moody to the post because he 
was familiar with the inside workings of federal politics having covered them as the 
Washington correspondent for the Detroit News, which was owned by Moody’s 
uncle, William Scripps.  In February 1952, Moody filed an 18-vote amendment (S.J. 
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Res. 127) that repeated verbatim Vandenberg’s motion from a decade earlier.557    
On 27 June 1952, the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments 
allowed Moody and Ellis Arnall to speak on behalf of the bill.   Senator Moody 
buttressed his proposal with the basic pro-18-vote arguments.  He said he based his 
resolution “on the conviction that the best way of teaching citizenship to our young 
people is by permitting them to participate actively in the important tasks of 
citizenship.”558  Moody asserted that “phenomenal advances” in modern education 
made contemporary 18-year-olds “more capable of performing the voting obligations 
of citizenship than were their fathers and grandfathers at the age of 21. . . .They 
have learned the facts and acquired the information on which to base an intelligent 
choice.”559  He maintained that America needed the “idealism and vigor” of youth as 
well as “their new ideas, their selfless devotion, and their pioneering spirit” to 
combat the “widespread apathy toward the problems of our unstable and abnormal 
world.”560  Moody noted that 20% of “our Army’s strength is composed of men 
between 18 and 20.  These men are, by force of circumstance, mature enough to 
assume the obligations of full citizenship.”561  He finished his presentation by 
insisting that only enfranchisement would prevent young people “from losing 
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interest in public affairs between the time they leave school and the time they are 
eligible to vote.”562  Arnall earnestly shored each of Moody’s points with affirmations 
trumpeting the electoral abilities of young enfranchised Georgians.  He attested, 
“Many of the fears that used to be expressed by people about youth voting in my 
State were dissipated when it was put into effect.  All of the bad things they said 
about it did not materialize, none of the bad ones.  All of the good ones we predicted 
for it did come about.”563 
On Monday, 1 July 1952, the full Senate Judiciary Committee voted viva voce 
to report out Moody’s 18-vote amendment.564  When it reached the floor for 
consideration on 3 July, Senator Andrew Schoeppel (R-KS) requested that S.J. Res. 
127 be passed over.565   Under the Senate’s standing rules, the first two hours of 
each new working day are dedicated to conducting routine business, such as 
introducing bills, concurrent resolutions, and committee reports.  An important task 
during that time is to confirm the day’s legislative calendar.  During the reading of 
the pending business, the majority and minority leaders (or their designees) either 
agree or object to unanimous consent requests asking for a bill to be considered by 
                                                          
562 Ibid, 64. 
 
563 Ibid, 68. 
 
564 Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States to Grant Citizens of the 
United States Who Have Attained Age 18 the Right to Vote, 82nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1 July 1952, Senate 
Report 2036.   See also Congressional Record 98 (1 July 1952):  8707; New York Times, 2 July 1952, 
20; Wall Street Journal, 2 July 1952, 1; and Washington Post, 2 July 1952, 10.  The 1952 
publications did not indicate the viva voce tally.  In January 1954, the Associated Press reported 
Moody’s proposal “was approved, 4 to 3, by a bare quorum of the Judiciary Committee.”  See Chicago 
Tribune, 23 January 1954, 1 and New York Times, 23 January 1954, 6. 
 
565 See New York Times, 2 July 1952, 20 and Congressional Record 98 (3 July 1952), 9105.   
 
198 
 
the Senate.  A “pass over” dismisses a piece of legislation, either temporarily or 
indefinitely, from floor consideration.566  On Wednesday, 3 July 1952, Minority 
Leader Styles Bridges (R-NH) designated Andrew Schoeppel as his proxy.  
Schoeppel had a busy morning negating bill proposals.  He lodged twenty-three 
objections before voicing the pass over to S.J. Res. 127.567  Schoeppel’s action 
jettisoned a measure that was temporally and politically fated to fail.  With the 
second session of the 82nd Congress due to adjourn on Saturday, 7 July, there was 
not enough legislative time to move Moody’s constitutional amendment through 
both the Senate and House. Schoeppel’s maneuver also helped his Republican Party 
deny the Democrats a potential legislative score just before plunging headlong into 
the 1952 presidential campaign – particularly on an issue that the GOP candidate, 
Dwight Eisenhower, pledged to tackle if elected.    
The ramp-up to the 1952 election generated party interest in adolescent 
enfranchisement.   Both the Democrats and Republicans viewed young people as a 
potentially influential constituency in a period of deep political competitiveness.  
During the postwar years, the United States witnessed one of the rare instances of 
divided partisan government in its political history.  From 1896 to 1946, America 
had experienced divided government (i.e. different parties in control of the 
legislative and executive branches) in only three of twenty-five congresses.  From 
1946 to 1960, the political party not occupying the White House controlled four of its 
                                                          
566 Valerie Heitshusen, The Legislative Process on the Senate Floor:  An Introduction, 
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, No. 96-548, (13 August 2014):  1-14.  
 
567 Congressional Record 98 (3 July 1952):  9042-9105. 
199 
 
seven congresses.  The 1956 electoral outcomes marked a historical rarity:  for the 
first time since 1876, a president was elected without majority control of 
Congress.568   
This era of shifting congressional majorities and divided government 
engendered a spirited competition between the Democratic and Republican parties 
to enlist new young members.  Party chieftains took note of the era’s changing 
social patterns, especially the rising percentage of adolescents in the general 
population and the movement of young adults to suburbia, and tailored appeals to 
those demographic cadres.  The recruitment of young people contributed to a 
political climate more attuned to youth issues than in the past.  In particular, both 
the Republicans and Democrats believed that championing the 18-vote would yield 
partisan benefits.  In 1946, the editor of the Wilmington (DE) Morning News 
predicted that future actions to lower the voting age would be motivated more by 
“political considerations” than patriotic sentimentalism, democratic idealism, or 
authentication of adolescent acumen.  He postulated that lawmakers would “[take] 
the gamble” to support youth suffrage only if they had “good reason” to suspect that 
it would bolster “the relative strength of the two major parties.”569   
The Democratic Party worked to boost its existing advantage in youth 
allegiance.   In 1946, for example, South Carolina Democrats decided to reduce the 
age of eligibility for their all-white primary elections to eighteen, although state law 
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applicable to general elections kept the threshold at twenty-one.570  Coming out of 
World War II, the majority of adolescents, like the bulk of the adult electorate, 
aligned with Democrats.  A January 1946 Gallup poll revealed that 65% of 15-18-
year-olds and 62% of persons aged 21-to-29 identified as Democrats.571  Those 
results were understandable considering that other surveys showed postwar youth 
favored liberal policies and statist approaches to governing.572  In addition, an 
entire generation of young people had only known Democratic rule.  In reporting on 
soldier reaction to Franklin Roosevelt’s death, Gene Currivan of the New York 
Times observed that his passing “was particularly affecting” among those troops 
“not yet of voting age” but who had matured during the New Deal.  A frontline 
infantryman from Ohio told Currivan, “’I can remember the President ever since I 
was a little kid.  America will seem a strange, empty place without his voice talking 
to the people whenever great events occur.’”573  Comfort with FDR-style liberalism 
and a desire for continuity of leadership fed youth devotion to the Democrats in the 
years after World War II.  George Gallup underscored that the political significance 
of youth fidelity to the Democrats was linked to demographics.  Normally, eight to 
ten million adolescents became eligible to vote between presidential elections.   “If 
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only 50 per cent of these young people turn out at the polls,” he noted, “their vote of 
almost two-to-one Democratic would be enough to offset a substantial defection 
among older voters.”574   
Since Roosevelt’s first election in 1932, the Republicans had banked on men 
“in their late forties, fifties, or sixties” to carry the party.575  To win elections, GOP 
strategists trusted their oldsters would turn out at the polls in greater proportion 
than younger voters.  Census Bureau statistics, however, undercut the plan.  Based 
on current population trends, the American electorate would become younger and 
more female with each future election cycle.576  Motivated by the irrefutable 
demographics, the Republican Party labored to break the Democrats’ hold on young 
people.  Their efforts began with the resuscitation of the Young Republican National 
Federation, which began in 1931 but became moribund during World War II.   The 
Republican National Committee tasked the Federation with organizing Young 
Republican Clubs across the nation.  Between 1946 and 1949, the number of states 
hosting clubs grew from 18 to 46 (and the District of Columbia); anyone between 
ages fourteen and thirty-nine could join.  To rope in new young members, local clubs 
hosted civic education programs and social events, such as picnics, dances, athletic 
contests, and sleigh rides.577  The Young Republicans also sought to increase their 
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presence on college campuses.  Ralph E. Becker, chairman of the Young Republican 
National Federation, cited two motives for cultivating university cells:  to combat 
pro-Democrat, left-wing student groups and to capture new young electors.  Becker 
stated, “’More students of voting age are attending our universities and colleges 
than ever before.  Approximately 60 per cent of the 2½ million students, most of 
them veterans of World War II, are of voting age.  This strong potential group is 
only part of the 47 million young Americans between the ages of 21 and 40 who will 
be eligible to vote this year.’”578  Many Republicans worried that the Democrats’ 
political dynasty would persist if their efforts to recruit young people flopped. 
During Harry Truman’s second term, however, the Democratic Party saw its 
popular support slowly dissipate.  Truman had attributed “our party’s success in 
years past, and the proud tradition it bears today, to the genuine spirit of youth 
which is inherent in its philosophy.”  And he pledged “to retain the imagination and 
idealism of youth in our approach to the perplexing problems of government.”579  
More and more citizens reckoned the energetic methodology and activist philosophy 
of Truman and his Democrats as too statist in an era devoid of crises akin to the 
Great Depression or World War II.   In particular, many Americans rebuffed 
Truman’s attempts to expand social welfare, create a universal health care 
program, and protect the civil rights of minorities as an overextension of federal 
power.  Other people criticized the party’s legislative agenda as languid and 
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outdated.  Even Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr. blasted his Democratic comrades during 
the 1948 campaign as “lazy” for “trying to meet today’s problems with yesterday’s 
programs,” namely, his dad’s.580 
As the Democrats scuffled to rebrand their approach, internal clashes over 
political philosophy began to fracture the party membership, including its youth 
devotees.  In the 1948 elections, Truman faced two in-house revolts. From the left, 
former vice president Henry Wallace led the new Progressive Party.  From the 
right, South Carolina governor Strom Thurmond headed the “Dixiecrat” insurgents 
who had stormed out of the Democratic Party convention after it placed a civil 
rights plank onto the national platform.   Young people got caught in the wake of 
the power struggle.  The Progressives siphoned off those left-leaning youths 
(typically from urban areas) who were attracted to Wallace’s call for full voting 
rights for blacks and adolescents and alienated by what they perceived as the 
Democrats’ rightward-shift toward hawkish foreign policy.  The Dixiecrats carried 
away young conservative southerners whose partisan loyalties were more regional 
than political.  For young moderates, the internal strife belied the promises of 
Democratic chieftains to “heed the voice of youth” in party affairs.581 As the 
disillusion with the intraparty squabbling grew, many young people reconsidered 
their political allegiance.  Even the youngest delegate at the 1948 Democratic 
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national convention, 18-year-old Truman Williams of Douglas, Georgia, admitted 
that he “might be forced” to cast his first presidential ballot for Republican 
presidential nominee Thomas Dewey:  “’I can’t see [voting for] Truman.  I am 
definitely against Henry Wallace.’”582   
After Harry Truman’s miraculous comeback victory in 1948, the Democrats 
struggled to retain the former strength of its youth following.  During the 1950s, a 
cohort of young people came to political maturity more ideologically uncommitted 
than the previous generation.583  The student council president of St. John’s 
University in New York City affirmed that his classmates and age peers elsewhere 
disdained “’the ignorant element that follows either party blindly.’”584   “’High school 
students may reflect their parents’ political beliefs,” a social studies teacher in 
Maryland conveyed, “but they sure don’t want you to know it.’”585  Several factors 
can explain why postwar youths coolly refrained from reflexively assuming the 
political affiliation of their families, particularly if they were loyal Democrats. The 
intense socioeconomic debates of the 1930s that had forged the hard-core 
partisanship of their Democratic parents had been tempered by the peace and 
prosperity of the postwar years.  Because of an upsurge in internal migration, 
increasing numbers of American children grew up in the suburbs.  The suburban 
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emphasis on conformity, communal acceptance, and conservative politics 
encouraged many youths to adopt the political habits and prejudices of their 
neighbors.586  The Democrats’ domestic program also suffered under a wave of 
anticommunist hysteria that impugned statist liberalism as radicalized socialism. 
Beginning in the late 1940s, polling data indicated that the political affinities of 
young people had started to drift rightward along with the rest of the nation.587   
“’I’m a Southerner, a Dixiecrat, and believe in states’ rights,” a 21-year-old female 
student at Southern Methodist University averred, “but the Republicans are now 
more what the Democrats ought to be.”588  Gallup polls in 1950 and 1951 showed 
the Democrats continued to attract the majority of young, first-time voters, but the 
number of them declaring as Republicans or independents increased.589  By the 
presidential election of 1952, high school and college students self-identified nearly 
equally as Republicans and Democrats.590   
During the 1952 campaign, both Democrats and Republicans tried to rally 
the support of young people.  The Census Bureau estimated that approximately 
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98.4 million Americans were age-qualified to vote; 7.5 million were youths who had 
turned old enough to cast ballots for the first time.591   Each political party aimed to 
broaden its partisan base by capturing the youth bloc of votes and recruiting under-
age adolescents.  Part of the tactics relied on savaging the policies of the opposing 
party as an imminent threat to the future lives that young people imagined for 
themselves.592   Both parties also invited young people to take an active role in the 
election process.  For example, the Republicans and Democrats included youths in 
campaign work, such as voter registration, preparation and distribution of 
campaign literature, rally organization, campus mobilization, membership 
recruitment, stumping for candidates, fundraising, policy planning, vote soliciting, 
and poll watching.  Maryland Democrats even hosted “political birthday parties” 
that, akin to the Citizenship Day galas, celebrated those youths who reached the 
age of enfranchisement.593   By meshing the experience of party regulars with the 
enthusiasm of the amateur volunteers, the Democrats and Republicans hoped not 
only to rouse an apathetic adult electorate but to show young people that, in the 
words of a Chicago committeeman, “’Politics should be a young man’s game too.’”594   
 Since voteless youth had no electoral skin in the game, both parties actively 
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championed reducing suffrage ages.  Democrat and Republican strategists hoped 
that adolescents would show their gratitude by joining the party they believed 
would best fulfill the pledge to enfranchise them.   At an April 1952 campaign stop 
at the University of Miami, Senator Estes Kefauver (D-TN) became the first 
presidential contender to announce his support for lowering the national voting age 
to eighteen.595  Known as a crusader against organized crime and government 
corruption, Kefauver had become the front-runner for the Democrat nomination by 
defeating Harry Truman in the New Hampshire primary, which caused Truman to 
quit the competition.  During a June radio interview in New York City, Kefauver 
again advocated giving voting privileges to 18-year-olds.   “’They are better qualified 
to vote today than I was at the age of 21,” Kefauver said, because of the wide access 
to political information provided by modern mass media. He further asserted that to 
continue the 21-vote tradition risked “dampening their intelligent interest in 
government.”596  Internal party politics caused Kefauver to lose the nomination to 
Illinois governor Adlai Stevenson. 
Stevenson also backed the 18-vote.  As a candidate for the Illinois 
governorship in 1948, he embraced a state party plank calling for a constitutional 
amendment to reduce the Land of Lincoln’s franchise age to eighteen.597  As 
governor, he endorsed a drive launched by University of Illinois students to change 
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the state’s legal age of majority, including voting rights, from 21 to 18.  “’I’m 
emphatically in favor of conferring full citizenship rights at 18,” Stevenson 
asserted.598  Part of Stevenson’s presidential campaign strategy in 1952 sought to 
glean votes from new first-time electors and of-age university students by 
underscoring his intellectualism.599  Though critics dubbed him an “egghead” for his 
professorial demeanor (and baldness), college students and urbane young people 
gravitated toward Stevenson.  Future U.S. Senator Paul Simon (D-IL) recalled that 
Stevenson appealed to youth because they recognized he was “young himself, 
always growing, always eager to explore and probe untried paths.”600  Throughout 
the campaign, Stevenson reminded young people that his administration would 
tackle long-standing socioeconomic matters by employing novel methods, which 
included providing youth new opportunities for meaningful political action.  In 
September, Stevenson proclaimed his support for a reduction of the franchise age to 
eighteen but acknowledged that the matter “’presents difficult questions with 
respect to Constitutional amendment.’”601 His squishy, overly analytical positions 
on the issues of the campaign, as exemplified by the hedging on the 18-vote, were 
contrasted by the firm, plain-spoken stances of the GOP candidate Dwight 
Eisenhower.  
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Eisenhower maintained a comfortable lead in the polls throughout the 1952 
campaign.  His prestige as former Supreme Allied Commander during World War II 
made him an idol of many Americans, including young people.  His civic esteem 
combined with the public’s frustration with the Democrats’ handling of the Korean 
War to propel Eisenhower’s candidacy.  Among the many assurances he made as a 
presidential contestant, Eisenhower affirmed that his administration would “’bring 
the youth in[to]” the governing fold by offering a “’vigorous, appealing, dynamic 
program’” that would utilize “’their freshness and their vigor.’”602  At a June press 
conference in Detroit, Eisenhower said he backed lowering the legal voting age to 
eighteen.603   The following day in Denver, he succinctly explained his reason:  “’If a 
man is old enough to fight he’s old enough to vote.’”604  On the campaign trail a 
month later in Iowa, Eisenhower stated that he would sponsor an 18-vote federal 
amendment in Congress if elected.605   After he won the Republican nomination in 
August, several GOP stalwarts wondered if a 62-year-old political novice had the 
energy and skills to pull enough young “first voters” and electors under 30 away 
from Stevenson to win the presidency.606 
Eisenhower’s rout of Stevenson proved party worries to be unfounded.  More 
people voted, 55 million, than ever before in a presidential election, which several 
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pundits attributed to Eisenhower’s fame.607  His swamping of Stevenson (55% to 
45% of the popular vote and 442-89 in the Electoral College) roused a popular 
majority reminiscent of Franklin Roosevelt’s elections.  Eisenhower offset 
Democratic strength in the cities by scoring well in the growing suburbs, and 20% of 
the votes cast for Ike came from registered Democrats, including a large chunk from 
the South by winning Florida, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.608  Even more 
gladdening for the GOP, Eisenhower’s landslide swept the party into majority 
command of both houses of Congress; not since 1930 had the Republicans controlled 
the White House and Capitol Hill.  And in another bit of good news, a poll released 
less than a week before Election Day revealed that 65% of 18-to-21-year-olds 
supported Eisenhower for president.609  The election data appeared to show that his 
spectacular triumph might yield a generation of Republican dominance. 
Americans, young and old, obviously liked Ike, but most people still remained 
registered Democrats despite his big victory.  To regain the majority status the 
Republicans once had, Eisenhower and party leaders adopted a two-pronged 
approach to woo more people to join. First, the GOP worked to expand its 
membership base by creating new auxiliaries (like Citizens for Eisenhower) that 
leveraged Ike’s popularity to recruit new constituents, especially white 
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suburbanites and black southerners.  Second, the party attempted to broaden the 
appeal of its principles and policies by softening its image as a club of rich, anti-
government curmudgeons.610   Both prongs of the strategy relied on leveraging 
Eisenhower’s popularity and program for party gain; indeed, not only did millions of 
Americans personally like Ike, they also accepted his “dynamic conservative” 
philosophy.  As Eisenhower explained, his approach charted a “middle way” that 
tried to balance the liberal prescription for an activist government with the 
conservative predilection for balanced budgets and local alternatives to federally-
run programs.611  His brand of moderate Republicanism and the grassroots work of 
the recruiting bureaus slowly began to revitalize the GOP. 
Part of the effort to rejuvenate the Republican Party called for following up 
on Eisenhower’s pledge to enfranchise juveniles.  During the first three months of 
the 1953, Republican-controlled statehouses in California, Illinois, Iowa, and New 
York debated bills to reduce state franchise ages from 21 to 18.612  In March, U.S. 
Senator William Langer (R-ND), chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
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proposed a constitutional amendment that would declare eighteen as the legal 
suffrage age for all elections.613  Two months later, Leonard W. Hall, national 
chairman of the GOP, announced that President Eisenhower and Vice President 
Richard Nixon had “endorsed enthusiastically” the legislative efforts to establish 
eighteen as the national voting age.  Hall expressed no preference to the method of 
adoption, claiming he would “support all valid proposals” at the state or federal 
level “with every effort at my command.”  After stating that young people had been 
“more vigorous” than older groups in backing Eisenhower’s campaign, Hall framed 
the 18-vote as an issue of maturity rather than recompense for military service.  
Hall asserted,  
The old argument that young people between the ages of  
18 and 21 are not sufficiently matured to exercise the right  
of suffrage is as dead as a dodo bird, in my opinion.  It has  
been my observation that the age of maturity has steadily  
been lowered in recent years.  I am further convinced of it  
by the views of the President, who, after all, led the greatest  
army of youth ever assembled during World War II, and his  
judgment on the matter profoundly impresses me.614  
 
Two days after Hall’s pronouncement, Representative Kenneth Keating (R-NY) 
introduced a constitutional amendment in the House of Representatives that would 
enfranchise all 18-year-olds.615   Keating claimed the “backing of our enlightened 
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President and Vice President” prompted him to put forth his measure.  Echoing 
Chairman Hall, Congressman Keating said the demonstrated maturity of 
contemporary youth proved them capable of voting sensibly.  Keating averred,  
 An 18 year old today has greater maturity of judgment 
 than his grandfather had at 21.  There are exceptions, 
 of course, but that generalization would apply to nine- 
 tenths of our youth.  Improved educational facilities and 
 their wide use are important contributing causes.  In most 
 schools young people are taught about the workings of 
 their government in their early teens.  Everyone in public 
 life has enjoyed the stimulating experience of being questioned 
 by these bright, alert youngsters.  Their questions are often 
 penetrating and searching to a degree every bit the equal 
 of their elders.  There is no magic in the figure 21.  In 
 determining the age at which a person should be permitted 
 the franchise, competency, not arithmetic, should govern.616 
 
  
During the summer of 1953, considerable momentum built in support of 
adolescent enfranchisement.  In June and July, four more amendments were filed in 
the House and Senate to establish a national voting age.617  On June 2nd and July 
13th, the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments conducted hearings 
on Langer’s resolution and another filed by Hubert Humphrey (D-MN).618  Both 
bills received hearty praise for recognizing the cognitive capacities of modern youth.  
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Rufus H. Wilson, national legislative director of the American Veterans of World 
War II, summarized the views of those witnesses who championed youth suffrage.  
He declared the 18-vote issue went beyond the “natural argument” of old enough to 
fight, old enough to vote “inasmuch as we believe that the educational standard of 
the United States has increased to a considerable extent over the last 150 years, 
and that the teaching of various democratic ideals in high schools and colleges 
certainly makes it obvious that the vast majority of people who are at this age do 
have the necessary qualifications to allow them to cast their legitimate and proper 
vote as a result of their convictions.”619   
As the summer progressed, Republican operatives worked to inflate public 
support for teen suffrage.  At the yearly meeting of Girls’ Nation, Bertha Adkins, 
assistant chairman of the Republican National Committee, encouraged the group to 
get behind lowering the voting age to 18.620  At its national convention, the Young 
Republicans National Federation offered its support to the cause.621  Meanwhile, 
President Eisenhower, Vice President Nixon, and Chairman Hall pushed Congress 
to pass one of the 18-vote bills. Republican lawmakers pressed the case that the 
nation would benefit by tapping the talents of adolescents.  Senator Alexander 
Wiley (R-WI), for example, asserted that since many young people “had the 
maturity, the responsibility, the judicial temperament, the understanding of men 
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twice their age” they deserved to be “given some reins of responsibility today – 
now.”622  Republican promotion of adolescent enfranchisement pumped public 
sentiment for the 18-vote to an all-time high.  A July 1953 Gallup poll showed 63% 
of those people surveyed favored lowering voting ages to eighteen.623   Republicans 
believed that their efforts to secure youth suffrage would reap a harvest of young, 
loyal constituents.  According to the Census Bureau, there were 6.3 million youths 
between ages 18 and 20 potentially eligible to vote if they were enfranchised.624   
With so many virgin votes up for grabs, an unnamed GOP strategist admitted to the 
Wall Street Journal, “”I’m surprised the Democrats didn’t do it long ago.’”625   
Like in 1952, the legislative clock expired before the House or Senate could 
approve any of the youth suffrage resolutions.  On 3 August 1953, the first session 
of the 83rd Congress adjourned.  Under institutional rules, however, bills pending in 
committee but not acted upon in the first session of a Congress could be considered 
without re-filing during the second session.   William Langer’s amendment 
appeared the 18-vote measure most likely to be contemplated first upon the 
resumption of the 83rd Congress.  Because he chaired the committee processing S.J. 
Res. 53, legislators presumed it would be quickly sent on to the full Senate early 
next session. 
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At the beginning of 1954, the chances for passing a youth suffrage bill looked 
excellent.  A Republican-controlled Congress seemed poised to advance a party-
sponsored 18-vote amendment that had historically-high popular support and 
conspicuous backing from a well-liked Republican president.   Among the twenty-
two topics touched upon in his first State of the Union address (delivered 7 January 
1954), President Eisenhower asked Congress to pass a constitutional amendment 
establishing age eighteen as the official voting age in federal elections.  “For years 
our citizens between the ages of 18 and 21 have, in time of peril, been summoned to 
fight for America,” the Commander-in-Chief declared, “They should participate in 
the political process that produces this fateful summons.”626  The Washington Post 
disagreed with the proposition to enfranchise 18-year-olds but commended 
Eisenhower’s request as an “astute political move” to consolidate youth support for 
the Republican Party.627  James Reston, Washington correspondent for the New 
York Times, reported that the 18-vote proposal was one of “only two surprises” 
(besides an appeal to strip the citizenship from any American convicted of 
conspiring to overthrow the government) in the oration.628   It caught journalists 
and congressmen unawares because Eisenhower had not commented publicly on 
any of the voting-age bills before the 83rd Congress, and neither the president nor 
any of his aides had indicated that his State of the Union would include remarks 
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about setting a national age of enfranchisement.629  Newsweek claimed that “most 
legislators are leery” of the 18-vote proposal, and the New York Times predicted 
Eisenhower would have “more difficulty in securing” it than the other parts of his 
legislative slate.630  By promoting the voting-age resolution within the speech, 
however, Eisenhower signaled to Congress that it was “high on the list” of his 
legislative priorities for 1954.631  
In the hours immediately following the State of the Union (which ended 
around 3:00 p.m.), Republicans and Democrats quickly introduced legislation to 
carry out Eisenhower’s recommendation.  In the Senate, three Republicans (Francis 
Case of South Dakota, Homer Ferguson of Michigan, and William Knowland of 
California), three Democrats (Robert Hendrikson of New Jersey, Estes Kefauver of 
Tennessee, and Alton Lennon of North Carolina), and independent Wayne Morse of 
Oregon joined to sponsor a constitutional amendment to enfranchise all citizens 
who had reached age eighteen.632  Representatives Dwight Rogers (D-FL) and 
William Widnall (R-NJ) introduced similar measures in the House.633   Rogers 
claimed that he had already prepared his bill prior to hearing Eisenhower’s 
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request.634   The three new resolutions of 1954 added to the eight measures still 
pending from the 1953 session gave the 83rd Congress eleven possible voting-age 
bills to contemplate – the most that any Congress would have to sift through before 
the 90th Congress of 1967-68. 
Eisenhower’s call to enfranchise adolescents inspired several states to 
consider 18-vote legislation.  One week after the State of the Union, South Carolina 
Governor James Byrnes, a former Supreme Court Justice nominated by Franklin 
Roosevelt and Secretary of State under Harry Truman, urged his legislature to 
reduce the state suffrage age.  “If today’s youths between 18 and 21 are not more 
mature and better informed than persons of that age a century ago,” Byrnes 
maintained, “we have wasted millions in education.”635  Several states, including 
Virginia, Mississippi, and Maryland, mulled over 18-vote bills.636  The governors of 
Massachusetts and Michigan also asked their statehouses to consider youth 
suffrage legislation.  Eisenhower’s proposal to reduce franchise ages received solid 
bipartisan gubernatorial sponsorship.  A New York Times poll revealed that 29 of 
the nation’s 48 governors backed dropping their state’s voting age to eighteen; only 
seven executives rejected the proposition outright.  However, the supportive 
governors overwhelmingly said it should be accomplished by state action rather 
than federal amendment.637   
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The auspicious state response to Eisenhower’s 18-vote pitch paralleled the 
“particularly favorable” public reaction.638  Robust support came from familiar 
allies.  Ellis Arnall penned a special piece for the Washington Post, apparently 
targeted at federal lawmakers, lauding the positive effects of youth electors upon 
Georgia politics.  “The people of the state have never had cause to regret their 
decision,” he affirmed, “No responsible political leader, of any party or faction today 
would suggest that the change has not benefited the state and all its people.”  
Arnall concluded that the nation as a whole would “profit by the idealism, the 
instinctive sympathy and generosity, the courage and the good intentions of young 
voters.”639  The American Association of School Administrators adopted a resolution 
supporting Eisenhower’s amendment request.  The group claimed civics classes and 
other programs that familiarized high-school students with the democratic process 
had amply prepared youth for the “’assumption of responsible citizenship.’”640  In a 
speech to a New York City youth forum hosted by the Teachers College at Columbia 
University, Eleanor Roosevelt again espoused dropping the age of enfranchisement 
to eighteen nationwide.641  Praise for the cause of youth suffrage even came from 
overseas.  Afrikaner Nationalists from South Africa had advocated allowing 18-
year-olds to vote as part of the process of creating a republic independent from 
British rule.  “When a good democrat like Eisenhower decides that 18-year-olds 
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should have the vote,” the main Afrikaner newspaper crowed, “then certainly there 
can be no protest when nationalists here do the same.’”642  
Opposition to Eisenhower’s 18-vote appeal emphasized its potential political 
harm.  Many critics insisted that the impulsiveness and gullibility of youth would 
make them acutely susceptible to radical ideas and subversive forces that could 
imperil the Republic.   They highlighted recent historical examples of foreign 
demagogues exploiting impressionable and inexperienced – but enfranchised – 
young people to seize power.  The day of the State of the Union, Representative 
Emanuel Celler (D-NY) blasted the president’s proposal as dangerously “naïve,”’  He 
stressed, “’It is significant that Hitler and Mussolini lowered the voting age to help 
create their dictatorship.’”643 The editors of the New York Times, claimed the 
“greatest factor” that allowed Hitler, Mussolini, Lenin, and Mao to rise to power 
was “their success in capturing and misusing the youth of their countries, especially 
among the student groups whose book learning had not yet been tempered by 
practical experience.”  They reminded their readers that young people “in times of 
stress, if not in this country then in others, have proved themselves the easiest 
victims of demagogues propounding easy solutions through direct action leading to 
tyranny.” 644  Sponsors of the 18-vote found the notion of adolescents as witless 
dupes insulting.  “The idea of getting the young people of America to do any goose-
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stepping around seems to me to show an utter lack of comprehension of American 
youth,” Representative Kenneth Keating (R-NY) maintained, “I don’t think you can 
regiment the youth of this country in this way.  In fact, I think just the opposite is 
true.  You can’t dictate to the young people the way you can to some of the older 
people.  They have more independence of judgment.”645   
The confidence in youth abilities expressed by Keating and other 18-vote 
advocates clashed with the “grave doubt” other elected officials had about 
enfranchising callow juveniles.646   Casting teenagers as credulous, which in the 
context of the Cold War served to pique suspicions about their fidelity and 
trustworthiness, underscored the uncertainty many politicians held regarding 
whether adolescent enfranchisement would improve the quality of the electorate.  
To some, like former president Harry Truman, the continued qualms about the 
reliability, maturity, and capacity of young people seemed to necessitate lifting 
rather than lowering suffrage ages. “’The more a man knows, the more intelligently 
he can vote,” Truman contended, “’I do not think he has that knowledge at 18; 21 is 
a better age; 24 would be still better.’”647  Truman’s comment seemed to play 
directly into Republican plans to use the 18-vote amendment as a wedge issue.  The 
weekly newsletter of the Republican National Committee, “Straight from the 
Heart,” debuted the week after Eisenhower’s address with the headline:  “’Ike Likes 
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Voters of 18:  HST Says They’re Dumb.’”648  Sullivan Barnes, chairman of the Young 
Republican National Federation, wisecracked that Truman’s call arose from the 
bitterness over youth repudiation of the Democrats’ “alien socialist philosophy” in 
1952.  Barnes also said Truman’s suggestion to disfranchise 6.5 million 21-to-24-
year-old voters was “shocking.”649  No congressman, Republican or Democrat, 
proposed legislation to raise franchise ages.  In March 1954, however, 
Representative Celler submitted an amendment barring citizens under age twenty-
one from voting in any election or primary.650  “Fixing the age of 21 as the age of 
majority,” he declared, “is the result of the accumulated wisdom of the centuries.  It 
has been tested through the ages.”651  Celler’s resolution was the last suffrage-age 
bill filed during the 83rd Congress. 
By the time Celler offered his 21-vote measure, William Langer’s 18-vote 
amendment had eased through the committee review process.  In late January, the 
Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments forwarded S.J. Res. 53 to the 
full Judiciary Committee.  All three Republicans on the subcommittee (Langer, 
Everett Dirksen of Illinois, and John Butler of Maryland) endorsed the proposal.  
The two Democratic members were absent from the closed-door meeting, but Harley 
Kilgore of West Virginia later registered his aye vote, and Estes Kefauver was a 
known supporter of the 18-vote.  Several southern senators voiced opposition to 
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changing franchise ages by federal action.  Two Judiciary Committee members, Olin 
Johnston (D-SC) and James Eastland (D-MS), maintained any change to voting 
qualifications, including age of eligibility, should come from the states.652  Despite 
their objections, on 15 March 1954, the Judiciary Committee voted 7-3 (with eight 
members absent) to send Langer’s resolution to the full Senate – the first time any 
legislation to establish a national voting age had gotten to the stage of floor 
deliberation.653  The Washington Post noted that a tally indicating how each 
individual committeeman voted on S.J. Res. 53 “was not officially announced,” 
which the New York Times interpreted “as to foreshadow a bitter fight in 
Congress.”654 
Though the scrap over Langer’s amendment was forecast to be acrimonious, 
Washington insiders expected it to be approved by the Senate.  Opinion polls 
identified a marked degree of public support for the proposal.  A March 1954 survey 
taken by George Gallup revealed adults endorsed the 18-vote by a wide margin 
(58% to 34%); among 18-, 19-, and 20-year-olds, it received over a 2-to-1 majority 
(64% to 31%).655  Gallup also undercut the claim that young people were not smart 
enough to vote through a quiz of basic political knowledge given to five different age 
groups: 18-20, 21-29, 30-39, 40-49, and over 50 years old.  The results showed that, 
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“on the whole, the 18 to 20 age group does far better than their elders.”656  
Representative Charles Howell (D-NJ) contended Gallup’s findings were of 
“considerable value” in proving to skeptical lawmakers that adolescents possessed 
equal, if not better, educational qualifications than current adult voters.657   For 
those congressmen concerned that lowering the suffrage age might 
disproportionately benefit one political party, another Gallup survey found that the 
allegiance of young people (51% Democrat to 49% Republican) almost duplicated 
that of adults (50% Democrat and 50% Republican).658  The overwhelmingly positive 
polling results emboldened congressional supporters of the 18-vote.  On the eve of 
Senate deliberation of Langer’s bill, Democrat Hubert Humphrey confidently 
predicted it would pass.  Not only did the public and President Eisenhower “want 
it,” Humphrey said, but he personally knew a “number of Senators of both parties” 
who supported the resolution.659   
On 21 May 1954, the Senate debated S.J. Res. 53.  A plurality of senators 
approved the measure, 34-24, but it did not garner enough votes to receive the two-
thirds majority required by the Constitution for the authorization of 
amendments.660  C.P. Trussell of the New York Times reported that the vote on 
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Langer’s amendment “could not have been made on a worse day.”661   Trussell’s 
insight proved prescient on multiple levels.  May 21st was a Friday, the traditional 
day of the week congressmen left Washington, D.C. to tend to political matters or go 
home to family and constituents.  In an era in which trains still predominated for 
long-distance traveling, many lawmakers frequently departed after the completion 
of morning business to begin their treks.  The floor debate on S.J. Res. 53 began 
around 2:30 p.m. and lasted, off and on, for nearly two hours.  Within the first hour, 
Senate majority leader William Knowland (R-CA) called for a quorum and ordered 
the Sergeant at Arms to summon the missing legislators.  During the roll call of 
names, majority whip Leverett Saltonstall (R-MA) and minority leader Lyndon 
Johnson (D-TX) announced that sixteen colleagues were gone on “official business,” 
nine were “necessarily absent,” and four were “absent by leave of the Senate.662  
Another six senators who had been present at the quorum call left before the vote 
on S.J. Res. 53.663  Some of the staunchest supporters of the 18-vote bill were among 
the absentees, including Harley Kilgore, Wayne Morse, and Hubert Humphrey.   
After the Senate vote, a mini-tempest brewed whether Knowland deliberately 
scuttled S.J. Res. 53 by intentionally scheduling it to be considered late in the 
afternoon on the Friday before the Memorial Day recess.  The timing of the bill’s 
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calendar call was more accidental than purposeful.   The legislation had been 
passed over twice, first on 5 April and again on 4 May 1954, at the request of 
Democrats.664  On Thursday, 20 May, the Senate agreed to a motion by Knowland to 
take up the Langer’s amendment.  Rather than immediately proceeding to debate, 
Knowland instead chose to announce the legislative program for the days leading 
up to the Memorial Day recess, slated to begin on Friday, 28 May.  He stated his 
priority to be the passage of an appropriations bill before adjourning for the holiday 
break.  Before consideration of that measure, Knowland wanted to finish 
deliberations on other pending legislation, including S.J. Res. 53, beginning the 
following day, Friday, 21 May.  He received unanimous consent to start that day’s 
business at noon.665  After discussing various legislative matters for over two and a 
half hours, the Senate finally got to Langer’s amendment.  At a June 2nd press 
conference with President Eisenhower, Sara McClenden of the El Paso Times asked 
him about rumors that Knowland had deliberately bungled the bill.  She said she 
heard chatter from “Senators on both sides of aisle” that Knowland’s “lack of 
organization and purposeful planning” suggested he “didn’t intend for [S.J. Res. 53] 
to pass.”  Eisenhower disavowed the gossip by claiming that he “never had heard 
any such – this was the first time I had heard such an idea.”666  
The convoluted leadership issues unique to the 83rd Senate (1953-1955) 
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shaped the milieu that framed the rumors about Knowland’s alleged managerial 
misconduct.  That Senate, unlike any other, endured extraordinary roster turnover 
due to nine deaths and one resignation.  Because of the personnel tumult, the 83rd 
Senate witnessed continuous shifts in party majority.  The elections of 1952 
garnered for the Republicans hair-thin control of the Senate by capturing 48 out of 
the 96 available spots. Democrats held 47 seats, and independent, but GOP-
caucusing, Wayne Morse of Oregon held one.  Even if Morse switched to the 
Democrat side of the aisle to deadlock votes, Senate rules empowered Vice 
President Richard Nixon to break any potential ties.  State laws outlined varied 
procedures for replacing federal lawmakers who could not complete their elected 
terms.  Most every state allowed governors to appoint interim congressmen until 
another election (either specially-arranged or regularly-scheduled) could be held; a 
handful of states mandated waiting until the next election cycle to determine the 
new legislator.  Whilst the states resolved who should fill the vacant legislative 
posts, the Senate continued conducting business, and each new personnel 
replacement altered the balance of institutional power.  In two cases, Robert Taft 
(R-OH) and Pat McCarran (D-NV), the deceased senator was replaced by a person 
from the opposite party.  And at several moments during the 83rd Senate, a death 
reduced the interparty division to a tie or resulted in the Republicans temporarily 
losing their slender margin of control.667  
William Knowland became Senate majority leader due to Robert Taft’s 
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passing.   After Senator Hiram Johnson’s death in 1945, California governor Earl 
Warren named Knowland to complete Johnson’s term as a favor to his father Joe 
Knowland, a major campaign contributor and owner/editor of the Oakland Tribune, 
an influential GOP organ in California.  At 37-years-old, Knowland became the 
Senate’s youngest lawmaker.668  After winning the seat outright in 1946, Bill 
Knowland made his reputation as a hard-nosed partisan who specialized in 
lambasting the Democrats’ containment strategy as too passive and their welfare 
policies as too aggressive.  He had a reputation for being curt with constituents, 
pedantic in committee, aloof with colleagues, and pompous in public. In a profile for 
the Saturday Evening Post, journalist Paul Healy tagged Knowland as the “grim 
Senator from California” and noted that his fellow legislators teased him for “being 
the Senate’s youngest fogy.”669  The left-leaning political journal New Republic 
mocked him as the “boob in armor” for his self-aggrandizing jingoism.  Knowland, 
however, was a dyed-in-the-wool GOP loyalist.  During the 1952 Republican 
national convention, he earned the respect of party leaders for his attempts to 
smooth the rift between the Taft and Eisenhower camps.  As a reward, his 
partymates elected him chairman of the Senate Republican Policy Committee (a 
weekly steering group to map GOP legislative strategy) for the 83rd Senate. 
At the opening of the 83rd Senate in January 1953, the GOP leadership 
selected Taft as majority leader.  In June, doctors diagnosed Taft with bone cancer 
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in his right hip.  Before he left Washington to begin treatments, Taft handpicked 
Knowland to fill-in as interim majority leader.670  Taft did not consult senior party 
leadership about his decision or give an official explanation of his reason to skip 
over majority whip Leverett Saltonstall.  Cabell Phillips, the Senate beat writer for 
the New York Times, speculated that Taft bypassed Saltonstall for ideological 
reasons.  Phillips deduced that since Taft and Knowland had “seen eye to eye” on 
most foreign and domestic issues, Taft saw Knowland as “a man more nearly of his 
own kidney” than Saltonstall.671  In his autobiography, Saltonstall admitted that his 
“feelings were hurt” over Knowland’s appointment “because no one in the 
Republican leadership discussed the move with me.” But he also confessed, “I don’t 
think I had the temperament for the job.”672  Saltonstall, a moderate East Coast 
establishmentarian, was known as a “senator’s senator” for his courtesy, 
cooperation, and tact.673  However, as Taft biographer William S. White contends, 
Taft thought Saltonstall had done too much wheedling and not enough whipping.  
Taft sensed that Knowland’s tenacity, partisanship, and shrewdness could both 
thwart Democrat ambitions and unite a GOP still smarting from the intraparty 
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bruises of 1952.  White stated Taft regarded Knowland as “a man who would not in 
any circumstance panic in the face of any internal Republican trouble and who 
certainly would not deal with the Democratic minority any more gently than the 
circumstances might require.”674  As Taft supposedly told Styles Bridges (R-NH), 
the president pro tempore of the Senate, upon choosing Knowland to become the 
next majority leader, “I’m going away and I’ve asked Bill to carry on for me.  Nobody 
can push him around.”675  
Within two months of his appointment, Knowland faced being pushed out of 
his post.  In a span of seven days between July 24th and July 31st, 1953, the deaths 
of Taft and Charles Tobey (R-NH) shifted the party balance in the Senate:  46 
Republicans, 47 Democrats, 1 Independent, and 2 vacancies.  On 1 August, two days 
before the first session of the 83rd Congress was scheduled to adjourn and one day 
after Taft died, Wayne Morse, who had bolted GOP ranks during the 1952 
presidential campaign to support Adlai Stevenson, announced he would vote to keep 
Republicans in control of the Senate during the next session.  Three days later, 
Senate Republicans unanimously elected the 45-year-old Knowland majority 
leader.676  With Morse’s vote lost and looking to avoid throwing the Senate into 
further turmoil, minority leader Lyndon Johnson (D-TX) stated he would not 
challenge GOP control even if Democrats won the special elections for the two 
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vacant seats, which, technically, would give his party a majority.677  The GOP 
retained Tobey’s seat but lost Taft’s; that meant when the second session of the 83rd 
started in January 1954, the Democrats held the majority 48-47.  The election 
results placed Knowland in a precarious position:  never before (and never since) 
had the official majority leader of the Senate been a member of the minority party.  
During the first weeks of the second session of the 83rd Congress, Knowland 
scrambled to shore his shaky situation.  His first order of business was to set the 
committee assignments; once completed, the Senate could get the legislative process 
started with GOP lieutenants in place.  On 11 January 1954, he forged an 
agreement with minority leader Lyndon Johnson to change the institutional rules 
regarding committee memberships.  The previous rules limited each senator to two 
committee assignments, but seventeen senators, fourteen of them Republican, held 
a third assignment because of the flux in Senate membership during the previous 
session.  The new formula allowed four more Republicans to serve on three 
committees, which gave the GOP one-vote majorities on each of the fifteen Senate 
committees.678  In March, those Republican majorities helped William Langer’s S.J. 
Res. 53 get reported out of the Judiciary Committee to the full Senate for floor 
consideration. 
Clayton Knowles of the New York Times stated that the new committee 
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arrangement represented “a remarkable degree of Democratic largesse.”679   
Benevolence, however, did not motivate Johnson to accept Knowland’s tender. 
Johnson clearly understood the true nature of the Democrats’ Senate condition.  
Wayne Morse’s alignment with the Republicans, plus the tie-breaking vote of Vice 
President Richard Nixon, actually made the outnumbered Republicans the 
“majority” party.  Johnson also knew that the GOP’s slender margin meant 
Knowland needed blocs of Democrat votes to fulfill Eisenhower’s legislative wishes.  
With the 1954 mid-term elections on the horizon, Johnson calculated that he could 
leverage Knowland’s wobbly “majority” for Democrat gain by gridlocking the Senate 
at advantageous moments and hanging the responsibility for its futility onto the 
GOP leadership.680    
Republican leaders recognized Knowland lacked the political skills to match 
Johnson’s tactical talents and parliamentary finesse.681  To help Knowland parry 
Democrat maneuvers, President Eisenhower became more involved in senatorial 
operations.  During his first year in office, Eisenhower delegated much legislative 
authority to experienced Republican lawmakers as he focused on fulfilling his 
campaign promise to wind down the Korean War.   They struggled, however, to turn 
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Eisenhower’s electoral mandate into national policy, particularly in domestic 
affairs.682  Consequently, Eisenhower decided to take more direct control over the 
legislative agenda.  In December 1953, he unveiled his plans to be visibly involved 
in crafting, explaining, and lobbying for his programs.  Eisenhower also pledged 
renewed efforts to create more congenial personal relations with members of 
Congress, particularly the leadership cadre of the House and Senate, to help carry 
his proposals.683  The bulk of the legislation that Eisenhower advocated for 1954, 
like the 18-vote amendment, was generally non-partisan.  Columnist Marquis 
Childs of the Washington Post described it as a “middle-of-the-road program . . . 
designed to appeal to the great band of middle-of-the-road voters, which includes 
not only Republicans but independents and Democrats.”684  Most of the bills 
reflected the president’s moderate political philosophy and could not be classified as 
obviously pushing a particular ideological slate.   
The success of Eisenhower’s agenda relied on Republican congressional 
leadership.   Political scientist Henry Z. Scheele contends Eisenhower tapped House 
Majority Leader Charles Halleck (R-IN) as his chief legislative lieutenant on 
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Capitol Hill because, as the president wrote in diary, he considered Halleck “’smart, 
capable, and courageous.’”685   House Speaker Joseph Martin (R-MA) became, 
according to Time, “Ike’s grand legislative strategist.”686  Eisenhower marveled at 
Martin’s political acumen and deeply valued his patient but persistent leadership.  
In contrast, Eisenhower distrusted and disliked Bill Knowland, and the president 
became one of the people the majority leader refused to let push him around.   
Knowland thought his job required serving the needs of the Senate first and the 
wants of the president second.  Because Knowland believed he should speak to the 
president for the Senate rather than address the Senate for the president, scholars 
Neil MacNeil and Richard A. Baker maintain, “Knowland felt no obligation to his 
party’s president, regularly finding fault with Eisenhower’s policies and 
programs.”687  Knowland drew Ike’s ire by brazenly criticizing his approaches in the 
media and on the Senate floor; he especially chided Eisenhower for failing to take a 
stronger stand against communism in China, Korea, and Vietnam.  Knowland 
really got under Eisenhower’s skin during the weekly strategy sessions the 
president hosted for GOP leaders.  Knowland routinely scowled, grumbled, and 
disapprovingly shook his head at administrative plans; sometimes, he angrily 
interrupted the president mid-sentence. Eisenhower interpreted Knowland’s 
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peevish tantrums as undisciplined egocentrism that, at times, crossed from 
rudeness to insubordination.  “In his case,” Eisenhower wrote in his diary about 
Knowland, “there seems to be no final answer to the question, ‘How stupid can you 
get?’”688 
The mutual disdain between Knowland and Eisenhower underpinned the 
rumors about an intraparty plot to undermine S.J. Res. 53.  Clearly, Eisenhower’s 
extensive program for 1954 had more trouble in the Senate than in the House.  
Unlike Speaker Martin, political scientist Randall B. Ripley contends, Knowland 
weakened his leverage as majority leader because he was “torn between being a 
good soldier for Eisenhower and being a dedicated conservative.”689   Knowland also 
struggled to keep his chamber in order. Too often, Knowland slavishly adhered to 
the Senate’s custom of allowing extended deliberations rather than push a bill 
along.  His laissez-faire approach stroked the egos of vainglorious senators and 
provided frustrated GOP right-wingers a stage to vent against the administration, 
yet it also stalled legislative business.  Knowland possessed tireless energy, but, 
seeing himself more as a statesman than a politician, he appeared indifferent to 
parliamentary deal-making.  He also regularly failed to perform the routine 
homework required for successful lawmaking, such as counting heads before 
allowing a floor vote on a piece of legislation and maintaining a strict legislative 
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calendar.  And his humorless, abrasive personality certainly put off many senators, 
including fellow Republicans.690   
Ironically, historian Thomas M. Gaskin notes, President Eisenhower 
“actually found it easier to deal with” Lyndon Johnson than Knowland.691  Johnson 
fostered cordial relations with Eisenhower, and occasionally, Ike invited him to 
have a nightcap in the White House.  To the chagrin of his Democratic flock, 
Johnson adopted a collaborative tack with Eisenhower, particularly on foreign 
affairs.  Historian Robert Caro explains that Johnson’s cooperation strategy sought 
to neutralize the legislative influence of conservative Republicans, which Johnson 
believed would so enflame internal GOP divisions that the public would overlook 
their like for Ike and scorn congressional Republicans for failed statecraft ahead of 
the 1954 mid-term elections.692  Of course, as scholars Neil MacNeil and Richard A. 
Baker point out, Johnson’s “supportive bent stood in striking contrast to Senator 
Knowland’s bristling independence.”693  Eisenhower routinely turned to Johnson to 
get his key legislation adopted, including passage of the act to fund construction of 
the St. Lawrence Seaway several days before the Senate considered S.J. Res. 53.   
In the weeks prior to deliberations on the 18-vote bill, Knowland’s flawed 
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headship and indifferent parliamentarianism had widened the rift between him and 
the president.  Knowland sided with GOP isolationists to support John Bricker’s (R-
OH) amendment to grant Congress regulatory power over all international 
agreements made by the executive branch.  Only a hastily-cobbled coalition of 
liberal Democrats and GOP stalwarts kept the president from an embarrassing 
defeat.694  Knowland failed to hold his Republican colleagues together for key 
Eisenhower bills on Hawaii statehood and a revision of the Taft-Hartley Act.  Nor 
did he do much to rein in or cut off Joseph McCarthy’s unruly hearings on 
communism in the Army.695  But more often than not, Knowland delivered for 
Eisenhower.  Historians Gayle B. Montgomery and James W. Johnson assert, 
“Knowland supported Eisenhower a vast majority of the time,” particularly on 
domestic policy.696  Political scientists George Edwards, Andrew Parrett, and Jeffrey 
Peake find that the 83rd Congress only rejected six bills that the president 
supported.697  In a review of its legislative record, journalist Roscoe Drummond, 
longtime Washington correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor, reckoned 
                                                          
694 “Vote, Vote, Vote,” Time, 8 March 1954, 29.  See also Duane A. Tananbaum, “The Bricker 
Amendment Controversy:  Its Origins and Eisenhower’s Role,” Diplomatic History 9, no. 1 (January 
1985):  73-93. 
 
695 “The Mess in Washington,” Time, 17 May 1954, 26-29. 
 
696 Gayle B. Montgomery and James W. Johnson, One Step from the White House:  The Rise 
and Fall of Senator William F. Knowland (Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1998).  
Contemporary assessments of Knowland’s outlook square with the historical evaluation.  In factual 
profile of him, for instance, Time summarized that “Knowland has voted with the Administration on 
domestic matters, but has veered farther and farther away on foreign policy.”  See “Senator 
Knowland,” Time, 13 December 1954, 15.  
 
697 George C. Edwards III, Andrew Parrett, and Jeffrey Peake, “The Legislative Impact of 
Divided Government,” American Journal of Political Science 41, no. 2 (April 1997): 553.  See also, 
William S. White, “Eisenhower Ahead on 5 of 11 Issues,” New York Times, 6 July 1954, 1 & 12. 
238 
 
that the 83rd had been “more responsive to the President’s requests on domestic 
matters than any previous Congress since the first two years of the New Deal.”698  
Even Eisenhower said he was “proud” of the 83rd for its record of “effective 
accomplishments,” especially in areas, like tax reform, “that previous Congresses 
have tried time and time again to do and they failed to do so.”699   Knowland might 
have been stubborn when dealing with the president and sour about many of his 
policies, but he was first and foremost a party loyalist.  Like many Republicans, 
Knowland favored youth suffrage, and he co-sponsored an 18-vote bill early in the 
1954 legislative session in support of Eisenhower’s State of the Union appeal.700  
When S.J. Res. 53 came up for vote, he worked on its behalf and, unlike many of the 
more recent administration-sponsored bills, managed to unite all twenty-seven 
Republicans present behind the amendment.  Knowland’s scheduling of the bill was 
certainly inopportune, and possibly inept, but not purposefully injurious.   
The rumors of spiteful sabotage overlooked that Knowland probably harbored 
more hard feelings toward William Langer than Dwight Eisenhower.  In mid-
January 1954, President Eisenhower asked the Senate to confirm Earl Warren as 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.701   Since September 1953, Warren had served 
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as the interim Chief Justice after Fred Vinson died of a heart attack. For seven 
weeks, Langer conducted a “one-man campaign” to bottle up the confirmation of 
Knowland’s friend and benefactor.  Langer delayed action on Warren’s nomination 
while supposedly examining his qualifications for the judgeship.  Newsweek 
reported he held Warren’s appointment hostage in committee until securing more 
federal patronage for his home state of North Dakota.  And, in unprecedented 
fashion, Langer allowed inflammatory statements against Warren to be aired in 
public during the Judiciary Committee’s vetting process.702  Before Warren’s 
confirmation vote in the Senate, Knowland blasted Langer’s probe as the “’most 
shocking’” and “’irresponsible’” investigation he could remember in his senatorial 
career.703  Over two months passed between the approval of Warren as Chief Justice 
and the vote on Langer’s 18-vote amendment.  Though Knowland held grudges and 
occasionally betrayed colleagues who he believed had wronged him, his animosity 
toward Langer had no visible bearing on the defeat of S.J. Res. 53.  In fact, they 
collaborated on the Senate floor to try to persuade their colleagues to pass the 
measure.  As the majority leader of a body in which his party was actually in the 
minority, Knowland simply could not get around a cold political reality:  he did not 
have the votes, even with every Republican present in support, to harvest a 
legislative victory for his partymate or his president.  
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Unfortunate timing, rather than malicious scheduling or purposeful 
bungling, prevented Knowland from gathering enough votes to secure S.J. Res. 53. 
On 17 May 1954, the Supreme Court ruled in Brown v. Board of Education that 
state laws establishing racially segregated public schools were unconstitutional.704  
The Court’s decision, announced a mere four days before deliberations on Langer’s 
amendment, enraged southern congressmen, and their anger enflamed opposition to 
the 18-vote proposal.  From the start of the 1954 session, most southern Democrats 
appeared to disfavor the federal route to establishing eighteen as the nation’s voting 
age.  A January poll conducted by the New York Times indicated a smattering of 
southern support, as Alton Lennon of North Carolina and both Tennessee senators, 
Albert Gore and Estes Kefauver, said they would vote affirmatively.  A strong 
contingent opposed Eisenhower’s call for a constitutional amendment, including 
John Sparkman of Alabama (Adlai Stevenson’s running-mate in 1952) and three 
senators “who carry great influence”: Harry Byrd of Virginia, James Eastland of 
Mississippi, and Clyde Hoey of North Carolina.705  During the late winter and early 
spring, southern state legislatures sent conflicting messages regarding lowered 
voting ages.  Mississippi’s statehouse rejected an 18-vote measure after opponents 
claimed it would increase the number of African-American voters.706  Maryland 
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lawmakers refused to report an 18-vote resolution out of committee.707  Kentucky 
legislators, however, sent an 18-vote referendum to Bluegrass State voters for 
approval over the objections of governor Lawrence W. Wetherby.708  A week before 
consideration of S.J. Res. 53, Senator Olin Johnston of South Carolina slightly 
darkened the afterglow of Kentucky’s action by reaffirming the majority viewpoint 
of his southern cohorts:  “’The federal government has no right to legislate for the 
states on the question of the lower voting age.’”709 
When S.J. Res. 53 came up for deliberation, Lyndon Johnson allowed his 
mentor, Richard Russell of Georgia, to lead the Democratic opposition to the 
amendment.710  The 57-year-old Russell spent more than half of his lifetime, from 
1933 to 1971, in Congress, but was the “junior” U.S. Senator from Georgia for three-
fourths of his career because of Walter George’s long service. Russell’s colleagues 
recognized him as the “dean” of the southern Democrats because of his intellect, 
eloquence, integrity, affable personality, mastery of parliamentary maneuver, and 
ability to forge compromises.  By 1954, according to his biographer Gilbert C. Fite, 
Russell had completed a metamorphosis from a moderate liberal to a conservative 
on social legislation.  He had been an ardent New Dealer, championing rural 
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electrification, conservation, forestry, and agricultural programs.  Russell never 
married or had children but felt compelled by the abject poverty in his state to 
combat the undernourishment of America’s youth.  In 1946, Russell originated the 
national school lunch program to promote adequate nutrition among school-aged 
kids.711  By the late 1940s, however, Russell had become an opponent of Harry 
Truman’s Fair Deal because he believed it overinflated federal involvement in the 
private lives of citizens, particularly regarding racial concerns.  As leader of the 
Southern Caucus, Russell organized southern Democrats in the Senate to block any 
and all legislation that threatened desegregation, such as anti-lynching laws, 
integration of the armed forces and public schools, and fair employment practices.712    
Citizens inundated Russell with comments regarding S.J. Res. 53.  A few 
letters, like one from a man in San Francisco, urged him to fight the measure to 
prevent “extreme left-wingers” from radically altering the nation’s laws.713  Most 
people, particularly adolescents, asked Russell to support the resolution.  A high-
school senior from Atlanta, for example, insisted that the Senate extend to 
America’s youth the same electoral trust “Georgia has given us.”714  Russell’s stock 
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reply underscored how the 18-vote “has worked out very well in my own state” but 
emphasized that “each and every one of the states has adequate legal machinery for 
fixing the age of suffrage at either eighteen, nineteen, or twenty years.”715 His ever-
deepening conservatism honed his sharp antagonism toward federal action to 
establish a national suffrage age.  Unlike Estes Kefauver and Adlai Stevenson, 
Russell opposed congressional legislation to lower voting ages as a Democratic 
presidential candidate in 1952.716  And he vocally contested Eisenhower’s call for 
federal 18-vote legislation.  Immediately after the president’s 1954 State of the 
Union address, Russell lambasted his plea for a constitutional amendment as “an 
invasion of states’ rights.”717   He later wrote to a state representative from Idaho:   
I am very much opposed to the Federal Government  
coercing any state in this field, and believe the President’s  
recommendations only point to a classic illustration of an  
instance where people should go to their state government  
and promote the changes rather than to dictate to sister  
states from Washington.  I regard this tendency, and the 
concentration of power here, as the greatest threat to our 
individual rights and our form of government.718 
 
Some letter-writers pleaded with Russell to look past his dogmatism to give the 
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letter of the 18-vote amendment a fair evaluation.  “I also believe in states’ rights,” 
a 17-year-old girl from Chicago affirmed, “but don’t you think that in a National 
Election it is for the National government to decide?”719    
 Russell’s correspondence shaped the carefully-parsed words he spoke during 
floor debate on S.J. Res. 53.  He expressed support for the principle of youth 
suffrage and praised Georgia adolescents for their able electorship in the decade 
since they had been enfranchised.  Russell also agreed with 18-vote advocates that 
young people possessed the mental, emotional, and educational fitness to vote.720  
But he firmly opposed William Langer’s resolution on the grounds that determining 
voter qualifications, including age requirements, was solely a state matter.  The 
crux of Russell’s argument was made plain in a repartee with fellow Democrat 
Thomas Hennings of Missouri: 
Mr. HENNINGS.  I am sure the Senator from Georgia and  
many other Senators would not assume an attitude of old- 
fogyism or rigidity to the extent of believing that the human  
race does not make progress and suggesting that some boys  
and girls 18 years of age have not attained sufficient maturity  
and a sufficient degree of wisdom and judgment to exercise  
the franchise.  I believe there are many youngsters of 18 years  
of age who can, perhaps, vote more intelligently than can some  
who have attained a much greater age. 
 
Mr. RUSSELL.  I stated that that was not the issue at all,  
that there is much merit to the contention that 18-year-olds  
are qualified to vote, and my State permits them to vote.  But  
the question is whether we should have a Federal strait-jacket  
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placed on the States by amending the Constitution which was  
deliberately drawn to provide the States some elasticity in  
requirements for voting.721 
 
The Brown decision was clearly on Russell’s mind as he spoke out against 
S.J. Res. 53.  Robert C. Albright, Senate correspondent for the Washington Post, 
observed that Russell was “still bridling at the Supreme Court decision outlawing 
public school segregation” when he denounced the 18-vote proposal as an 
“’inexcusable infringement’” on states’ rights.722   Russell complained that the 
hearings on it in the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments inadequately 
vetted the proposal.  He had a point.  The first inquiry on 2 June 1953 lasted ten 
minutes, and the second on 13 July 1953 finished in thirty minutes.  Only four 
people testified (all in favor), and one of them (a political science professor from 
Wabash College) volunteered to do so after Langer, chairman of the subcommittee, 
asked at the end of the June hearing if anyone in the audience wanted to speak 
publically on the issue.  Of the four written statements submitted to the 
subcommittee, three supported the resolution.723  Without directly referring to the 
mountain of case documents involved in the Brown litigation, Russell, a lawyer by 
training, charged, “So I say it is a sad commentary on our times that it is proposed 
to have the Federal power invade the several States and prescribe the qualifications 
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of the electors, and to have that done on such skimpy and inadequate hearings as 
those which were conducted by the subcommittee in this case.”724   
Russell’s criticism of the 18-vote resolution laid bare his and the white 
South’s condemnation of the Brown verdict.  He alleged that S.J. Res. 53 was “only 
one more illustration of the theory of trying to carry on all government from 
Washington.”725  Russell charged that the states “are fast losing their identity as 
units of Government.  Our once proud dual system seems to be giving way to the 
view that all power should be concentrated in Washington, that only Washington 
has the wisdom to direct and control the people of the United States in every detail 
of their daily lives.”726  Russell postulated that congressional rejection of the 18-vote 
bill might spur executive action to change state franchise ages by fiat, which would 
give the Warren Court cause to “incorporate the order into a decision” that would 
seek “to force compliance by the States.”727  In a press conference after the defeat of 
S.J. Res. 53, Russell expressed “gratification” that it had been sent to the Senate as 
a constitutional amendment. He pointed out that had it been submitted as a 
statute, it would have passed muster since it gained a simple majority (34-24) – 
then, he alleged, “the present Supreme Court would have seen fit to try to enforce 
it.”728 
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Republican sponsors of S.J. Res. 53 became openly frustrated during floor 
debate that it would be thwarted by the sociopolitical grievances of southern 
Democrats regarding a judicial matter that had little direct bearing on the voting-
age measure.  Republican strategists staked passage on convincing enough non-
southern Democrats to break party ranks and back the amendment.  Because 
Majority Leader Knowland lacked the personal charms and political muscle to 
manufacture a favorable outcome, they hoped to parlay the public’s support of youth 
suffrage and Eisenhower’s popularity into legislative success.  As William Langer 
declared, “[T]his is as good a time as any to press the amendment.  With the public 
support for the amendment increasing all the time, with the occupant of the White 
House and the present majority leader in the Senate supporting it, this is an 
excellent time to approve it.  I am satisfied in my own mind that the issue narrows 
down to the simple question:  Eventually, why not now?”729   
Republican pleas to take advantage of the ripe legislative moment on behalf 
of youth suffrage, however, did not break the Democrat bloc.  Because Senate 
Republicans lacked a working majority, they depended on sizeable blocs of 
Democrat votes to pass virtually every bill.  In the weeks just prior to debating S.J. 
Res. 53, Democrats had become less willing to go along with Eisenhower’s program, 
reckoning there was no political profit in helping the GOP build up a legislative 
record before the 1954 mid-term elections.  Under the temporal circumstances 
shaped by the timing of the Brown decision announcement, Republicans were 
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unable to steer the deliberations away from the politics of states’ rights onto the 
merits of enfranchising teenagers.  Russell and his Democrat allies cleverly 
redirected the floor debate to the federalist question every time a Republican offered 
a reason why adolescents deserved to vote.  When Langer referenced the opinion 
polls that demonstrated broad public support for youth suffrage, for example, 
Russell agreed that adolescents should be enfranchised, like in his state, but not by 
federal action.730  When Langer and Knowland highlighted Eisenhower’s espousal of 
the amendment, Thomas Hennings noted the president had recently stated that 
nineteen might be a better franchise age than eighteen; if the chief executive was 
unsure what the exact suffrage age should be, Hennings maintained, the Senate 
could not impose age uniformity on the states.731  And when Knowland impatiently 
thundered, “What in the world are those who are opposing the amendment afraid of 
in submitting the matter to the 48 States of the Union?  Why not let the States 
express themselves?,” Carl Hayden (D-AZ) calmly interjected that, as of May 1954, 
36 out of 37 state legislatures had already spoken by rejecting proposals to lower 
voting ages.732  
In the recent past, southern Democrats had employed parliamentary 
legerdemain to defeat bills anathema to their interests or philosophy.  Vanquishing 
S.J. Res. 53 required no such trickery.  Russell and his regional brethren simply 
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repeated the chorus that the amendment constituted a gross violation of states’ 
rights.  Enough of their non-southern partymates heeded the refrain so as to retain 
the unity necessary to kill the bill.  Clearly, the undertow of Brown v. Board of 
Education snagged S.J. Res. 53 by pulling the deliberations away from what should 
have been a discussion about the democratic justice of youth suffrage toward a 
dispute about the constitutional principles of states’ rights.  As Senator John 
Kennedy (D-MA) concluded at the end of the floor debate, “Reluctance to amend the 
Constitution is one of our most valuable safeguards and bulwarks of stability. . . 
.[A]lthough the maturity and wisdom of those in this age group is not to be 
deprecated – indeed, I would support such an amendment in my own State, and in 
the Congress if it were supported by the experience and demand of many States – 
there have not been demonstrated sufficient grounds for changing this basic 
document today.”733    
Neither a popular majority leader nor impeccable bill management could 
have saved Langer’s amendment in the torrent of southern umbrage to the Brown 
ruling.  The accidental timing of its promulgation so close to the date of Senate 
deliberation on S.J. Res. 53 inadvertently doomed the voting-age proposition.  
“There wasn’t any visible connection between the Supreme Court’s anti-segregation 
ruling and President Eisenhower’s proposal for a constitutional amendment to 
lower the voting age from 21 to 18,” Newsweek observed, “but that made no 
difference.  All riled up over the court’s decision, the Southern Democrats had to let 
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off steam some way.  So they blocked the amendment in the Senate.”734  William 
Moore of the Chicago Tribune reported that the “determined stand” of southern 
Democrats against the resolution “was regarded by many as a slap at the 
Eisenhower administration occasioned by their resentment over the recent Supreme 
Court decision banning segregation in the public schools.”735  Southern scorn of Earl 
Warren turned Eisenhower’s endorsement of the 18-vote into a detriment because 
the president had chosen him to be Chief Justice.  The rage the Court stoked among 
southern senators also damaged Ike’s rapport with Democrat leaders to such a 
degree that he could not mend the regional, partisan, and ideological divides, like he 
had on other measures, to rescue Langer’s measure.  Indeed, the Senate’s rejection 
of the 18-vote bill withered the informal bipartisan coalition Eisenhower had 
cultivated.  In the days afterwards, congressional Republicans and White House 
officials charged Democrat chiefs with duplicity for agreeing to help advance the 
president’s legislative agenda – including youth suffrage – at the outset of the 83rd 
Congress then reneging by constructing barriers to stymie most of the president’s 
priorities.736  Some people blamed Russell directly for undermining S.J. Res. 53.  
“You ought to be ashamed of yourself for having defeated it,” a man from Kansas 
City, Missouri, charged, “I don’t like the Supreme Court’s decision any better than 
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you do, but, don’t take it out on the younger generation.”737   Of course, Democrats 
had planned from the beginning of the 1954 congressional session to stonewall GOP 
domestic legislation whenever politically gainful.  To southern Democrats still 
smarting from the Brown case, thwarting an administration-backed voting rights 
amendment appeared to be the proper political retort to shield the states from 
another federal attempt to encroach upon constitutionally-protected rights.    
Although the 18-vote measure failed, Eisenhower and the GOP gleaned a 
smidgeon of satisfaction in the outcome.  Republican support for adolescent 
enfranchisement cut into a long-standing Democratic voting stronghold in 
presidential elections:  the 21-to-29-year-old demographic.  In 1952, according to 
George Gallup’s calculations, 49% of electors in that age class cast ballots for 
Eisenhower; in 1956, 57% of them voted for Ike.738  “This shift is significant,” Time 
maintained, “because 8,600,000 adults have reached voting age since 1952, and 
more are coming fast.”739  The vote on Langer’s bill also begat a rare display of party 
solidarity.  Not one Republican in attendance voted against it, rallied by Bill 
Knowland to fulfill their president’s request.  The cohesion exhibited by the GOP on 
behalf of an administration-backed amendment showed that conservative 
Republicans could be more loyal to party than to ideology under the right episodic 
circumstances.  Since the late 1930s, GOP right-wingers had often allied with 
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southern Democrats in a “conservative coalition” to suppress congressional attempts 
to expand social welfare and civil liberties.  Typically, as political scientist Mack C. 
Shelley argues, southern Democrats were the swing bloc that decided whether the 
coalition formed at all and determined if conservatives would be in the majority on 
a particular vote.740  Scholars Ira Katznelson, Kim Geiger, and Daniel Kryder 
contend, however, Republicans represented the swing votes on civil rights issues, 
including the expansion of voting rights.741  The circumstances of S.J. Res. 53 
turned the usual equations upside down, as united Republicans relied on 
Democratic defections to halt southern attempts to derail the 18-vote amendment.  
In the end, GOP leaders managed to capture only seven out of seventeen non-
southern Democrats, which left the resolution five votes short of achieving the two-
thirds majority required for the acceptance of a constitutional amendment.  Not 
until 1970 did the Senate again consider a bill to establish a national suffrage age. 
 
After the defeat of S.J. Res. 53, federal interest in reducing franchise ages 
dwindled.  In the midst of staring down the menaces of communism and smoothing 
out the vicissitudes of capitalism, congressmen regularly snubbed calls for youth 
suffrage.  Between 1955 and 1960, only four 18-vote measures were introduced in 
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the Senate.742  Ten resolutions were filed in the House, but seven of them were 
submitted by the same three congressmen:  Clyde Doyle (D-CA), Kenneth Keating 
(R-NY), and William Widnall (R-NJ).743  Each of the bills died in committee. 
President Eisenhower said he had “terrific interest” in young people and placed 18-
vote proposals on his post-1954 legislative agendas.744   Part of the president’s “zeal” 
for reducing voting ages, journalist Robert J. Donovan of the Saturday Evening Post 
stated, was his desire “to build the Republican Party up to a point where it can win 
without him in 1960.”745  The polls revealing an uptick in youth support for the GOP 
boded well, but Eisenhower failed to follow up by choosing not to push Congress to 
adopt a national youth suffrage bill.  He calculated that the legislative toil on behalf 
of adolescent enfranchisement would ultimately be futile for two reasons.  After the 
83rd Congress and for the remainder of his term, Eisenhower faced a Democrat-
controlled Capitol Hill staffed with southern committee chairman outwardly hostile 
to any legislation that suggested voting rights expansion, including the 18-vote.  In 
addition, Eisenhower recognized that the majority of federal lawmakers viewed 
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suffrage age requirements as “a matter for the states to decide.”746 
Three states and one U.S. territory did choose to reduce franchise ages during 
the Eisenhower era.  Guam’s legislature voted in July 1954 to reduce its age of 
enfranchisement to eighteen.747  In November 1955, Kentucky became the second 
state to reduce its voting age to eighteen.748  On 3 January 1959, Alaska and Hawaii 
joined the United States having different suffrage ages; Alaska set its age at 
nineteen, and Hawaii at twenty.749 The actions of Kentucky, Alaska, and Hawaii 
were noteworthy when compared to the number of states that considered youth-
suffrage propositions.  Between 1952 and 1960, thirty-seven state assemblies 
entertained proposals to reduce franchise ages.  However, a mere eighteen states 
(Alaska, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Montana, Nevada, New York, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, 
Washington, and Wisconsin) experienced having at least one house of its legislature 
vote affirmatively; the vast majority of voting-age bills never got past committee 
review.  Only Idaho (1960), Kentucky (1955), Oklahoma (1952), and South Dakota 
(1952 and 1958) allowed plebiscites to reduce suffrage ages, with Kentucky 
representing the singular success.750   The consistency of the rebukes strongly 
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indicated, according to Congressional Digest, that “there was no compelling need or 
widespread national demand” for enfranchising 18-year-olds.751 
State lawmakers and their constituents rebuffed actualizing youth suffrage 
because of broad adult skepticism about the maturity of adolescents.  Dwight 
Eisenhower claimed that his 18-vote proposals were inspired by his observations of 
the maturity of young soldiers.  Eisenhower’s military experiences rooted his “faith 
and trust” in the ability of young people to take responsible actions, make sensible 
decisions, and form considered opinions.752  As he said before the national 
convention of 4-H Clubs in 1954:  “’I personally think that your judgments in the 
destiny of this nation are about as good as those of some of us who are many years 
your senior.’”753  Other adults lacked the president’s conviction.  Various grown-ups 
agreed with 18-vote advocates that citizenship training and modern education 
provided youth the academic credentials to proffer electoral consent as 
knowledgeably as adults.  Many parents and politicians also accepted the insights of 
social scientists and businessmen that showed adolescents to be more 
developmentally and cognitively adult-like than previously known.754  The steady 
climb in public approval of the 18-vote in postwar polls reflected a sentiment that 
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both the brawn and brains of youth justified enfranchisement.   Nevertheless, 
individual affirmations in response to the queries of a pollster did not indicate 
collective interest in or widespread demand for the enactment of youth suffrage 
among adults.    Not only did many authorities curtly dismiss the issue as 
unimportant when compared to more serious concerns at home and abroad, 
countless other adults flippantly disparaged it as unwise in the context of 
contemporary angst about “teenagers.”  
Prior to World War II, the word “teenager” did not exist as part of the 
American lexicon.  According to the Dictionary of American Slang, the United 
States became the first nation with a specific word to distinguish the adolescent 
cohort and the only country to consider it “a separate entity whose influence, fads, 
and fashions are worthy of discussion apart from the adult world.”755   Age-based 
cultural differences had existed since ancient times, but, as historian Thomas Hine 
asserts, the identification of a discrete “teenage” lifestyle had never occurred before 
World War II.756  By the mid-1950s, the teen world of high school and hanging out, 
replete with academic and socioeconomic activities, had become a fairly finite social 
orbit.  To adolescents, the noun “teenager” captured more than an age in one’s life; 
it encapsulated a distinct youth culture, an inimitable cohort identity with values, 
understandings, and practices unlike that of children and adults.   Teen culture 
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drew heavily from socially marginal groups, such as working-class gangs and 
African-Americans, who overtly or covertly opposed the conformity imposed by the 
dominate middle-class culture.757  The most visible features of teendom seemed to 
copy from these groups:  the distinctive hair styles, special clothing (such as blue 
jeans and t-shirts), use of slang and profanity, souped-up cars, smoking, drinking, 
and unabashed sexuality.  Because of the flowering of youth culture, all things 
tagged with the adjective “teen” became the exclusive domain of adolescents, and 
age became a primary determinant of social behavior equal to, and in some cases 
greater than, race, class, gender, or ethnicity.  According to postwar critic Dwight 
Macdonald, teenagers had taken shape as “a caste, a culture, [and] a market.”  They 
were “not just children growing into adults,” he asserted, “but a sharply 
differentiated part of the population” practicing “a style of life that was sui 
generis.”758   
As teen culture matured, the social distance between adults and adolescents 
widened.  Postwar America prescribed individualism, freedom of expression, 
socioeconomic mobility, and self-determination as the antidote to the stultifying 
tyranny of communism.  Adolescents broadly accepted those aspects of Americanism 
and trusted the precepts would also apply to them; as a 17-year-old New Yorker 
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averred, “teen-agers are citizens and entitled to protection, too.”759  Age conflicts 
arose, however, as teenagers insisted upon pursuing self-identity on their own 
terms and adults demanded conformity to social norms.760   Many adults, even the 
ones who listened to rock-n-roll “tunes” and bought youth-inspired “threads,” 
lambasted the messages and mores of teen culture for flouting traditional values 
and behaviors and disrespecting authority.  An endless stream of adult-produced 
essays and profiles portrayed young people as churlish hellions bent on nihilism.761  
Such alarmist portrayals convinced millions of adults that an epidemic of “juvenile 
delinquency” had swept over the nation.  The archetype of the “juvenile delinquent” 
as defiant, self-centered, and emotionally-troubled – which closely mirrored the 
imagery of the “turbulent” adolescence described by G. Stanley Hall – fostered 
judgments of teenagers as not just troublesome but rebellious.  In a 1957 special 
issue on youth, Cosmopolitan magazine mused, “Are Teenagers Taking Over?” and 
conjured images of “a vast, determined band of blue-jeaned storm troopers forcing 
us to do exactly as they dictate.”762   In the context of the fears about internal 
subversion fomented by the Cold War, imagining adolescents as automatons in 
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dungarees envisioned something sinister:  the disintegration of sociopolitical 
conventions historically defined by adults.  Concerns about the potential for youth 
to undermine American institutions appeared to so consume adults that, in 1959, 
sociologist Edgar Friedenberg observed, “The ‘teen-ager’ seems to have replaced the 
Communist as the appropriate target for public controversy and foreboding.”763   
The social anxieties about teenagers framed the political concerns about 
enfranchising them.   In the context of the postwar “youth problem,” many parents 
and politicians alike simply doubted that adolescents collectively possessed 
sufficient judgment about their own wellbeing to make responsible electoral 
decisions regarding the welfare of other people.  They summarized their skepticism 
by claiming teenagers unfit to vote because of their “immaturity,” by which, 
depending on the context of its usage, adults meant youths were emotionally 
disturbed, socially gauche, culturally insolent, personally inexperienced, and/or 
politically naïve.  A New York City resident, for instance, asserted that the “obvious 
argument” against youth suffrage was that “juvenile fads, adolescent crazes, 
schoolgirl hysteria and passing hero-worship are widespread evidence of political 
immaturity.”764  A man from Des Plaines, Illinois, advocated lifting the voting age 
“to 25 or even 30” because, based on his own adolescence, teenage minds were 
addled by thoughts of “girls, dances, parties, boxing, vaudeville, and burlesque 
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shows.”765  Some older people reckoned that enfranchising youth might destabilize 
adultocracy.  In 1957, Maryland’s House Judiciary Committee heard testimony on 
legislation granting 18-year-olds voting rights.  Committee members appeared to 
support the measure until Elvis Presley’s name entered the debate.  After Secretary 
of State Claude B. Hellman stated that lowering franchise ages would “’encourage 
greater responsibility among young people toward government,’” Representative 
Daniel M. Murray challenged, “’Don’t you believe that most Elvis Presley fans are in 
this age bracket? Do you think that’s a proper frame of mind for voters?’”  Before 
Hellman could respond, Representative Edgar P. Silver yelped, “’Presley could 
conceivably be elected President” on the strength of the 18-to-20-year-old 
demographic.  The committee summarily killed the teenage suffrage bill.766     
Legislative denials of adolescent enfranchisement fell within a body of legal 
prohibitions on teen activities.   Scholar Ronald D. Cohen contends that “adults’ fear 
of youthful rebellion and their urge to control youth” prompted the promulgation of 
such restrictive laws as curfews, loitering ordinances, and car cruising bans.767  
Several cities even tried to neuter “Elvis the Pelvis” by barring rock-n-roll from the 
airwaves.768   While adult authorities busily tried to stifle expressions of youth 
culture, they chided teenagers for becoming a “silent generation” unconcerned about 
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political matters, including youth suffrage.  After sending another voting-age 
request to Congress in 1955, Dwight Eisenhower commented that young people 
“don’t seem steamed up” about their own enfranchisement.769  Whereas the 
president lamented youth indifference as “sad,” other politicians believed it to be 
damnable.  In 1956, Maryland governor Theodore McKeldin blamed the “’apathy of 
youth itself’” for the failure of the Old Line State to lower its voting age.  Speaking 
before a seminar of Young Democrats and Republicans, McKeldin demanded, 
“’Where were you when the question was before the Legislature a few years ago?  
Where were the 18-year-olds themselves – where were the 19-year-olds and the 20-
year-olds?’” when he and other state lawmakers led the charge.770   The adult 
explanation for youth apathy asserted that pleasure-seeking teenagers had other 
things on their minds besides voting.  Hal Boyle of the Associated Press, for 
example, observed that adolescents cared more about securing a drivers license 
than suffrage.  “They’d fight by fair means or foul – even ask dad and mom to help – 
to preserve what they regard as youth’s inalienable right to drive a motor car,” 
Boyle noted, “But several million teen-agers now have the opportunity to fight for 
the greatest single privilege of American democracy, and, by and large, their 
attitude seems to be one of indifference.”771    
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Postwar youths were not uncaring about suffrage.  Based upon polling 
statistics, they were, as former Georgia governor Ellis Arnall insisted, “most active 
and most anxious to vote.”772  During the 1950s, a handful of teenagers organized a 
few small bands on behalf of adolescent enfranchisement.  Several national youth 
associations publicly supported reducing voting ages, but no countrywide youth-led, 
18-vote movement developed, though the Future Voters of America tried.773  Teen 
efforts to revise suffrage ages were unconsolidated, haphazard, and short-lived, and 
their campaigns were limited to individual cities or states.  Mostly, the young 
advocates wrote petitions to influential lawmakers urging a reconsideration of 
franchise ages; sometimes, they travelled to statehouses to pitch lawmakers in 
person.  Their endeavors to win adult endorsements of the 18-vote and to stir a 
youth groundswell to the cause were equally fruitless.   Most teenagers simply saw 
no need to get agitated over an issue utterly out of their control.  Whereas 
indignation over adult-made political decisions fueled youth in the 1960s to clamor 
for voting rights, the events of the postwar era stoked no such teen fury.  Domestic 
political matters sometimes irked and even angered adolescents, including their 
votelessness, but they had been socialized in their homes and classrooms to handle 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
use of automobiles, such as drive-in theaters and cruising lanes, youths saw the car as a chariot for 
freedom and fast times. See Amy L. Best, Fast Cars, Cool Rides:  The Accelerating World of Youth 
and Their Cars, (New York:  New York University Press, 2006).  
 
772 New York Times, 25 October 1953, 51. 
 
773 For additional information regarding the Future Voters of America, see Ina Don 
Manzanares to Harry S Truman, 10 March 1952, White House Central Files:  Official File 465 
(March-June 1952), Box 1299, Harry S Truman Papers, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, 
Missouri. 
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troublesome matters democratically, i.e. by patient submissions within proper 
governmental channels.   Within a social milieu paranoid about youth subversion 
and frenzied by depictions of juvenile delinquency, the vast majority of teenagers 
grasped the futility of petitioning legislators for a redress of their electoral 
grievances.  Adolescents clearly understood that adult intransigence rather than 
youth indifference was the central obstacle to the attainment of suffrage.  As a 
teenager remarked in 1954, “It seems everything we do has to be sanctioned by 
adults.”774   
The denial of adolescent enfranchisement epitomized the postwar tension 
between adults and teenagers.  The view of teenagers as a vital but alien social 
group and the perception of teenage culture as vivid but deviant would derail the 
political efforts to establish youth suffrage.  Stereotyping teenagers as 
dunderheaded and angst-ridden prompted numerous adults to suspect that 
adolescents were psychologically and emotionally unfit to vote.  Lawmakers saw no 
compelling need to adopt youth suffrage legislation because of the fears and 
uncertainties about enfranchising immature teenagers.  As Puerto Rico’s Senate 
succinctly declared upon declining a 18-vote bill in 1953:  “We feel it a risk for 
democracy to give voting rights to impulsive youth.”775  The travails of youth 
suffrage in the postwar era evidenced that political regulations establishing who 
can vote within democracies are lashed to social beliefs determining which people 
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should vote.  Young people believed adults would eventually see them as persons 
rather than stereotypes and consider them as citizens rather than outliers.  And 
they trusted that authorities would one day uphold the inclusive, democratic 
rhetoric civic leaders espoused every Citizenship Day by counting them as electors.  
“The perpetuation of our freedoms will ultimately depend not so much on patriotic 
oratory,” Oscar Benton, leader of the National Lutheran Council, declared, “as on 
the attitudes we develop in the hearts of our youth.”776  During the 1960s, those 
young people who had taken the rhetoric about self-determination to heart would 
demand that adults practice what they preached by enfranchising teenagers. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
LIBERALS, YOUTH, AND THE 18-VOTE, 1960-1971 
 
 
If you’re under 25, YOU are the MAJORITY, YOU can RUN the COUNTRY! 
 
                                           “Wild in the Streets,” (1968)777  
 
 
 
To many Americans, 1968 appeared to be the year that the United States 
would achieve domestic meltdown.  A long train of internal pressures percolating 
over the course of the decade seemed poised to dissolve the essential sociopolitical 
elements that had ever-so tenuously held the nation together.  Social, cultural, and 
political fissures so harried feelings and shook nerves that many people behaved as 
though a genuine revolution would begin at any moment.  Adults, in particular, 
worried that America’s young demi-monde, allegedly stoked by mindless hedonism 
and dangerous nihilism, would push the country toward violent destruction.  Many 
of the movies in that polarizing year of 1968 tried to explain why an ever-increasing 
number of supposedly good kids had rebelled against established authorities. While 
the teen-pics of the 1950s chronicled the impish fascinations of youth culture (like 
rock-n-roll, drag racing, and delinquency), the hippie-flicks of the 1960s detailed the 
insurrectionary allure of the counterculture’s casual sex, psychedelic drugs, acid 
                                                          
777  Wild in the Streets, directed by Barry Shear (American International Pictures, 1968), 
movie trailer, accessed 24 July 2015, http://www.youtube.com /watch?v=rRLwV2xafpk. 
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rock, and radical politics.  These hippie-exploitation movies cautioned adult viewers 
that their images of adolescents needed immediate readjustment.  Contemporary 
youth were not, as played by James Dean, merely estranged progeny seeking 
acceptance from parents; rather, they appeared to be alien creatures busily creating 
an alternative universe that rebuffed adults and traditional mores. 
“Wild in the Streets” offered moviegoers a campy slice of sociopolitical 
paranoia.    Based on a 1966 short story by Robert Thom, “Wild in the Streets” 
depicts the ascent of Max Frost, a 22-year-old rock star millionaire, to the 
presidency of the United States.778   Frost’s climb to the White House begins with a 
flash of insight when he hears a politician declare that voting ages should be 
lowered to eighteen because 52% of the American population was under age 25.779  
Frost decides to lead his “troopers” (i.e. devoted young fanatics) into the political 
arena to gain power for disfranchised youth.  He convinces Congress to accept a 
constitutional amendment declaring fourteen as the national franchise age by 
having his merry pranksters spike the Washington, D.C. water supply with LSD.  
After Frost sweeps into the presidency riding the youth vote, he makes executive 
decisions based on what his young majority wants, such as withdrawing U.S. troops 
from Vietnam, disbanding the FBI, shipping surplus grain to third-world nations, 
                                                          
778 Robert Thom, “The Day It All Happened, Baby,” Esquire, vol. LXVI, no. 6 (December 
1966):  220-240.  
 
779 During the 1960s, public officials often repeated that statistic in support of youth causes. 
Between 1960 and 1970, Americans under age 25 actually constituted 45% of the national 
population.  See U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, “Annual Estimates of the 
Population, by Age:  1900 to 1970,” Series A 29-42, Historical Statistics of the United States:  
Colonial Times to 1970, Part 1, Chapters A-M (White Plains, NY:  Kraus International Publications, 
1989; reprint of 1970 edition), 10. 
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instituting 30 as the new mandatory retirement age, and sending all persons over 
35 to “re-education camps” where young guards force them to imbibe water laced 
with LSD.  With the adult population perpetually incapacitated, Frost has fully 
consolidated his power, or so he thinks; in the film’s final sequence, Frost gets 
surrounded by a pack of hostile children for killing a pet crawfish, and one 
menacing-looking kid vows to “put everybody over [age] ten out of business.”      
“Wild in the Streets” fizzled at the box-office despite its election-year 
topicality.780  Released two months after Eugene McCarthy’s “children’s crusade” 
pushed Lyndon Johnson out of the Democratic race for president, the movie exposed 
the depth of the generational tension between adolescents and adults.  It 
underscored a paradox that had increasingly smoldered within American civic life 
during the 1960s:  while adults fetishized being young, they feared young people.  
The film’s absurdist depictions of obsequious parents, feckless politicians, and 
merciless teens resonated with those adults concerned about enfranchised teenagers 
hijacking America, culturally and politically.   Its dystopian portrayal of hippie 
fascism certainly took the ‘60s catch phrase “Never trust anyone over 30” to its most 
extreme consequence.  To many grown-ups, Frost and his adolescent acolytes 
symbolized a rebellious youth cohort not just aimlessly running amok, but one that 
posed a subversive threat to America’s sociopolitical order.  Their young foils 
seemingly agreed with Frost’s mother who, when pressed by reporters to explain his 
actions, exclaimed, “I’m sure my son has a very good reason for paralyzing the 
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country.”  Terry Clifford, film critic for the Chicago Tribune, surmised that the 
“effectively smug, demagogic, and ruthless” young antiheroes in the movie would 
deeply appeal to the “Now Generation” who had switched their collective focus 
“from electric guitars to electoral college, from Clearasil to Congress.”781 
“Wild in the Streets” presented an over-the-top, apocalyptic vision of the 
consequences of youth suffrage.  A New York City resident lambasted the film as an 
“insult” for scaring adults into believing that “simplistic, sinister, and totalitarian” 
impulses motivated potential youth electors.782   Yet the movie tapped into a sense of 
“moral panic,” clearly palpable in 1968, that all young people posed serious peril to 
time-honored conventions, domestic tranquility, and adultocratic command.783   As 
Cornell University political scientist Andrew Hacker illuminated in July 1968, “Not 
only do many adults fail to discriminate between non-rebellious and rebellious 
youths, they fail to discriminate between the various types of rebellion; every 
published vignette of dissent and disorder is added to the total impression of a 
uniform and pervasive state of social chaos in the youthful sector of the nation.”784  
Throughout the 1960s, the fear of unhinged teenagers electorally and politically 
going berserk (i.e. voting irrationally and governing irresponsibly) kindled an fretful 
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uncertainty within parents and politicians whether enfranchising adolescents would 
energize or eviscerate the body politic.   
 
A favorite parlor game of Americans tries to tag historical decades with a 
pithy descriptor.  The “gay” 1890s and the “roaring” 1920s, for example, supposedly 
illustrate the cultural vivaciousness of those particular years.  Such brands, of 
course, speciously oversimplify; no decade can be described by an exclusive epigram.  
Though “the Sixties” were one of the most exciting, fascinating, and troubling 
decades in American history, popular evaluations have yet, thus far, to fix onto 
those years a fashionable, one-word label.  For many years, however, academic 
assessments of the era remained singularly lashed to the “declension” thesis.  This 
interpretative framework postulates that the decade began bathed in a buoyant 
optimism, symbolized by President John Kennedy’s call to service, civil rights sit-
ins, and the rhetoric of the Port Huron Statement.  At mid-decade, the hopeful 
idealism reached its acme with the Mississippi Freedom Summer campaign, Lyndon 
Johnson’s electoral landslide, the Free Speech Movement, and the transformative 
legislation of the Democrat-controlled 89th and 90th Congresses (especially the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965).  During the last third of the 
decade, ever-escalating social dislocations at home and military incursions in 
Vietnam curdled optimism and buoyancy into disillusionment, anger, and despair.   
The declension thesis concludes that 1968 “delineated the end of the Sixties.”785  
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That year, Americans endured the revelations of government falsehoods about 
progress in Vietnam (as exposed by the Tet Offensive), assassinations of Martin 
Luther King, Jr. and Robert Kennedy, LBJ’s decision to not seek re-election, 
hostilities at Columbia University and other campuses, and a bloody riot outside the 
Democrats’ national convention in Chicago.  Those events fed the growing distrust 
of public officials, the disintegration of the New Left and civil rights movements, the 
embrace of violence by radical activists, the unraveling of the liberal consensus, and 
the victory of Richard Nixon.786 
In recent years, scholars have challenged the hegemony of the “good 
sixties/bad sixties” canon.  Several historians of the black freedom struggle, for 
instance, claim the Black Power movement represented an evolutionary growth out 
of, rather than dramatic departure from, the civil rights movement.787  Local and 
regional case studies expose the idiosyncratic limitations of social movements often 
portrayed as organizational and ideological monoliths controlled from bases in New 
York City or San Francisco.788  Several works contest the notion of 60s activist 
                                                          
786 For examples of the declension analysis, see Kirkpatrick Sale, SDS, (New York:  Random 
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movements as being exceptionally American by chronicling the global reach of 
dissent, especially the international protests of 1968.789 Historians of women’s 
rights, gay liberation, and the New Right propose that the story of the 1960s 
entailed more than the rise and fall of the Students for a Democratic Society and 
the triumphs and travails of liberalism.790  Significantly, these scholars champion 
the concept of a “long 1960s” by tracing the origins of the feminist, homosexual, and 
conservative movements back to the 1940s or 1950s and tracking their development 
into the 1970s and beyond.  These works suggest that the chronology of the 1960s 
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sociopolitical crusades should be broadened; they also maintain that the idealism 
and activism of the 1960s survived the implosion of SDS and the election of Nixon.  
When to date precisely the start and finish of the “long 1960s” remains a fervent 
historiographical subject.791 
The topic of youth suffrage has been minimized, if not overlooked, within the 
recent revisions of 1960s historiography.  The protracted gestation of the Twenty-
sixth Amendment certainly squares with the “long 1960s” interpretation.  The effort 
to enfranchise adolescents was not an exclusive cause of SDS or liberals for it 
attracted broad, but not necessarily deep, support across various social, cultural, 
ideological, and political spectrums.  Nor was the quest to reduce voting ages a 
particularly American venture; numerous nations, including communist countries, 
enfranchised teenagers during the postwar era and into the 1970s.  The course of 
youth suffrage within the 1960s also contradicts the declension thesis.  As the 
decade ended, hopes for lowering the franchise age among 18-vote devotees had 
never been higher.  By 1970, genuine legislative progress toward granting 
adolescents electoral rights had been made in Congress, and a lobbying campaign to 
legalize youth balloting had coalesced for the first time.  When the Sixties began, 
however, the prospects for achieving the 18-vote appeared dim.    
The decade’s first serious discussion of youth suffrage occurred in connection 
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with the passage of the Twenty-third Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  
Proposed by Congress in June 1960, it became effective in March 1961 after 
ratification by the states.   The amendment allowed the residents of the District of 
Columbia to vote in presidential elections and a vote in the Electoral College, but it 
did not grant District residents representation in Congress.792  Upon the 
amendment’s ratification, Congress empowered the Washington D.C. Board of 
Commissioners to determine the city’s election laws; once promulgated, the laws 
were submitted by the Board to Congress for approval.793  The age of 
enfranchisement became an immediate flashpoint of contention.  At the Board’s 
initial meeting, held 3 April 1961, the commissioners heard recommendations from 
local Democratic and Republican leaders.  The Democratic spokesman, Joseph 
Rauh, Jr., proposed a voting age of eighteen; the Republican, Carl Shipley, 
countered with twenty-one as the suffrage age.794   In the days and weeks following 
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the meeting, Rauh and Shipley fiercely accused each other of trying to rig municipal 
voter laws, including suffrage age, to manipulate the allocation of Washington’s 
1964 Electoral College representatives.  At a Harvard Club luncheon, for example, 
Shipley charged local Democrats had sinister reasons for supporting the 18-vote:  
they wanted to “’scoop up a lot of irresponsible’” teenagers to inflate vote totals, 
which, Shipley alleged, Democrats had traditionally done via “’fraud’” and 
“’tombstone voting.’”  Rauh countered Shipley backed a high suffrage age to “’keep 
down the vote to try to pull out an election the Republicans can’t win.’”795 
On 13 April 1961, the Commission adopted twenty as the minimum age to 
vote after the Board’s lone Republican, Robert E. McLaughlin, agreed to yield his 
party’s line.  McLaughlin claimed he had been swayed by talks with Senator 
Jennings Randolph (D-WV), well-known stalwart for the 18-vote, that contemporary 
adolescents could cast ballots responsibly because they “’probably are more mature’” 
than past youth due to the “’pressures of our civilization and our political life.’”796  
Commission President, Walter N. Tobriner, acknowledged the Board’s compromise 
as only a “’gesture’” because Congress held the final authority to fix the District’s 
voting age, which the Washington Post editorialized “is not likely to be 20.”797 
In May 1961, a special House subcommittee formed to consider the 
Commission’s proposals.  President John Kennedy asked its chairman, James C. 
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Davis (D-GA), to set Washington’s voting age at 18 so as to enfranchise “’the 
greatest possible number’” for the 1964 presidential election.798 Kennedy’s 
encouragement of youth to get involved in public affairs served as one of his core 
presidential themes.  His 1961 inaugural address famously implored Americans, 
especially those young citizens of the “new generation” to whom “the torch has been 
passed,” to “ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your 
country.”   Kennedy never formally or publicly sponsored youth suffrage before his 
request to establish eighteen as Washington D.C’s voting threshold.  As a Senator 
in May 1954, he voted against a constitutional amendment setting the national 
suffrage age at eighteen.  As a presidential candidate in 1960, the closest Kennedy 
came to advocating under-21 voting came during an October rally at American 
University when he told the students that he “’wished all of you lived in Kentucky, 
where you could vote.’”799   During the campaign, Kennedy eagerly solicited the votes 
of enfranchised college students and tapped campus Young Democrat clubs as a 
source of campaign support.800  Upon election to the presidency, he sought ways to 
expand civic opportunities for America’s youth.  To that end, Kennedy established 
the Peace Corps via executive order in March 1961 – the same month the Twenty-
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third Amendment became law.801    
Kennedy’s actions to integrate young people into America’s civic life 
underpinned his support for the 18-vote in the nation’s capital.  On behalf of the 
District Commission, Walter Tobriner testified before Davis’s subcommittee that it 
backed the president’s position.  When pressed by members why the Commission 
now supported 18 as the District suffrage age, Tobriner said conversations with 
administration officials convinced them that including teenagers in the presidential 
election process would infuse D.C. youths with “’a feeling of responsibility’” that 
might benefit the nation.  Tobriner further argued that “’the greater danger is not to 
allow them to have a voice.’”802  The “chilly reaction” of the subcommittee to 
Kennedy’s request and Tobriner’s testimony indicated scant interest in establishing 
eighteen as the franchise age.803  The editors of the Washington Post identified 
Chairman Davis as the main 18-vote killjoy, though he represented a state that had 
already enfranchised adolescents.  They challenged Davis to undo a seemingly 
undemocratic double-standard:  “Will he now hold that the 18-year-old vote is 
acceptable in his own district but not for the young people of Washington?”804  In 
August 1961, Davis’s subcommittee reported out legislation that preserved twenty-
                                                          
801 See Gerard T. Rice, The Bold Experiment:  JFK’s Peace Corps, (South Bend, IN:  
University of Notre Dame Press, 1985) and Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, All You Need Is Love:  The 
Peace Corps and the Spirit of the 1960s, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998). 
 
802 Washington Post, 16 May 1961, A1.  Besides the District Commission, Kennedy’s tender 
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one as the suffrage age in Washington.805   
That same month, the Senate’s District Committee took up its own bill to 
implement the 23rd Amendment.  Supporters of the D.C. 18-vote actively lobbied the 
committee.  Commissioner Tobriner reminded them of a unique temporal issue 
facing young Washingtonians:  “’If we adopt a 21-year-age limit in the District, 
where elections are held only once every four years, a person whose 21st birthday 
came just after an election would have to wait until he was almost 25 years old 
before he could vote.’”  Joseph Rauh, Jr. reiterated President Kennedy’s view that 
“’as many people as possible should vote in the Nation’s Capital.’”806  Senator 
Jennings Randolph (D-WV), former chairman of the House District Committee from 
1939 to 1945, urged his colleagues to enfranchise 18-to-21-year-olds because they 
“’already bear the responsibilities of citizenship without its privileges.’”  Senators 
Kenneth Keating (R-NY) and Estes Kefauver (D-TN) seconded Randolph’s 
entreaty.807   On 29 August 1961, the committee recommended eighteen as the 
minimum voting age for Washington residents.808  Chairman Alan Bible (D-NV) 
concurred with the Kennedy administration’s position of expediting youth 
involvement in electoral politics.  Bible stated, “The very strength and vigor of 
America’s democratic heritage are dependent upon our young people being 
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integrated into our democratic processes by being allowed to participate at an early 
date commensurate with their abilities.”809  
Political observers foresaw a tense fight over the differing ages of suffrage 
based on what had transpired during the congressional debate on the Twenty-third 
Amendment in 1959 and 1960.  Northern Democrats had strongly supported 
enfranchising District 18-year-olds, but Republicans and southern Democrats forced 
them in committee action to logroll on the age qualification to secure passage of the 
amendment.     Prior arguments notwithstanding, reconciling the age discrepancy 
between the House and Senate measures proved simpler than anticipated.  On 19 
September 1961, the Senate voted 38-36 to accept an amendment to the Bible 
committee’s proposal offered by Russell Long (D-LA) to establish twenty-one as 
Washington’s suffrage age.  Senate approval of Long’s amendment marked a clear 
defeat for President Kennedy, the majority of the Senate District Committee, and 
the 59,000 young D.C. residents between 18 and 21.810  Because the congressional 
settling of which citizens would be enfranchised by the Twenty-third Amendment 
did not get much discussion outside of the District of Columbia, there was little 
national attention brought to the youth suffrage issue. 
Congress’s failure to adopt the 18-vote for Washington, D.C. exposed a juicy 
irony.  Southern congressman utilized federal authority to deny a local government 
its preferred choice of whom to enfranchise.  Stark racism rather than defense of 
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states’ rights inspired southern antagonism to the doling of the franchise under the 
Twenty-third Amendment.  “There has been heavy Southern opposition to 
enfranchising the District of Columbia,” the New York Times reported, “because of 
its large Negro population.”811  Though ratified by the states in only 286 days, no 
southern state accepted the amendment.  According to Congressional Quarterly, 
southern refusal “was apparently motivated by the race issue;” in particular, the 
fear that Washington would elect a city government dominated by blacks.812  
Washington, D.C. was the only major American city in which African-Americans 
constituted a majority of the population:  54% of the city according to the census of 
1960 and 59.9% according to Census estimates for 1961.813  The Washington Post 
reported that “among Washingtonians of voting age, there are actually more white 
persons (248,000) than nonwhites (244,000),” but with D.C.’s growing black 
demographic “this balance may shift by 1964,” the first year the 23rd Amendment 
would take effect.814  A few weeks before the 1964 presidential election, Carlo J. 
Salzano of the Chicago Tribune conveyed that southern congressmen were stalling 
attempts to grant Washington, D.C. self-government “on the ground the Negroes 
would take control.”815  Typically rural and conservative, white southern Democratic 
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congressmen apparently reckoned that expanding democracy in Washington, 
including a lowering of its voting age, might markedly enhance D.C.’s national 
influence as an urban, liberal, and black city.  Normally slavish supporters of local 
political decisions, southern Democrats defied the requests of Washington’s District 
Commissioners to defeat, for the second time, an 18-vote proposal before Congress.   
The D.C. youth suffrage issue of 1961, like the federal 18-vote amendment of 
1954, got tangled in the obstructionist politics orchestrated by southern Democrats.  
Though they constituted a numerical minority (e.g. only 128 of the 535 legislators 
serving in the 87th Congress that met in 1961-62), southern Democrats possessed an 
inordinate amount of institutional power.816  Political scientists Ira Katznelson and 
Quinn Mulroy argue they formed a “structurally pivotal bloc” because of the need 
for southern votes to pass legislation.817   Southern Democrats practiced what 
Katznelson and Mulroy label “situated partisanship”:  some legislative situations 
called for the maintenance of regional needs, while others required acquiescence to 
national party wants.  Southern Democrats realized that the best way to maintain 
white supremacy in their region was to retain majority standing within their party.  
Only through sustained party status could southern Democrats receive the rewards 
of congressional influence afforded by seniority.  The key legislative question for 
Congresses in the New Deal-Great Society era involved when, rather than whether 
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or how, southern Democrats would choose to exercise their institutional advantage.  
Katznelson and Mulroy contend southern Democrats most often affected the course 
of national politics, especially in thwarting proposals related to social justice, when 
they prioritized regional concerns over party interests.818  “Acting as it did,” 
Katznelson and Mulroy conclude, “the South altered the vectors of lawmaking, 
including the era’s most significant policy decisions.”819       
 Into the 1960s, southern Democrats constituted the main congressional 
obstacle to the advance of youth enfranchisement.  They consistently balked at the 
use of federal power to expand voting rights and routinely flexed institutional 
muscle to obstruct the extension of suffrage to disfranchised groups.  The sway 
southern Democrats held in congressional committees served as a key impediment 
to franchise initiatives.   The modern Congress relies on committees to shoulder the 
burden of lawmaking.  The authors of the Constitution assumed that an irregular 
arrangement of temporary ad hoc panels could handle America’s legislative 
workload.  During the 19th century, the developmental complications of national 
expansion spawned a system of permanent congressional committees to process the 
increased volume and complexity of federal legislation.   By the early twentieth 
century, centralized majority-party control over legislative politics had given way to 
centralized committee government.  As Congress institutionalized the system, the 
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number of standing committees multiplied until reaching a peak in 1913 of 61 in 
the House and 74 in the Senate.820  In 1946, Congress overhauled the committee 
structure via the Legislative Reorganization Act.   The act’s main feature reduced 
the number of standing committees to nineteen in the House and fifteen in the 
Senate.  Streamlining the committee scheme to better regulate the flow of 
legislation seemed to fit the needs of Congress to check the increasing power of the 
executive branch.   
Consolidation, however, inadvertently enhanced the autonomy of the 
committees and the power of their chairmen.  Chairs possessed immense command 
over legislative operations by holding undisputed control over the agenda, 
resources, meeting times, structure, and staffing of committees.   The deferential 
culture of Congress reinforced their authority.  In a study of the postwar Congress, 
political scientist Richard F. Fenno, Jr. showed that sitting congressmen expected 
new members to serve an apprenticeship period during which they refrained from 
active participation in committee or floor deliberations.  He found junior 
congressmen usually acquiesced to senior lawmakers, especially committee chairs, 
because an institutional culture predicated on reverence emphasized that deference 
to, and the development of, congressional expertise would yield high-quality 
legislation.821  After passage of the 1946 Act, the committees so commanded the 
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lawmaking process that scholars called them “little legislatures.”822  Party leaders in 
Congress labored to influence committee actions, but the chairmen, usually 
southern Democrats, possessed enough institutional independence to operate 
virtually as they wished.823 
Southern Democrats often chaired committees in the postwar era because of 
the inexorable workings of a rigid seniority system within Congress.   “Seniority” 
meant that longevity of congressional service, rather than individual ability or 
personal work ethic, determined the assignment of committee posts.  The unwritten 
seniority system conferred chairmanships on the member of the majority party with 
the longest continuous service on the committee.824   Because of good health, 
political acumen, and mal-apportioned home districts, a number of southern 
congressmen accumulated seniority.  Because of the national electoral brawn of the 
Democratic Party, they gained access to prestigious committees in disproportionate 
numbers.  Between Franklin Roosevelt’s victory in 1932 and Jimmy Carter’s defeat 
in 1980, the Democrats controlled both houses of Congress during every session 
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except two:  the 80th (1947-1949) and 83rd (1953-1955).  Regionally, Democrats 
enjoyed a nearly 100-year political monopoly owing to the evisceration of the 
southern wing of the Republican Party during Reconstruction.  Within the one-
party South, those politicians who seemed to best deliver socioeconomic benefits to 
and maintain racial segregation for white constituents managed to construct 
lengthy legislative careers.825  Repetitive incumbency allowed southern congressmen 
to accrue seniority, which gave them appointments and chairmanships on 
important committees whenever the Democrats controlled the House and/or the 
Senate.  When John Kennedy took office in January 1961, southern Democrats 
chaired exactly half (12 of 24) of the standing committees though they constituted 
only 39% of their party’s congressional delegation.826  
Since Franklin Roosevelt’s second term, southern Democrats had bolstered 
their congressional clout through an unofficial governing coalition with conservative 
Republicans (usually from the Midwest) based upon a common aversion to liberal 
and statist legislation.827  The coalition usually materialized when southern 
Democrats (who feared federal activism would promote desegregation) crossed party 
lines to ally with conservative Republicans (who feared federal activism would 
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provoke authoritarianism) to defeat social welfare, economic regulation, and foreign 
aid bills.  With their power magnified by the seniority system, the conservative 
coalition regularly constricted congressional policy-making and repeatedly foiled 
executive activism.  An analysis of roll-call votes between 1953 and 1980 by political 
scientist Mack C. Shelley II revealed the presidents in that era “had relatively little 
impact on conservative coalition success” in foiling executive policy wishes.828  The 
conservative coalition seemed to so dominate national politics that scholar James 
MacGregor Burns described postwar America as a four-party political system in 
which Democrats and Republicans each divided into a progressive-urban-
presidential wing and an obstructionist-rural-congressional oligarchy.829   
Scholars often present the coalition (implicitly or explicitly) as a floor-voting 
bloc united by an ideological predisposition to block liberal initiatives.830  Political 
scientist John F. Manley argues that southern Democrats and Republicans often 
informally coordinated tactics and strategy during both “the committee stage and 
the floor stage” of the legislative process to achieve policy success.831  Though the 
conservative coalition had no formal leadership, staff, or structure akin to other 
congressional caucuses, Manley contends its ability to block bills in committee 
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before they reached either the House or Senate floor was its most powerful 
institutional weapon against liberal or statist measures.  Government scholar Roger 
H. Davidson holds that the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 unintentionally 
strengthened “the grip the conservative coalition held upon the legislative 
apparatus.”832  The consolidation of committees reduced the number of chairmen, 
which emboldened power of the remaining chairs – the majority of whom were 
southern Democrats.  Their alliance with conservative Republicans, the iron-clad 
rules of accumulated seniority, and the national electoral muscle of the Democratic 
Party in the postwar era allowed a handful of southern chairmen to dominate 
congressional policymaking.   
The names of Howard Smith (D-VA, House Rules), Wilbur Mills (D-AR, 
House Ways and Means), Richard Russell (D-GA, Senate Armed Services), Harry 
Byrd (D-VA, Senate Finance), and James Eastland (D-MS, Senate Judiciary) 
epitomized the period of southern-controlled, committee-centered government.   
Eminent historian of Congress, Donald A. Ritchie, notes that they, like other 
chairmen, “acted as barons who ruled their committees in styles ranging from 
despotic to democratic.”833 This southern gang of chairmen formed a ruling elite that 
subscribed to an interpretation of American government in which the institutions of 
Congress were designed more to thwart than to promote action.  House chairs 
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routinely smothered progressive, reform-minded bills in committee; if Senate chairs 
could not do so, southern Democrats (sometimes in concert with their GOP allies) 
could talk measures to death on the legislative floor. The ability of chairmen to bend 
institutional rules to facilitate the South’s needs turned Capitol Hill into a citadel 
for defending white southern interests and made congressional committees the 
front-line guard against perceived federal over-reach into regional affairs. 
The command of southern chairmen over the national legislative agenda 
cleaved the Democratic Party.  Since the 1920s, the Democrats had been a party 
divided by region, religion, culture, and ideology.  The southern, native-born, white, 
rural, Protestant conservative branch found little common ground with the 
northern, immigrant, urban, Catholic-Jewish liberal wing.  This unruly amalgam 
managed to coalesce behind the electoral bids of Franklin Roosevelt but fractured 
over his New Deal policies and Harry Truman’s efforts to expand them.  While 
northerners sought to enact legislation that would directly address the nation’s 
most vexing socioeconomic issues, southerners united to resist any and all efforts 
that might impinge states’ rights or allow the federal government to reshape 
sociopolitical practices in their region.  Liberal Democrats grew more and more 
perturbed with the obstructive shenanigans orchestrated by southerners to defend 
white supremacy.  During the late 1940s and 1950s, they watched their southern 
partymates block or water down bills related to education, housing, desegregation, 
fair employment practices, and voting rights.   Southern Democrats, often in league 
with conservative Republicans, regularly torpedoed undesirable liberal legislation 
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via wily procedural maneuvers such as committee holds, points of order, and 
quorum calls.834     
Democratic party leaders grew increasingly exasperated with the obstinacy of 
their southern brethren.  The two Texans who led congressional Democrats for the 
majority of the 1950s, House Speaker Sam Rayburn and Senate Majority Leader 
Lyndon Johnson, carefully straddled the liberal-northern and conservative-southern 
divisions within the Democratic Party.  Rayburn and Johnson believed that the 
survival and enhancement of the New Deal agenda should be their party’s chief 
legislative goal.  They did not envision themselves as programmatic innovators nor 
as organizational reformers but as brokerage politicos who would advance 
Democratic policy ends through the means of accommodation and compromise.  The 
sum of their individual talents equaled a formidable congressional team. The 
knowledge of Rayburn and Johnson about the norms and folkways of Congress, 
their working relationship with key lobby groups, their persuasive powers with 
fellow lawmakers, and their personal friendship yielded significant legislation, 
including the Interstate Highway and National Defense Education Acts, increased 
funding Social Security and the minimum wage, and the passage of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1957.   
The power of the conservative coalition tempered the legislative activism of 
Rayburn and Johnson.  Conservatives used their control of committees to dominate 
House proceedings and resorted to filibusters to stymie Senate business.  Non-
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southern Democrats believed the conservative coalition operated as a cartel 
unjustly manipulating the levers of power to sustain ideological and individual self-
interests.  They chafed as southern committee chairmen and their Republican 
confederates manipulated the legislative agenda of Congress to push conservative 
initiatives.835  Rayburn and Johnson had to bargain, cajole, and persuade southern 
chairs to follow the party’s legislative wishes, but, often, their committees refused to 
adopt the slate of Democrat-preferred priorities.  The frustrations with 
organizational obstructionism inspired liberal Democrats (who, over the course of 
the 1950s, had become the party’s congressional majority) to demand that Rayburn 
and Johnson do something to check the conservative southerners who dominated 
the committee leadership positions. Rayburn and Johnson hesitated to tinker with 
institutional rules or intraparty regulations that might limit the authority of the 
chairmen, however, out of fear that a southern backlash might splinter the party.836   
The mid-term elections of 1958 served as the catalyst that sparked the 
congressional reforms during the 1960s that curbed southern power.  Sensing 
popular discontent over a sharp recession, an unemployment spike, and the 
launching of Sputnik, Democrats aggressively accused President Dwight 
Eisenhower of feckless policy-making and slack administering.  Voters in 1958 
handed the GOP its worst electoral defeat in twenty-five years.  Democrats gained 
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fifteen members in the Senate (raising their majority from 49 to 64 of the 98 seats) 
and forty-eight in the House (increasing their majority from 234 to 282 of the 436 
seats).  All of the Democratic newcomers hailed from outside of the South, and, 
because of them, the former Union states had as many Democrats in Congress as 
the old Confederate states.  Most of the greenhorns were liberals (giving the 
Democrats their largest liberal majority since 1936), and many were younger than 
the lawmakers they replaced.837  Several of them, such as Representatives John 
Brademas (D-IN), Ken Hechler (D-WV), James O’Hara (D-MI), and Dan 
Rostenkowski (D-IL) and Senators Thomas Dodd (D-CT), Clair Engle (D-CA), Philip 
Hart (D-MI), Edmund Muskie (D-ME), and Jennings Randolph (D-WV), would play 
prominent roles in changing congressional operations, passing civil rights 
legislation, and/or championing youth suffrage.838   
Soon after the elections of 1958, liberal Democrats began to unravel the 
establishmentarianism that had permitted the conservative coalition to dominate 
Congress.  Former U.S. Senator Fred Harris’s (D-OK) insider account of Congress’s 
inner workings details how legislative titans such as Sam Rayburn, Wilbur Mills, 
Lyndon Johnson, Everett Dirksen, and Richard Russell presided over an “inner 
club” that commanded lawmaking.  According to Harris, that clique controlled the 
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nation’s legislative business because its members were insulated from public 
pressure due to longevity of service and empowered by the seniority-based 
hierarchical norms of Congress.839  Political scientist Kenneth Kofmehl contends 
liberal Democrats eventually broke the entrenched institutional dominion of this 
“Establishment” by forming themselves into a viable activist bloc.840  Their ends 
were plain:  to increase the rate of Congress’s productivity and improve the quality 
of its performance.  Their motives were clear:  to install a philosophy of lawmaking 
that emphasized active problem-solving.  Their means were direct:  to give more 
congressmen a “piece of the action;” i.e. to expand policymaking power and 
participation to wider circles of legislators.  According to historian Julian E. Zelizer, 
the lawmakers who pushed for structural reforms saw the institutional culture of 
the seniority system and the organizational hegemony of the committees as 
impediments to solving the social justice problems that persistently plagued the 
nation.841   Little by little, they chipped away at the power of senior congressional 
leaders and worked to clear the procedural clogs southern Democrats and their GOP 
partners had created to stymie the policymaking process.   
In September 1959, liberal Democrats in the House of Representatives 
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formally organized a caucus, the Democratic Study Group, to spearhead efforts for 
institutional reform.  Political scientists Arthur G. Stevens, Jr., Arthur H. Miller, 
and Thomas E. Mann assert that creation of the DSG “marked the first sustained 
effort to counter the conservative coalition” by House liberals.842  Led by Richard 
Boling (MO), Lee Metcalf (MT), and Frank Thompson (NJ), the DSG labored to 
redefine the omnipotent role of the committees and reduce the hegemony of their 
chairmen – particularly Howard W. Smith of the Rules Committee.  The Rules 
Committee played a critical role in the lawmaking process of the House of 
Representatives.  It controlled whether a piece of legislation would be taken up by 
the House.  If the Rules Committee allowed a proposal to be pondered by the full 
body, it determined the schedule of legislation for consideration.  It also set the floor 
guidelines that framed the amount of time allotted for discussion and the types and 
number of amendments that could be offered to a bill.  Because all House measures 
required specific rules for deliberation, the chairman of the Rules Committee 
possessed life-or-death power over legislation.843   
Howard W. Smith of Virginia, a cantankerous and racist septuagenarian first 
elected to the House of Representatives in 1930, chaired the Rules Committee from 
1956 to 1966.  Congressman Carl Albert (D-OK), who served as Speaker of the 
House in the 1970s, described Smith as a “Tenth Amendment congressman. . 
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.brought up believing that Yankees, carpetbaggers, Republicans, and foreigners 
were enemies of his people and the way of life they enjoyed.”844  Smith gained wide 
respect among his colleagues for his parliamentary prowess, especially his 
knowledge of House rules and how to use them ingeniously to block bills potentially 
harmful to white southerners.  During most of Smith’s reign, the twelve-member 
Rules Committee consisted of eight Democrats and four Republicans.  Smith and 
fellow southerner William Colmer of Mississippi (the next senior Democrat) 
frequently aligned with the four conservative GOP members to deadlock the group 
in 6-6 votes.  Committee guidelines stipulated that bills had to receive a simple 
majority of 7-5 to reach the House.  The other Democrats on the committee, Bolling, 
Tip O’Neill, and Homer Thornberry, became increasingly frustrated by Smith’s 
power as head gatekeeper of House legislation to forestall Democratic policy 
initiatives.  Smith’s obstructionism was particularly galling since liberal Democrats 
had steadily increased their majority on Capitol Hill after 1956 and a progressive 
had captured the White House in 1960 by promising vigorous federal action to 
tackle America’s tough socioeconomic problems.  The iron law of the seniority 
system, however, prevented Smith from being dislodged from his chairmanship.   
Because he was so publicly antagonistic to John Kennedy’s proposals and 
worked so openly with conservative Republicans, Sam Rayburn and the DSG boldly 
moved to weaken Smith. In January 1961, they proposed increasing the size of the 
Rules Committee from 12 to 15.  The three new seats were to be allocated to junior 
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Democrats.  The “packing” ploy intended to neutralize Smith by ostensibly giving 
the majority party an 8 to 7 working margin within the committee.  After intense 
lobbying by President Kennedy, Vice President Lyndon Johnson, and Speaker 
Rayburn (who each wanted the New Frontier legislative agenda to have fair 
consideration), the House narrowly (217 to 212) approved enlarging Rules to fifteen 
members.  The change was only supposed to be applicable to the 86th Congress.  But 
in 1963, the new Speaker, John McCormack (D-MA), convinced the House to adopt 
a resolution (235-196) that set fifteen as the permanent membership.845 The 
“packing” scheme tilted the Rules Committee in a liberal direction and withered 
Smith’s obstructionism, thereby setting the stage for the historically transformative 
civil rights, voting rights, and social welfare legislation passed during the 1960s.  
The change to the Rules Committee did not garner immediate returns for the 
18-vote.  Before 1970, no youth suffrage bill ever reached Rules because they were 
bottled up in the House Judiciary Committee by its chairman Emanuel Celler.  
Known for his genial disposition, hard-nosed partisanship, and arch-liberalism, 
Celler (b. 1888) became the fourth longest-serving congressman in House history by 
representing the New York City boroughs of Brooklyn and Queens for fifty years, 
1923-1973.846   His Columbia University law degree and the heterogeneous 
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demography of his district prompted Celler to seek a position on the Judiciary 
Committee, which holds oversight purview over immigration and civil rights 
legislation.847  As chairman of Judiciary from 1949 to 1973 (except for 1953 and 1954 
when the GOP controlled the House), Celler became a staunch advocate of liberal 
causes.  He vigorously fought for the Twenty-third and Twenty-fourth Amendments, 
the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, 1964 and 1968, the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1965, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.   
Just as ardently, Celler opposed bills enfranchising adolescents.  His anti-18-
vote position remained firm for the entirety of his legislative career.   The father of 
two daughters, Celler consistently maintained that teenagers simply lacked the 
mental maturity to cast a sensible vote.  He emerged as a chief critic of youth 
suffrage during World War II.   On a national radio program, he argued that “the 
average youths of 18 could not properly evaluate the intricate questions of 
economics and government, though they might be splendid physical specimens for 
fighting forces.”848  He lampooned Dwight Eisenhower’s 18-vote proposal as 
“’immature and naïve’” for enfranchising credulous juveniles susceptible to 
demagoguery as a reward for their military service in Korea.849  In March 1954, 
Celler offered a constitutional amendment barring all persons under age twenty-one 
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from voting in any election or primary as a counter to Eisenhower’s measure.  
“’Voting is as different from fighting as chalk is from cheese,” Celler stated upon 
filing his bill, “Young men under 21 are more pliable and more amenable to 
indoctrination.  Instant and unquestioning obedience may be most desirable from 
soldiers in the battlefield, but in a voter such obedience would be most undesirable.  
Self-interested groups and corrupt politicians would find such obedience a fertile 
playground.’”850  
During the 1960s, Celler stepped up his advocacy for federal voting rights 
laws on behalf of disfranchised minorities.  Before then, Celler accepted state 
jurisdiction over deciding the lawful prerequisites for enfranchisement – except in 
the case of poll taxes.  In 1949, Celler argued before a House subcommittee that poll 
taxes should be outlawed as an undue financial obstacle to electoral participation.  
When asked if he supported additional federal impingements upon state voter 
requirements, Celler replied that he had “’sufficient confidence in Congress to 
believe that it would not remove reasonable qualifications such as character – 
preventing criminals from voting – age, length of residence, and intelligence.’”851 
Though not a crony of Howard W. Smith, Celler put himself in de facto league with 
Smith’s efforts to impede suffrage expansion due a shared philosophical accord for 
the right of states to set the legal determinants of enfranchisement.   
As the civil rights movement exposed the struggles of southern blacks to vote, 
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his multiracial constituents prodded Celler to reverse his stance on states’ rights.  
He came to see state stipulations for residence requirements and literacy tests more 
as undemocratic restrictions than acceptable prerequisites.  Celler instigated the 
bill that eventually became the Twenty-third Amendment; he even served as the 
“principal sponsor” of the Twenty-fourth Amendment banning poll taxes as a 
prerequisite for voting in federal elections.852  During House debate on the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, according to historian Robert V. Remini, Celler steadfastly 
“demanded that the trickery and legalisms and coercion that blocked the voting 
rights of blacks in the [S]outh ‘must be smashed and banished.’”853   But Celler 
refused to budge on teen suffrage.  Scholars Charles Whalen and Barbara Whalen 
find that his obstinacy exasperated some of his younger colleagues.  They knew, 
however, that Democratic leaders would not diminish Celler’s command or pack the 
Judiciary Committee as punishment for his inflexibility on the 18-vote because of 
his senior status and unyielding commitment to civil rights legislation.854  Free from 
institutional or party pressure, Celler stymied all House efforts to reduce the age of 
enfranchisement.  
The longtime chairman (1956-1978) of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
James Eastland (D-MS), appeared equally adverse to youth suffrage.  Known as the 
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“Authentic Voice of the White South,” Eastland became the cigar-chomping 
caricature of segregationist intransigence.855 Inside the corridors of Congress, 
Eastland was called “The Chairman,” and through his committee passed more than 
half of the legislation filed in the Senate.  Historian Chris Myers Asch notes that 
Eastland’s fair handling of judicial nominations earned the grudging respect of his 
liberal colleagues, which blunted much of their disgust at his ardent defense of the 
South’s Jim Crow system.856  Until Senate leaders figured out how to circumvent his 
powers in the 1960s, Eastland mercilessly killed numerous pieces of civil rights 
legislation.      
Eastland was not as outspoken as Celler in his opposition to reducing voting 
ages, but he was more strident in his commitment to states’ rights.  Most anytime 
the Senate considered a bill to expand suffrage, Eastland excoriated the action as 
an unlawful federal power grab.  “The proposed legislation now before us,” he 
charged in a rebuke of the voting rights provisions within the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, “usurps and arrogates to the National Legislature a constitutional prerogative 
that has been fixed and vested in the several States since the formation of the 
Union.”857  Like other southern Democrats, Eastland categorized the 18-vote as one 
part of a congressional civil-rights campaign designed to cripple states’ rights and 
kneecap white supremacy.  In a 1970 speech arguing against the extension of the 
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Voting Right Act, Eastland charged the Act was “unfair, unconstitutional, and 
discriminatory” because, as the Supreme Court had consistently determined, 
“Residence requirements, age, previous criminal record are obvious examples 
indicating factors which a State may take into consideration in determining the 
qualifications of voters.”858 
The authority to set committee agendas provided Chairman Eastland an 
effective tool to impede Senate legislation anathema to his personal or political 
interests.  But, as the 1960s progressed, Eastland and other southerners felt greater 
intra-committee pressure from northern and western Democrats to adopt the social 
justice measures that party leaders prized.  As a result, southern senators 
increasingly resorted to the threat of filibusters to impede civil rights legislation.859  
Because of Senate rules that permitted extended discussion of pending bills, 
filibusters allowed a determined minority of one or a few senators to prevent 
passage of a proposal by prolonging debate and monopolizing floor action.  Since 
filibusters ground Senate business to a halt, the threat of one often compelled bill 
managers to amend controversial legislation or resist bringing it to the floor.860      
Southern senators often utilized the menace of a filibuster as an effective 
tactic against civil rights legislation.  They generally followed a two-pronged 
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strategy:  talk disagreeable proposals to death or emasculate them by tacking on 
cumbersome amendments.  In 1943, for instance, Theodore Bilbo (D-MS) halted a 
federal anti-poll tax measure via a week-long, intermittent talk-a-thon that 
involved burying the bill in a flurry of amendments, including a youth suffrage 
tender that became its poison pill.  Political scientist Bruce I. Oppenheimer finds 
that the most successful filibusters, either really conducted or tactically feigned, 
occurred near the end of a legislative session (when it could threaten the completion 
of other business) or when a sizeable number of senators vehemently opposed a 
measure (as southern Democrats were to most civil rights bills).  Oppenheimer 
argues timing was crucial to filibuster strategy because delaying maneuvers had to 
be precisely sprung to minimize the likelihood of gathering enough votes to invoke 
cloture, or the parliamentary petition to limit or end debate in the Senate.861   
Established in 1917, Senate Rule XXII required extraordinary majorities to 
bring debate to an end:  two-thirds of those senators present for a chamber vote 
between 1917 and 1949, two-thirds of the entire membership between 1949 and 
1959, and, again, two-thirds of senators in attendance between 1959 and 1975.  
Because both of the two-thirds requirements were difficult to obtain, only four out of 
23 cloture proposals were successful between 1917 and 1960.  Calls for cloture 
mostly occurred when southern Democrats engaged in filibusters of civil rights bills.  
Prior to 1964, historical Gregory Koger reports, the Senate rejected cloture in every 
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one of those instances, and each effort to reduce the two-thirds requirement to 
three-fifths or a simple majority was defeated.862  Though the 1959 reversion to the 
original two-thirds present-and-voting rule (shepherded through the Senate by 
Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson) appeared modest, it frustrated the ability of 
southern senators to employ unlimited debate as a stratagem to stall or dilute 
unwanted legislation.863  As scholars Neil MacNeil and Richard A. Baker state, 
“Tampering with Rule 22 suggested the weakening of the Southern bloc’s once 
formidable power.”864  In June 1964, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-MT) 
defanged southern obstructionism by engineering the cloture of a 75-day filibuster 
against the Civil Rights Act.865   The following year, he steered another cloture 
motion through the Senate to cut off southern scheming against the Voting Rights 
Act.866  The historic cloture votes, according to Washington Post congressional 
correspondent Robert C. Albright, “broke the Senate sway of King Filibuster, the 
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Old South’s modern day refuge.”867  The ability of Mansfield and other liberal 
Democrats to secure cloture on two major civil rights bills in two years loosened the 
southern grip on the Senate’s domestic policy-making agenda.  
Emboldened by their success in overcoming southern intransigence, northern 
Democrats pursued additional reforms inside Congress.  Junior liberal lawmakers 
in the House and Senate pushed the effort to streamline institutional business and 
reduce the independent powers of the committee chairmen.  They reckoned that 
moving toward a more equitable distribution of influence in shaping legislative 
agendas would eventually undermine the conservative coalition.  Key regulations 
adopted between the mid-1960s and early 1970s allowed committee members other 
than the chair the ability to force the consideration of an issue, capped the amount 
of time committees could deliberate on legislation, stripped chairs of the exclusive 
authority to set meeting dates, set limits on proxy voting, and called for majority 
consent to table bills in committee.868  Subcommittees also grew in number and 
autonomy, thereby growing the number of leadership positions and strengthening 
the checks on rogue chairmen.  The institutional reforms harnessed the unbridled 
obstructionism of the past by shifting legislative controls from committee chairmen 
to party leaders and rewarding party loyalty over seniority.  The net effect of such 
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changes wrested deal-making clout from southern Democrats and their conservative 
GOP sidekicks, which, according to political scientist Eva Bertram, yielded the 
transformative social justice legislation that liberals had long pursued – including 
youth suffrage.869 
The efforts to restructure the conduct of institutional business engendered 
generational discord among congressmen.  Political scientist Nelson Polsby finds 
that the procedural reforms within Congress coincided with a great turnover of its 
personnel roster.  Polsby contends that immense demographic transformations 
(particularly mass suburbanization and the Baby Boom) spurred the growth of 
heterogeneous metropolitan population centers.  The lawmakers elected from these 
districts tended to be relatively young, independent, and disdainful of traditions 
that impeded reform or innovation – just like the constituents they represented.  By 
the early 1970s, Polsby concludes, successive crops of such like-minded congressmen   
gradually replaced older politicos (usually from the rural South or urban North) 
who had accumulated institutional power within the seniority structure.870  During 
the 1960s, elder lawmakers sought to sustain the establishmentarian culture that 
emphasized congeniality, collegiality, and conventionality as the time-honored 
mores of a professional legislator.  Political scientists who studied the postwar 
Congresses chronicled the internal socialization and intense coercion upholding the 
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institutional folkways that governed congressional operations.  Their studies 
revealed that inexperienced lawmakers endured an “apprenticeship” that 
emphasized homage to tradition, respect for elders, and acquiescence to superiors as 
the basis for legislative accomplishment and career advancement.871  In 1964, 
journalist David S. Broder observed that most every high-ranking congressman had 
followed the “established route up the seniority ladder to a committee chairmanship 
and increasing influence with The [leadership] Establishment.”  But Congress, 
Broder asserted, also provided “outlets for ‘the angry men’ who cannot conform to 
these comfortable career lines.”872   
In the decade after the historic 1958 elections, more and more legislators, 
both Democrat and Republican, conspicuously defied Congress’s establishmentarian 
ethos.  In particular, junior congressmen increasingly refused to abide customs that 
muted their representative voices or limited their legislative agency.  They insisted 
that individual capacity rather than years of service should determine institutional 
ranks of influence.  These younger, reform-minded lawmakers seemed to be inspired 
by a zeitgeist emphasizing, as New York Times political commentator Arthur Krock 
explained, “fresh approaches to public problems to which youth is supposed to be 
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more responsive than maturity.”873  They also appeared to be motivated by a 
perception that Congress had failed to uphold its part in the national lawmaking 
process. Tom Wicker, Washington correspondent for the New York Times, remarked 
in 1965 that “Congress has let itself become too small.” While the modern 
presidency had evolved to become a “remarkable instrument of governing power,” 
Wicker maintained, “Congress has not similarly grown and adapted itself to new 
conditions.”874  Among several explanations of its deficiencies, many contemporary 
political observers faulted Congress for maintaining a dogmatic internal culture 
that ranked its members by experience rather than talent and valued the following 
of arcane institutional procedures over achieving notable legislative results.875  
The jolting assertiveness of the greenhorns was a byproduct of a moment of 
significant turnover in congressional membership.  Nearly 60% of the legislators 
who served in Dwight Eisenhower’s last Congress (1959-1961) would leave Capitol 
Hill before Richard Nixon’s election to the presidency in 1968.   Though the average 
age of Congress fluctuated little in that decade, the newcomers appeared “younger” 
(i.e. more energetic, strong-willed, and activist) than their predecessors.876 Raymond 
Moley, lead columnist for Newsweek, observed that they were “not merely an ‘angry’ 
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generation bent on revenge against their elders;” rather, “these young members of 
both parties” generally refused to abide the orthodoxy imposed by “their own party 
leadership.”877  As Moley sensed, the youthful neophytes who came to Congress in 
the 1960s were more self-assured and less conformist than past members.  They 
respected institutional traditions but were unwilling to defer robotically to the 
orders of senior congressmen.  Most of them refused to accept the apprenticeship 
custom, especially within their committees.  Importantly, they disregarded Sam 
Rayburn’s classic dictum, “The way to get along is to go along.” Instead, they 
worked to weaken the grip of the seniority system and the committee structure to 
allow rank-and-file lawmakers meaningful participation in policymaking.  Such 
institutional changes, along with the election of more iconoclastic legislators, 
eventually wrought the enactment of historic civil rights bills and major suffrage 
laws, including the Twenty-sixth Amendment.  David Broder described this cohort 
of eager legislators as a “new breed . . . impatient with the old ways of doing 
business; less willing to ‘move up the chairs,’ waiting silently for years for their turn 
at a subcommittee chairmanship; less deferential to their elders; and more insistent 
on grabbing a piece of the action now.”878  The claims of this “new breed” of junior 
congressmen for their rightful share of congressional power mirrored the demands 
of the “new generation” of young citizens for an equal voice in national decision-
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making. 
By all accounts, the 1960s were years of extraordinary domestic turbulence.   
As historian James Miller contends, “’The Sixties’ represented not just a span of 
time but an impetuous, extreme spirit – youthful and reckless, searching and 
headstrong, foolhardy, romantic, willing to try almost anything.”879   The upheavals 
that define “The Sixties” as exciting and transformative took place because the 
nation’s most excluded members insisted upon full and equal access to all the 
privileges and opportunities afforded American citizens. Many of the decade’s 
storms and stresses were set off by disgruntled adolescents.  Idealistic young people 
rebelled against the enduring inequalities and injustices that stained the American 
Dream but adults had abided.  They rejected mainstream beliefs, engaged in direct-
action protests, and defied government bureaucracies.  In seeking to empower 
disadvantaged groups, youth activists took to the streets to contest the power of 
elites, reform social conventions, end the Vietnam War, fight for socioeconomic 
justice, revamp university governance, and democratize political life.  Young people 
also sought to empower themselves by insisting that adult lawmakers enfranchise 
citizens at least 18-years-old.  
Two sources of inspiration roused young people to get actively involved in 
public affairs.  Many youths were moved by the uplifting words of John Kennedy’s 
inaugural address. In his speech, Kennedy purposefully spoke as the leader of “a 
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new generation of Americans,” implying that Dwight Eisenhower and Congress’s 
leadership cadre had come to represent older Americans.  He had promised during 
the 1960 campaign to get the nation “moving again” and outlined in the inaugural 
how muscular governmental activism at home and abroad would invigorate the 
nation.  Many young Americans who were attracted to Kennedy’s youth, will, and 
dynamism took to heart his call to public service, especially those idealistic 
teenagers and 20-somethings who joined the Volunteers in Service to America or 
the Peace Corps.  
 The bold activism of the civil rights movement stirred other youths.  The sit-
ins, marches, protests, ideals, and sacrifices associated with the black offensives 
against white supremacy in the South captured the imaginations of young people all 
over the nation.  “There was a feeling that they were us and we were them, and a 
recognition that they were expressing something we we feeling as well,” recalled 
Rennie Davis, an Oberlin College student who became a leader of the Students for a 
Democratic Society.880  The civil rights movement gave cause to many youths, 
particularly from minority groups, to rebel against all forms of injustice and 
inequality.  The energy, tactics, and courage of civil rights activists inspired other 
social reform movements, such as those on behalf of women, Latinos, Native 
Americans, homosexuals, and disabled persons, that were infused by young 
advocates.   
 By the mid-1960s, the heightened interest in social causes and public service 
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stoked by the civil rights movement and President Kennedy propelled youth 
activists into political work.  Academic explanations of 60s political advocacy among 
young people generally divide along two theoretical tracks.  While some scholars 
argue youth political involvement was a predictable outgrowth of the youthful 
rebellion against the older generation, others contend young people merely put into 
action the political attitudes and behaviors taught to them by their parents and 
teachers.881   Whether of liberal or conservative bent, young partisans challenged 
what they perceived to be the unfulfilled political promises and unacceptable social 
circumstances created by their elders.   
Through various means of petition and protest, young people forced issues to 
the forefront of national concern that had been ignored or deferred by adults.   
Young liberals insisted that politicians take direct, remedial action against 
discrimination, poverty, ignorance, and the military-industrial complex.  During the 
early and mid-1960s, they organized and staffed seminal movements on behalf of 
civil rights for minorities, aid to the underprivileged, the elimination of nuclear 
weapons, and peace in Vietnam.   Those movements inspired liberal Democrats in 
Congress to initiate bold policies, which moderate Republicans mostly supported, 
that advanced equality and opportunity at home and goodwill and amity abroad.  
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Lyndon Johnson unreservedly embraced the idealistic commitment of John 
Kennedy, Martin Luther King, Jr., and their youthful devotees to improve 
America’s quality of life.  Johnson’s executive dash and legislative savvy advanced a 
broad reform agenda he called the “Great Society.”  The Great Society produced a 
torrent of new federal programs that addressed problems regarding segregation, 
prejudice, poverty, food security, housing, health care, job training, education, 
immigration, and the environment.  The great bulk the Great Society emerged 
during the 89th Congress of 1965-66, a legislative session many people regard as one 
of the most significant in U.S. history.882     
Johnson’s presidency also witnessed a historic expansion of voting rights.  
Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy had moved cautiously in the field of 
suffrage; neither administration wanted to get too far ahead of public opinion on 
broadening the franchise nor cared to challenge the tradition of state prerogative in 
determining voter qualifications.  By the time Johnson’s term began, many 
Americans insisted that the franchise was less a privilege and more a right that 
should be extended to as many qualified citizens as possible.  Media exposés 
chronicled suffrage problems rooted in local prejudices that consistently stymied 
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minorities and suburban migrants who wanted to vote.  Government studies 
bolstered the press reports.  In October 1963, the Commission on Civil Rights 
detailed the pathetic stoops of bigotry employed by white voter registrars to reject 
black applicants.  The Commission called for uniform voter-registration standards, 
enforced by federal officials if necessary, to thwart “the evil of arbitrary 
disfranchisement.”883  In December 1963, the President’s Commission on 
Registration and Voting Participation, a special bipartisan panel appointed by JFK 
the previous March, made public its examination of the procedural restrictions that 
deterred Americans from voting.  Chaired by Richard M. Scammon, director of the 
Census Bureau, the 11-member commission found that “unreasonable, unfair, and 
outmoded” election laws denied millions of capable citizens the opportunity to 
vote.884   The Commission offered three core proposals to swell the ranks of voters:  
shorten residency requirements to thirty days, abolish literacy tests and poll taxes, 
and lower franchise ages to eighteen.  The commission reasoned that establishing 
the 18-vote might fix the dismal turnout rate among voters under age thirty.  It 
claimed a “major reason” young electors stayed away from the polls was that “by the 
time they have turned 21 . . . many young people are so far removed from the 
stimulation of the educational process that their interest in public affairs has 
waned.  Some may be lost as voters for the rest of their lives.”885    
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Like many Americans, President Johnson thought of suffrage denial as a 
problem that demanded federal remedy since state statutes and local ordinances 
suborned disfranchisement.  “’I am told that it is easier today to buy a destructive 
weapon, a gun, in a hardware store than it is to vote,” Johnson remarked upon 
receiving the President’s Commission inquiry, “Why should we make it difficult for 
people to vote?’”886  Taking the commission reports as a blueprint, Johnson sought to 
maximize voter turnout and minimize voter discrimination – even if that meant 
bending states’ rights tradition.  For geographically mobile Americans, he pursued 
standardizing residency requirements and registration procedures to spur electoral 
participation.  For black southerners, Johnson pushed hard to collapse the racial 
disfranchisements whites constructed to circumvent the Fifteenth Amendment.  
Civil rights leaders put suffrage high on their political agenda, and, one by one, 
Johnson, Congress, and the Supreme Court labored to smash the undemocratic 
barriers to African-American voting.  The Civil Rights Act of 1964 barred voter 
registrars from applying unequal criteria in registration procedures or rejecting 
applications because of immaterial errors.  The Twenty-fourth Amendment, also 
promulgated in 1964, made poll taxes unconstitutional as a requirement for voting 
in national elections.  In 1966, the Supreme Court nixed poll tax prerequisites for 
balloting in state and local elections.887  The Voting Rights Act of 1965 prohibited 
any government from using voting procedures that denied a person suffrage on the 
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basis of race or color.  It abolished the use of literacy tests for anyone who had 
completed sixth grade or its equivalent for naturalized citizens schooled outside of 
the United States.   The Act also allowed the U.S. attorney general to send federal 
election registrars to places with long histories of voter discrimination.  These same 
areas had to submit all proposed changes in their suffrage laws or voting practices 
to federal officials for approval.888   
Advocates of youth suffrage realized that the actions of Congress and the 
Supreme Court had undercut the states’ rights arguments against the 18-vote.  The 
provisions of the laws and rulings circumscribed the power of states to have sole 
discretion over the determination and application of voter requirements.  Moreover, 
the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts squashed the argument that teenagers were 
not smart enough to vote by defining literacy, in terms of legal qualification to cast 
a ballot, as the attainment of a 6th-grade education.  The institution of federal 
checks on state administration of suffrage forever transformed American politics by 
empowering formerly disfranchised voters and enabling their election to public 
office.  Federal activism did much to expand the right to vote to all citizens – except 
young people.  While government officials eased residency requirements and 
eliminated literacy tests and poll taxes, they neglected to lower voting ages to 
eighteen.  During the era 1960 to 1967, legislators in twenty-seven states filed 
sixty-seven 18-vote measures.  Of those 67 resolutions, only two were sent to state 
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voters for approval, and both were rejected.  In addition, New York’s 1967 
constitutional convention declined an opportunity to promulgate eighteen as the 
state’s new suffrage age.889  Federal proposals to establish eighteen as the standard 
franchise age proved equally fruitless.  Between the 87th (1961-62) and the 90th 
(1967-68) Congresses, lawmakers proposed 98 constitutional amendments to set the 
national voting age at eighteen:  11 in the Senate and 87 in the House of 
Representatives; none were reported out of committee in either body.890 
Reasons for the legislative inaction on youth suffrage varied.  In statehouses, 
the issue got wrapped into drives to modernize constitutions.  The passage of 
federal civil rights laws and the promulgation of the “one man, one vote” standard 
by the Supreme Court spurred several states to update outmoded and cumbersome 
franchise statutes.891  The goal of modernizing suffrage laws was to inspire renewed 
interest in voting by loosening old voter requirements.  The revision of state codes, 
however, stopped short of enfranchising new classes of voters; instead, lawmakers 
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worked to broaden electoral access for people already enfranchised, which was an 
effort encouraged by the federal government.  As Attorney General Robert Kennedy 
told the 1961 graduates of the University of Georgia’s law school, “we must make a 
total effort to guarantee the ballot to every American of voting age – in the North, 
as well as in the South.”892  The attention given to boosting the turnout of adult 
voters caused state assemblymen to bypass enfranchising adolescents.  In addition, 
many state officials contended that extending voting rights to inexperienced and 
immature teenagers might pose unintended harm to American democracy.  Naïve 
and impressionable juveniles, they posited, could be easily manipulated to subvert 
public order by unscrupulous schemers.  Maryland’s 1967 Constitutional 
Convention Commission, for example, rebuffed an 18-vote proposal because it 
would:  1) add “idealistic rather than practical” persons to the voting populace, 2) 
enfranchise people “highly influenced by their parents, schools, television, and 
special interest groups,” and 3) spur “energetic college students” to “overrun” the 
local governments of small college towns.893   
In the White House, the issue of adolescent enfranchisement stirred yawning 
indifference.  Neither Democratic president of the 1960s, John Kennedy and Lyndon 
Johnson, made reducing suffrage ages a top legislative priority.  Their aloof position 
on the issue seemed unusual because of their avid encouragement of youth 
participation in civic matters, which stemmed from an unreserved confidence in the 
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capacities of adolescents.  In 1962, for example, Kennedy challenged the 
participants of the Girl Scout Senior Roundup to “make the most of your natural 
abilities, develop your skills and character, seek wider horizons in order to become 
more constructive citizens of our nation and the world even before you become of 
voting age.”894   Both Kennedy and Johnson couched their political appeals in 
language that implied that being young in spirit, if not in years, would offer a fresh 
and vigorous approach for dealing with the aging international and domestic 
problems of the postwar era.  Johnson even hailed a throng of college students 
gathered on the White House law in 1965 as his “fellow revolutionaries” in the 
cause of change and progress.895  LBJ and JFK certainly appreciated the labors of 
young Americans on behalf of their nation. 
Though Kennedy and Johnson asked young people to do things for their 
country, they never asked Congress to do anything for voteless youths. Both men 
warmly espoused the idea of youth suffrage, but neither felt compelled to force 
legislation on the issue.   As senators, Kennedy and Johnson voted against Dwight 
Eisenhower’s 1954 proposal to establish eighteen as the voting age in federal 
elections as a violation of states’ rights prerogative.896  As a presidential candidate, 
Kennedy replied to questionnaire that he supported the teen franchise but felt 
“’that the voting age should remain a matter for state decision.”897  In June 1961, 
                                                          
894 New York Times, 21 July 1962, 9. 
 
895 Ibid, 5 August 1965, 13. 
 
896 Congressional Record 100 (21 May 1954):  6979. 
 
897 Quoted in Wendell W. Cultice, Youth’s Battle for the Ballot: A History of Voting Age in 
317 
 
Assistant Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach testified before a Senate 
subcommittee that the president opposed a constitutional amendment offered by 
Estes Kefauver (D-TN) to lower the national voting age to eighteen as potentially 
injurious to federalist tradition.898  In contrast, the Kennedy administration 
vigorously pursued passage of the federal amendments that took away from states 
the power to charge poll taxes and utilize literacy tests to screen possible electors.  
President Johnson unabashedly employed federal authority to secure the right to 
vote for African-Americans and other minority groups but exerted little effort to 
enfranchise adolescents.  In March 1965, Johnson said he wanted to add an 18-vote 
provision to the Voting Rights Act but held back because “the lawyers felt that that 
would complicate the matter and that it should be approached otherwise.”899  For 
the Machiavelli of congressional machination to shrink away from a legislative 
battle on behalf of teen voting within the arena of a civil rights bill appeared both 
shrewd (to adults) and timid (to adolescents).  Because Kennedy and Johnson did 
not consider youth suffrage one of the big domestic issues of the day, they viewed it 
as a low executive priority compared to more pressing matters, such as containing 
communism, winning the space race, establishing welfare programs, and 
eliminating racial segregation.900  Even though junior lawmakers were ascending 
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and the committee oligarchies were crumbling inside Congress, there was still 
enough bipartisan resistance to youth suffrage that Kennedy and Johnson reckoned 
a legislative battle on its behalf was not worth putting other, more important 
concerns as risk.  Hence, the 18-vote languished without a strong push from the 
White House.   
On Capitol Hill, most congressmen did not rank reducing voting ages as an 
issue of critical importance.  The transformative legislation Congress passed during 
Kennedy-Johnson years showed they were willing to take on the toughest 
challenges of the moment.  Nor did they have to be afraid of political fallout since 
support and opposition for youth suffrage cut across ideological and party lines.  Yet 
the legislative inaction on the ninety-eight 18-vote proposals offered between 1960 
and 1968 clearly signified Congress’s indifference to enfranchising adolescents.  And 
never in that span did either the House or Senate host a genuine floor debate about 
the pros and cons of teen voting similar to what had taken place in 1954.   
Congressional advocates could have used parliamentary maneuvers to ramrod 18-
vote bills through the lawmaking process like other social justice measures of the 
period.  Promulgating a national suffrage age, however, simply did not garner “the 
fierce urgency of now” that drove passage of the era’s progressive initiatives and 
electoral reforms.901  Legislative apathy allowed Judiciary chairs Emanuel Celler 
and James Eastland to let voting-age measures expire of neglect within their 
committees.  
                                                          
901 See Julian E. Zelizer, The Fierce Urgency of Now:  Lyndon Johnson, Congress, and the 
Battle for the Great Society (New York:  Penguin Press, 2015).  
319 
 
The lack of legislative resolve in Washington and the states paralleled 
contemporary disinterest for recalibrating franchise ages.  George Gallup’s polling 
organization, a reliable barometer of public opinion on the hot topics of the moment, 
took no surveys gauging civic views on youth suffrage between March 1954 and 
August 1965.902   Prior to 1965, discussion of the issue in the public domain occurred 
chiefly among young people.  Many youths subscribed to the “old enough to fight-old 
enough to vote” aphorism.  Other teens, like a male from Indianapolis who wrote 
Senator Richard Russell, pointed out that since the “federal government helped the 
Negroes and the women” gain the right to vote, “It is time for the federal 
government to help the young adults.”903  However, most youths appeared to 
disfavor the idea.  In 1960 and 1961, for example, the Illinois teens who attended 
the YMCA’s mock “Youth Legislature” turned down bills favoring voting rights for 
18-year-olds.904  An informal poll of high-schoolers attending a regional Junior 
Achievement conference in December 1962 also revealed a clear distaste (340-136) 
for reducing franchise ages to eighteen.905  The prevailing sentiment against the 
proposals emphasized that adolescents were too inexperienced and immature to be 
enfranchised.  “I happen to be almost 21 years old, and believe me,” a Chicago 
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resident declared, “no 18-year-olds (or teen-agers collectively) are prepared to vote.  
They don’t have enough brains or interest.  They are preoccupied with cars and girls 
and probably won’t even bother to vote when they are 21 or older.”906   
Adults questioned whether teenagers possessed the emotional and cognitive 
capacity to vote sensibly.  The allies and adversaries of the 18-vote shared a 
common view of teenagers as idealistic, passionate, willful, and immature, but they 
disagreed which qualities mostly defined youth.   Advocates of the 18-vote believed 
young people had, in the words of a Long Island resident, “the ability as a group to 
make contributions to wise decision making” in political venues.907  Representative 
Ken Hechler (D-WA) questioned why ignorant elders could vote while 
knowledgeable teenagers could not since, as statistical data plainly showed, “There 
is far more illiteracy among people over sixty than there is among people between 
18 and 21.”908  However, most adults agreed that young people were too callow to be 
entrusted with the franchise.  A 18-vote bill filed in the Wisconsin legislature in 
1961 prompted the Milwaukee Journal to affirm, “Voting intelligently requires 
knowledge, judgment, and maturity. . . .Many young persons lack these qualities.  
Those who have them won’t mind waiting three years for the right to vote.”909  The 
conservative editors of the Wall Street Journal urged state and federal legislators to 
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uphold the 21-vote standard to “protect our society and its governments against the 
irresponsible, and against those who understand neither our political system nor 
the issues facing it nor the full meaning of the voting privilege.”910  Lawmaking 
adults in Washington, D.C. and the states concurred.  Executive and legislative 
indifference curtailed the opportunity to build momentum on behalf of adolescent 
enfranchisement.  Nor did government officials feel a compelling need to act since 
there was no widespread demand or vibrant grassroots support among adults or 
adolescents to lower voting ages.   
The Vietnam War revived public interest in youth suffrage.  In 1965, Lyndon 
Johnson made the fateful decision to use military means to contain communism in 
South Vietnam.  Sending American troops into combat to prevent the communist 
dominoes from falling across the rest of Asia eventually doomed LBJ’s presidency.  
Initially, support for the war was high across all demographic groups, including 
youth.  A Gallup survey taken in August 1965 revealed that 76% of Americans 
under age 30 backed the war, compared to 64% of persons between 30 and 49 and 
51% of those over age 50.911  The same month, Gallup found a “majority of America’s 
adults believe that the voting age should be lowered, to permit persons 18, 19, and 
20 years old to vote.”912  The numbers of adults who accepted the 18-vote in August 
1965 (57%) nearly replicated the approval rating in Gallup’s last teen voting poll 
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taken in March 1954 (58%).  Public support for enfranchising adolescents never fell 
below 57% nationally, as registered by the Gallup group, throughout the duration of 
the Vietnam War.913  
The war added an emotional quotient to the civic discussions about youth 
suffrage not present between 1954 and 1965.  “When there’s a war on,” an adult 
from Nebraska admitted, “it gets harder and harder to say to a kid is old enough to 
defend his country in Vietnam but not old enough to vote.”914  The vast majority of 
18-vote advocates argued that young troops deserved enfranchisement because of 
their service to the nation.  They insisted that the draft age represented the most 
important legal marker signifying adulthood, for it reflected a collective decision 
that 18-year-olds should be considered of full age to defend and possess the rights 
and privileges afforded adults – including suffrage.  “If a person is old enough to be 
drafted and be asked to fight for his country he is old enough to vote,” a Georgia 
high-school succinctly proclaimed.915  Many people claimed that performing the 
duties involved with warring in the tricky jungles of Vietnam against a tough 
enemy proved adolescents were more than capable to handle the task of voting.  “If 
18-year-old boys are smart enough to die for their country,” a Michigan 
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businessman asserted, “they should be smart enough to vote.”916   Some citizens 
pointed out the irony of adolescents fighting for democracy against communist 
forces abroad without having full voting rights at home. “How can our soldiers be 
expected to sincerely defend ‘American ideals,’ nebulous at best, in an inhospitable 
foreign country while they are being denied their constitutional rights at home?” a 
New Jersey 18-year-old demanded.917  
Between 1965 and 1968, as President Johnson steadily increased the number 
of American servicemen and the death toll of young soldiers mounted, the dialogue 
about teen suffrage became evermore charged.  In those years, an ever-increasing 
number of youths began to question the necessity of “a bewildering struggle whose 
origins are unclear, whose progress is unsure, whose aims are unsettled, and whose 
outcome is in doubt.”918  Like those young people who had staffed the civil rights 
movement, antiwar youths claimed that adults could no longer be the sole 
custodians of truth and reason.  They emphasized that enfranchising the generation 
shouldering the burdens of the war was a matter of simple democratic justice.  A 
pamphlet issued by the Fair Franchise Committee declared, “American democracy 
is based upon a social contract:  the right to vote in return for meeting adult citizen 
responsibilities.  Those over 18 are meeting their responsibilities.  They have 
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earned the citizen’s franchise.”919  Non-combatant teens on the homefront forcefully 
insisted that they, too, were fulfilling their obligations, and, therefore, earned 
voting rights.  As girl from Michigan fumed to her congressman: 
I’m 17 years old, and still don’t understand how they run the 
government.  For instance, I work, pay taxes, and naturally I 
am too young to vote. . . .Now, you tell me how can I be old 
enough to work, own a car, pay insurance, and go to school, 
plus saving money for my college education, and still I don’t 
have the right to vote, or at least determine what I’d like to do 
with the taxes I pay out.  If this is the way it has to be for the 
government’s sake, I think it is a very unfair proposition for  
all the young adults under 21. . . .If the government is going 
to treat us like kids, they I think it’s cruel to send a child to  
Viet Nam to get killed and take away the money he or she is 
working hard for.  So you tell me why I’m not considered an 
adult, who can vote, either on taxes or for offices?920 
 
The Vietnam War served as a galvanizing agent pulling together a public 
consensus in support of the 18-vote.  That accord prompted renewed congressional 
interest.  During the 90th Congress (1967-68), lawmakers offered sixty 18-vote bills, 
which represented a 114% increase in filings from the 89th.  The emotionalism 
stoking the action on behalf of teen enfranchisement, however, did not yield 
legislation.  While the young people who connected soldiering and suffrage insisted 
that voting was a right, congressional opponents of the 18-vote maintained that 
voting was a privilege.  And as a privilege, they contended, suffrage unquestionably 
required specific qualifications.  Mainly, detractors of youth enfranchisement 
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questioned whether the mass of teenagers possessed the maturity required for 
making consequential political decisions irrespective of a youth’s ability to respond 
to military commands.  Most congressmen, across the ideological spectrum, held 
that the vast majority of 18-year-olds lacked the life experience, emotional stability, 
and common sense to exercise good voting judgment.   House Judiciary chairman 
Emanuel Celler (D-NY) alleged that teenagers were “’easily enflamed’” and usually 
saw things “’in patterns of black and white without shadings.” Because of the 
tempestuousness inherent to adolescence, Celler asserted, “’There are sound 
psychological reasons why the age of 21 has been considered the beginning of 
maturity.’”921  
The sense that adolescents were too immature to vote heightened as youth 
activism against the war and for social justice causes intensified.  During the 1960s, 
young people led and staffed a series of widely disparate protest movements that 
expressed discontent with American politics and society.  Spurred on by the civil 
rights movement, the Vietnam War, and a growing counterculture, youth 
organizations such as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and the 
Students for a Democratic Society rose to prominence by protesting long-accepted 
conduct codes that grounded the subjugation experienced by powerless citizens.   
They advocated populist democracy and socioeconomic justice and criticized 
corporate-military interlocks and unresponsive government bureaucracies.  Their 
tactics included rhetorical appeals, political lobbying, peaceful protests, and mass 
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demonstrations.   The threat that tied many of these groups was a desire to redefine 
American democracy to make it more inclusive and responsive to the members of 
previously underrepresented groups – including women, ethnic and racial 
minorities, students, and youth – who sought a greater role in determining the 
goals, values, and policies of the U.S. government.   Tom Hayden, original organizer 
of the Students for a Democratic Society, famously penned in the Port Huron 
Statement that young activists sought “the establishment of a democracy of 
individual participation, governed by two central aims:  that the individual share in 
those social decisions determining the quality and direction of his life; that society 
be organized to encourage independence in men and provide the media for their 
common participation.”922 
In its crusade to establish participatory democracy, the Students for a 
Democratic Society led a loose coalition of left-wing youths deeply committed to the 
ideas of liberal politics and social progress.  The “New Left” of the 1960s was born 
from the experiences of civil rights activists, opposition to the Vietnam War, and 
disillusionment with Lyndon Johnson’s version of liberalism.  Initially, the New 
Left focused on the issues facing the students at the growing “multiversities,” such 
as limitations on free speech and the persistence of in loco parentis as the 
philosophical basis for administering campus life.  By the end of the decade, New 
Left activists had moved on to deal with troubles in the jungles of Vietnam, the 
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inner cities of America, and the legislative halls of Washington, D.C.  They blamed 
Johnson for trading away the populist inclusiveness intrinsic to modern liberalism 
in exchange for an impersonal, corporatized politics that valued exercising power 
more than advancing social justice.  And they railed against the sluggish progress 
toward solving the problems that had beset generations of Americans, especially 
ageism, racism, sexism, homophobia, xenophobia, and imperialism.923  Even 
President Johnson admitted in the final months of his presidency that in spite of all 
the progress his administration had made “’we are still unable to set a precise date 
for the arrival of equality, the advent of peace, the curing of old ills, and the healing 
of old wounds.’”924    
British journalist Henry Fairlie identified the “politics of expectation” as a 
key source of 60s sociopolitical turmoil.  He argued that the decade’s political 
bigwigs, following the example of John and Bobby Kennedy, carefully crafted 
images of themselves as leaders who could spectacularly deliver on quixotic 
promises.  Fairlie concluded that the Kennedy brothers taught their contemporaries 
to think more about image than achievement.925  Young people, however, had been 
socialized to believe that results mattered more than style in politics, especially in 
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the substance-laden realm of the White House.  As the Johnson presidency 
unfolded, many politicized youths reckoned his administration would not fulfill the 
idealistic pledges of John Kennedy or complete the reform agenda of the Great 
Society.  That realization either disillusioned or angered thousands of young 
liberals.  Because they sensed that “’no one is listening,’” Bobby Kennedy averred, 
“’we can understand why so many of our young people have turned from 
engagement to disengagement, from politics to passivity, from hope to nihilism, 
from S.D.S. to LSD.’”926  Young leftists acknowledged that many Johnson initiatives 
suffered from unrealistic hopes and poor execution.  But they blamed America’s 
expanding military involvement in Vietnam for impeding a full political 
commitment to social transformation.  And they charged “the Establishment” – that 
mysterious cabal of Wall Street tycoons, Pentagon brass, and Ivy League-trained 
bureaucrats – with monopolizing governmental power to benefit their elite self-
interests at the expense of the needs of the people.  
As criticism of LBJ, Vietnam, and the Establishment mounted, young people 
disillusioned with the federal government and authority of all kinds became 
evermore radicalized. In a 1969 special broadcast trying to explain why youths were 
rebellious, CBS news anchor Walter Cronkite concluded young people most wanted 
to “’make things happen now’” because of a shared “’frustration, restiveness, and 
dissatisfaction’” with the persistence of bigotry, intolerance, and militarism.927   A 
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1968 Gallup poll indicated that the youth revolt “appears directed against 
traditionalism and complacency, or ‘the Establishment.’  Sometimes this takes the 
form of attacks on the [Johnson] Administration’s Vietnam policies, other times 
against the slowness of efforts to help the Negro race.”928  A man from West 
Chatham, Massachusetts, justified his support for the 18-vote by highlighting that 
youth “are almost the only ones among us who in recent years have had the 
audacity to point to the emperor’s nakedness.  And naked he has been on many of 
the matters these committed young people have decried.”929  Whether Johnson 
under-delivered or youths demanded too much, the disappointments of unrealized 
expectations fueled the generational crises that convulsed American society 
between the mid-1960s and early 1970s. 
That brief era marked the singular time in U.S. history when sociopolitical 
conflict manifestly divided along age-group lines.  Many of the same forces that had 
fostered the complacent prosperity of the 1950s – the Baby Boom, Cold War, and 
burgeoning consumer culture – helped set off the volatile clashes between young 
and old during the 1960s and 1970s.   The chasm between the traditionalism of 
adults and the iconoclasm of adolescents, contemporaneously referred to as the 
“generation gap,” appeared unbridgeable.  A 1969 Gallup survey found that 70% of 
college students and adults believed a “generation gap” existed and that it would 
most likely persist because adults were “’too set in their ways’” and adolescents 
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fancied “’undisciplined behavior.’”930  Whereas adults expected young people to 
conform to the norms of mainstream culture, adolescents insisted that all 
individuals had a right to self-determination – even if its expressions were 
disobedient or disruptive.  Age-based social differences have existed since the 
beginnings of recorded history.  Only in the post-World War II era, however, did 
“teenagers” become recognized as distinct cultural personae with their own 
lifestyles separate from adults.  The adult-adolescent cultural strife of the 1950s 
begot the young-old generational hostilities of the 1960s.   When the decade began, 
most youths were either apolitical or dedicated to working peacefully for change 
within the existing systems of governance.  By the end of the decade, large numbers 
of young people had become politicized, and many disbelieved peaceful change was 
possible.   
As the sixties unfolded, more and more young people assailed time-honored 
notions of authority.   Civil rights marches, counterculture be-ins, student strikes, 
antiwar rallies, and protests against the Johnson administration each contested the 
values and rules that elders claimed made America exceptional among world 
nations.  Young people of all ideological stripes criticized the special privileges 
attached to age and seniority within America’s sociopolitical system.  Hardly any 
civic institution dominated by adults escaped scrutiny or challenge from some youth 
group.  The most revolutionary of youths saw themselves as the vanguard of “the 
Movement,” a supernatural force of history that would overthrow a corrupt and 
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outdated way of life perpetuated by adults.  By the late 1960s, it had evolved from a 
generally passive civil disobedience to aggressive resistance.  An angry 
rebelliousness stoked the most aggrieved and disaffected youth.  They harbored a 
bitter resentment that the majority of adults and government officials patronized, 
neglected, or ignored the issues they found morally compelling.  Abandoning the 
idealistic rhetoric of John F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr., young activists 
openly questioned the efficacy of sociopolitical change through existing institutions.  
They concluded that the American political system was utterly impotent and had to 
be fundamentally reformed. Believing they had been duped by the politics of 
expectation, young nihilists launched a multidimensional assault upon virtually 
every aspect of the mainstream life.  More militant youths prepared for a war with 
adult authorities.931   As more and more youths insisted upon a greater voice in 
campus affairs, demanded justice for oppressed people, burned their draft cards, 
and, occasionally, bombed university buildings, their increased belligerence 
enflamed national tensions.  Across the United States, multiple places, particularly 
university campuses, witnessed disruption, violence, and, on occasion, fatalities.  
The young radicals who pursued “liberation” from social and political constraints 
became the focus of the public’s scorn. Parents and politicians alike worried that 
Bob Dylan was right when he sang in his hit “The Times They Are A-Changin’” that 
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“your sons and your daughters are beyond your command.”932 
The rising tide of youth outrage crested in 1968.  “There was a sense 
everywhere in 1968 that things were giving way,” journalist Garry Wills observed, 
“That man had not merely lost control of his history, but might never regain it 
again.”933  In a year of chaos punctuated by violence and enveloped by tragedy, the 
spring of 1968 proved to be the most traumatic season:  LBJ announced he would 
not run for reelection after a narrow victory over an antiwar candidate, Senator 
Eugene McCarthy, in New Hampshire’s Democratic primary; assassins murdered 
Martin Luther King, Jr. and Robert Kennedy; and campus unrest boiled over across 
the nation.  In a semester that began the month of the Tet Offensive, major protests 
(i.e. those involving at least 1,000 people) erupted at more than 200 colleges.  At 
fifty-nine universities, students occupied campus buildings, mainly administrative 
centers.  Students on at least another thousand campuses held smaller 
demonstrations, usually against the Vietnam War.934   The spring campus unrest 
reached its acme at Columbia University.  Beginning on 23 April 1968, SDS radicals 
and black militants occupied the president’s office and classroom buildings for eight 
days in protest of a defense research center on campus and the construction of a 
gymnasium bordering Harlem that would be closed to community members.  The 
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strike paralyzed the campus, forcing administration officials to summon New York 
City police to arrest the students – a process that turned bloody as many officers, 
resentful of what they saw as privileged students who lacked respect for authority, 
beat the protestors and their faculty advocates indiscriminately.935   Similar clashes 
among students, administrators, and police at Harvard, Cornell, San Francisco 
State, and other universities further widened generational rifts.   
The incessant on-campus havoc convinced many adults that a full-fledged 
youth revolt had erupted.  When the 1960s began, most Americans lauded the 
idealism, courage, and restraint of young demonstrators, particularly the students 
involved in the civil rights movement.  As the decade ended, public opinion 
registered confusion, fear, and anger over the escalation and extremism of youth 
protest.   The vehement challenges of the “Me Generation” to the existing social 
order and dominant value system added to the anxiety.  By the end of the 60s, 
historian Carl Boggs writes, most adult authorities agreed that the hopeful visions 
of change outlined by young activists had turned into “a nightmare of adventurous 
violence, dogmatic posturing, and a decaying drug culture.”936   Millions of vexed 
adults thought that young people, whether Black Panthers, student militants, or 
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hippie chicks, threatened to shred the sociopolitical fabric of America.  As New York 
City Mayor John Lindsay observed, “The country is virtually on the edge of a 
spiritual – and perhaps physical – breakdown.  For the first time in a century, we 
are not sure there is a future for America.”937   
Adults pondered how to rescue America from the young insurgents and how 
to save fanatical youths from self-ruination.  Some adults championed suppression 
of youth activism.   In 1968, J. Edgar Hoover, director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, established a nationwide program to disrupt the lives of key New Left 
leaders.  He deployed hundreds of undercover agents in a massive surveillance 
program to neutralize civil disorders.938   Other people sought a salve for the social 
wounds inflicted by intergenerational conflict by resurrecting the issue of lowering 
the voting age.  For many adults, the specter of youth-inspired domestic calamity, 
especially the mayhem instigated by college-age activists, convinced them of the 
sociopolitical need to enfranchise young people.  As a mother from East Detroit 
averred, “I believe that in lowering the voting age to 18, student protest and 
violence would diminish.  Through the elections of candidates who represent the 
views of the youth today, their ideas could be put across in a non violent manner.”939  
Most adults who supported adolescent suffrage did not necessarily hanker after the 
political insights of youth; rather, they believed including young voices in national 
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dialogues might yield social tranquility.   Pro-18-vote adults reckoned that young 
people, upon enfranchisement, could no longer protest that they lacked a say in 
shaping the laws and policies that directly affected their lives.  Of course, the youth 
activists who turned university campuses and political conventions into 
battlegrounds turned some adults against adolescent suffrage.  An eighty-year-old 
woman from Minnesota told the Minneapolis Tribune, “When I think of the way 
kids are acting on campuses these days, I certainly don’t think they should have the 
vote.”940  Although Representative James Harvey (R-MI) stated that continued 
campus protests would create “a most unfavorable atmosphere for this deserved 
legislation,” his colleague Howard Robison (R-NY) speculated that Congress might 
reconsidered the 18-vote issue “if there is a groundswell of public interest in and 
support for the proposal.”941 
During 1968-69, the effort to lower the voting age steadily gathered 
momentum.  High school students flooded state and federal representatives with 
petitions asking for a legislative redress of the youth suffrage grievance.  “I stand 
with the thousands of responsible, respectable, educated teenagers, members of my 
generation who want to take an important part in their country’s welfare and help 
in the election of their representatives and those who will represent their children,” 
a 14-year-old Michigan resident wrote to House Minority Leader Gerald Ford, “Sir, 
I hope that you will have faith in my generation and promote any bill that will 
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enable us the right to vote.”942  Eugene McCarthy’s “Children’s Crusade” spurred the 
formation of youth groups to promote the 18-vote, such as the Youth Franchise 
Coalition and Let Us Vote.  Both the YFC and LUV constructed national coalitions 
on behalf of adolescent enfranchisement with such organizations as the AFL-CIO, 
NAACP, Young Republican and Young Democrat clubs, National Educational 
Association, and United States Youth Council.  Let Us Vote formed 327 college and 
3,000 high school chapters.943  A Gallup survey taken in December 1969 indicated 
that 76% of college students favored allowing 18-, 19-, and 20-year-olds to vote.944  
Other polls indicated broad-based support for teen suffrage among adults.945  While 
some adults feared the granting “hippies, yippies, and other beatnik types” voting 
power, an ever-increasing number of parents and politicians came to believe that 
enfranchising “the handful of [youth] trouble makers” might calm their 
antinomianism.946   
Influential government officials also agreed a lower franchise age could 
                                                          
942 Sharon Hattis to Gerald R. Ford, n.d. Folder “Voting” (51), Box B132, Ford Congressional 
Papers, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan. 
 
943 Time 93, 31 January 1969, 20.  Time described the leader of LUV, Dennis Warren (a 21-
year-old prelaw student from the University of the Pacific), as the “very antithesis of the stereotype 
student radical, Warren wears his hair closely cropped and dresses in conservative pinstripe suites 
and black shoes.” 
 
944 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, 3:2229. 
 
945 A Minneapolis Tribune poll found that 58% of those persons asked approved of a lowered 
voting age.  The same poll also indicated that 68% of people between ages 21 and 29 favored the 18-
vote as compared to only 44% of persons age 60 or over.  The poll noted that percentage approval 
youth suffrage in Minnesota had climbed up from 43% in May 1964.  Congressional Record 115, 17 
February 1969:  3589.   
 
946 James G. O’Hara to Andrew J. Jasina, Jr., 17 March 1969, Box 13, James G. O’Hara 
Papers. 
 
337 
 
become part of the cure for the youth-fired social distempers unsettling the nation.  
Early in the first session of the 91st Congress, lawmakers in support of the 18-vote 
intently lobbied their ambivalent colleagues.  Jennings Randolph (D-WV) and Jacob 
Javits (R-NY), for example, tried to impress upon fellow senators that the valor of 
youths abroad, “their political involvement at home, and their deep concern for the 
complex social problems of our times, clearly indicate new compelling reasons for 
the vote.”  They acknowledged that “contemporary frustrations” had driven “some of 
our most capable and inquisitive youth to seek less acceptable means of making 
known their views on public affairs.”  But, Randolph and Javits concluded, “We feel 
our Nation also should benefit from the creative energy of these individuals.”947  
Beginning in the summer of 1969, a task force within Richard Nixon’s 
administration began work on a national youth policy to remedy the “crisis of 
authority” stoked by the pervasive sense of alienation among youth.  Part of the 
strategy to integrate young people into mainstream politics included establishing 
eighteen as the national suffrage age – a suggestion that President Nixon 
endorsed.948   
In November 1969, the National Violence Study Commission, impaneled by 
Nixon in June 1968 to study the causes of social unrest, issued a report that 
advocated easing marijuana laws, enacting draft reforms, expanding public service 
activities, and lowering the voting age to eighteen as steps to dampening the “youth 
                                                          
947 Jennings Randolph and Jacob K. Javits to Richard B. Russell, 31 January 1969, Series 
XV, Subseries AY, Box 44, Folder 9, Richard B. Russell Collection. 
 
948 New York Times, 8 December 1969, 54. 
338 
 
rebellion.”  The Commission asserted that enfranchising 18-year-olds would be an 
important part of the process to woo alienated youths back into the mainstream of 
American society:  “The anachronistic voting age limitations tend to alienate them 
from systematic political processes and to drive them into a search for alternative, 
sometimes violent, means to express their frustrations over the gap between the 
nation’s ideals and actions.  Lowering the voting age will provide them with a 
direct, constructive and democratic channel for making their views felt and for 
giving them a responsible stake in the future of the nation.”949  The torrent of 
positive support, both public and political, encouraged Representative James 
Howard to report to his House colleagues “that the majority of the population of the 
country supports the need for lowering the minimum voting age.”950 
 The civic demand that social order be restored became the motivating force 
propelling Congress to lower the voting age to eighteen.  In May 1968, the Senate 
Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments conducted hearings on a handful of 
18-vote resolutions.  In his opening statement, Subcommittee Chair Birch Bayh (D-
IN) noted that American youth were “deeply involved” in political campaigns, civil 
rights, the Peace Corps, Volunteers in Service to America, and the “issues of war 
and peace.”951  Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-MT) maintained that “the 
                                                          
949 Washington Post, 26 November 1969, A4 and Lowering the Voting Age to 18:  Hearings 
Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments on S.J. Res. 7, S.J. Res. 19, S.J. Res. 32, 
S.J. Res. 34, S.J. Res. 38, S.J. Res. 73, S.J. Res. 87, S.J. Res. 102, S.J. Res. 105, S.J. Res. 141, and 
S.J. Res. 147, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., 16 February 1970, 22. 
 
950 Congressional Record 115, (5 February 1969):  2823. 
 
951 Lowering the Voting Age to Eighteen:  Hearings Before the Senate Subcommittee on 
Constitutional Amendments, 14 May 1968, 3. 
339 
 
age of 21 is not simply the automatic chronological door to the sound judgment and 
wisdom that is needed to exercise the franchise of the ballot, or, for that matter, to 
assume any other responsibility.”  He also claimed that the great majority of 
unradicalized youth should be granted the franchise because “their probing 
intelligence, deep interest, and eagerness to participate in the elective process 
exemplify the best qualities of responsible citizenship.”952  Other supporters argued 
that the denial of a formal voice in political processes, particularly suffrage, fueled 
the palpable distrust of “the Establishment” among young people.  As John Owen, 
president of the Philodemic Debating Society at Georgetown University, charged: 
The big student complaints are that students are not consulted 
in decision making. . . .This sort of thing has just snowballed to  
the point where the mind of the young people age 18 to 21, many 
people who feel themselves excluded from the political process or 
just any decision making process, they feel the exclusion and 
their idealism turns to some form of cynicism.  Their cynicism 
then turns into some sort of violence, which they feel is the last 
way they have of communicating with the older generation.953 
 
 
The justification most often cited in support of the 18-vote emphasized its 
potential to diminish, if not stop, the violent machinations of those angry and 
dispossessed young people.  Proclaiming that youth needed “both a stake and a role” 
in American government, Senator Howard Cannon (D-NV) declared that “it is 
important, indeed crucial, that young adults – especially the concerned and active 
young person – be convinced that improvement can still occur through the 
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established processes.”954  Mansfield underscored that dissatisfied youth “need to 
know that their participation and counsel is sought and valued.”955  Jack McDonald, 
chairman of the Young Republican National Federation, asserted that reducing the 
franchise age “would do a lot to make young people realize that they are involved 
rather than alienated from today’s society in America.”956  Senator Javits said he 
was “convinced that self-styled student leaders who urge acts of civil disobedience 
would find themselves with no support if students were given a more meaningful 
role in the electoral process.”957  On the final day of the hearings, Representative 
Ken Hechler (D-WV) provided insightful testimony linking the continuation of 
youth disfranchisement and the prolongation of youth radicalism.  He warned: 
Today, the 18-year-old vote is needed to harness the energy of 
young people and direct it into useful and constructive channels, 
not simply for their benefit, but for the benefit of the entire 
Nation. . . .[I]f we deny the right to vote to those young people 
between the ages of 18 and 20, it is entirely possible that they 
will join the more militant minority of their fellow students and 
engage in destructive activities of a dangerous nature.958 
 
 
 The 18-vote resolutions received overwhelming bipartisan support within the 
subcommittee, but it did not forward the bills to the full Senate Judiciary 
Committee for consideration.  Though the successes of the Civil Rights Act and 
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Voting Rights Act had weakened Chairman Eastland, he still held considerable 
sway within the Judiciary Committee to thwart legislation he considered a threat to 
states’ rights.  Bayh and other youth suffrage supporters on the committee reckoned 
that the time was not advantageous for an aggressive push.  The hearings took 
place less than a month after President Johnson’s decision not to seek reelection.  
Democratic leaders sought to hold onto as much southern support within the party 
as they muster could for the upcoming elections since Republicans captured a large 
number of congressional seats in the 1966 mid-term elections.  Republicans found 
ready allies in southern Democrats and a few of them, like Strom Thurmond, had 
switched their party affiliation to the GOP.  Intraparty politics halted the Senate’s 
progress on youth suffrage, but the issue had garnered serious congressional 
attention.  The May 1968 hearings showed that the majority of congressmen 
approved youth suffrage regardless of the conservative resurgence.  Hence, the 
debate over the 18-vote had shifted from a question of should Congress grant youth 
the right of suffrage to how Congress could most suitably establish a national voting 
age. 
The 1970 renewal of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 provided pro-18-vote 
congressmen a ripe legislative circumstance to enfranchise adolescents.   The Voting 
Rights Act intended to facilitate black voter registration in the South by outlawing 
the legal barriers at the state and local level that prevented African-Americans 
from exercising their right to vote under the Fifteenth Amendment.  Congress 
mandated that the Act be reexamined every five years to gauge compliance.  The 
342 
 
initial debate on the extension of the Act focused on whether its “triggering 
formula” within Section 4 or the “preclearance” measures of Section 5 would remain 
unchanged as a common national standard. Section 4 banned literacy tests for five 
years in Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, and 
several counties in North Carolina; it also allowed federal officials to enfranchise 
African-Americans and monitor elections within the aforementioned states.  Section 
5 dictated that federal courts and agencies could hold up the passage of suffrage 
laws in the seven affected states until approved by a three-judge federal court in the 
District of Columbia.  In January 1969, Representative Emanuel Celler introduced 
H.R. 4249 to extend, with no modifications, the 1965 Act.  In July 1969, House 
Minority Leader Gerald Ford, prompted by the Nixon administration, offered 
several amendments to Celler’s bill.  Ford’s proposal sought to change Section 4 of 
the Voting Rights Act by authorizing a nationwide ban on literacy tests and 
prohibiting extended residential requirements for voting in presidential elections; it 
also altered Section 5 by placing jurisdiction over voting rights cases in local federal 
district courts.959  On 11 December 1969, the House agreed to Ford’s modifications to 
H.R. 4249 and sent the amended resolution to the Senate.960    
Five days later, the Senate unanimously referred the bill to its Judiciary 
Committee.  The referral specified that the committee should report back to the full 
Senate by 1 March 1970 and mandated that the bill, whether marked up or 
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accepted in toto, become the pending order of business upon its return to the 
Senate.  Liberal Democrats secured the special instructions because they worried 
that Judiciary Chairman James Eastland would kill the measure by purposely 
refusing to schedule committee discussion about it.  The Subcommittee on 
Constitutional Rights discussed the House amendments to the Voting Rights Act 
extension over five nonconsecutive days during the latter part of February 1970.      
The day before the Subcommittee on Constitution Rights initially met to talk 
about H.R. 4249, the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments concluded its 
two-day hearings regarding a Senate-derived youth suffrage bill.  In August 1969, 
Jennings Randolph and 67 co-sponsors offered S.J. Res. 147 to declare eighteen as 
the national voting age.961   The first day of the hearings, 16 February 1970, 
repeated the positive support for the 18-vote heard during the 1968 inquiry.  
Subcommittee Chairman Birch Bayh opened the proceedings by emphasizing, “I 
know of no other step that government can take that will lessen discontent and 
provide a viable alternative to activities outside of the system than giving young 
people a voice, an act, a responsible position within the system.”962   Dr. S.I. 
Hayakawa, who as president of San Francisco State had become renowned for his 
calm defusing of on-campus tensions, seconded Bayh’s thesis by asserting suffrage 
held “symbolic meaning” for adolescents because it represented an acknowledgment 
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of adulthood.963   Theodore Sorenson, a well-respected former advisor to John and 
Robert Kennedy, said Congress should view the 18-vote as a “moral issue” that, if 
not adopted, threatened to tear asunder the common democratic standards that had 
traditionally rooted political socialization in America.964   Senator Randolph, a 
staunch supporter of youth suffrage since World War II, focused his testimony on 
the national political benefits of adding 11 million new electors to the voting rolls.965      
The following day of hearings proved more contentious, as the participants 
debated whether Congress held the power to lower voting ages in federal, state, 
and/or local elections.  Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst stated that 
President Nixon and the Justice Department both disagreed with S.J. Res. 147 
because it established eighteen as the national age of enfranchisement for all 
elections.  Kleindienst affirmed that the Nixon administration would only support a 
constitutional amendment that restricted 18-year-olds to vote in federal elections.  
He claimed that the qualification of age, unlike the categories of race and sex, 
remained a “compelling interest” of the states; therefore, Kleindienst argued, 
Congress possessed no power to require the states to reduce their minimum age 
qualifications for enfranchisement.966  The other witnesses disagreed with 
Kleindienst’s stance.  Charles Gonzalez, president of the Student National 
Education Association, labeled Kleindienst’s position “tokenism” and urged the 
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subcommittee to accept S.J. Res. 147 as proposed.967   Former Attorney General 
Ramsey Clark also backed an unadulterated S.J. Res. 147 and criticized the 
limiting of the 18-vote to federal elections because “halfway steps are one of the 
causes of [young people’s] doubt that we understand the times.”968   The hearings 
again revealed widespread support for the idea of reducing suffrage ages.  However, 
the dispute over congressional authority to alter voting-age qualifications in state 
and local elections stymied approval of S.J. Res. 147 in the subcommittee.    
The spurning of S.J. Res. 147 did not derail the 18-vote effort, however, as its 
senatorial proponents found a different path to promulgate youth suffrage.  As 
specified by the Senate’s special instructions, Emanuel Celler’s H.R. 4249 to extend 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 became the pending order of business on 1 March 
1970.  On 2 March, Senators Hugh Scott (R-PA) and Philip Hart (R-MI) offered an 
amendment, in the nature of a substitute bill, to Cellar’s measure.  The Scott-Hart 
proposal narrowed Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act from nationwide application to 
only those affected southern states as originally provided in 1965.969  Two days later, 
Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, on behalf of Warren Magnuson (D-WA) 
and Edward Kennedy (D-MA), introduced an amendment to the Scott-Hart 
substitute bill.  Quickly named the Mansfield Amendment, the tender sought to 
lower the voting age to eighteen in all local, state, and federal elections.  Senators 
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quickly realized that Mansfield’s amendment, as a rider to preexisting law, schemed 
to establish a national 18-vote via legislative statute.  Mansfield claimed that he 
proposed the statutory route because the “states simply have not taken the 
initiative.”970   
Several senators criticized Mansfield’s action.  Hugh Scott charged it would 
jeopardize the extension of the Voting Rights Act.  Jennings Randolph stated that 
he preferred a constitutional amendment rather than a congressional statute to 
establish youth suffrage.  He suggested that Mansfield’s ploy to make an end run 
around the traditional amendment process might not even be necessary.  Randolph 
announced to his senate colleagues that James Eastland had assured him the 
Judiciary Committee would not impede passage of S.J. Res. 147 (which Eastland 
later confirmed on the Senate floor).971  But Randolph asked to co-sponsor 
Mansfield’s measure “to join others who feel that the statutory approach is 
possible.”972 Southern Democrats, led by Sam Ervin, opposed the rider as a threat to 
a state’s right to determine suffrage qualifications.  Ervin objected to the statute as 
a violation of four sections of the Constitution (Section 1 of Article 2, Section 2 of 
Article 1, the Tenth Amendment, and the Seventeenth Amendment) that he claimed 
prohibited Congress from interfering with state determination of voting 
requirements, including age specifications.  In summarizing southern objections to 
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the Mansfield amendment and the Voting Rights Act, Ervin forcefully inquired:  
“Are we going to strive to have an indestructible Union composed of indestructible 
States, or are we going to attempt to destroy, in an unauthorized manner, in an 
unconstitutional manner, that Union by usurping for the Congress the powers 
reserved to the States to prescribe the qualification for voting?”973   
The central controversy that consumed the Senate involved an argument over 
the means to begat the 18-vote.  While some senators backed the slow but legally 
certain path of a constitutional amendment, others preferred the expedient but 
legally dubious course of a legislative statute.  Supporters of Mansfield’s 
amendment argued that the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Katzenbach v. 
Morgan offered a solid constitutional basis for declaring a national suffrage age via 
statute.  In Katzenbach, the Court declared that the enforcement powers written 
into Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment allowed Congress to enact laws that 
increased the rights of citizens beyond what the judiciary had previously recognized.  
The case originated from a suit brought by New York voters who contested Section 
4(e) of the Voting Rights Act, which provided that no person who had successfully 
completed sixth grade in a school accredited by the commonwealth of Puerto Rico 
could be denied the right to vote because of an inability to read or write English.  
The plaintiffs argued that Section 4(e) violated New York elections laws that 
specifically required reading and writing literacy in English as a condition to vote.  
A three-judge federal district court concurred with the plaintiffs.  It held that 
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Congress had infringed on rights reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment 
and exceeded its powers of enforcement under the Fourteenth Amendment in 
enacting Section 4(e).  In a 7-2 decision written by Justice William J. Brennan, the 
Supreme Court ruled that Section 4(e) was constitutional because Congress had 
exercised its powers consistent with those afforded it by Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Brennan held that the supremacy clause embedded into Article VI, 
Paragraph 2 of the U.S. Constitution prevented the enforcement of New York’s 
English literacy requirement since Congress specifically wrote Section 4(e) of the 
Voting Rights Act to enfranchise educated but non-English literate Puerto Ricans.  
Brennan theorized that Congress could ratchet up civil rights beyond what the 
Supreme Court had recognized via legislation enacted under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment that expressly sought to uphold or expand its equal 
protection clause.  He concluded that Section 5 offers “a positive grant of legislative 
power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining the need for 
and nature of legislation to secure Fourteenth Amendment guarantees.”974   
Proponents of Mansfield’s amendment seized onto Justice Brennan’s “ratchet 
theory” as justification for the statutory route to promulgate the 18-vote into federal 
law.  In testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, 
former Solicitor General Archibald Cox and Harvard constitutional law professor 
Paul Freund backed the statutory approach to the 18-vote.  Both men asserted that 
Justice Brennan’s “ratchet theory” allowed Congress full authority to expand those 
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rights recognized by the judiciary as essential to the types of civil equality intended 
by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Since Brennan’s theory proposed that Congress 
could not ratchet down judicially recognized rights, Cox and Freund maintained 
that Mansfield’s rider had constitutional validity because the Supreme Court had 
frequently protected infringements of suffrage as potential violations of the equal 
protection clause.  Cox and Freund agreed that Brennan’s “ratchet theory” allowed 
for multiple interpreters of the Fourteenth Amendment.  They concluded that the 
statutory route to youth suffrage would most likely pass constitutional muster if a 
court clearly saw that Congress deliberately intended through legislation to deem 
persons at least 18-years-of-age to be a class of citizens worthy of voting rights 
equal to those of enfranchised adults.975  
Opponents of Mansfield’s rider solicited the counsel of six Yale law 
professors, including Alexander Bickel and Robert Bork, who rejected Brennan’s 
“ratchet theory.”  Bickel and Bork defended Justice John Marshall Harlan’s 
minority opinion in Katzenbach that allowing Congress to interpret the Fourteenth 
Amendment undercut the power of the judiciary. In particular, Bickel and Bork 
concurred with Harlan’s objection to Congress having the power to interpret the 
Fourteenth Amendment substantively, which, in their view, would permit Congress 
great latitude under the 14th’s Section 5 enforcement provision to create new rights 
with scant limitation and little judicial oversight.  They insisted that Brennan’s 
“ratchet theory” would harm the Constitution’s separation of powers by sanctioning 
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judicial deference to Congress’s authority to interpret the equal protection clause as 
it saw fit.  Bickel and Bork argued that limiting congressional use of Section 5 
power to the enforcement of judicially-recognized Fourteenth Amendment rights 
was the proper constitutional safeguard.  Bickel and Bork rebuffed Brennan’s 
opinion as a foundation for justifying a statute overturning a state’s right to 
determine age qualifications for voting, and they questioned the applicability of the 
Katzenbach case to support any federal expansion of voting rights.976   
The position of the Nixon administration further confused the situation.  
President Nixon supported the use of the Katzenbach ruling by the Justice 
Department and in Gerald Ford’s amendments to H.R. 4249 to validate the 
abolition of state literacy tests and the reduction of state residency requirements for 
voting.  But in the case of youth suffrage, Nixon accepted the view of Bickel and 
Bork that an overzealous interpretation of the “ratchet theory” posed potential 
harm to federalist traditions regarding the locus of suffrage laws.  William 
Rehnquist, who served as the Assistant Attorney General of the Office of Legal 
Counsel under Nixon, testified before the Subcommittee on Constitutional 
Amendments that the statutory route to adolescent enfranchisement would confuse 
the legality of the upcoming 1972 presidential election.  He claimed Nixon 
supported voting rights for young people, but the president preferred the more 
certain and less polarizing amendment process to Mansfield’s rider.977  Edward 
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Kennedy highlighted the seeming incongruity of Nixon’s employ of Katzenbach to 
argue the case offered blanket constitutional protection for changing state suffrage 
qualifications via federal decree.  “If it is constitutional to change literacy and 
residence requirements by statute,” Kennedy declared, “then it is also constitutional 
to change age requirements for voting.”978   
The floor debate on the Mansfield amendment to H.R. 4249 repeated, 
virtually verbatim, the arguments for and against the statutory approach to 
establishing a national voting age.  Senator Vance Hartke (D-IN) believed passage 
of the rider “both morally right and politically expedient.”979  Eugene Talmadge (D-
GA) insisted, “The worthiness of a cause and the popularity of an issue should not 
and cannot be used to circumvent the process by which the Constitution can be 
amended.”980  Birch Bayh reminded his colleagues of their legislative duty despite 
their personal or political beliefs: 
Whether it is by statute or by constitutional amendment, we 
must proceed until we succeed.  We must not raise the expect- 
ations of young people that we are going to give them a place 
in the system and then fail them once more.  We must continue 
until they are full participatory partners in this great system 
of ours.981 
 
 
On 12 March 1970, the Senate accepted Mansfield’s amendment 64-17.982  The 
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following day, the Senate agreed to the Scott-Hart substitute bill (51-22) and passed 
H.R. 4249 as amended back to the House by a vote of 64 to 12.983  The success of the 
Mansfield rider, in part, stemmed from the potent leadership of the Democratic 
majority leader, plus bipartisan support from moderate and liberal senators who 
overcame the objections of a small group of Republican and southern conservatives 
backed by the Nixon administration. 
 In returning the substitute bill to the House, the Senate placed great cross 
pressure on Emanuel Celler.  Since World War II, he had staunchly opposed any 
measure intending to establish a national voting age.  But he had just as resolutely 
supported any legislation proposing to uphold the civil rights of oppressed 
minorities, especially African-Americans.  Celler eventually relented from his 
warning that he would “fight like hell” against the inclusion of the 18-vote rider to 
the Scott-Hart bill.  Celler reasoned that the Supreme Court would swiftly 
determine the constitutionality of the Mansfield amendment prior to the effective 
date (1 January 1971)  of the Voting Rights Act renewal.984  He did, however, garner 
a rule (H. Res. 914) from the Rules Committee that instructed the House to vote on 
the Mansfield provision first, and then, if accepted, to next vote on the Scott-Hart 
substitute bill.  The rule also designated a one-hour time limit for debate on the 
House floor. 
 House Minority Leader Gerald Ford attempted to send Scott-Hart to a 
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conference with the Senate to delete the Mansfield rider.  He charged that the 
extraordinary legislative step to bypass committee and take up the Mansfield 
amendment on the House floor was “the most indefensible procedure I have ever 
seen.”985  Celler, however, realized the potential for southern obstructionism against 
the renewal of the entire Voting Rights Act if Scott-Hart was tabled to conference.  
When Celler pointed out that James Eastland would take part in the conference as 
chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, congressmen anxious about the potential 
derailing of the Voting Rights Act extension rallied to reject Ford’s conference call.  
After Celler openly approved Scott-Hart on the House floor, passage of the measure 
was virtually guaranteed, and the majority of representatives who commented 
during the bill’s discussion castigated the Senate for the House’s predicament.986  On 
17 June 1970, the House passed the Mansfield rider by a margin of 224-183, and 
then quickly agreed 272-132 to the Scott-Hart substitute extending the Voting 
Rights Act until 1975.987  President Nixon signed the amended H.R. 4249 into law on 
22 June 1970.  Nixon said he accepted the resolution despite disagreeing with its 
18-vote statute.  Nixon explained, “If I were to veto, I would have to veto the entire 
bill – voting rights and all. . . .Because the basic provisions of this Act are of great 
importance, therefore, I am giving it my approval.”988  
 At the request of President Nixon, the constitutionality of the Mansfield 
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provision to Public Law 91-285 was immediately tested before the Supreme Court.  
Many of the most fundamentally important and politically controversial decisions of 
the Supreme Court since the 1930s had pondered the federal-state balance.  The 
Brown v. Board of Education decision, for example, placed the most traditionally 
local of all governmental institutions, the public school, under the scrutiny of the 
federal judiciary.  In other rulings, the Court reconsidered the proper reach of the 
Fourteenth Amendment while debating the limits of how far state regulation of 
behavior might properly extend.  The case concerning Mansfield’s amendment, 
Oregon v. Mitchell, exemplified the Court’s post-New Deal forays into federal-state 
relations.  The ruling, however, represented one of the few Court decisions that 
sided with the states at the expense of individual or group rights. 
 The Court actually reached three verdicts in deciding Oregon v. Mitchell.  
The justices decided by a 5-4 vote that Congress held the power to lower the voting 
age in federal but not in state or local elections.  They also ruled 8-1 to restrict state 
residency requirements for voters in presidential elections.  And in another 8-1 vote, 
they banned literacy tests as a voter qualification device in any election.989  The 
Court’s ruling violated the intended spirit of the Voting Rights Act to facilitate voter 
participation among historically vote-deprived social groups.  But it also upheld a 
core federalist tenet fixing within the states the primary responsibility for 
determining the age qualifications of potential voters.  To youth, the ruling 
evidenced the vast gulf between democratic promise and adult action. 
                                                          
989 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1971). 
 
355 
 
 Senator Birch Bayh said the Court’s verdict produced “some significant 
problems” for the states.990  In ruling that Congress’s statue was only good in federal 
elections, the Supreme Court created a gaping discrepancy in election laws that 
threatened to muddle the upcoming 1972 plebiscite.  The Court’s decision placed 
profound administrative and financial burdens upon the 47 states that did not allow 
18-year-olds to vote.  To oblige the judgment, those states would be required to keep 
two voter registration lists:  one for federal offices and one for all other offices.  
State administrators told federal officials that the added expense of holding 
simultaneous federal elections that included 18-, 19-, and 20-year-olds while 
conducting state elections that disfranchised persons under age 21 would exhaust 
state electoral budgets.   They also claimed the task of producing dual registration 
books, ballots, and voting machines to comply with Oregon v. Mitchell could not be 
completed in time for the 1972 election.  Costs of conducting dual-age voting were 
estimated at $5 million for New York City, $2.5 million for St. Louis, and between 
$10 and $20 million for the nation as a whole.  Further, because of state 
requirements for amending state constitutions, twenty-two legislatures could not 
act to lower state voting age laws before November 1972.991   
 The 91st Congress had determined how a national voting age could be 
established.  The Supreme Court’s half-hearted acceptance of the 18-vote statute, 
however, engendered a dilemma for the 92nd Congress:  how quickly could it pass a 
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constitutional amendment to simplify for the states the “’dangerously complicated’” 
construction of dual-age voting systems?992  A New York Times editorial aptly 
described the problem as “no longer of philosophical preference, but only of smooth 
mechanics . . . to bring uniformity out of confusion – ideally in time for the 1972 
elections.”993  Early in the 92nd session, lawmakers in both the House and Senate 
filed numerous 18-vote measures.   Two identical bills, S.J. Res. 7 and H.J. Res. 223, 
that set eighteen as the national age of enfranchisement age became the focus of 
legislative action.    The House resolution garnered attention because Emanuel 
Celler proposed it and House Speaker Carl Albert (D-OK) endorsed it; the Senate 
measure, put forth by Jennings Randolph, had 85 co-sponsors.994  In late January, 
Judiciary chairmen Celler and James Eastland announced they had pledged 
cooperation to expedite passage of a youth suffrage amendment.  Their timeline 
appeared unusually aggressive.  Celler and Eastland aimed for congressional 
approval by the first week of March, so as to give state legislators enough time to 
act before the end of 1971.995   
 The rush to get a youth suffrage amendment passed truncated debate on the 
youth suffrage resolutions.  A few conservative lawmakers repeated the dictum 
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against federal infringements upon traditional state prerogatives.   Opposing 
legislators, mostly Republicans, also questioned whether the American people 
wanted Congress to enfranchise adolescents by highlighting the 1970 state 
referendums in Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, and Michigan that rejected 
youth suffrage proposals.  Representative John G. Schmitz (R-CA) revealed that he 
planned to introduce a bill to repeal the federal statute that had promulgated the 
18-vote to thwart congressional action on a national voting age resolution.  In 
announcing his plan to his House colleagues, Schmitz declared, “There is no reason 
whatever to assume that we must resolve the present chaos by a constitutional 
amendment compelling the states to reject the will of their own people and lower 
the voting age for state as well as federal legislatures.”996    
Republican resistance to the 18-vote measures got undercut by the Nixon 
administration.  In early February, Vice President Spiro Agnew proclaimed at the 
annual Hearst Senate Youth Conference that he backed the efforts to lower the 
voting age via constitutional amendment.   Though Richard Nixon never publically 
weighed in on the issue during the 92nd Congress, the implication of Agnew’s 
message was that the president concurred.997  Some citizens claimed Nixon’s use of 
Agnew as a proxy exposed the depth of the president’s scheming political 
opportunism.  Dr. E. James Lieberman, former director of the Center for Studies of 
Child and Family Mental Health at the National Institute of Mental Health, 
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charged:  “With the lowering of the voting age and the erosion of his leadership 
among the living, perhaps Mr. Nixon is pursuing the silent majority all the way 
back to the womb.”998  After Agnew’s speech, however, Republican challenges to 
youth suffrage faded, and congressional support swelled. 
 During the last week of February 1971, work on the 18-vote resolutions 
began in the Judiciary Committees.  On 23 February, a House Judiciary 
subcommittee unanimously accepted H.J. Res. 223.999   On 2 March, the full 
Judiciary Committee approved the bill “with little argument and practically no 
opposition” 32-2 after a closed meeting lasting less than an hour; only Wiley Mayne 
(R-IA) and Charles Wiggins (R-CA) dissented.1000  Later that afternoon, the Senate 
Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments unanimously endorsed S.J. Res. 7 by 
a vote of 5-0.   Afterwards, Subcommittee chair Birch Bayh insisted, “’It’s 
imperative that we [the Senate Judiciary Committee] take action quickly on this.’”  
He worried that acceptance of the resolution might be impaired by the addition of 
other popular proposals, such as congressional representation for the District of 
Columbia or equal rights for women.1001   Emanuel Celler also urged his House 
colleagues to act posthaste.  He noted that several states had begun to amend their 
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own constitutions to reduce voting ages, but he cited an informal survey that found 
insufficient time for the states to accomplish a uniform 18-year-old standard by 
1972.  Celler claimed there existed a “’realistic possibility’” that enough state 
legislatures could ratify a federal constitutional amendment ahead of the 1972 
elections if Congress worked rapidly.1002    
On Thursday, 4 March 1971, the Senate Judiciary Committee, “moving with 
uncommon speed,” unanimously endorsed S.J. Res. 7.1003  “In an unusual display of 
agreement on a constitutional question,” United Press International commented, 
“conservatives and liberals, Republicans and Democrats got behind a bill to 
straighten out what they felt was certain to become an electoral mess next year 
without the amendment.”1004   Eastland kept his word not to muck up the 18-vote 
amendment in committee by getting it reported out by the first week of March.  In 
its official report to the Senate explaining why the body should approve the 
resolution, the committee averred “that the time has come to lower the voting age to 
18 in every election across the land – because it is right.  Lowering the voting age is 
sound principle, sound policy, and sound practice.”1005  The unanimous consent of 
the committee virtually assured Senate passage of S.J. Res. 7.  
 On Monday, 8 March, the Senate agreed to consider the resolution. Majority 
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Leader Mike Mansfield indicated there would be no filibuster holdups because of 
the Judiciary Committee’s categorical support.  He tapped Birch Bayh to be the 
floor manager for the bill.  While delivering the keynote affirmation of the measure, 
Bayh emphasized it would help restore domestic order by cooling the allure of 
radical sets.  He argued, “How devastating it would be to the main rallying cry of 
these groups if the very system they say is sterile and unresponsive to change 
proves that it can change, and purges itself of inequities.  No other one piece of 
legislation can do as much to convince the younger people that there is a place for 
them within the system.”1006  As Bayh had previously predicted, however, the 
addition of tangential amendments threatened to delay enactment of the 18-vote.  
On Wednesday, 10 March, Ted Kennedy and Tom Eagleton (D-MO) attempted to 
add, in essence, another constitutional amendment onto S.J. Res. 7 by proposing full 
voting representation for the District of Columbia within Congress.1007   To 
accomplish their aim, which Eagleton claimed was an essential “attribute of 
citizenship” that Washington’s residents deserved, they sought to replicate 
Kennedy’s 1970 scheme to enfranchise youth.1008   Kennedy and Eagleton argued 
that their attachment to S.J. Res. 7 was the only way to bypass the hostility within 
the Senate Judiciary and House Rules committees towards congressional 
representation for D.C.  “I doubt,” Kennedy affirmed, “that there has ever been a 
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more meritorious case in Congress that called out for the unusual procedure of 
legislation by rider.”1009   
Mansfield spiked the proviso by asking for it to be tabled, to which the Senate 
agreed 68-23.1010  “Unquestionably,” Mansfield assented, “the people of the District 
deserve full and fair representation.”  But he contended that the D.C. issue lacked 
the same “unanimity” of congressional accord that the cause to enfranchise youth 
fully had garnered.1011  Mansfield stressed, “It is imperative that no action be taken 
to jeopardize the effort to extend to 18, 19, and 20-year-olds the full franchise of the 
ballot in all elections.”1012 Mansfield’s parliamentary move to kill the Kennedy-
Eagleton amendment before it could be brought to a vote seemed unusual because of 
its intra-party, fratricidal quality.   To those people who knew the inside baseball of 
the Senate, however, the tabling motion appeared to widen the rift that had 
developed between Mansfield and Kennedy the previous year over the 18-vote rider 
during the Voting Rights Act renewal.1013 
After tabling the Kennedy-Eagleton tender, Senate discourse regarding S.J. 
Res. 7 resembled more a pep rally than a debate. Before announcing his support for 
the resolution, Senator James Allen (D-AL) noted, “Usually it is said that there are 
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two sides to every question; but, apparently, there is only one side to the issue now 
before the Senate, and that is the matter of granting the vote to young people of the 
age of 18 years and older.”1014  All the senators who spoke in favor of the resolution 
praised its judicious mending of the electoral fissure left by the Supreme Court.  As 
Strom Thurmond (R-SC) summarized, “It just does not make sense to permit young 
people to have a voice in choosing national leaders while denying them the 
opportunity to participate in local government.”1015  Many senators took the 
opportunity to lionize Jennings Randolph for his long efforts to enfranchise 
American youth; Marlin Cook (R-KY) even suggested naming the measure the 
“Randolph Amendment.”1016  Birch Bayh was the last senator to speak on behalf of 
the resolution.  He admitted that “lowering the voting age is not a panacea for the 
problems confronting us.”  He asserted the 18-vote would “give the 11½ million 
young people who are outside of much of the legislative process, young people who 
are subject to all laws passed in this body and in all other legislative bodies, the 
right to participate in the election process and shape and mold their own futures.”  
Bayh concluded with a confident forecast:  “I predict that young people will vote, in 
large numbers.  I believe that once these younger citizens have the right they have 
sought, they will use it.”1017  The Senate unanimously approved S.J. Res. 7 by a vote 
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of 94-0.1018 
The youth suffrage bill in the House received a little more pushback.  A few 
representatives envisioned doom if H.J. Res. 223 passed:  adult residents in college 
towns held hostage to the whimsies of transitory young voters and local 
governments occupied by charming radical carpetbaggers skilled in wooing gullible 
teenagers.   A handful of other congressmen pointed to recent failures of 18-vote 
legislation in the states as indication of popular disdain for adolescent 
enfranchisement.  Charles Wiggins spoke for a few lawmakers when he lamented 
that the resolution would pass “for no other reason than that the young people are 
asking for it and we don’t want to say ‘no’ to them.  In this, we sadly mirror the 
permissiveness of society in general.”1019  A small contingent of conservatives, both 
Republican and Democrat, objected on the grounds that voting requirements for 
electors should be decided by the citizens of the localities involved.1020  John Schmitz 
revived his suggestion that Congress should repeal youth suffrage in federal 
elections instead of seeking to broaden voting rights to 18-year-olds.  The newly-
formed Committee for Constitutional Integrity headed by Francis G. Wilson, 
emeritus professor of political science at the University of Illinois, encouraged 
House resistance.  Wilson mailed circulars to all fifty governors and each of the 
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7,500 state legislators urging them to refrain from taking up any 18-vote measure 
passed by Congress.  He highlighted that Virginia had filed a petition to repeal the 
statute, arguing it was an “act of usurpation” by granting suffrage powers to 
Congress outside of its prescribed authority established in the Constitution.1021   
This time, however, the adherents of states’ rights could not derail a federal 
youth suffrage amendment.  For most congressmen, including those who had voted 
against the 18-vote in 1970, the practical need to avoid the confusion and expense of 
dual-age voting systems outweighed the philosophical want to maintain states’ 
rights.  As Representative William L. Scott (R-VA) expounded, 
I have considerable reservations about permitting 18-year- 
olds to vote and, as the record will show, did vote against 
the provision in the Voting Rights Act last year to permit 
those between 18 and 21 to vote in Federal, State, and local 
elections.  One basis for the vote at that time is a belief that 
voting age is a matter to be determined by the State rather 
than the Federal Government.  In my opinion, the Constit- 
ution so provides.  However, the Supreme Court has now 
decided that Congress by general legislation can regulate 
the voting age in Federal elections but not in State and 
local elections.  The result of the recent decision of our 
highest Federal court is that there are two classes of voters 
and, apparently, those States which have not reduced the 
voting age to 18 must keep separate voting lists.  Moreover, 
the counting of ballots would be complicated if the present 
condition of the law continues to exist.  Therefore, I intend 
to support the present resolution which, when ratified by 
38 States of the Union, will make uniform the voting age 
for citizens within our States as well as throughout the 
country.  The action of the Supreme Court, in my opinion, 
has deprived us, as well as the individual States, of the 
opportunity to decide the question of whether 18-year-olds 
should vote on its merits.  We have to approve the resolution 
                                                          
1021 Willard Edwards, “Capitol Views:  Congress Shuffles 18 Vote to States,” column, Chicago 
Tribune, 20 March 1971, 12.  See also Washington Post, 29 March 1971, C1, 1 April 1971, F3, and 11 
May 1971, C5. 
365 
 
to obtain orderly electoral procedure.1022 
 
For the other legislators, the time had come to enfranchise adolescents irrespective 
of the measure’s utility.  As Representative James Kee (D-WV) asserted on the 
House floor, “I am going to support this constitutional amendment not because it 
will save the taxpayers money, not because the two-track system would be difficult 
to administer, but because I believe it is right.”1023    
Democratic leaders allowed Emanuel Celler, the oldest member of the House, 
to floor manage H.J. Res. 223.  Their choice illustrated just how far many adults 
had come in their view of the 18-vote since the 1940s.   Celler commenced the House 
discussion of the resolution by acknowledging his longtime criticism of youth 
suffrage.  He reminded his colleagues of his constant advocacy for civil rights, 
including co-sponsorship of the Twenty-third and Twenty-fourth Amendments, to 
argue that his support for the Twenty-sixth Amendment was “part of a 
constitutional tradition of enlarging participation in our political process.”  Celler 
wrapped up his speech by championing the capacities of young people.  “Some of our 
youth have disappointed us, but the preponderant majority are as sound of mind as 
they are strong in body,” he averred.  “Youth will be served,” Celler rousingly 
concluded, “by giving them the ballot.”1024   
As the proceedings on 23 March neared the time to vote on H.J. Res. 223, 
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Representative James J. Howard (D-NJ) proposed a last-second amendment.  
Howard sought to enlarge the resolution to establish eighteen as America’s legal 
age majority.  He argued that if 18-year-olds were old enough to vote, they should 
be allowed to assume the full responsibilities of adulthood, including the rights to 
enter contracts, be sued in court, have an abortion, carry a firearm, and run for 
Congress.  On a point of order raised by Celler, the chairman presiding over the 
House, Richard Bolling (D-MO), ruled Howard’s amendment non-germane to the 
resolution at hand, thus killing it.1025  Celler then asked for an immediate vote on 
H.J. Res. 223, which the House overwhelmingly adopted in a roll-call vote by a 
margin of 400 to 19.1026   
Acceptance of resolution kicked in a directive of the Rules Committee.  After 
the Senate had passed its 18-vote measure, Rules members understood the time 
pressures to fix the dual-age voting fiasco created by the Oregon v. Mitchell verdict.  
On 17 March, exactly one week after the Senate had approved S.J. Res. 7, the 
House confirmed by unanimous consent the bounds of debate for H.J. Res. 223 set 
by the Rules Committee.  One of the terms allowed the House to consider S.J. Res. 7 
immediately following the approval of H.J. Res. 223.  Rules member Thomas “Tip” 
O’Neill (D-MA) explained the simple goal was to expedite the legislative approval 
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process.  O’Neill said the committee wished to assure that a youth suffrage 
amendment would be “ratified prior to the 1972 presidential election.”1027   Since 
both the Senate and House 18-vote resolutions were identical, Rules members saw 
no need to ship them to a joint conference for mark up or language resolution.  Once 
the House consented to H.J. Res. 223, Emanuel Celler requested immediate 
consideration of S.J. Res. 7.  Speaker pro tempore Hale Boggs (D-LA) ordered the 
House clerk to give it a third reading, a basic parliamentary rule for the enactment 
of congressional legislation.  Upon the reading, Boggs declared the passage of S.J. 
Res. 7 the question before the House.  The terms of debate accepted on 17 March 
allowed the final vote total on H.J. Res. 223 to stand as the House’s tally for S.J. 
Res. 7.  Boggs declared the Senate resolution approved under the declared rules and 
ordered the House measure to be tabled.1028  The House action meant that the 
Twenty-sixth Amendment had passed Congress; whether the necessary number of 
states would accept it became the new political cause célèbre.   
   Article V of the U.S. Constitution requires that a minimum of three-fourths 
of the states (38 out of 50) must ratify an amendment proposal before it can become 
law.  S.J. Res. 7 allowed state legislatures seven years to approve the Twenty-sixth 
Amendment.  Support for quick ratification appeared strong.  The Wall Street 
Journal claimed there was “an excellent chance” that enough states would consent 
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to the 18-vote by the November 1972 elections.1029  A New York Times survey taken 
in the days after the House’s consent vote indicated “that at least 38 states will 
approve it within a short period.”1030  State sanction of the amendment appeared to 
be driven more by a desire to avoid the procedural headaches and financial drains of 
dual registration than an eagerness to enfranchise 18-year-olds.    For reasons 
related to internal politics and distrust of adolescents, ten states had rejected youth 
suffrage bills in the past two years.  Faced with the heavy costs of possibly having to 
hold separate federal and state elections to accommodate Oregon v. Mitchell, 
however, most states, including those that had previously rejected the 18-vote, 
seemed ready to ratify the Twenty-sixth Amendment.1031  Three states, North 
Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming, could not act because their legislatures had 
recently adjourned and would not reconvene until 1973.    
Among those state legislatures currently in-session, several hurriedly 
maneuvered to become the first to approve the amendment.  Within thirty minutes 
after the House approval of S.J. Res. 7 – and without even waiting for an official 
copy of the amendment certified by Congress – Minnesota and Delaware ratified it; 
later in the afternoon of 23 March, Connecticut, Tennessee, and Washington also 
gave consent.1032   “The bandwagon’s already rolling,” whooped Emanuel Celler upon 
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hearing news about the 26th’s acceptance by the first five states.1033  Conservative 
opponents of the 18-vote futility scrambled to stifle ratification.  They warned that 
enactment of the amendment would lead to student takeovers of governments in 
college towns.   A Republican state senator from Illinois bemoaned enfranchising 
“’the same people who have caused us so much trouble at S.I.U. [Southern Illinois 
University] and Kent State.’”1034  Most state legislators, however, rushed to relieve 
themselves of the logistical and financial burdens of creating separate voting-age 
systems to accommodate the Supreme Court’s decision, thereby steamrolling 
resistance to the Twenty-sixth Amendment.  Within thirty days of the House of 
Representatives’ passage, 60% of the necessary 38 states had approved it; within 
two months, 75% had consented.1035   
As the 18-vote amendment neared final approval, a handful of states 
maneuvered to become the historic 38th state to ratify.  As Ian McGowlan of 
Common Cause said, “’Nobody wants to be 39th.’”1036  A mini-tempest arose 
regarding which state actually became the 38th.  On the morning of 30 June 1971, 
Alabama became the 36th state to accept the amendment.  Three other states, 
Oklahoma, Ohio, and North Carolina, only needed one house of their legislatures to 
complete ratification.  Around 4:00 p.m. EST, North Carolina’s Senate gave final 
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approval.  As news of the Tar Heel State’s feat spread, it spurred Oklahoma 
lawmakers to call a special session just to endorse the 18-vote.  R.W. Apple, Jr., of 
the New York Times reported that Oklahoma’s action caused an “atmosphere of 
near-panic” in the Ohio general assembly.1037  Charles F. Kurfess, the Ohio House 
Speaker, furiously gaveled through a motion to cut off debate and ordered an 
immediate roll-call vote, which ended a little after 8:00 p.m. EST.  The Times and 
other news outlets crowned Ohio as the 38th and necessary state to make youth 
suffrage part of the Constitution.1038   However, the General Services Administration 
(the federal agency responsible for preserving and safekeeping the nation’s 
historical documents) considers North Carolina to be the 38th state because its 
governor delayed signing the official copy of the assembly’s bill until just after 
midnight on 1 July.1039  A total of 42 states eventually endorsed the 18-vote.  In 
October 1971, Georgia, the first state to permit 18-year-olds to vote, became the last 
state to ratify the Twenty-sixth Amendment.   
The 100 days to ratification established a record for swiftest approval of a 
constitutional amendment.1040  President Nixon declared that unprecedented speed 
of the 18-vote’s ratification “’affirms our nation’s confidence in its youth and its 
trust in their responsibility.’”1041  Most state lawmakers, however, were driven by a 
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practical want to have the process completed in plenty of time to accommodate the 
registration of new young voters before the presidential election in November 1972.  
According to David C. Huckabee of the Congressional Research Service, the average 
ratification time, excluding the Twenty-seventh Amendment (which took more than 
202 years), was one year, eight months, and seven days.1042  Had that historical 
standard been maintained, the 11 million newly enfranchised 18-to-20-years would 
have had to wait until 1974 to vote in a federal election and until 1976 to cast their 
first ballot for president.    
On 5 July 1971 – the day America officially observed its 195th birthday – 
Robert L. Kunzig, head of the General Services Administration, certified the 26th 
Amendment as part of the Constitution.  At a ceremony held in the East Room of 
the White House attended by federal officials and nearly 500 members of the 
singing group, Young Americans in Concert, Kunzig presented President Nixon an 
official copy of the amendment.1043  Nixon and a trio of 18-year-olds (Julianne Jones 
of Memphis, Joseph Loyd, Jr. of Detroit, and Paul Larimer of Concord, California) 
chosen by lot from the choir signed as witnesses to Kunzig’s certification, thereby 
making the 18-vote national law.1044  In his prepared remarks, Nixon never 
specifically endorsed the amendment.  Rather, he lauded the potential contributions 
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enfranchised young Americans could make to the nation.  “We can have confidence 
that these young Americans will provide America with what it needs now,” Nixon 
declared, “[They] will infuse into this country some idealism, some courage, some 
stamina, some high moral purpose.”1045  The Census Bureau determined that the 
Twenty-sixth Amendment enfranchised a little over eleven million persons aged 18 
to 21.  Despite optimistic predictions that young people would vote in large 
numbers, however, only 5.3 million of the new electors actually voted in the 1972 
presidential election.1046   
 
The Twenty-sixth Amendment overcame many obstacles before achieving 
passage and ratification.  The youth suffrage issue had been a “perennial political 
lemon” since its introduction during World War II.1047   Going into the 1960s, 
American lawmakers and their constituents appeared patently disinterested in 
reducing franchise ages.  During the postwar era, nearly all the states (except for 
Georgia, Kentucky, Alaska, and Hawaii) had refused to lower voting-age 
requirements, and only once, in 1954, had either house of the U.S. Congress voted 
on a youth suffrage bill.   But during the postwar era, adult advocates for the 18-
vote successfully nudged adolescent enfranchisement from an issue on the outer 
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edges to the margins of political discourse.  Youth suffragists in the 1960s would 
push enfranchisement into the political mainstream, and in doing so, public and 
political support for teen enfranchisement gradually built.   Like Max Frost and his 
troopers, a handful of youth activists reckoned young people could not hope to 
topple “the Establishment” or remake “the System” without voting rights.  A spike 
of intense sociopolitical shocks between summer 1968 and spring 1969 triggered by 
young demonstrators made youth suffrage a legislative priority.  The violent riots of 
the Democratic national convention in Chicago, bellicose antiwar rallies, and 
combative confrontations on university campuses convinced most lawmakers that 
enfranchising adolescents might keep young militants from running wild in the 
streets.   
Paradoxically, the Establishment politicians that young people often rebelled 
against acted responsibly on their behalf.  Influential federal officials championed 
youth suffrage as a political therapeutic to relieve generational tension.  The 
legislative toil of pushing the 18-vote through Congress proved arduous.  The task 
was indirectly aided by liberal Democrats who, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, 
pushed Congress to streamline its institutional operations.  In a political era that 
demanded forceful legislative responses to severe domestic and international crises, 
an energetic, motivated group of junior lawmakers were inspired by the zeitgeist to 
reform congressional practices.  Their actions overcame the procedural 
obstructionism orchestrated by conservative Republicans and southern Democrats 
against civil rights and social welfare legislation.  The cause of youth suffrage most 
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benefitted from a small cast of committed Senators who cleverly steered the 18-vote 
through Congress’s byzantine lawmaking System.   Their labors, prodded by youth 
dissidents and abetted by young lobbyists, produced an enduring electoral reform 
that remains an important political achievement of the long 1960s. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Nature herself has provided the distinction [between rulers and subjects] when she 
made a difference between old and young within the same species, of whom she 
fitted the one to govern and other to be governed.  No one takes offense at being 
governed when he is young, nor does he think himself better than his governors, 
especially if he will enjoy the same privilege when he reaches the required age. 
 
                                                             Aristotle1048 
 
 
Aristotle argued in his seminal treatise The Politics that the political history 
of human beings is the story of an evolution from the rule of a few to the 
government by the many.  Common people gained power, he asserted, because “man 
is by nature a political animal” who positively values, and even enjoys, participation 
in decision-making associations.1049  Aristotle uncovered what he believed to be an 
incontrovertible correlation:   the more democratic the government, the more the 
people possessed decision-making power.  But Aristotle acknowledged that 
democracies could not give every person an equal share in governing the state.  He 
reckoned that “nature herself” conceived age as the most fundamental chain of 
command:   between the old, “whom she fitted. . .to govern,” and the young, “whom 
she fitted. . .to be governed.”   Age was not as onerous in its dimensions of 
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inequality as other restrictions, like race or gender, for all humans, save untimely 
death, will eventually reach majority age.  Nonetheless, age-based prejudices 
constrained the sociopolitical autonomy and agency of all non-adults. 
Control over governmental decision-making processes became the foundation 
for adultocracy, or the rule of adults.  Because adults were presumed to have the 
knowledge and experience seemingly required for self-rule to endure, all western 
democracies vested them with the power to make decisions applicable to all the 
people.  Arguments about which adults comprised “the people” roiled democracies, 
ancient and modern.  Long before the creation of republicanism, adultocracy 
narrowed the connotation of “the people” to mean political people, or those adults 
empowered to act politically through voting, lawmaking, and administrating on 
behalf of the demos.  Certain adults were expected to lead community discussions, 
define civic goals, formulate public policy, and persuade (or coerce) the populace to 
follow along.  The methods for making choices and reaching conclusions varied, but 
democratic states always granted those persons considered adults the privileges of 
voting and office-holding.  Limiting decision-making authority to adults meant that 
the franchise served as a vital reinforcement of their sociopolitical omnipotence.   
Adultocracy framed suffrage battles.  The ancient progenitors of democracy in 
Greece and Rome devised the two major types of restrictions on suffrage:  those 
based on citizenship and those based on competence.  Greco-Roman legalists 
scripted community-based voter qualifications to assure that only those adults who 
had a vested socioeconomic stake in the outcomes of electoral affairs should be 
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allowed to participate in them.  Citizenship requirements also meant that every 
citizen was either a potentially-eligible or legally-enfranchised voter.  Competence-
based restrictions emerged from a common-sense notion that only those people 
deemed mentally proficient should be allowed to serve as electors, jurors, or 
lawmakers.1050  Setting the criteria for determining competency was rooted more in 
stereotype than objective standard.  Among adults in early America, for example, all 
persons not male, property-owning, white, and of European descent were denied 
suffrage for supposedly lacking the cognitive capacities deemed necessary for 
reasoned decision-making.   In the 19th and 20th centuries, political agitation by 
groups of voteless adults eliminated competence-based disfranchisements based on 
sex, class, race, and ethnicity by framing suffrage as an inherent birthright of 
citizenship.  As a result, American conceptions of “the people” expanded to include 
new factions of adult constituents. 
Widening the circle of who could vote proved less complicated than 
determining when a person should be enfranchised.   Across polities that granted 
suffrage, age has been the most universal of all voting qualifications. The “natural” 
hierarchy of age that Aristotle alluded to informed normative expectations 
associated with a particular chronological age.  Age norms structured social 
perceptions of what children, adolescents, adults, and elders should or should not be 
allowed to do – notions often summarized by the dictums “You’re not old enough 
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yet” or “Act your age.”  The cultural construction of age abilities shaped defining the 
temporal thresholds used by parents and the law for bestowing individual 
autonomy, social empowerment, and political enfranchisement to individuals and 
groups.  Age of majority laws codified links between status and entitlements to 
man-made dating schemes founded on chronology.  Not only was age a correlate of 
lawful privileges, legally-defined majority ages served as the prerequisite to acquire 
individual rights.  Simply, a person had to meet certain chronological benchmarks 
as determined by law to officially perform “adult” actions, such as to marry, enter 
contracts, or vote.  The word “majority” held dual political limitations for young 
people.  They were not of sufficient demographic numbers to wrest power from 
adults, and they had not attained the status of having reached full legal age to 
effect change.  Hence, American youth endured an exclusive tyranny of the 
“majority” never suffered by other disfranchised social groups.  
Age-based allocations of suffrage anchored adultocracy.  Regardless of other 
cultural, socioeconomic, or educational disfranchisements, every citizen first had to 
first reach a prescribed age before being considered eligible to cast a ballot officially.  
When to offer those persons considered “adults” the authority to make binding 
decisions for whole societies became a political conundrum.  Bands and tribes never 
set a majority age for voting because they did not tender suffrage; whereas, 
democratic states had to promulgate precise ages because they formally 
enfranchised citizens.  At their genesis, suffrage edicts reflected the band-tribal 
custom of deputizing able constituents to decide upon communal matters.  The size 
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of states, however, made ready assessments of individual competency exceedingly 
complicated.  In promulgating suffrage ages, lawmakers drew upon customs that 
gradually meted the responsibilities of adulthood across adolescent years.  That 
tradition was based upon a presumption that as people aged they became “mature,” 
or more stable, sensible, rational, and wise. To identify potential voters, states 
utilized subjective perceptions of maturity rather than objective measures of ability 
as the sorting mechanism.   Western democracies, sociologist Frank Henderson 
Stewart observes, believe that  
a person should not be given the right to vote until he has 
reached a certain degree of maturity.  We do not believe,  
however, that he suddenly achieves this degree of maturity  
on his eighteenth birthday.  We recognize that age is not  
an exact measure of maturity, but we use it because, in this  
case, it has many practical advantages:  above all, it is a  
measure of maturity that is generally accepted and that is  
cheap and simple to apply.  In both these respects it has the  
advantage over some psychological test.1051 
 
The ancient framers of western suffrage struggled to pinpoint the exact 
temporal moment when persons had chronologically matured enough to impanel 
them as voters.  The necessity of establishing a standard for enfranchisement led 
them to set arbitrary age floors, such as 21 or 18, as the determinants for exercising 
electoral power.  Choosing the precise chronological ages to grant electorship 
reflected, as Aristotle referenced, the supposed “natural” distinctions between 
adults and youth.  To legislators and jurists, the central age difference seemed to be 
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that adolescents were more naïve, impulsive, and unruly than adults.   A common 
understanding of adolescence as a turbulent time of the lifecycle defined by anxiety 
and rebelliousness framed the western system for parceling majority ages over the 
course of the teenage years.   Adult evaluations of electoral competency usually 
relied on some fuzzy combination of personal anecdote and private intuition lashed 
to public perceptions of a riotous adolescence.  This fickle rubric yielded a pastiche 
of voting-age laws that reflected a general adult indifference towards the true or 
known capabilities of young people.  Adolescents might have thought of themselves 
equal in capacity and knowledge to adults, but the law viewed youth as inherently 
inferior in temperament and judgment – the core aptitudes demanded of democratic 
electors.  No empirical evidence could prove conclusively that majority-age persons 
were any more able to cast an unadulterated ballot than teenagers or that 
adolescents were any less cognitively or emotionally fit to vote than enfranchised 
adults.  Yet the determination of a particular franchise age squared with a cultural 
construct that emphasized the perception of maturity over proof of capacity when 
dispensing legal freedoms.  Hence, the promulgation of voting-age statutes framed 
suffrage more as a privilege of adulthood than as a birthright guaranteed by 
government. 
The Twenty-sixth Amendment broadened the scope of electoral adulthood.  It 
confirmed that what passes in the modern American polity as “the people” means 
males and females over the age of eighteen who have also qualified by birth (or 
naturalization) and residence to be participatory political citizens.  In stretching the 
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bounds of who are considered “the people,” the 26th Amendment closed the gap 
between the promise and the actuality of full democratic citizenship for adolescents.  
American youth, like other social groups, overcame daunting political barriers and 
pervasive social obstacles to achieve suffrage.  Though teenagers had made 
distinctive contributions to the development of American institutions and culture, a 
combination of circumstances, customs, and laws hindered their enfranchisement.  
Extending suffrage to young people once seemed dangerously harebrained; by 1970, 
it seemed assuredly democratic and profoundly just.    
The Twenty-sixth Amendment overturned several centuries of Anglo-
American jurisprudence.  Twenty-one was the age fixed by medieval English jurists 
for full majority within the common law, and 21 had been observed informally as 
the chronological benchmark for suffrage.  In 1696, Parliament codified the custom 
by establishing twenty-one as the official age of enfranchisement.  American 
colonies and states maintained the 21-vote until 1943, when Georgia electors, 
spurred by a progressive governor, Ellis Arnall, voted to lower the suffrage age to 
eighteen.  Georgia’s action inspired the federal government to consider fixing 
eighteen as the uniform national voting age.  Proposals to establish an 18-vote 
amendment to the U.S. Constitution became a source of sociopolitical consternation 
for the next three decades.  In 1971, the United States declared that all citizens at 
least 18-years-old could not be denied suffrage.   Today, the overwhelming majority 
of world democracies set eighteen as the minimum voting age. 
The long, strange trip of the Twenty-sixth Amendment exemplifies the 
382 
 
stresses and strains of the political-social dynamic that informs American 
lawmaking.  Only the Twenty-Seventh Amendment has had a longer period of 
gestation from initial introduction in Congress to eventual addition to the 
Constitution.1052  One of the driving forces within modern political historiography is 
an interest in tracing the modifications made to New Deal-style liberal statism 
during the post-World War II period.  The varied scholarship of political scientists 
and historians shows that American democracy cannot be explained by recourse to a 
simple narrative of political events.  Political history is more than what lawmakers 
did and the people endured; it has deep connection to cultural practices.  
Constitutional historians, for example, dispute whether amendments are primarily 
an exercise of legislative or constituent power.  Bruce Ackerman maintains that any 
alteration to the Constitution, particularly amendments, can only be achieved when 
popular will supports the change.1053  Richard B. Bernstein and Jerome Agel hold 
that amending the Constitution also requires a mobilization of political will to 
undertake the arduous Article V process.1054  As Ackerman, Bernstein, and Agel 
allude, scholars must explain both the constitutional arrangements and the cultural 
mores that made political transformation possible (or in some cases impossible) to 
provide a fuller account of postwar political history.   
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The tumult over youth suffrage illuminates the theory of historian Michael 
Zuckerman that there exists a “social context” to American democracy that shapes 
political behavior.1055  The polling on the 18-vote issue followed a postwar political 
trend:  public opinion often tracked ahead of the legislative willingness to act.  
Millions of Americans wanted Congress to do more to broaden the electoral base of 
democracy, but many lawmakers, particularly southern Democrats and 
conservative Republicans, resisted new political initiatives.  Historian John Patrick 
Diggins contends that the conservative coalition foisted upon the postwar era a 
“politics of inertia” defined by “a retrenchment of federal power” and “a rise in local 
state jurisdiction.”1056  Their state-centered view of federalism proscribed any and 
all congressional actions that sought to widen the franchise, including the 
thwarting of an 18-vote constitutional amendment in May 1954. 
The social understanding of adolescence as a time of “storm and stress” 
buttressed the obstructionism of conservative congressmen and other like-minded 
adults.   G. Stanley Hall’s theory of a biologically-deterministic, tumultuous 
adolescence indelibly burned an image of the adolescent as hormonal, emotional, 
and irrational into the American mentalitê.  Postwar social scientists showed 
conclusively that there was no reason to deprive adolescents of consent powers on 
the basis of inferior competence; their research suggested that adolescent reasoning 
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capabilities were not significantly different from that of adults.  Yet, according to a 
1968 Newsweek piece, the 21-vote endured “more because of legal convenience and 
medieval custom than through biological necessity.”1057   The majority of adults 
could not identify G. Stanley Hall or describe his seminal thesis in much detail, but 
they certainly believed “storm-stress” valid.  Their proof was more personal and 
anecdotal:  the moody and mistake-prone teenagers who seemed to laze too much, 
listen too little, and dissent too often within their homes.  Adults also worried that 
“juvenile delinquents,” “beatniks,” and “hippies” were encouraging the “good kids” to 
defy traditional notions of propriety and authority.  Until adolescents could show 
themselves capable of providing a thoughtful and responsible vote, adults would not 
invite youth to join the American electorate. 
In the years between the initial raising and final ratification of the 18-vote 
amendment, the basic arguments for and against youth suffrage stayed remarkably 
consistent.  Adults never seriously considered whether adolescents, as citizens, 
possessed an inherent right to vote; instead, they debated whether teenagers 
possessed the requisite competency to justify enfranchisement.  Advocates of the 18-
vote argued that adolescents deserved suffrage because they had, just like adults, 
ably served the nation as soldiers, taxpayers, and workers.  Opponents of lowering 
the voting age countered that adolescents under age 21 lacked the intellectual or 
emotional maturity to proffer electoral consent sensibly.  Though popular opinion 
polls indicated that Americans accepted the notion of teen voting, most adults, 
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especially federal and state legislators, appeared thoroughly disinterested in 
reducing franchise ages until youth activism shook American society during the 
1960s.  Some adults pointed to the leftist ideology and aggressive tactics of the 
young militants as evidence of a congenital nihilism that made adolescents unfit for 
enfranchisement.  Other adults contended that the radical fringe should not deprive 
the majority of America’s responsible young people from voting.  They argued that 
expressing discontent with continued adult tolerance for bigotry, conformity, and 
the military-industrial complex evidenced an analytical maturity among youth; 
hence, exercising the rights to petition and assemble for a redress of grievances 
showed adolescents were savvy enough to proffer electoral consent.  By 1970, the 
18-vote became a national legislative priority.  Most congressmen eventually 
reckoned that suffrage could restore social order by giving talented and energetic 
young people what they demanded:  a real, consequential stake in the political fate 
of the nation.   As Senator Richard Schweiker (R-PA) asserted:  “the primary reason 
for endorsing the 18-year-old vote is on the merits.  Our young people have 
continually demonstrated the political awareness, the public concern, the desire to 
participate in our process, and the capability of exercising responsible judgment, 
sufficiently to have earned the right to vote.”1058 
Several immediate outcomes of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment can be readily 
observed.  Constitutionally, it settled the question of whether or not Congress could 
determine voter qualifications in federal, state, and local elections. A key reason 
                                                          
1058 Congressional Record 117 (11 February 1971):  2612. 
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some congressmen ratified the amendment was to satisfy a legal problem:  the dual-
age voting system created by the Oregon v. Mitchell ruling.  Legally, the 
amendment spurred many states to lower the basic age of majority from age 
twenty-one to eighteen.  States rationalized that if Congress accorded 18-year-olds 
greater authority to give consent, then state laws should be changed to allow them 
greater authority to make binding decisions on matters involving their personal 
welfare and legal condition.  Additionally, state lawmakers worried that 
maintaining variant ages of majority (for example, those statutes allowing different 
marriage ages based on sex) would lead to a myriad of constitutional challenges.  
Some states lowered the general age of majority but retained higher minimum age 
requirements for particular acts, especially the purchase of alcohol.       
Politically, the establishment of the 18-vote achieved both the inclusion and 
the quieting of American youth.  Lowering the voting age satisfied youth demands 
for full democratic participation.  Enfranchisement also granted young activists an 
opportunity to change the political status quo through electoral pressure.  Young 
politicos, however, could not take advantage because they lacked the consistency of 
organization and leadership common to other minority groups because of aging.  As 
the former firebrands grew older, the protests, movements, and identity politics 
that defined ‘60s social activism were not sustained by the ensuing cohort of youth:  
Generation X.  It lacked the rich, highly-charged formative experiences of Vietnam, 
Selma, or Chicago.  The tangible risks of military conscription, the denial of 
freedom, or violent physical harm never deeply threatened Gen Xers.  Nor did they 
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show any interest in ideological engagement; they preferred embarking on quests of 
personal fulfillment to contemplating the deep existentialism of liberal 
humanism.1059   Those young people who tried to retain the activist spirit of the ‘60s 
discovered that a ballot afforded youth no special political standing.  Competing 
against other groups for influence and working the process for results did not 
appear as politically gainful, or as culturally sexy, as the renegade agitation of 
oppositional activism.  Adult anxiety about what adolescents would do with their 
votes was proven misplaced; youth predictions of transforming the system from 
within proved false. Having reckoned the suffrage mission accomplished, 
Generation X felt secure in its civil rights and political equality.  Hence, the 
sociopolitical activism that had defined the protests of the 1960s culminated with 
the ratification of the Twenty-sixth Amendment.  
Enfranchisement entailed a responsibility to exercise the privilege, and, in 
that regard, youth voter turnout rates have generally disappointed.  Prior to the 
1972 election, the Census Bureau estimated that the vast majority of 18-to-21-year-
old voters would cast their first ballot, but less than 50% of newly-enfranchised 
youths actually voted.1060  Since 1972, young Americans have never been the crucial 
constituency in any election.   In marketing, media, fashion, and technology, 
adolescents have been an earth-shattering demographic.  But youth have not been 
                                                          
1059 For additional information regarding their political views, see Stephen C. Craig and 
Stephen Earl Bennett, eds., After the Boom: The Politics of Generation X, (Lanham, MD:  Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1997). 
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all that consequential as voters; in all elections since ratification of the 26th 
Amendment, young people consistently vote at lower rates of participation than 
older voters.  The general lack of electoral interest among American youth has 
puzzled pundits and politicians.  Well-publicized civic programs to register new 
young voters, especially the continuing efforts of MTV’s “Rock the Vote,” seemed to 
awaken youth to the importance to voting every presidential election cycle.  As the 
United States entered the 2000s, those endeavors did not spur widespread or 
continuous execution of the franchise among adolescent voters.  
The first three presidential elections of the new millennium rejuvenated 
youth electors.  The controversial circumstances of George W. Bush’s electoral 
victory in 2000 reminded young Americans of an important civics lesson:  every vote 
counts, including theirs.  During Bush’s first term, his decision to fight Iraq on the 
shaky grounds that Saddam Hussein was building weapons of mass destruction and 
supporting terrorism and his conservative positions on abortion, stem cell research, 
and homosexuality riled left-leaning youths.  In 2004, they rallied behind Democrat 
John Kerry, but his candidacy was undone by the unsupported claims of a well-
funded right-wing group that Kerry had lied about his service in Vietnam.  In 2008, 
young people flocked to the campaign of Barack Obama.  He ran for president as a 
fresh-faced alternative to the Washington status quo.  He pitched himself as a 
candidate who would bring the nation together after eight years of bitter 
divisiveness.  Obama electrified Democratic audiences with his call for “hope” and 
“change,” and he ran his campaign around the vague but appealing slogan, “Change 
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We Can Believe In.”  Obama’s campaign events drew enormous crowds.  His 
supporters, who were younger and more racially diverse than the population as a 
whole, were highly motivated.  Obama won the election with a clear majority of the 
electorate, and a handful of commentators gushed that his triumph heralded a 
political watershed:  the passage of governmental power from the graying Baby 
Boomers to the youthful Millennials.   
Political observers pointed to the success of Obama’s massive youth-get-out-
the-vote operation as key to his victory.  Labeled the “Millennial Tidal Wave” or the 
“Youthquake,” young people accounted for 23 million votes in 2008 (or 18% of the 
aggregated total) – and increase of 2 million as compared to the 2004 election.  
Nearly 55% of all eligible voters between ages 18 and 29 cast ballots, which 
represented the highest turnout among youth since 1972, and they overwhelmingly 
supported the 47-year-old Obama (68%) over his 72-year-old Republican opponent, 
John McCain (32%).1061  The prospect of a rush of liberal-leaning young people into 
mainstream politics startled conservatives.  They worried that the demography 
behind Obama’s youth-fired conquest might relegate the Republican Party to 
permanent minority status. After the election, the GOP made a concerted effort to 
stem the seemingly-imminent progressive swell by moderating some of its social 
policy positions and by broadening its youth recruitment programs.  Conservative 
commentators recommended a more blunt approach.  Near the fall 2010 mid-term 
                                                          
1061 See Amanda Ruggeri, “Young Voters Powered Obama’s Victory While Shrugging Off 
Slacker Image,” USA Today, 6 November 2008, 1 and 2 and Scott Keeter and Juliana Horowitz, 
“Young Voters in the 2008 Election,” Pew Research Center, 13 November 2008, accessed 30 
November 2008, http://www.pewresearch.org/2008/11/13/young-voters-in-the-2008-election.  
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elections, analyst Ann Coulter proposed a repeal of the Twenty-sixth Amendment.  
Coulter based her pitch on her observation that young people are not as politically 
serious as adults.  Her proof:  the 2008 election of Obama, which Coulter blamed on 
youths who lacked “fully functional brains.”1062  The public, outside the conservative 
blogosphere, responded to her call with a collective yawn. 
Whether Obama’s 2008 victory was the result of a generational shift toward 
an era of liberal governance or represented a quirk of political circumstances 
remains to be seen.  Conservative hyperventilating about 2008 notwithstanding, the 
Twenty-sixth Amendment has had negligible electoral impact since its 
promulgation.  That historical trend can be partly explained by consistently low 
turnout among young voters.  It can also be further clarified by the incomplete 
enfranchisement the amendment offered.  While the 26th guaranteed Americans at 
least 18-years-old the privilege of suffrage, it did not concurrently lower the 
constitutional ages for holding political office:  25 for representatives, 30 for 
senators, and 35 for presidents.  Young people between ages eighteen and twenty-
four remain the only voter group that cannot elect members of their constituency to 
serve as federal congresspersons.  The rules and regulations regarding 
enfranchisement stemmed from an ethos that declaimed citizenry as shareholding 
in the political community and voting as the essential act of citizenship.  The sense 
of equality bore by the status “of majority age” engendered a belief among 
adolescents that they were equal in capacity, aptitude, and worth to adults, and, 
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therefore, entitled to the full entitlements of adulthood.  But the adult lawmakers 
who authored the Twenty-sixth Amendment never considered making teenagers full 
governing partners.  They recognized in youth an ability to vote maturely but did 
not believe young people had the capacity to govern wisely.  By not specifically 
granting persons aged 18 to 24 the privilege of office-holding in its language, the 
26th Amendment provided adolescents electoral parity, but not full political 
equality, with adults.  Incomplete enfranchisement might explain why many young 
people do not see voting as a tool to change the political system and why youth 
suffrage did not loosen the grip of adultocracy.  
Although the Twenty-sixth Amendment failed to become the springboard for 
political transformation as its devotees predicted, it registered significant legal 
impact.  The amendment clarified age eighteen as the formal commencement of 
adulthood.  Throughout the 1970s, state governments responded by recalibrating 
their ages of majority at eighteen to correlate with the federal standard.  Like the 
Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments, the Twenty-sixth did not shake the 
fundamentals of social stratification, redefine social relationships, or improve social 
rank for the newly enfranchised.  Nevertheless, the clear public acknowledgement 
of adolescents as persons equally capable to give consent as adults certainly revised 
their legal identity and condition.  The Twenty-sixth Amendment indirectly granted 
to teenagers a degree of legal self-determination unknown to previous generations 
of adolescents.  It also unambiguously guaranteed to persons at least eighteen 
years-of-age the rights and privileges of citizenship free from competency-based 
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assessments.  Resetting the legal threshold of adulthood from 21 to 18 spawned a 
reconsideration of whether persons in their mid-teens could be considered mature 
enough to make autonomous decisions – a notion that has informed recent attempts 
to extend suffrage downward to 16- and 15-year-olds in Great Britain, Australia, 
and several municipalities in the United States.  Such efforts signify that 
adolescence is no longer viewed as a period of crisis that threatens social order or 
adult-centric age norms.   That adolescence can be wholly defined by the “storms 
and stresses” of the biological changes related to sexual maturation seems quaint.   
Whether contemporary teenagers should be assigned their sociopolitical status 
based on ascription or ability remains a civic question because of the Twenty-sixth 
Amendment.   
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